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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OFTHE

STATE OF IDAHO
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Vs.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW;GILBERT KING,As Trustee of
the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO
FALLS, INC.; THE ESTATE OF GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants/Respondents,
GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ROSE M. KING, as
Beneficiary of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
Counterclaimants,
Vs.
JOHN E. RUQUAY; CLINTON WARD FUQUAY and
HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY
Counterdefendants,
Appealed from the District of the Third Judicial District
for the State of Idaho, in and for Owyhee County

Honorable THOMAS J. RYAN, District Judge

Matthew R. Cleverly
Fidelity National Law Group
1200-6th Ave, Ste 620 Seattle, WA 98101

Attorney for Appellants
Ronald Rainey
110 N. Ninth St. Caldwell, ID 83707
S. Bryce Farris
1101 W. River St. Ste. 110 Boise, ID 83707

Attorney for State Of Idaho
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Date: 6/21/2016

Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County

Time: 03:00 PM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 11

User: RFAHEY

Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal.

Date

Code

User

8/11/2014

NCOC

TRINA

New Case Filed - Other Claims

TRINA

Christopher S. Nye
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F and
H(1) Paid by: Matthew R. Cleverley, Attorney
Receipt number: 0002703 Dated: 8/11/2014
Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: Fuquay, Hailey
Rose (plaintiff), Fuquay, John E. (plaintiff) and
Ward, Clinton (plaintiff)

COMP

TRINA

Complaint Filed ( Prescriptive Easement)

Christopher S. Nye

SMIS

TRINA

Summons lssued/6

Christopher S. Nye

APER

TRINA

Plaintiff: Fuquay, Clinton Ward Appearance
Matthew R. Cleverley

Christopher S. Nye

APER

TRINA

Plaintiff: Fuquay, Hailey Rose Appearance
Matthew R. Cleverley

Christopher S. Nye

APER

TRINA

Plaintiff: Fuquay, John E. Appearance Matthew R. Christopher S. Nye
Cleverley

TRINA

Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Christopher S. Nye
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by:
Cheri Draper, Hawley Troxell Receipt number:
0002797 Dated: 8/18/2014 Amount: $53.00
(Credit card)

TRINA

Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC
Paid by: Cheri Draper, Hawley Troxell Receipt
number: 0002797 Dated: 8/18/2014 Amount:
$3.00 (Credit card)

Christopher S. Nye

8/18/2014

Judge
Christopher S. Nye

8/27/2014

FSTC

TRINA

File Sent To Caldwell basket

Christopher S. Nye

9/4/2014

MISC

TRINA

Exparte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Motion for Telephonic Hearing Appearance

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Declaration of Raymond Jayo in Support of
Christopher S. Nye
Exparte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

MISC

TRINA

Declaration of John Fuquay in Support of Exparte Christopher S. Nye
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

MISC

TRINA

Declaration of Matthew Cleverley in Support of
Exparte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Christopher S. Nye

ORDR

TRINA

Order On Motion for Telephonic Hearing
Appearance

Christopher S. Nye

ORDR

TRINA

Order Granting Motion for Restaining Order and Christopher S. Nye
Setting Date for Hearing on Preliminary Injunction

HRSC

TRINA

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
09/18/2014 01 :30 PM) for temporary restraining
order

Christopher S. Nye

NOAP

TRINA

Notice Of Appearance

Christopher S. Nye

APER

TRINA

Defendant: King, Gordon G. Appearance Ronald
P. Rainey

Christopher S. Nye

APER

TRINA

Defendant: King, Rose M. Appearance Ronald P. Christopher S. Nye
Rainey

9/5/2014

9/8/2014
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Christopher S. Nye

9/8/2014

TRINA

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Ronald
Rainey Receipt number: 0003053 Dated:
9/8/2014 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: King,
Gordon G. (defendant) and King, Rose M.
(defendant)

9/9/2014

TRINA

Christopher S. Nye
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Sawtooth
Law Office, PLLC Receipt number: 0003076
Dated: 9/9/2014 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For:
Low, Cal (defendant) and Low, Susie (defendant)

APER

TRINA

Defendant: Low, Susie Appearance Bryce S
Farris

RTSR

CINDYH

Return Of Service/ Served First American Title on Christopher S. Nye
8/29/2014

MEFD

CINDYH

Murphy Envelope - Filing Of This Date

Christopher S. Nye

RTSR

CINDYH

Return Of Service/served Cal Low

Christopher S. Nye

MEFD

CINDYH

Murphy Envelope - Filing Of This Date

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Answer and Counterclaims by Defendants
Trustees for the Heart King Ranch Trust UTA
December 28, 2012

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Declaration of Mail Person in Support of
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Ex-Parte
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Christopher S. Nye

AFFD

TRINA

Affidavit of Gilbert King

Christopher S. Nye

AFFD

TRINA

Affidavit of Rose King

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Declaration of Denice Collett in Support of
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Ex Parte
Restraining Order

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Objection to Ex Parte Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order

Christopher S. Nye

NOTC

TRINA

Notice of Intent to Cross Examine and Produce
Witnesses

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Defendants' Counterclaimants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request for Temporary
Restaining Order

Christopher S. Nye

AFFD

TRINA

Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey

Christopher S. Nye

ORDR

LENA

Amended Order Requiring All Attorneys to Appear Christopher S. Nye
in Person for the Hearing Scheduled September
18,2014

ORDR

TRINA

Order on Motion to Deposit Funds into the Court
Registry

Christopher S. Nye

HRSC

TRINA

Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Conference
09/18/2014 01:30 PM) telephonic-recorded in
Murphy

Christopher S. Nye

MOTN

TRINA

Motion to Deposit Funds Into the Court Registry

Christopher S. Nye

9/10/2014

9/12/2014

Christopher S. Nye
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9/12/2014

BNDC

TRINA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3131 Dated
9/12/2014 for 1000.00)

Christopher S. Nye

9/15/2014

MISC

TRINA

Return of Service - 2

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Declaration of Schwann Delivery Person

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Response and Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction

Christopher S. Nye

AFFD

TRINA

Affidavit of Susie Low

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Defendants'/Counterclaimants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request for Preliminary
Injunction

Christopher S. Nye

PRSV

CINDYH

Personal Return Of Service/S. Low served
9/3/2014

Christopher S. Nye

PRSV

CINDYH

Personal Return Of Service - R. King served
8/28/2014

Christopher S. Nye

MEFD

CINDYH

Murphy Envelope - Filings Of This Date

Christopher S. Nye

ANSW

LENA

Answer of Defendants Susie and Cal Low and
Counterclaim

Christopher S. Nye

NOSV

LENA

Notice Of Service

Christopher S. Nye

MEMO

LENA

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Preliminary Injunction

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Declaration of Scott Snyder

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Return of Service - Susie Low

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Return of Service - Rose M. King

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Declaration of Scott Snyder

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Declaration of Seth Thomas

Christopher S. Nye

DCHH

TRINA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Christopher S. Nye
09/18/2014 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber - held in Caldwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

ORDR

TRINA

Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Christopher S. Nye
Injunction

ORDR

TRINA

Order to File Stipulated Trial Dates

Christopher S. Nye

10/10/2014

MOTN

TRINA

Motion To Quash Subpoena and Motion for
Protective Order

Christopher S. Nye

10/14/2014

FSTC

TRINA

File Sent withJudge Grober to Nampa Court for
Caldwell to pick up

Christopher S. Nye

10/15/2014

NOTC

TRINA

Notice of Hearing

Christopher S. Nye

10/16/2014

NOTC

TRINA

Notice of Non-Opposition to Subpoena
Concerning ITD Records

Christopher S. Nye

HRSC

TRINA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/20/2014 09:00
AM) Plaintiffs Motion to Quash Subpoena and
Motion for Protective Order

Christopher S. Nye

9/16/2014

9/17/2014

9/18/2014

9/29/2014

Judge
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10/20/2014

MOTN

TRINA

Motion for Default

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Declaration of Matthew Cleverley in Support of
Motion for Default

Christopher S. Nye

10/23/2014

MISC

TRINA

Reporters Transcript

Christopher S. Nye

10/28/2014

NOTC

TRINA

Notice of Compliance- Defendant Rose Kings
First Responses to Plaintiffs First Interrogatories
and Requests for Productions

Christopher S. Nye

NOTC

TRINA

Notice of Compliance- Defendant Gilbert King's
First Responses to Plaintiffs First Interrogatories
and Requests for Production

Christopher S. Nye

ORDR

TRINA

Order of Default

Christopher S. Nye

MOTN

TRINA

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
against Susie Low and Cal Low

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Declarations of Matthew Cleverley

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Declarations of John Fuquay

Christopher S. Nye

10/30/2014

HRSC

TRINA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 12/23/2014 10:30 AM)

Christopher S. Nye

12/8/2014

ORDR

TRINA

Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

TRINA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/28/2015 09:00 Thomas J. Ryan
AM) 3-day trial setting

HRSC

TRINA

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
03/27/2015 10:30 AM)

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

TRINA

Response and Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment

Christopher S. Nye

AFFD

TRINA

Affidavit of Rose King

Christopher S. Nye

AFFD

TRINA

Affidavit of Samuel V.C.Steiner

Christopher S. Nye

AFFD

TRINA

Affidavit of S. Bryce Farris

Christopher S. Nye

MISC

TRINA

Withdrawal of Motion for Summary Judgment
Against Lows

Christopher S. Nye

HRVC

TRINA

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Christopher S. Nye
scheduled on 12/23/2014 10:30 AM: Hearing
Vacated MSJ/Lows

1/15/2015

NOTC

TRINA

Notice of Service -Defendants Susie and Cal
Christopher S. Nye
Law's Responses to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories
and Request for Production of Documents to
Susie Low and Cal Low

1/23/2015

MISC

TRINA

Amended Order Setting Case for Trial and
Pretrial

Christopher S. Nye

HRVC

TRINA

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
04/28/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 3-day
trial setting

Thomas J. Ryan

HRVC

TRINA

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 03/27/2015 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Thomas J. Ryan

10/29/2014

12/9/2014

12/17/2014

Judge
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1/23/2015

HRSC

TRINA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/15/2015 09:00 Thomas J. Ryan
AM) 4-day trial setting

HRSC

TRINA

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
04/24/2015 10:30 AM)

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

TRINA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/27/2015 10:30
AM) Motion to Amend Complaint

Thomas J. Ryan

1/26/2015

CHJG

TRINA

Change Assigned Judge (batch process)

1/28/2015

MISC

TRINA

Plaintiffs Motion For Leave to File Amended
Complaint

1/29/2015

MOSJ

LENA

Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion For Summary Thomas J. Ryan
Judgment

NOHG

LENA

Notice Of Hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

MEMO

LENA

Defendant Heart K Ranch's Memorandum in
Support of Notion for Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

AFFD

LENA

Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey

Thomas J. Ryan

AFFD

LENA

Affidavit of Rose King in Support of the Defendant Thomas J. Ryan
Heart K Ranch's Motion for Summary Judgment

AFFD

LENA

Affidavit of Gilbert King in Support of the
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion for Summary
Judgment

HRSC

LENA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Thomas J. Ryan
Judgment 02/27/2015 10:30 AM) Heart K Ranch

2/9/2015

MISC

TRINA

Heart King Ranch Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint

Thomas J. Ryan

2/10/2015

RSPN

LENA

Defendant Lows' Response and Objection to
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint

Thomas J. Ryan

RSPN

LENA

Defendant Lows' Response to Kings' Motion for
Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

2/12/2015

MISC

TRINA

Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to
File Amended Complaint

Thomas J. Ryan

2/13/2015

MISC

TRINA

Plaintiffs Response to Heart K. Ranch's MSJ

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

TRINA

Compilation of Testimony

Thomas J. Ryan

2/19/2015

MISC

TRINA

Reply Memorandum in Support Defendant Heart
K Ranch's Motion for Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

2/27/2015

DCHH

TRINA

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan
scheduled on 02/27/2015 10:30 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Heart K Ranch

DCHH

TRINA

Thomas J. Ryan
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
02/27/2015 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Motion to Amend Complaint

Judge

Thomas J. Ryan

Thomas J. Ryan
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3/10/2015

NOHG

DORLA

Notice Of Hearing 3/17/15@ 11 :00 a.m. In
chambers.

Thomas J. Ryan

3/17/2015

MISC

LENA

Clarification of Oral Ruling Re: Motion to Amend
Complaint

Thomas J. Ryan

3/25/2015

MEMO

DORLA

Memorandum Decision upon King defendants'
motion for summary judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

ORDR

DORLA

Order referring case for mediation

Thomas J. Ryan

3/30/2015

AMCO

DORLA

Amended Complaint Filed/First amended

Thomas J. Ryan

3/31/2015

MEDI

DORLA

Mediation Ordered

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

DORLA

Hearing Scheduled (Mediation 04/30/2015 01:00 Thomas J. Ryan
PM)

ORDR

DORLA

Order vacating and rescheduling pretrial
conference

Thomas J. Ryan

HRVC

DORLA

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 04/24/2015 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

DORLA

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
05/22/2015 10:30 AM)

Thomas J. Ryan

NOTC

DORLA

Notice of service of second set of interrogatories, Thomas J. Ryan
requests for production of documents and request
for admission to defendant owyhee county

MOTN

DORLA

Thomas J. Ryan
Motion/King Defendant's motion for
reconsideration under rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of decision
denying motion for summary judgment

AFFD

DORLA

Affidavit in support of motion for reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

CONT

DORLA

Continued (Mediation 04/29/2015 01 :00 PM)

Stephen S. Dunn

MISC

DORLA

Amended notice of hearing, re:Mediation

Thomas J. Ryan

MEMO

LENA

Memorandum in Support of King Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration Under Rule 11(a)
(2)(8) of Decision Denying Motion for Summary
Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

MEMO

LENA

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion in Thomas J. Ryan
Limine

MOTN

LENA

Defendant's Motion in Limine

Thomas J. Ryan

AFFD

DORLA

Affidavit of service; letter, depositiopn subpoena

Thomas J. Ryan

ORDR

DORLA

Order SETTING case for hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

DORLA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine
05/14/2015 02:30 AM)

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

DORLA

Plaintiff response to King's motion in limine

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

DORLA

Plaintiffs' response to Kings motion for
reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

MOTN

DORLA

Motion to vacate trial setting and reset

Thomas J. Ryan

AFFD

DORLA

Affidavit of Ronald Rainey in support of motion to Thomas J. Ryan
vacate

4/6/2015

4/7/2015

4/13/2015

4/20/2015

4/28/2015

5/7/2015

Judge
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5/7/2015

MISC

DORLA

Plaintiffs' response to King's motion to continue
trial date

Thomas J. Ryan

NOTC

DORLA

Notice of hearing on motion

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

DORLA

Hearing Scheduled (Mediation 05/14/2015 02:30 Thomas J. Ryan
PM)

MEMO

DORLA

Memorandum/Reply memorandum in support of Thomas J. Ryan
King defendants' motion for reconsiteration under
Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of decision denying motion for
summary juddgment

CONT

DORLA

Continued (Motion in Limine 05/14/2015 02:30
PM)

LENA

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Thomas J. Ryan
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
Gil/Angelia King Receipt number: 0005455
Dated: 5/12/2015 Amount: $48.00 (Check)

5/11/2015

5/12/2015

Judge

Thomas J. Ryan

5/14/2015

HRHD

DORLA

Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on Thomas J. Ryan
05/14/2015 02:30 PM: Hearing Held

5/15/2015

HRSC

DORLA

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 10/26/2015
09:00 AM)

Thomas J. Ryan

ORDR

DORLA

Order vacating and rescheduling court trial

Thomas J. Ryan

HRVC

DORLA

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
06/15/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4-day
trial setting

Thomas J. Ryan

HRVC

DORLA

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 05/22/2015 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Thomas J. Ryan

HRHD

DORLA

Hearing result for Mediation scheduled on
05/14/2015 02:30 PM: Hearing Held

Thomas J. Ryan

HRVC

DORLA

Hearing result for Mediation scheduled on
04/29/2015 01 :00 PM: Hearing Vacated

Stephen S. Dunn

HRHD

DORLA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
10/20/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Held Plaintiffs
Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for
Protective Order

Christopher S. Nye

HRSC

DORLA

Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/28/2015 10:30

Thomas J. Ryan

AM)
5/21/2015

6/16/2015

MISC

DORLA

Declaration of Matthew Cleverley

Thomas J. Ryan

MOTN

DORLA

Plaintiffs Motion for summary judgment against
Susie Low and Cal Law's conterclaims

Thomas J. Ryan

NOTC

DORLA

Notice of hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

DORLA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 06/26/2015 01 :00 PM) Plaintiffs
motion

Thomas J. Ryan

NOTC

DORLA

Amended as to time only. Notice of hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

DORLA

Resonnse and objection to plaintiffs motion for
sumary judgment agains Susi and Cal Law's
counterclaims

Thomas J. Ryan
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6/16/2015

AFFD

DORLA

Affidavit of Steve Murdock

Thomas J. Ryan

AFFD

DORLA

Affidavit of Cal Low

Thomas J. Ryan

6/17/2015

REPL

DORLA

Reply/Plaintiff, in support of motionf for summary Thomas J. Ryan
judgment against Susie and Cal Low's
counterclaims

6/19/2015

MEMO

DORLA

Memorandum Decision upon King Defendatnts'
motion for reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

6/26/2015

FSTC

DORLA

File Sent To Caldwell

Thomas J. Ryan

DCHH

DORLA

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan
scheduled on 06/26/2015 01 :00 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Plaintiff's motion

MOTN

LENA

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the
Thomas J. Ryan
Court's June 19, 2015 Memorandum Decision on
King's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Request for Reconsideration

MISC

LENA

Deposition of Rose King

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

LENA

Deposition of Gilbert King

Thomas J. Ryan

7/8/2015

JDMT

DORLA

Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

7/15/2015

TRAN

LENA

Transcript Filed/May 14, 2015

Thomas J. Ryan

MEMO

LENA

Susie and Cal Lowe's Memorandum in Support of Thomas J. Ryan
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

MOSJ

LENA

Motion For Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

NOHG

LENA

Notice Of Hearing Re: Susie and Cal Lowe's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

LENA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Thomas J. Ryan
Judgment 08/20/2015 02:00 PM)

7/22/2015

NOHG

DORLA

Notice Of Hearing motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan
and request for reconsideration

8/4/2015

MEMO

DORLA

Memorandum/King Defendants' memorandum in Thomas J. Ryan
opposition to the Fuquay Plaintiff's Motion for
reconsideration

NOHG

DORLA

Notice Of Hearing

MEMO

DORLA

Memorandum/King Defemndant's memorandum Thomas J. Ryan
in Support of motion to strike the Fuquay plaintiffs'
motion for consideration

MOTN

DORLA

Motion/KingDefendant's motion to strike the
Fuquay Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

DORLA

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
08/20/2015 02:00 PM)

Thomas J. Ryan

NOHG

DORLA

Notice Of Hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

7/6/2015

8/12/2015

Judge

Thomas J. Ryan
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8/12/2015

MOTN

DORLA

Motion/Plaintiffs' motion to allow late filed
declaration in support of motion for
reconsideration

MOTN

DORLA

Motion/Plaintiffs' motion to shorten time for
Thomas J. Ryan
hearing on motion to allow late filed declaration in
support of motion for reconsideration

MISC

DORLA

Declaration of Matthew Cleverley

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

DORLA

Plaintiffs' response to King's motion to strike
deposition submissions

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

DORLA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/20/2015 02:00
PM) Plaintiffs motions

Thomas J. Ryan

REPL

DORLA

Reply/Plaintiffs' reply in support of motion for
reconsideration of the court's June 19, 2015
memorandum decision of King's motion for
summary judgment and request for
reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

MEMO

DORLA

Memorandum/The King Defendants' reply
memorandum on their motion to strike the
Fuquay Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

DORLA

Susie and Cal Law's reply in support of miotion
for partial summary judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

DCHH

RFAHEY

Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment scheduled on 08/20/2015 02:00 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

Thomas J. Ryan

DCHH

RFAHEY

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Thomas J. Ryan
on 08/20/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

DCHH

RFAHEY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Thomas J. Ryan
08/20/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel1
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Plaintiffs motions

HRSC

RFAHEY

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
09/25/2015 10:30 AM)

Thomas J. Ryan

CONT

RFAHEY

Hearing result for Status scheduled on
08/28/2015 10:30 AM: Continued

Thomas J. Ryan

8/25/2015

MEMO

RFAHEY

Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion
For Summary Judgment Against Susie Low and
Cal Low's Counterclaims

Thomas J. Ryan

9/11/2015

MEMO

RFAHEY

Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion
For Reconsideration Filed July 6,2015

Thomas J. Ryan

9/16/2015

MEMO

RFAHEY

Memorandum of Costs

Thomas J. Ryan

8/17/2015

8/21/2015

Judge
Thomas J. Ryan
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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County

Time: 03:00 PM

ROA Report

Page 10 of 11

User: RFAHEY

Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal.

Date

Code

User

9/21/2015

MEMO

RFAHEY

Memorandum Decision Upon Low Defendants'
Motion For Summary Judgment

9/25/2015

DCHH

RFAHEY

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
Thomas J. Ryan
on 09/25/2015 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter:laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

HRHD

RFAHEY

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
on 09/25/2015 10:30 AM: Hearing Held

Thomas J. Ryan

10/2/2015

HRVC

RFAHEY

Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on
10/26/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Thomas J. Ryan

10/6/2015

ORDR

RFAHEY

Order on Low Defendants' Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

10/13/2015

STIP

RFAHEY

Stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment on King's
Counterclaims

Thomas J. Ryan

10/21/2015

NOTA

RFAHEY
RFAHEY

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Thomas J. Ryan

Judge
Thomas J. Ryan

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Thomas J. Ryan
Supreme Court Paid by: Cleverley, Matthew R
(attorney for Fuquay, Clinton Ward) Receipt
number: 0007098 Dated: 10/21/2015 Amount:
$129.00 (Check) For: Fuquay, Clinton Ward
{plaintiff), Fuquay, Hailey Rose {plaintiff) and
Fuquay, John E. (plaintiff)

RFAHEY

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Thomas J. Ryan
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
Matthew Cleverley Receipt number: 0007099
Dated: 10/21/2015 Amount: $100.00 (Check)

12/21/2015

JDMT

RFAHEY

Judgment - Final Entered RE: counterclaims
against Plaintiffs

Thomas J. Ryan

1/6/2016

NOTA
REQU
ORDR

RFAHEY
RFAHEY
RFAHEY

NOTICE OF APPEAL-AMENDED

Thomas J. Ryan

Request For Status Conference

Thomas J. Ryan

Order Setting Case For Telephonic Status
Conference

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

RFAHEY

Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/26/2016 11 :00
AM) Telephonic

Thomas J. Ryan

2/22/2016

MISC

RFAHEY

Order Granting Motion To dismiss Appeal From
Supreme Court

Thomas J. Ryan

3/10/2016

MEMO

RFAHEY

Kings' Memorandum In Support Of Proposed
Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

3/14/2016

MEMO

RFAHEY

Plaintiffs' Memorandum Regarding Entry Of Final Thomas J. Ryan
Judgment On Kings' Counterclaims

3/24/2016

REMT

RFAHEY

Remittitur

Thomas J. Ryan

3/29/2016

FJDE

RFAHEY

Amended Final Judgement, Order Or Decree
Entered

Thomas J. Ryan

2/16/2016
2/19/2016
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Time: 03:00 PM
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User: RFAHEY

Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal.

Date

Code

User

3/29/2016

MEMO

RFAHEY

Memorandum Decision Upon Request For Final
Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

REMT

RFAHEY

Remittitur

Thomas J. Ryan

CDIS

RFAHEY

Civil Disposition entered for: Fuquay, Clinton
Ward, Plaintiff; Fuquay, Hailey Rose, Plaintiff;
Fuquay, John E., Plaintiff. Filing date: 3/29/2016

Thomas J. Ryan

STAT

RFAHEY

STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

Thomas J. Ryan

JDMT

RFAHEY

Judgment - Final Entered

Thomas J. Ryan

4/19/2016

BNDT

RFAHEY

Bond Transferred To County: (Transaction
number 67 dated 4/19/2016 amount 1,000.00)

Thomas J. Ryan

5/2/2016

NOTA

RFAHEY

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Thomas J. Ryan

RFAHEY

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Thomas J. Ryan
Supreme Court Paid by: Cleverley, Matthew R.
(attorney for Fuquay, John E.) Receipt number:
0001083 Dated: 5/2/2016 Amount: $129.00
(Check) For: Fuquay, Clinton Ward {plaintiff)

RFAHEY

Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid
by: Fuquay, Clinton Ward Receipt number:
0001084 Dated: 5/2/2016 Amount: $100.00
(Check)

Judge

Thomas J. Ryan
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 - 61h A venue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

---

P.M.

AUG 11 2014
AN~~~ERK
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
V.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No.

{!t)//1/ JtJ~ 1f

COMPLAINT
(Prescriptive Easement)

Fee: $221.00

Defendants.

NATURE OF THIS PROCEEDING
1. This is an action for a declaratory judgment to establish an easement to the real properties
owned by 1) John E. Fuquay and 2) Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay. The
Properties are accessed via a private roadway commonly known as King Lane.
2. Some of the Defendants own or have an interest in the parcels of property that are
burdened by King Lane. Others may be burdened by the roadway, depending on the
specific location of the roadway, if there is a dispute as to its actual location on the

COMPLAINT- I

ASSIGNED JUDGE
CHRIS10PHER S. NYE

FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200-6rn AVENUE, SUITE 620
SEATTLE,\VA 98101

{206) 223-4525
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I.

ground.

Those Defendants whose property is determined not to be burdened by the

roadway or any easement will be dismissed from this action.
3. This action does not seek any monetary damages or to change any property boundaries. It
seeks only to confirm that the Plaintiffs have the right to access their properties over King
Lane.
PARTIES

4. The properties at issue are located east of the city of Oreana, Idaho in Owyhee County.
5. A street map showing the general location of the area is attached as Exhibit "A." An aerial
map showing the Owyhee County Assessor's lot boundaries is attached as Exhibit "B." A
Google Earth map showing an aerial view and general road boundaries and identities of
the affected parcel owners is attached as Exhibit "C."
Clinton Ward Fuguay and Hailey Rose Fuquay

6. Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuquay
Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once part of the John Fuquay Parcel. The
legal description for the Clinton Fuquay Parcel is shown on the warranty deed attached as
Exhibit "D."
John Fuquay

7. John Fuquay owns the parcel (the "John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the
Clinton Fuquay Parcel. The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the
Trustee's Deed dated October 13, I 989 attached as Exhibit "E," (less the Clinton Fuquay
Parcel).
COMPLAINT- 2

FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
) 200- 6m A VENUE, SUITE 620

SEATTLE, WA 9810)

(206) 223-4525
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Susie Low and Cal Low Parcel 1

8. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel I") located south of King Lane.
There are two parcels which were conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for
the Low Parcel 1 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F."
Avco Financial Services of Idaho Falls, Inc.

9. Avco Financial Services ofldaho Falls, Inc. may claim some right, title or interest in the
Low Parcel 1 by virtue of a Real Estate Mortgage in the amount of $68,000 which was
recorded on or around March 18, 1996 as Owyhee county records no. 218373.

The

Mortgage was executed by Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner, husband and wife
and encumbers Low Parcel I. It is possible that this mortgage was paid but was never
released. A copy of the Mortgage is attached as Exhibit "G."
Susie Low and Cal Low Parcel 2

I 0. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2") located south of King Lane.
Oreana Loop Road crosses the northwest corner of Low Parcel 2. The legal description
for the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "H."
Heart K Ranch Trust

11. The Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 owns the parcel to the north of King
Lane (the "Heart K Ranch Parcel"). The legal description got the Heart K Ranch Parcel is
shown on the Gift Deed attached as Exhibit "I."

COMPLAINT- 3

FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 -6rn A VENUE, SUITE 620
SEATILE, WA 98101

(206) 223-4525
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Gordon G. King and Rose M. King

12. Gordon G. King and Rose M. King may claim some right, title or interest in the Heart K.
Ranch Parcel by virtue of a Deed of Trust in the amount of $86,500 in favor of One West
Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as Owyhee County records no. 248616 and
encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit
"J." The deed of trust was assigned to Gordon G. King and Rose M. King on September

12, 2005. A copy of the Assignment of Deed of Trust is attached as Exhibit "K."
First American Title Insurance Company

13. First American Title Insurance Company may claim some right, title or interest in the
Heart K. Ranch Parcel by virtue of being named as the trustee under a Deed of Trust in the
amount of $86,500 in favor of One West Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as
Owyhee County records no. 248616 and encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy
of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit "J."
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

14. The properties at issue in this Complaint are located in Owyhee County, Idaho. They are
located approximately three miles east of Oreana and are south of Highway 78. The
closest public roadway to the properties is Oreana Loop Road.
15. Oreana Loop road runs in a generally west direction from Highway 78 to a point near a
location where Low Parcels l and 2 and the Heart K Ranch Parcels intersect. Near that

COMPLAINT- 4

FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 - 6'" A VENUE, SUITE 620
SEATTLE, WA 98101
(206) 223-4525
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location, Oreana Loop Road turns and continues in a southwesterly direction through Low
Parcel I.
16. King Lane is a private roadway that continues westerly from where Oreana Loop Road
turns southwest Oreana Loop Road and provides the access to the Clint Fuquay Parcel and
the John Fuquay Parcel.
17. The Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay
Parcel since at least 1989.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
(PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT)

18. The use of King Lane for access by owners of the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John
Fuquay Parcel has been open and continuous over the same route for more than 5 years, 1
and was without permission from adverse land owners.
19. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment declaring that they have established a prescriptive
easement for access and utilities from Oreana Loop Road over King Lane for access to the
Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay Parcel.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS PRAYS AS FOLLOWS

1. For a Judgment declaring that they have an easement for ingress, egress and utilities to
over King Lane for access to Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay Parcel.

1

J.C. 5-203 was amended from 5 years to 20 years in 2006, but the 5 year time frame still
applies to prescriptive claims before 2006. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Id 212, 222.

COMPLAINT- 5

FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200-6rn A VENUE, SUITE 620
SEATTLE, WA 98101
(206) 223-4S2S
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2. For a Judgment Declaring that each of the Defendants rights in their parcels are
subject to and servient to the easement for access to Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John
Fuquay Parcel.

3. For a Judgment declaring that the easement runs with the land and is binding and
inures to the benefit of all subsequent owners, transferees, and assigns of the Clint
Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay Parcel.
4. For a Judgment declaring that the easement runs with the land and is binding and that
all subsequent owners, transferees, and assigns of Defendants shall be subject to the
easement.
5. For a Judgment enjoining any defendant from impeding or interfering with Plaintiffs'
access rights over King Lane.

Dated: August 6, 2014

COMPLAINT- 6

FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200-6'" AYENUE,SUITE620
SEATTLE,'\VA 98101
(206) 223-4525
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Recording Requested By and
When Recorded Return to:
SUSIE LOW
CALLOW
21220 Oreana Loop Road
Oreana, ID 83650

Instrument # 254987
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO
2006-01-27
04:35:41 No. of Pages: 4
Recorded for : PIONEER TITLE COMPANY
~Fae: 12.00
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN
Ex-Officio Recorder Daputy~~-----4-o------

A~

lndn to: DEED. WARRANTY

SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED (this "Deed"), made as of the 61h day of January, 2006, is between
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"),
whose legal address is: 21220 Oreana Loop Road, Oreana, ID 83650.
WITNESSETH, That Grantor, for and in consideration of One Dollar and No/100 ($1.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and
confirm, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever, all the real property, together with
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State of Idaho, more particularly described as follows:
See legal description described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto
Futher Granted Water Rights as Defined in Attachment "Water Rights"
TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in
law or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of
way and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water,
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which are
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the
property (collectively, the "Property").
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors and assigns,
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in law, in fee
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in
manner and fonn as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants,
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature
whatsoever, as of July 15, 2005 .
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above-bargained premises in the quiet
and peaceable possession of Grantee, its successors and assigns, against all and every person or persons
claiming the whole or any part then:of BY, THROUGH OR UNDER Grantor.

24

...
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Grantor has executed this Special Warranty Deed as of the date set

forth above.

PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC,

an Idaho limited liability company

By:

Pioneer 1031 Company, Member

By:

STA TE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)
) ss.
)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 6 1hday of January, 2006, by Alicia
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer I 031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company.
WJTNESS my hand and official seal.
My commission expires: 9.9.09.

-

Notary Public
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EXHIBITX
P07036

In Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho.
Section 34:
Section 35:

E1/2 SE1/4, SE1/4 NE 1/4
W1/2 SW1/4, SW1/4 NW14

EXCEPTING 1-1/2 acres in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35,
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as
follows:
COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
of said Section, running thence in a Westerly direction 630 feet; thence in a Southerly
direction 104 feet; thence in an Easterly direction 630 feet; thence in a Northerly direction
104 feet to the PLACE OF BEGINNING.
In Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho.
Section 2:
Section 3:

Lot 4
Lot 1

First American nue Insurance
Sehedule

a
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WATER RIGHTS

•

EXHIBIT.Ji_

l. No. 57-89. 4-1-1874 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation and Stock Water. 0.240 CFS.
2. No. 57-95. 4-1-1885 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation.
0.360 CFS.
3. No. 57-!04. 4-1-1887 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
0.200 CFS
4. No. 57-116. 4-1-1895 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
0.100 CFS
5. No. 57-120. 4-1-1896 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
0.300 CFS
6. No. 57-127. 4-1-1899 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation.
0.400 CFS
7. No. 57-149. 4-1-1906 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
0.200 CFS
8. No. 57-2104. 10-5-1920 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
I.280 CFS
Total
3.080 CFS .
Total Acres: 145.
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REAL ESTATE :\lORTGAGE
I··,,: \":,lu..- H,-c,·,no!,

SAMUEL V.C. STBINER AND HIIR'l J. STEINm, lnJSIWm AND WIFE

ht>r\.~b;• 1:r:in!. hnrg;tin, srll ar.cl roovt'Y unto
IIV<D FINANCIAL SERVICES CF DIJ\fD FALLS, INC.

County, lil:iho. to-wit:

oesauPTia. laE PARTICULARLY DESCRI£1ED
A'ITACIJED HmE:10 ANO MADE A PART IIERfOf.

LEX:,\[.

Paa>ERI'Y

m

BXHIOIT .,..

a:tKNLY K!DiN AS: HC 79 BOX 2235
MURPHY, IDAJD 83650

TO HAVF. A!'ID TO HOLD the s:iiJ premises, witb thc:r :11•r>11rten:i11r1·s. unto the s:tiJ mvrti:a~te
hcfrs :md a..~"{igns forever.

..
-·

This ro,wep:ice i, intm<l~J ,,. :, mortgage to serurc the p:,ymenl of th~ sum o! $68,000.00
SIX'l'Y EIGIT m:llWm NI'.> 0 0 / 1 . 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - with inlt.!rcst, in :.c-cord:inrc with Lhe terms of a proani::.sory u,,te o! t\·t•n tl~tc heri>with, pa)'al,le t,) t:u: fJrch·r o! the
morti;ai;ee, with linal parmcnt due
Unisource Line of Credit
:mo! pro,·iJing for :ic-,eleration o{ the due d:ile or the princ,pal for ,!cfault in the 1~-:.rm•·nt of il\l<·,e,t or :.:,y insr:.Un ..•a:
or prin.-·ipal, and i,ro\'iding for :1 rca."ionab!c attorucy·.s. (Cf! in C':i:<.c n( suit or :iction.
l••• n•ltc ...••
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Instrument# 254988
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO

2006-01-27
04:38:59 No. of Pages: 2
RecOfded for : PIONEER TITLE COMPANY
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN
~ ~ ~ e e : 6.00
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy__..~
......-L-4-~;I.
_ _ _ __
lndtx to: DEED. WARRIINlY

SPACE ABOVE THIS UNE FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED (this "Deed"), made as of the 6th day of January, 2006, is between
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"),
whose legal address is: 21220 Oreana Loop Road, Oreana, ID 83650.
WITNESSETH, That Grantor, for and in consideration of One Dollar and No/I 00 ($1.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and
confirm, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever, all the real property, together with
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State of Idaho, more particularly described as follows:
Township 4 South, Range I East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; Section 35: Northeast Quarter
Southwest Quarter; Southwest Quarter Northeast Quarter; Southeast Quarter Northwest Quarter; Northwest
Quarter Southeast Quarter ; Including Water Right #57-10045 and #57-10046
TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in
Jaw or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of
way and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water,
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which are
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the
property ( collectively, the "Property").
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors and assigns,
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in Jaw, in fee
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in
manner and form as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants,
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature
whatsoever, as of July 15, 2005 .
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above-bargained premises in the quiet
and peaceable possession of Grantee, its successors and assigns, against all and every person or persons
claiming the whole or any part thereof BY, THROUGH OR UNDER Grantor.
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IN WJTNESS WHEREOF, Grantor has executed this Special Warranty Deed as of the date set
forth above.

PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC,

an Idaho limited liability company
By:

Pioneer 1031 Company, Member

STA TE OF IDAHO

COUNTY OF ADA

)
) ss.
)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 6thday of January, 2006, by Alicia
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer 1031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.
My commission expires: 9.9.09.

(NOT ARIAL SEAL)
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GIFfDEED
Intending a gift, ROSE M. KING, a single person, Grantor, does hereby grant, bargain,
sell and convey to GILBERT GENE KING, AS TRUSTEE (or any successor Trustee
thereof) OF THE HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012, Grantee, whose
current address is Post Office Box 36, Murphy, Idaho 83650, the following real property located
in Owyhee County, Idaho, as described on Exhibit A, attached hereto and incorporated herein.
SUBJECT TO current taxes and assessments and all subsequent years, together with any
and all existing easements, rights-of-way, reservations, restrictions and encumbrances of record,
to any existing tenancies, to all zoning laws and ordinances, and to any state of facts an accurate
survey or inspection of the premises would show.
This conveyance shall include any and all appurtenances, tenements, hereditaments,
reversions, remainders, easements, rights-of-way and water rights in anywise appertaining to the
property herein described.
All income and gain derived from such property shall be the sole and separate property of
said Grantee.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has hereunto subscribed her name to this
instrument this 28th day of December, 2012.

Instrument# 279540
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO
12-31-2012
10:09:48 No. of Pages: 5
Recorded for : ROSE KING
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN ~ e · 22.00

GIFT DEED · l

00433804.000

Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy~t::OY'\
Index lo: DEED, PERSONAL REPRES

A
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STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Ada

) ss:
)

On this 28th clay of December, 2012, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in and for
said State, personally appeared ROSE M. KING, known or acknowledged to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed
the same.

IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the clay and year first
above written.

My Commission Expires

6'ii, · 1,,Q IS

GIFT DEED - 2 00433804.000
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EXHJBITA

Tract]:
In Township 4 South, Range I Fat, Bois~ Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho
Section 26:
Southwest Quarter, South Half of the Northwest Quarter, North Half of the Southeast
Quarter; Southwest Quarter ofthe Southeast QUarter. South Half ofth~ Northeast Quarter. Northeast
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter
Section 27:
Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter
Section 34:
Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter
Section 35:
North Half ofthe N<lrthwest Quarter, and a parcel in the Southwest Quarter of the
No(thwest Quarter described as follows: Beginning at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Northwest Quarter, Sec. 3S, T48, R1B, B.M.; thence In a Westerly direction 630 feet; thence in a
Southerly direction 104 feet; thence In an Easterly direction 630 feet; thence In a Northerly dfreotion I04
feet to the PLACE OF BEGINNING.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM:
A ·portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35 fn Township 4 South, Range I
&st, Boise Meridian, Owybeo County, Idaho. described as follows:

COMMBNCJNO at the Section comer common to Sections 26, 27, 34 and 35 of Township 4 South,.
Range 1 Bast, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; 1henoe
· South 1320 feet along the Section line common to Sections 34 and 3S a distance of 1320 feet to
the Southwest comer ·of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 35; 1bcmcc
East along tho South line of said Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of SS8
feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
North parallel with the West line of said Section 3S a distance of 165 feet; thence
But and parallel with the South line of the Northwest Quarter ofthe Nonhwest Quarter a distance
of 175 feet; thence
South and parallel with the West line of said Section 3~ a distance of 16S feot to a point on the
South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section JS that Is Bast a distance of
175 feet from the POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
West along said South Une of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of l 7S
feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
Tractll:
.
A portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35 in Township 4 South, Range I
Eas~ Boise Meridian. Owyhee County, Idaho, described as follows:

COMMENCING at the Section comer common to Sections 26, 27, 34 and 3S of Township 4 South,
Range 1 Bast, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; thence
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South 1320 feet along the Section line common to Sections 34 and 35 a distmwe of 1320 feet t.o
the Southwest comer of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 35; thence
East along the South line of said Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of SS8 ·
feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
North parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 16S feet; thence
East and parallel with the South line of the Northwe.,t Quarter of tho Northwest Quarter a distance
of l 7S feet; thence
South and parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet to a point on the
South line of~e Northwe.tt Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 3S that is Bast a ttistance of
l 7S feet from the POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
West along said South line ofthe Northwest Quarter ofthe Northwest Quarter a cllstance of l 7S
feet to the 1RUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
Tract Ill:
In Township 7 South, Range I East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho
Section 9:
East Half of the Northeast Quarter

Tract IV:

In Township 7 South, Range 2 East, Boise Mmidian, Owyhee County, Idaho
Section 30:
West Half of the Northeast Quarter
Tract V:
In Township 8 South, Range I East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho
Section 6:
Government Lot 7, Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter, Southwest Quarter of the
Southeast Quarter
Section 7:
Government Lot I, Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter, North Half of the
Northeast Quarter
Section 18:
Government Lots 2, 3, S, 6 and 7, Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter
Section 19:
Government Lots I, 2 and 3, East Half of the Northwest Quarter, Northeast Quarter of the
Southwest Quarter, North Half of1he Southeast Quarter
Tract VI:
In Township 8 South, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Owyhee Couniy, Idaho
Section 1:
East Half of the Southeast Quarter
Section 12:
East Half of the Northeast Quarter, East Half of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast .
Quarter

Section 13:

South Half ofthe NorthH~ North Half of the South~ Government Lots 1, 2, 3 and

4

Section 18:
Southeast Quarter, East Half of the Southwest Quarter, Government Lots 3 and 4
Section 19:
North Half of the Northeast Quarter, Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter,
Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter, Government Lot I, East Half of the Southeut Quarter
Section 20:
Southwest Quarter of dle Northwest Quarter, Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter
Section 22:
Northwest Quarter of1he Southeast Quarter, South Half of the Sou1heast Quarter
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Section 24:

Section 26:
Section 27:

Northwest Quarter, North Half of the Southwest Quarter
Southwest Quarter ofthe Northwest Quarter
Northeast Quarter ofthe Northeast Quarter

TOGETHER WITH a grant of Basement for a well, ditch and cooling pond located in the NWNE, Sec.
34, T4S, RIE, BM, as granted by the.United States, Dept oflnterior, Bureau ofLand Management, on
August 4, 1961, under Serial No. Idaho 012682.
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After recording please return to:

Bank of the West, a

Instrument# 241t16

California Corporation

IIURPHY,OWVHE~IOAHO
20CM-0 7.2a
IM:26:21 No. otP
. 16
llecordad for-; PIOfllEER TITLE COlltPA:;s·

[Company Name}

CHAltlOTTEattERBURN

l!x-Oflclo Rtccrdlr ~

..._•lo:DEEDOFTitUST

8 ~ : 48.00

[Name of Natural Person]

P.O. Bax 512086 (service)
[Street Address]

Los Angeles, CA 90051-0086
[City, State Zip Code]

- - - - - - - - - - - - - { S p a c e Above This Line For Recording D a t a ] - - - - - - - - - - - PREPARED BY:

Kathy Rodriguez

(323} 727-4987 EKt.

DEED OF TRUST
DEFINITIONS
Words used in muhiple sections of this document are defined below and other words are defmed in Sections 3, 11,
13, 18, 20 and 21. Certain rules regarding the usage of words used in this document are also provided in Section 16.
"Security Instrument" means this document, which is dated
(A)
together with all Riders to this document.

(B)

July 19, 2004

"Borrower" is Karla Kay King love, an umarried w:nan

. Borrower is the trustor under this Security Instrument.

(C)

.. Lender" is Bank of the West , a california Corporation

Lender is

organized and existing under the laws of

California
{bene), Monterey Park, CA 91755

. Lender's address is

1977 Saturn Street

Lender is the beneficia,y under this Security Instrument.

: 3984002
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(D)

"Trustee" is First Anerican Title Insurance Crnpany, a

(E)
"Note" means the promissory note signed by Borrower and dated
The Note states that Borrower owes Lender
Eighty Six Thousand

COI:pOration

July 19, 2004

Five Hundred and

ID/lOOths
Do1Iars(U.S.$ 86,500.00
)
plus interest. Borrower has promised to pay this debt in regular Periodic Payments and to pay the debt in full not
laterthan
August 1, 2024
(F)
"Property" means the property that is described below under the heading "Transfer of Rights in the
Property."

(G)
"Loan" means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest, any prepayment charges and late charges due
under the Note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest
(H)
"Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instnnnent that are executed by Borrower. The following
Riders are to be executed by Borrower [check box as applicable]:

0
0
0
0

Adjustable Rate Rider
Balloon Rider
1-4 Family Rider
Other(s) {specify]

0

D
D

Condominium Rider
Planned Unit Development Rider
Revocable Trust Rider

D

0

Second Home Rider
Biweekly Payment Rider

{I)
"Applicable Law" means all controlJing app1icable federal, state and local statutes, regulations, ordinances
and administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable final, non-appealable
judicial opinions.

(J)
"Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments" means all dues, fees, assessments and other
charges that are imposed on Borrower or the Property by a condominium association, homeowners association or
similar organization.
(K)
"Electronic Funds Transfer" means any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check,
draft, or similar paper instrwnent, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, computer,
or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an account. Such term
includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale transfers, automated teller machine transactions, transfers initiated by
telephone, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse transfers.
(L)

"Escrow Items" means those items that are described in Section 3.

(M)
"Miscellaneous Proceeds" means any compensation, settlement, award of damages, or proceeds paid by
any third party ( other than insurance proceeds paid under the coverages described in Section 5) for: (i) damage to,
or destruction of, the Property; (ii) condemnation or other taking of all or any part of the Property; (iii) conveyance
in lieu of condemnation; or (iv) misrepresentations of, or omissions as to, the value and/or condition of the Property .
. (N)
Loan.

"Mortgage Insurance" means insurance protecting Lender against the nonpayment o( or default on, the

: 3984002
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(0)
"Periodic Payment" means the regularly scheduled amount due for (i) principal and interest under the
Note, plus (ii) any amounts under Section 3 of this Security Instrument.
(P)
"RESPA" means the Real Est.ate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. §2601 et seq.) and its
implementing regulation, Regulation X (24 C.F.R. Part 3500), as they might be amended from time to time, or any
additional or successor legislation or regulation that governs the same subject matter. As used in this Security
Instrument, "RESPA" refers to all requirements and restrictions that are imposed in regard to a "federally related
mortgage loan" even if the Loan does not qualify as a "federally related mortgage loan" llllder RESPA.

(Q)
"Successor in Interest of Borrower'• means any party that has taken title to the Property, whether or not
that party has assumed Borrower's obligations under the Note and/or this Security Instrument.

TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY
This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and
modifications of the Note; and (ii) the peifonnance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security
Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust. with power
of sale, the following described property located in the
county
[Type of Rttr:ording Jurisdiction]

Owyhee

of

[Name of Recording Jurisdiction]

SEE A'IT.AO!ED HEREIO AND MADE A PARI' HEREDF

which currently has the address of

19100 King Lane
[Street/

Murphy
[City]

, Idaho

83650

(''Property Address"):

[Zip Code]

: 3984002
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P06120
Exhibit "A"
PARCEL I:
A portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35 in Township
4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as follows:
COMMENCING at the Section corner common to Sections 26, 27, 34 and 35 of Township
4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; thence
South 1320 feet along the Section llne common to Sections 34 and 35 a distance
of 1320 feet to the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
of said Section 35; thence
East along the South line of said Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a
distance of 558 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
North parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet; thence
East and parallel with the South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter a distance of 175 feet; thence
South and parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet to
a point on the South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said
Section 35 that Is East a distance of 175 feet from the POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
West along said South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a
distance of 175 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
PARCEL 11:
An easement for ingress and egress over a parcel of land located in the Northwest Quarter
of Section 35, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho.
Being further described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point on the Northerly right-of-way of Oreana Loop Road from which the
East Quarter corner of said Section 35 bears South 68° 05'05" East a distance of 3,483.22
feet;
thence along said right-of-way on a curve to the left with a radius of 456.77 feet
and a central angle of 13° 02'31", an arc length of 103.97 feet (with a chord bearing of
South 74° 35'55" West, and a chord distance of 103.75 feet);
thence leaving said right-of-way North 89° 44'39" West a distance of 34.65 feet;
thence South 86° 52'41" West a distance of 101.22 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 956.00 feet and a central angle
of 08° 09'05", an arc length of 136.01 feet (with a chord bearing of South 82° 48'09" West,
and a chord distance of 135.89 feet);
thence South 78° 43'37" West a distance of 16.97 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 190.00 feet and a central angle
of 34° 08'57", an arc length of 113.24 feet (with a chord bearing of North 84° 11'54" West,
and a chord distance of 111.57 feet);
thence North 67° 07'26" West a distance of 132.56 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 162.00 feet and a central angle
of 57° 53'42", an arc length of 163.69 feet (with a chord bearing of South 83° 55'43" West
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and a chord distance of 156.82 feet);
thence Into a tangent reverse curve to the right having a radius of 139.00 feet and
a central angle of 16° 00'01 "' and a length of 38.82 feet. (with a chord bearing of South 62°
58'52" West, and a chord distance of 38.69 feet);
thence along a cure to the right having a radius of 474.00 feet and a central angle
of 18° 35'17";
thence westerly along the arc, a distance of 153.78 feet (with a chord bearing of
South 80° 16'32" West, and a chord distance of 153.10 feet);
thence South 89° 34'10" West a distance of 364.49 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 60.45 feet and a central angle of
80° 02'33", an arc length of 84.45 feet (with a chord bearing of North 51° 23'44" West, and
a chord distance of 77.75 feet);
thence South 85° 29'29" East a distance of 30.23 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 32.45 feet and a central angle of
65° 16'28", an arc length of 36.97 feet (with a chord bearing of South 58° 46'46" East, and
a chord distance of 35.00 feet);
thence North 89° 34'10"' East a distance of 364.49 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 446.00 feet and a cental angle of
18° 35'17", an arc length of 144.69 feet (with a chord bearing of North 80° 16'31" East, and
a chord distance of 144.06 feet);
thence along a curve to the left having a radius of 111.00 feet and a central angle
of 16° 00'01", an arc length of 31.00 feet (with a chord bearing of North 62° 58'52"' East,
and a chord distance of 30.90 feet);
thence along a curve to the right having a radius of 190.00 feet and a central angle
of 57° 53'42" and a length of 191.99 feet, (with a chord bearing of North 83° 55'43" East,
and a chord distance of 183.92 feet);
thence South 67° 07'26" East a distance of 132.56 feet;
thence along a circular curve to the right with a radius of 162.00 feet and a central
angle of 34° 08'57", an arc length of 96.55 feet (with a chord bearing of South 84° 11 '55"
East, and a chord distance of 95.13 feet);
thence North 78° 43'37"' East a distance of 16.97 feet;
thence along a circular curve to the right with a radius of 984.00 feet and a central
angle of 08° 09'05", an arc length of 139.99 feet (with a chord bearing of North 82° 48'09"
East, and a chord distance of 139.87 feet);
thence North 86° 52'41" East a distance of 102.04 feet;
thence South 89° 44'39" East a distance of 135.37 feet to the POINT OF EGINNING.
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TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements,
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and additions shall also be
covered by this Security Instrument All of the foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as the "Property."
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the
right to grant and convey the Property and that the Property is 1.lllencumbered, except for encumbrances of record.
Borrower warrants and will defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to any
encumbrances of record.

THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform
covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a unifonn security instrument covering real property.
UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows:

1.

Payment of Principal, Interest, Escrow Items, Prepayment Charges, and Late Charges.

Borrower shall pay when due the principal of, and interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment
charges and late charges due under the Note. Borrower shall also pay funds for Escrow Items pursuant to Section 3.
Payments due llllder the Note and this Security Instrument shall be made in U.S. currency. However, if any check or
other instnnnent received by Lender as payment under the Note or this Security Instrwnent is returned to Lender
unpaid, Lender may require that any or all subsequent payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument be
made in one or more of the following forms, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order, (c) certified check,
bank check, treasmer's check or cashier's check, provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose
deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer.
Payments are deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at such
other location as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15. Lender may
return any payment or partial payment if the payment or partial payments are insufficient to bring the Loan current.
Lender may accept any payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan current, without waiver of any
rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or partial payments in the future, but Lender is not
obligated to apply such payments at the time such payments are accepted. If each Periodic Payment is applied as of
its scheduled due date, then Lender need not pay interest on unapplied funds. Lender may hold such unappJied
funds until Borrower makes payment to bring the Loan current If Borrower does not do so within a reasonable
period of time, Lender shall either apply such funds or return them to Borrower. If not applied earlier, such funds
will be applied to the outstanding principal balance under the Note immediately prior to foreclosure. No offset or
claim which Borrower might have now or in the future against Lender shall relieve Borrower from making payments
due llllder the Note and this Security Instrument or performing the covenants and agreements secured by this
Security Instrument.
2. Application of Payments or Proceeds. Except as otherwise described in this Section 2, all payments
accepted and applied by Lender shall be applied in the following order of priority: (a) interest due under the Note;
(b) principal due under the Note; (c) amounts due Wlder Section 3. Such payments shall be applied to each Periodic
Payment in the order in which it became due. Any remaining amounts shall be applied first to late charges, second
to any other amounts due under this Security Instrwnent, and then to reduce the principal balance of the Note.
If Lender receives a payment from Borrower for a delinquent Periodic Payment which includes a sufficient
amount to pay any late charge due, the payment may be applied to the delinquent payment and the late charge. If
more than one Periodic Payment is outstanding, Lender may apply any payment received from Borrower to the
repayment of the Periodic Payments if, and to the extent that, each payment can be paid in full. To the extent that
any excess exists after the payment is applied to the full payment of one or more Periodic Payments, such excess
may be applied to any late charges due. Voluntary prepayments shall be applied first to any prepayment charges and
then as described in the Note.
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Any application of payments, insurance proceeds, or Miscellaneous Proceeds to principa] due wider the
Note shall not extend or postpone the due date, or change the amount, of the Periodic Payments.

3. Funds for Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day Periodic Payments are due
under the Note, until the Note is paid in full, a sum (the "Funds") to provide for payment of amounts due for:
(a} taxes and assessments and other items which can attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien or
encumbrance on the Property; (b) leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c) premiums
for any and all insurance required by Lender and (d} Mortgage Insurance premiums, if any, or any sums
payable by Borrower to Lender in lieu of the payment of Mortgage Insurance premiums in accordance with
the provisions of Section 10. These items are called "Escrow Items." At origination or at any time during the
term of the Loan, Lender may require that Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any, be
escrowed by Borrower, and such dues, fees and assessments shall be an Escrow Item. Borrower shall
promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under this Section. Borrower shall pay Lender
the Funds for Escrow Items unless Lender waives Borrower's obligation to pay the Funds for any or all
Escrow Items. Lender may waive Borrower's obligation to pay to Lender Funds for any or aD Escrow Items
at any time. Any such waiver may only be in writing. In the event of such waiver, Borrower shall pay
directly, when and where payable, the amounts due for any Escrow Items for which payment of Funds has
been waived by Lender and, if Lender requires, shall furnish to Lender receipts evidencing such payment
within such time period as Lender may require. Borrower's obligation to make such payments and to
provide receipts shall for all purposes be deemed to be a covenant and agreement contained in the Security
Instrument. H Borrower is obligated to pay Escrow Items directly, pursuant to a waiver, and Borrower fails
to pay the amount due for an Escrow Item, Lender may exercise its rights under Section 9 and pay such
amount and Borrower shall then be obligated to repay to Lender any such amount. Lender may revoke the
waiver as to any or all Escrow Items at any time by notice and, upon such revocation, Borrower shall pay to
Lender all Funds, and in such amounts, that are then required.
Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount (a) sufficient to permit Lender to
apply the Funds at the time specified under RESPA, and (b) not to exceed the maximum amount a lender can
require under RESPA. Lender shall estimate the amount of Funds doe on the basis of current data and
reasonable e~-timates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise in accordance with Applicable Law.
The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency,
instrumentality, or entity (including Lender, if Lender is an institution whose deposits are so insured) or in
any Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the Escrow Items no later than the time
specified under RESPA. Lender shall not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually
analyzing the escrow account, or verifying the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the
Funds and Applicable Law permits Lender to make such a charge. Unless an agreement is made in writing
or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on the Funds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower
any interest or earnings on the Funds. Borrower and Lender can agree in writing, however, that interest
shall be paid on the Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the
Funds as required by RESPA.
If there is a surplus of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall account to
Borrower for the excess funds in accordance with RESPA. If there is a shortage of Funds held in escrow, as
defined under RESPA, Lender shall notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to
Lender the amount necessary to make up the shortage in accordance with RESPA, but in no more than 12
monthly payments. If there is a deficiency of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall
notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to Lender the amount necessary to make up
the deficiency in accordance with RESPA, but in no more than 12 monthly payments.
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund
to Borrower any Funds held by Lender.
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4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay an taxes, assessments, charges, fines, and impositions
attributable to the Property which can attain priority over this Security Insttument, leasehold payments or ground
rents on the Property, if any, and Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any. To the extent that
these items are Escrow Items, Borrower shall pay them in the manner provided in Section 3.
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless
Borrower: (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable to
Lender, but only so long as Borrower is performing such agreement; (b) contests the lien in good faith by, or
defends against enforcement of the lien in. legal proceedings which in Lender's opinion operate to prevent the
enforcement of the lien while those proceedings are pending, but only until such proceedings are concluded; or (c)
secures from the holder of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender subordinating the lien to this Security
Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien which can attain priority over this
Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying the lien. Within 10 days of the date on which
that notice is given, Borrower shall satisfy the lien or take one or more of the actions set forth above in this
Section 4.
Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for a real estate tax verification and/or reporting
service used by Lender in coIU1ection with this Loan.
5. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the
Property insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage," and any other haz.ards
including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be
maintained in the amounts (including deductible levels) and for the periods that Lender requires. What Lender
requires pursuant to the preceding sentences can change during the term of the Loan. The insurance carrier
providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's right to disapprove Borrower's choice,
which right shall not be exercised unreasonably. Lender may require Borrower to pay, in connection with this Loan,
either. (a) a one-time charge for flood zone determination, certification and tracking services; or (b) a one-time
charge for flood zone determination and certification services and subsequent charges each time remappings or
similar changes occur which reasonably might affect such detennination or certification. Borrower shall also be
responsible for the payment of any fees imposed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in comection with
the review of any flood zone determination resulting from an objection by Borrower.
If Borrower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above, Lender may obtain insurance coverage,
at Lender's option and Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any particular type or amount
of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might not protect Borrower, Borrower's
equity in the Property, or the contents of the Property, against any risk, hazard or liability and might provide greater
or lesser coverage than was previously in effect. Borrower acknowledges that the cost of the insurance coverage so
obtained might significantly exceed the cost of insurance that Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts
disbursed by Lender under this Section 5 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security
Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable,
with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment
All insurance policies required by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lender's right to
disapprove such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an
additional loss payee. Lender shall have the right to hold the policies and renewal certificates. If Lender requires,
Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and renewal notices. If Borrower obtains any
form of insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, for damage to, or destruction of, the Property, such
policy shall include a standard mortgage clause and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional loss
payee.
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may
make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any
insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall be applied to restoration
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or repair of the Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened.
During such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such insurance proceeds until Lender
has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction,
provided that such inspection shall be undenaken promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and
restoration in a single payment or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is
made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such insurance proceeds, Lender shall not be
required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such proceeds. Fees for public adjusters, or other Urird parties,
retained by Borrower shall not be paid out of the insurance proceeds and shall be the sole obligation of Borrower. If
the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the insurance proceeds
shall be applied to the smns secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any,
paid to Borrower. Such insurance proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2.
If Borrower abandons the Property, Lender may file, negotiate and settle any available insurance claim and
related matters. If Borrower does not respond within 30 days to a notice from Lender that the insurance carrier has
offered to settle a claim, then Lender may negotiate and settle the claim. The 30-day period will begin when the
notice is given. In either event, or if Lender acquires the Property under Section 22 or otherwise, Borrower hereby
assigns to Lender (a) Borrower's rights to any insurance proceeds in an amount not to exceed the amounts unpaid
under the Note or this Security Instrument, and (b) any other of Borrower's rights (other than the right to any refund
of unearned premiwns paid by Borrower) under all insurance policies covering the Property, insofar as such rights
are applicable to the coverage of the Property. Lender may use the insurance proceeds either to repair or restore the
Property or to pay amounts unpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, whether or not then due.
6. Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal residence
within 60 days after the execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as
Borrower's principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender otherwise agrees in
writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, or unless extenuating circumstances exist which are
beyond Borrower's control.
7. Preservation. Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Inspections. Borrower shall not
destroy, damage or impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the Property. Whether
or not Borrower is residing in the Property, Borrower shall maintain the Property in order to prevent the Property
from deteriorating or decreasing in value due to its condition. Unless it is determined pursuant to Section 5 that
repair or restoration is not economically feasible, Borrower shall promptly repair the Property if damaged to avoid
further deterioration or damage. If insurance or condenmation proceeds are paid in connection with damage to, or
the taking of, the Property, Borrower shall be responsible for repairing or restoring the Property only if Lender has
released proceeds for such purposes. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single
payment or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. If the insur.ince or condemnation proceeds
are not sufficient to repair or restore the Property, Borrower is not relieved of Borrower's obligation for the
completion of such repair or restoration.
Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. If it has reasonable
cause, Lender may inspect the interior of the improvements on the Property. Lender shall give Borrower notice at
the time of or prior to such an interior inspection specifying such reasonable cause.
8. Borrower's Loan Application. Borrower shall be in default if, during the Loan application process,
Borrower or any persons or entities acting at the direction of Borrower or with Borrower's knowledge or consent
gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements to Lender (or failed to provide Lender
with material information) in connection with the Loan. Material representations include, but are not limited to,
representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the Property as Borrower's principal residence.
9. Protection of Lender's Interest in the Property and Rights Under this Security Instrument. If
(a) Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, (b) there is a legal
proceeding that might significantly affect Lender's interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security
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Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condenmation or f01feiture, for enforcement of a lien
which may attain priority over this Security Instrument or to enforce laws or regulations), or (c) Borrower has
abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's
interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument, including protecting and/or assessing the value of
the Property, and securing and/or repairing the Property. Lender's actions can include, but are not limited to:
(a) paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument; (b) appearing in court; and
(c) paying reasonable attorneys' fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or rigltts under this Security
Instrument, including its secured position in a bankruptcy proceeding. Securing the Property includes, but is not
limited to, entering the Property to make repairs, change locks, replace or board up doors and windows. drain water
from pipes, eliminate building or other code violations or dangerous conditions, and have utilities turned on or off.
Although Lender may take action under this Section 9, Lender does not have to do so and is not under any duty or
obligation to do so. It is agreed that Lender incurs no liability for not taking any or all actions authorized W1der this
Section 9.
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured
by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and
shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment
If this Security Instrument is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the lease. If
Borrower acquires fee title to the Property, the leasehold and the fee title shall not merge unless Lender agrees to the
merger in writing.
10. Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan,
Borrower shall pay the premiwns required to maintain the Mortgage Insurance in effect. If, for any reason, the
Mortgage Insurance coverage required by Lender ceases to be available from the mortgage insurer that previously
provided such insurance and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments toward the premiums
for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage substantially equivalent to the
Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially equivalent to the cost to Borrower of the Mortgage
Insurance previously in effect, from an alternate mortgage insurer selected by Lender. If substantially equivalent
Mortgage Insurance coverage is not available, Borrower shall continue to pay to Lender the amount of the separately
designated payments that were due when the insurance coverage ceased to be in effect. Lender will accept, use and
retam these payments as a non-refundable loss reserve in lieu of Mortgage Insurance. Such loss reserve shall be
non-refundable, notwithstanding the fact that the Loan is ultimately paid in full, and Lender shall not be required to
pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such loss reserve. Lender can no longer require loss reserve payments if
Mortgage Insurance coverage (in the amount and for the period that Lender requires) provided by an insurer selected
by Lender again becomes available, is obtained, and Lender requires separately designated payments toward the
premiums for Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan and
Borrower was required to make separately designated payments toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance,
Borrower shall pay the premiwns required to maintain Mortgage Insurance in effect, or to provide a non-refundable
loss reserve, until Lender's requirement for Mortgage Insurance ends in accordance with any written agreement
between Borrower and Lender providing for such termination or until termination is required by Applicable Law.
Nothing in this Section 10 affects Borrower's obligation to pay interest at the rate provided in the Note.
Mortgage Insurance reimburses Lender (or any entity that purchases the Note) for certain losses it may
incur if Borrower does not repay the Loan as agreed. Borrower is not a pany to the Mortgage Insurance.
Mortgage insurers evaluate their total risk on all such insurance in force from time to time, and may enter
into agreements with other parties that share or modify their risk, or reduce losses. These agreements are on terms
and conditions that are satisfactory to the mortgage insurer and the other party (or parties) to these agreements.
These agreements may require the mortgage insurer to make payments using any source of funds that the mortgage
insurer may have available (which may include funds obtained from Mortgage Insurance premiums).
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As a result of these agreements, Lender, any purchaser of the Note, another insurer, any reinsurer, any other
entity, or any affiliate of any of the foregoing, may receive (directly or indirectly) amounts that derive from (or
might be characterized as) a portion of Borrower's payments for Mortgage Insurance, in exchange for sharing or
modifying the mortgage insurer's risk, or reducing losses. If such agreement provides that an affiliate of Lender
takes a share of the insurer's risk in exchange for a share of the premiums paid to 1he insurer, the arrangement is
often tenned "captive reinsurance." Further:
(a) Any such agreements will not affect the amounts that Borrower has agreed to pay for Mortgage
Insurance, or any other terms of the Loan. Such agreements will not increase the amount Borrower will owe
for Mortgage Insurance, and they will not entitle Borrower to any refund.
(b) Any such agreements will not affect the rights Borrower has - if any - with respect to the
Mortgage Insurance under the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 or any other law. These rights may
include the right to receive certain disclosures, to request and obtain cancellation of the Mortgage Insurance,
to have the Mortgage Insurance terminated automatically, and/or to receive a refund of any Mortgage
Insurance premiums that were unearned at the time of such cancellation or termination.
11. Assignment of Miscellaneous Proceeds; Forfeiture. All Miscellaneous Proceeds are hereby
assigned to and shall be paid to Lender.
If the Property is damaged, such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of the
Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. During such
repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such Miscellaneous Proceeds until Lender has had
an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided
that such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may pay for the repairs and restoration in a single
disbursement or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing
or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such Miscellaneous Proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay
Borrower any interest or earnings on such Miscellaneous Proceeds. If the restoration or repair is not economically
feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by
this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid to Borrower. Such Misce1laneous
Proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2.
In the event of a total taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall
be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid to
Borrower.
In the event of a partial talcing, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market value of
the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is equal to or greater than the amount
of the sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately before the partial talcing, destruction, or loss in value,
unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, 1he sums secured by this Security Instnnnent shall be
reduced by the amount of the Miscellaneous Proceeds multiplied by the following fraction: (a) the total amount of
the sums secured immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value divided by (b) the fair market
value of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value. Any balance shall be paid
to Borrower.
In the event of a partial talcing, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market value of
the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is less than the amount of the sums
secured inunediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value, Wlless Borrower and Lender otherwise
agree in writing, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the smns secured by this Security Instnnnent
whether or not the sums are then due.
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the Opposing Party
(as defined in the next sentence) offers to make an award to settle a claim for damages, Borrower fails to respond to
Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender is authorized to collect and apply the Miscellaneous
Proceeds either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or
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not then due. "Opposing Party'' means the third party that owes Borrower Miscellaneous Proceeds or the party
against whom Borrower has a right of action in regard to Miscellaneous Proceeds.
Borrower shall be in default if any action or proceeding. whether civil or criminal, is begun that, in
Lender's judgment, could resuh in forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment of Lender's interest in the
Property or rights under this Security Instrument. Borrower can cure such a default and, if acceleration has
occurred, reinstate as provided in Section 19, by causing the action or proceeding to be dismissed with a ruling that,
in Lender's judgment, precludes forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment of Lender's interest in the
Property or rights wder this Security Instnnnent The proceeds of any award or claim for damages that are
attributable to the impairment of Lender's interest in the Property are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender.
All Miscellaneous Proceeds that are not applied to restoration or repair of the Property shall be applied in
the order provided for in Section 2.
12. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time for payment
or modification of amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument granted by Lender to Borrower or
any Successor in Interest of Borrower shall not operate to release the liability of Borrower or any Successors in
Interest of Borrower. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against any Successor in Interest of
Borrower or to refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortiz.ation of the swns secured by this
Security Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower or any Successors in Interest of
Borrower. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy including, without limitation, Lender's
acceptance of payments from third persons, entities or Successors in Interest of Borrower or in amounts less than the
amount then due, shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy.
13. Joint and Several Liability; Co-signers; Successors and As~igns Bound. Borrower covenants and
agrees that Borrower's obligations and liability shall be joint and several. However, any Borrower who co-signs this
Security Instrument but does not execute the Note (a "co-signer"): (a) is co-signing this Security Instrument only to
mortgage, grant and convey the co-signer's interest in the Property under the tenns of this Security Instrument; (b) is
not personally obligated to pay the smns secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lender and any
other Borrower can agree to extend, modify, forbear or make any accommodations with regard to the terms of this
Security Instrument or the Note without the co-signer's consent.
Subject to the provisions of Section 18, any Successor in Interest of Borrower who assumes Borrower's
obligations under this Security Instrument in writing. and is approved by Lender, shall obtain all of Borrower's
rights and benefits under this Security Instrument. Borrower shall not be released from Borrower's obligations and
liability under this Security Instrument unless Lender agrees to such release in writing. The covenants and
agreements of this Security Instrument shall bind (except as provided in Section 20) and benefit the successors and
assigns of Lender.
14. Loan Charges. Lender may charge Borrower fees for services performed in connection with
Borrower's default, for the pUipOse of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security
Instrument, including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees. In regard to any
other fees, the absence of express authority in this Security Instrument to charge a specific fee to Borrower shall not
be construed as a prohibition on the charging of such fee. Lender may not charge fees that are expressly prohibited
by this Security Instrument or by Applicable Law.
If the Loan is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges, and that law is finally interpreted so that
the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the Loan exceed the permitted
limits, then: (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the
permitted limit; and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded
to Borrower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal owed under the Note or by making a
direct payment to Borrower. If a refund reduces principal, the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment
without any prepayment charge (whether or not a prepayment charge is provided for m1der the Note). Borrower's
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acceptance of any such refund made by direct payment to Borrower will constitute a waiver of any right of action
Borrower might have arising out of such overcharge.
15. Notices. All notices given by Borrower or Lender in connection with this Security Instnnnenl must be
in writing. Any notice to Borrower in connection with this Security Instrument shall be deemed to have been given
to Borrower when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to Bonower' s notice address if sent by other
means. Notice to any one Borrower shall constitute notice to all Borrowers unless Applicable Law expressly
requires otherwise. The notice address shall be the Property Address unless Borrower has designated a substitute
notice address by notice to Lender. Borrower shall promptly notify Lender of Borrower's change of address. If
Lender specifies a procedure for reporting Borrower's change of address, then Borrower shall only report a change
of address through that specified procedure. There may be only one designated notice address under this Security
Instrument at any one time. Any notice to Lender shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail
to Lender's address stated herein unless Lender has designated another address by notice to Borrower. Any notice
in connection with this Security Instrument shall not be deemed to have been given to Lender until actually received
by Lender. If any notice required by this Security Instrument is also required under Applicable Law, the Applicable
Law requirement wiJl satisfy the corresponding requirement under this Security Instrument
16. Governing Law; Severability; Rules of Construction. This Security Instrument shall be governed
by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. All rights and obligations contained
in this Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and limitations of Applicable Law. Applicable Law
might explicitly or implicitly allow the parties to agree by contract or it might be silent, but such silence shall not be
construed as a prohibition against agreement by contract. In the event that any provision or clause of this Security
Instrument or the Note conflicts with Applicable Law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security
Instrument or the Note which can be given effect without the conflicting provision.
As used in this Security Instrument: (a) words of the masculine gender shall mean and include
corresponding neuter words or words of the feminine gender; (b) words in the singular shall mean and include the
plural and vice versa; and (c) the word "may" gives sole discretion without any obligation to take any action.
17. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be given one copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument.
18. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 18, "Interest
in the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not limited to, those beneficial
interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or escrow agreement, the intent
of which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser.
If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or if Borrower is not a
natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior written consent,
Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument. However, this
option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law.
If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide
a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15 within which
Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to the
expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security Instrument without further
notice or demand on Borrower.
19. Borrower's Right to Reinstate After Acceleration. If Borrower meets certain conditions, Borrower
shall have the right to have enforcement of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time prior to the earliest of:
(a) five days before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in this Security Instrument; (b) such
other period as Applicable Law might specify for the termination of Borrower's right to reinstate; or (c) enlry of a
judgment enforcing this Security Instrument. Those conditions are that Borrower: (a) pays Lender all sums which
then would be due under this Security Instrument and the Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any
default of any other covenants or agreements; (c) pays all expenses incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument,
including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees, and other fees
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incurred for the purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument; and
(d) talces such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure that Lender's interest in the Property and rights
under this Security Instrument, and Borrower's obligation to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument, shall
continue unchanged. Lender may require that Borrower pay such reinstatement sums and expenses in one or more
of the folJowing forms, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check, bank check, treasurer's
check or cashier's check, provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured by a
federal agency, instrumentality or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer. Upon reinstatement by Borrower, this
Security Insttument and obligations secured hereby shall remain fully effective as if no acceleration had occurred.
However, this right to reinstate shall not apply in the case of acceleration under Section 18.
20. Sale of Note; Change of Loan Semcer; Notice of Grievance. The Note or a partial interest in the
Note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower. A
sale might result in a change in the entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that collects Periodic Payments due under
the Note and this Security Instrument and performs other mortgage loan servicing obligations under the Note, this
Security Instrument, and Applicable Law. There also might be one or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated
to a sale of the Note. If there is a change of the Loan Servicer, Borrower will be given written notice of the change
which will state the name and address of the new Loan Servicer, the address to which payments should be made and
any other infonnation RESPA requires in connection with a notice of transfer of servicing. If the Note is sold and
thereafter the Loan is serviced by a Loan Servicer other than the purchaser of the Note, the mongage loan sen:icing
obligations to Borrower will remain with the Loan Servicer or be transferred to a successor Loan Servicer and are
not assumed by the Note purchaser unless otherwise provided by the Note purchaser.
Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence, join, or be joined to any judicial action (as either an
individual litigant or the member of a class) that arises from the other party's actions pursuant to this Security
Instrument or that alleges that the other party has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by reason of, this
Security Instrument, until such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party (with such notice given in
compliance with the requirements of Section 15) of such alleged breach and afforded tbe other party hereto a
reasonable period after the giving of such notice to take corrective action. If Applicable Law provides a time period
which must elapse before certain action can be taken, that time period will be deemed to be reasonable for purposes
of this paragraph. The notice of acceleration and opportunity to cure given to Borrower pursuant to Section 22 and
the notice of acceleration given to Borrower pursuant to Section 18 shall be deemed to satisfy tbe notice and
opportunity to take corrective action provisions of this Section 20.
21. Hazardous Substances. As used in this Section 21: (a) "Hazardous Substances" are those substances
defined as toxic or hazardous substances, pollutants, or wastes by Environmental Law and the following substances:
gasoline, kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides and herbicides, volatile solvents,
materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials; (b) "Environmental Law" means federal
laws and laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that relate to health, safety or environmental
protection; (c) "Environmental Cleanup" includes any response action, remedial action, or removal action, as
defined in Environmental Law; and (d) an "Environmental Condition" means a condition that can cause, contribute
to, or otherwise trigger an Environmental Cleanup.
Borrower shall not cause or pennit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any Hazardous
Substances, or threaten to release any Haz.ardous Substances, on or in the Property. Borrower shall not do, nor allow
anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property (a) that is in violation of any Environmental Law, (b) which
creates an Environmental Condition, or (c) which, due to the presence, use, or release of a Hazardous Substance,
creates a condition that adversely affects the value of the Property. The preceding two sentences shall not apply to
the presence, use, or storage on the Property of small quantities of Hazardous Substances that are generally
recognized to be appropriate to normal residential uses and to maintenance of the Property (including, but not
limited to, hazardous substances in consumer products).

: 3984002
Idaho Deed of Trust-Single Family-Fannie Mae/F:redu !\,lac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT
-THE
INc.Paee 12 of1 4

c=.!!.:.,~~:!;;,E,

IDIIIIIIIIIIIUIU

Jt'onn 3013 01/01
140011D D&'ID
C2000, Th< Compliuu:e Soun,e. Int.

54

Borrower shall promptly give Lender written notice of (a) any investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit or
other action by any governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any Hazardous
Substance or Enviromnental Law of which Borrower has actual knowledge, (b) any Environmental Condition.
including but not limited to, any spilling, leaking, discharge, release or threat of release of any Hazardous Substance,
and (c) any condition caused by the presence, use or release of a Hazardous Substance which adversely affects the
value of the Property. If Borrower learns, or is notified by any governmental or regulatory authority. or any private
party, that any removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Property is necessary,
Borrower shall promptly take all necessary remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law. Nothing
herein shall create any obligation on Lender for an Envirorunental Cleanup.
NON-UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows:

22. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following
Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument (but not prior to acceleration
under Section 18 unless Applicable Law provides otherwise). The notice shall specify: (a) the default; (b) the
action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to
Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or before the date
specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument and sale of
the Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the
right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense of Borrower to
acceleration and sale. H the default is not cored on or before the date specified in the notice, Lendu at its
option may require immediate payment in ful] of all sums secured by this Security Instrument without
further demand and may invoke the power of sale and any other remedies permitted by Applicable Law.
Lender shall be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22.
including. but not limited to. reasonable attorneys• fees and costs of title evidence.
H Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall execute or cause Trustee to execute written notice
of the occurrence of an event of default and of Lender's election to cause the Property to be sold, and shall
cause such notice to be recorded in each county in which any part of the Property is located. Lender or
Tnistee shaU mail copies of the notice as prescribed by Applicable Law to Borrower and to other persons
prescribed by Applicable Law. Trustee shall give public notice of sale to the persons and in the manner
prescribed by Applicable Law. After the time required by Applicable Law, Trustee, without demand on
Borrower, shall sell the Property at public auction to the highest bidder at the time and place and under the
terms designated in the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in any order Trustee determines. Trustee
may postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public announcement at the time and place of any
previously scheduled sale. Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale.
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property without any covenant
or warranty, expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the
truth of the statements made therein. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale in the following order:
(a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable Trustee's and attorneys' fees; (b) to all
sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the person or persons legally entitled to it.
23. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall request
Trustee to reconvey the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured
by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property without warranty to the person or
persons legally entitled to it Such person or persons shall pay any recordation costs. Lender may charge such
person or persons a fee for reconveying the Property, but only if the fee is paid to a third party (such as the Trustee)
for senrices rendered and the charging of the fee is pennitted under Applicable Law.
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24. Substitute Trustee. Lender may, for any reason or cause, from time to time remove Trustee and
appoint a successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor
trustee shall succeed to all the title, power and duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by Applicable Law.
25. Area and Location of Property. Either the Property is not more than forty acres in area or the
Property is located within an incorporated city or village.

BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this Security
lnsttument and in any Rider executed by Borrower and recorded with it.
Witnesses:

(Seal)
-Borrower

Mailing Address:

P.O. Box 36, Murphy, 10 83650

(Seal)
-Borrower

Mailing Address:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Seal)
-Borrower

Mailing Address:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Seal)
-Borrower

Mailing Address:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - [Space Below This Unr, For Acl<nowledgment} - - - - - - - - - - - - -

State of
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County of

§
§
§

CJL ~

Before me the undersigned authority, on this day persona1ly appeared

knmn1 to me (or proved to me through an identity card or other docwnent)

to be the person(s) whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instnnnent, and acknowledged to me that he/she/they
executed the same for the purposes iWiliiQVsideration therein expressed.
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& Eiden, P.A.
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820
Boise, ID 83701
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ATIN: Kimbell D. Gourley, Esq.

(Space above this line for Recorder's use)

ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST
Bank of the West , a California corporation ("Bank of the Wesr), the
beneficiary under that certain deed of trust executed by Karla Kay King Love, a
single individual, as grantor/trustor, in favor of Bank of the West, as beneficiary,
securing a promissory note in the original principal sum of $86,500.00, recorded
July 28, 2004, as instrument no. 248616, in the records of Owyhee County, Idaho
(the "Deed of Trust"), does hereby assign and transfer unto Gordon G. King and
Rose M. King, husband and wife, whose address is 1912.f King Lane. Murphy,
Idaho 83650, all right, title, and interest in and to the Deed of Trust, without Bank
of the West's warranties, express or implied, as to the priority of the Deed of
Trust, but with Bank of the West's warranty that it is the legal and lawful owner
and holder of the Deed of Trust and the promissory note and other loan
documents associated therewith.
DATED this (2. 'ti day of September, 2005.
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STATE OF HAWAII

)
: 55.

City &County of Honolulu )
On the f2t"' day of September, 2005, before me, the undersigned notary
public in and for said state, personally appeared
GARY v. KAWAMtJJO
,
known or identified to me to be the
A$SISTANJ VICE msioon
of First
Hawaiian Bank, the company that executed the within instrument or the person who
executed the same on behalf of said company, and acknowledged to me that said
company executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day
and year first above written.

No ary
blic for Hawaii
Residingat Honoluh..•
Commission expires: N

HI

dv 1 4 2005
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200- 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fuf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
v.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMP ANY,

Case No. CV-14-0278

DECLARATION OF RAYMOND JAYO
IN SUPPORT OF EXPARTE MOTION
FOR TEMORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER

Defendants.
Under penalty of perjury wider the laws of the state ofldaho, the undersigned declares:
I . I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in this action and am not
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and
could testify to them in a court proceeding.
2. I am a friend of the Plaintiffs and have used King Lane to get to Plaintiffs houses for more
than 5 years.
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3. On or Around August 21, 2014, someone installed a gate across King Lane. Prior to the
installation of this gate, there had never been any obstruction of the roadway or any
prohibition of access.
4. On or around August 22, 2014, I attempted to cross the gated roadway to get to John
Fuquay's house. Rose King confronted me and told me I was not allowed to use King
Lane to get to the Fuquay's house.
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY OF PERJURY.

Dated: August 27, 2014
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200- 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
V.

Case No. CV -14-0278

DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY IN
SUPPORT OF EX PARTE MOTION FOR
TEMORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Oregon, the undersigned declares:

Properties and Parties
1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this action. I am submitting this declaration in support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (the "Motion") preventing any of the
Defendants from blocking access to our property over King Lane.
2. A street map showing the general location of the area is attached as Exhibit "A" to the
Motion. An aerial map showing the Owyhee County Assessor's lot boundaries is attached
as Exhibit "B" to the Motion. A Google Earth map showing an aerial view and general
COMPLAINT- I
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road boundaries and identities of the affected parcel owners is attached as Exhibit "C" to
the Motion.
3. Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuquay
Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once part of the John Fuquay Parcel. The
legal description for the Clinton Fuquay Parcel is shown on the warranty deed attached as
Exhibit "D" to the Motion.
4. I own the parcel (the "John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the Clinton Fuquay
Parcel. The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the Trustee's Deed
dated October 13, 1989 attached as Exhibit "E" to the Motion (less the Clinton Fuquay
Parcel).
5. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel l ") located south of King Lane.
There are two parcels which were conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for
the Low Parcel 1 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F" to the
Motion.
6. Avco Financial Services of Idaho Falls, Inc. may claim some right, title or interest in the
Low Parcel 1 by virtue of a Real Estate Mortgage in the amount of $68,000 which was
recorded on or around March 18, 1996 as Owyhee county records no. 2183 73. The
Mortgage was executed by Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner, husband and wife
and encumbers Low Parcel 1. It is possible that this mortgage was paid but was never
released. A copy of the Mortgage is attached as Exhibit "G" to the Motion.
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7. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2") located south of King Lane.
Oreana Loop Road crosses the northwest corner of Low Parcel 2. The legal description
for the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "H" to
the Motion.
8. The Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 owns the parcel to the north of King
Lane (the "Heart K Ranch Parcel"). The legal description got the Heart K Ranch Parcel is
shown on the Gift Deed attached as Exhibit "I" to the Motion.
9. Gordon G. King and Rose M. King may claim some right, title or interest in the Heart K.

Ranch Parcel by virtue of a Deed of Trust in the amount of $86,500 in favor of One West
Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as Owyhee County records no. 248616 and
encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit
"J." The deed of trust was assigned to Gordon G. King and Rose M. King on September
12, 2005. A copy of the Assignment of Deed of Trust is attached as Exhibit "K" to the
Motion.
10. First American Title Insurance Company may claim some right, title or interest in the
Heart K. Ranch Parcel by virtue of being named as the trustee under a Deed of Trust in the
amount of $86,500 in favor of One West Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as
Owyhee County records no. 248616 and encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy
of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit "J" to the Motion.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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11. The properties at issue in this Complaint are located in Owyhee County, Idaho. They are
located approximately three miles east of Oreana and are south of Highway 78. The
closest public roadway to the properties is Oreana Loop Road.
12. Oreana Loop road runs in a generally west direction from Highway 78 to a point near a
location where Low Parcels 1 and 2 and the Heart K Ranch Parcels intersect. Near that
location, Oreana Loop Road turns and continues in a southwesterly direction through Low
Parcel 1.
13. King Lane is a private roadway that continues westerly from where Oreana Loop Road
turns southwest Oreana Loop Road and provides the access to the Clint Fuquay Parcel and
the John Fuquay Parcel.
14. The Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay
Parcel since at least 1989.
15. King Lane has been an unobstructed roadway used by Plaintiffs and the general public
since at least 1989.
Blockage of King Lane by Defendants

16. On or Around August 21, 2014, one or all of the Defendants installed gates across King
Lane to prevent us from accessing King Lane to our properties. One gate was installed at
the northeast corner of the Clinton Fuquay Parcel and a second gate was installed near the
intersection of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
17. Pictures of the gated area are attached as Exhibit "K" to the Motion.
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18. On or around August 22, 2014, a friend of ours, Raymond Jayco, attempted to cross the
gated roadway to get to our house. Rose King confronted the friend and told him he was
not allowed to use King Lane to access our property.

19. We are in immediate need of access to their properties over King Lane.
20. The gates interfere with norm.al delivery services used by Plaintifls such as Federal
Express, UPS and Schwann's.
21. The gates interfere with Plaintiffs' access to emergency services such as police, fire and
ambulance services.
22. Defendants' installation of the gate across King Lane was done after this lawsuit was
filed, and we were not consulted prior to the installation of the gate. None of the
Defendants will be harmed or damaged by allowing us to continue the same uninterrupted
access over King Lane that we have used for 25 years. Therefore, we should not be
required to post a bond for the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order.
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE
Y.
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENAL TY OF PE

Dated: August 27, 2014
John FuquaY,
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l

Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200- 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fuf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No. CV-14-0278

DECLARATION OF MATTHEW
CLEVERLEY IN SUPPORT OF EX
PARTE MOTION FOR TEMORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER

Defendants.
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state ofldaho, the undersigned declares:
1. I am the attorney for Plaintiffs in this matter.
2. I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in this action and am not
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and
could testify to them in a court proceeding.
3. This case was filed on August 11, 2014. The Summons and Complaints for each named
party were sent for service shortly after that. I have received confirmation that First
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American Title has been served, but I have not received confirmation of service on any of
the other defendants.
4. I have not received any communications from any of the defendants or any attorneys for
the defendants. I do not have phone numbers for any of the defendants.
5. On September 3, 2014, my office overnighted copies of the Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and exhibits, Declaration of John Fuquay, Declaration of Raymond
Jayco, Declaration of Matthew Cleverley and the proposed Order to each of the
defendants to give them notice of the motion.
6. Because the blocking of the roadway presents an immediate threat to the health and safety
of Plaintiffs because it blocks emergency vehicles, and a delay in giving notice to the
defendants creates an undue risk, I believe that entry of the Order is appropriate without
additional notice to defendants.
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY OF PERJURY.

Dated: September 3, 2014
Matthew Cleverley
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RONALD P. RAINEY -ISB # 1022
Attorneys at Law
110 North Ninth Avenue
Post Office Box 26
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Telephone:
(208) 459-3659
Facsimile:
(208) 459-9067 or 459-6147

FiL~~ P.M.

____AM.. .

SEP O9 2014

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
VS.

)

)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
)
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendants.
)

GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
HEARTKRANCHTRUSTUTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
Counterclaimants,
vs.

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS
BY DEFENDANTS TRUSTEES FOR
THE HEART KING RANCH TRUST
UT A DECEMBER 28, 2012

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, the Defendants, GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ROSE M. KING, as
Beneficiary,bothonbehalfoftheHEARTKRANCHTRUSTUTADECEMBER28,2012HEART
K RANCH (hereinafter, "Heart K Ranch"), by and through its attorney of record, Ronald P. Rainey,
and in response to the complaint of the Plaintiffs, answers, alleges, denies and counterclaims as
follows:

I.
FIRST DEFENSE

1.

The Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted.
II.

SECOND DEFENSE

2.

Unless specifically admitted herein, The Defendant Heart K Ranch denies each and

every allegation contained in the Plaintiffs' complaint. The Defendant Heart K Ranch specifically
responds to the numbered allegations of the complaint as follows:
3.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits the nature of the proceeding, as alleged in

paragraph 1 of the complaint, but denies the validity of those claims as later specifically alleged
within the complaint.
4.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch denies the allegations made in paragraph 2 of the

complaint as made specifically to it concerning "parcels of property that are burdened by King
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Lane," and further denies all allegations as to any burden of any easement, as alleged in that
paragraph. The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without specific knowledge to admit or deny the
allegations as to property it does not own or occupy and therefore denies the same on that basis.
5.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits the allegation made in paragraph 3 that the

Plaintiffs' claims seek neither monetary damages nor to change any property boundaries. The
Defendant Heart K Ranch denies the allegation that the Plaintiffs have any "right" to access their
properties over King Lane, as alleged in that paragraph.
6.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits that the general location of the properties is as

alleged in paragraph 4 of the complaint.
7.

In response to paragraph 5 ofthe complaint the Defendant Heart K Ranch only admits

that the referenced Exhibits, "A," "B,", and "C," are attached to the complaint, but does not
otherwise admit or deny the genuineness or accuracy ofthose documents, and specifically relies upon
the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36(a) declaring that, "The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document
attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make
a verified denial thereof by a responsive pleading or affidavit."
8.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the

allegation made in paragraph 6 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal
description attached as Exhibit "D" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or
accuracy ofthat document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R. C .P. 36(a) declaring that,
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive
pleading or affidavit."
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9.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the

allegation made in paragraph 7 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal
description attached as Exhibit "E" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or
accuracy ofthat document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36(a) declaring that,
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive
pleading or affidavit."
10.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the

allegation made in paragraph 8 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal
description attached as Exhibit "F" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or
accuracy ofthat document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36(a) declaring that,
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive
pleading or affidavit."
11.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the

allegation made in paragraph 9 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal
description attached as Exhibit "G" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or
accuracy ofthat document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36(a) declaring that,
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive
pleading or affidavit."
12.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the
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allegation made in paragraph 10 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal
description attached as Exhibit "H" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or
accuracy of that document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36(a) declaring that,
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive
pleading or affidavit."
13.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits the allegations made in paragraph 11 of the

complaint, and as to the legal description attached as Exhibit "I'' to the complaint, does not admit
or deny the genuineness or accuracy of that document, and specifically relies upon the provision of
l.R.C.P. 36(a) declaring that, "The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a
pleading shall not be deemed as admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified
denial thereof by a responsive pleading or affidavit."
14.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the

allegation made in paragraph 12 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal
description attached as Exhibits "J" and "K" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the
genuineness or accuracy of those documents, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P.
36(a) declaring that, "The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading
shall not be deemed as admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial
thereof by a responsive pleading or affidavit."
15.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the

allegation made in paragraph 13 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal
description attached as Exhibit "J" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or
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accuracy ofthat document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36(a) declaring that,
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive
pleading or affidavit."
16.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits the allegations made in paragraphs 14 and 15

of the complaint.
17.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits that King Lane is a private roadway as alleged

in paragraph 16 of the complaint that continues westerly from where Oreana Loop Road turns
southwest, and further admits that King Lane provides "an" access to the Cling Fuquay Parcel and
the John Fuquay Parcel as alleged in that paragraph of the complaint.
18.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny

whether the Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Cling Fuquay Parcel and John Fuquay
Parcels since at least 1989, as alleged in paragraph 17 of the complaint, and therefore deny the same.
19.

The Defendant Heart K Ranch denies the allegations made in paragraph 18 of the

complaint, and further responds that while the footnote attached to paragraph 18 of the complaint
may or may not be a correct statement of the law, it does not apply to the facts of this case, and
therefore in response to the allegations of paragraph 18 denies the application of that statement of
the law to the facts of this case, if so intended to be alleged in that paragraph.
20.

The Defendant Herat K Ranch denies the allegations made in paragraph 19 of the

complaint.
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III.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

As declared in, Fuhriman v. State Dept. ofTransportation, 143 Idaho 800, 15 3 P. 3d 480, 483
(2007), under I.R.C.P. 8(c), "An affirmative defense is '[al defendant's assertion raisin& new

facts and amments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff's or prosecution's claim, even if all
alleeations in the complaint are true.' Blacks Law Dictionary 186 (2d Pocket ed.2001)."
(emphasis added). Therefore, this answering defendant, "Heart K Ranch," as declared and described
above in the opening paragraphs of in this I.R.C.P. 7(a) pleading, further alleges the following
affirmative defenses to the Fuquay Plaintiffs' claims, as made in this complaint:
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

21.

A "trust" is not itself a separate legal entity that can itself own property, or that can

be named as a party in a lawsuit under Idaho law, but instead, a ''trust" merely describes a
relationship having certain attributes. See e.g., In re Thompson, 454 B.R. 486,492 (Bkrtcy.D.Ida.
2011) (citing Idaho case law). Therefore, the Fuquay Plaintiffs' claims must fail as having been only
alleged against directly against the Heart K Ranch Trust itself, rather than having been brought and
alleged against the trustees of that trust.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

22.

Gordon King, was named as a "coparty" Defendant by the Plaintiffs to this action,

but was actually deceased on the date the complaint commencing this action was filed, August 11,
2014, and therefore could not be named as a party Defendant in this civil action. Inasmuch as the
claims placed at issue by the Fuquay Plaintiffs' complaint appear to survive Gordon King's death
without the need of substitution, and as further provided by I.R.C.P. 25(a)(2), "The death shall be
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suggested upon the record and the action shall proceed in the favor or against the surviving parties."
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
23.

Inasmuch as Gilbert King is the sole trustee of the Herat K Ranch Trust, and he has

not been named as a defendant in this action in a representative capacity under LR. C.P. 17(b), in his
standing as trustee of the Heart K Ranch, the Fuquay Plaintiffs' claims must fail as having been only
alleged directly against the Heart K Ranch Trust itself, rather than having been brought and alleged
against the trustee of that trust.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
24.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has been entirely permissive, and not by,
or under, any claim of right.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
25.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has NOT BEEN open and notorious, as
is required as one of the five elements that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence in order
to establish a prescriptive easement.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
26.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has NOT BEEN continuous and
uninterrupted, as is required as one of the five elements that must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence in order to establish a prescriptive easement.
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SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

27.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has NOT BEEN adverse and under a claim
of right, as is required as one of the five elements that must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence in order to establish a prescriptive easement.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

28.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has NOT BEEN with the actual or imputed
knowledge of the owner of the servient estate, as is required as one of the five elements that must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence in order to establish a prescriptive easement.
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

29.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has NOT BEEN for the applicable
statutory period, as is required as one of the five elements that must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence in order to establish a prescriptive easement.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

30.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has in fact been undertaken in common
with the servient landowner over which King Lane passes.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

31.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has been without the knowledge or adverse
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and prescriptive claim sufficient to place the servient landowner on notice of that claim so as to have
the opportunity to assert his or her rights against the development of an easement by prescription.
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

32.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint did not meet the necessary requirements
of a prescriptive right before the change in the statutory adverse period to twenty years in 2006, such
that any prescriptive right claim must be established by a use that has persisted for a period of
twenty years.
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

33.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint, was of a limited character and use, as
undertaken by a limited number of individuals and vehicles, such that any prescriptive right that
might be recognized is limited to the nature and use established by that limited number of individuals
and vehicles that persisted during the prescriptive use period.
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

34.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint is limited in scope and purpose. to the
length, width, location, and character of the prescriptive easement during the period of prescriptive
use.
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

35.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint DID NOT constitute an invasion or
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infringement upon the rights of the servient owner over which King Lane crossed, and therefore no
presumption arose that the use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs was in any way adverse to the to
servient owners, as a necessary element of their prescriptive easement claim.
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

36.

Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest,

at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint was only occasional and sporadic and
therefore did not rise to the level of use required to meet the requirement of "continuous and
uninterrupted use" that is necessary to establish a prescriptive easement.
IV.
COUNTERCLAIMS
GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

37.

The Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants John E. Fuquay, Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey

Rose Fuquay (hereinafter, "the Fuquays") previously used King Lane in common with the
Defendants and the Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants. The Fuquays use of King Lane was infrequent
and sporadic and mostly for incidental residential use, such as taking their children to school.
38.

Recently the Fuquays use of King Lane changed dramatically both as to frequency

and type of use, by increasing that use to almost daily use and from use by passenger vehicles to very
heavy commercial trucks used in hauling commercial construction materials.
39.

As a result of this change in use the nature and extent of the prior permissive use that

the Fuquays had been allowed by the Defendants in this action, and particularly by the Heart K.
Ranch Counterclaimants, has been greatly exceeded.
40.

The Fuquays have no right to make use of King Lane for the uses that they are
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currently making ofthat access road by use oflarge commercial trucks on a daily basis, either by way
of the scope of permissive use, nor by way of any prescriptive right.
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM
DECLARATORY RELIEF

41.

The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants reallege all of the foregoing as if fully set forth

42.

The Idaho Declaratory Judgments Act, I.C. § 10-1201 et seq., provides for the

herein.

determination of rights, status, and other legal relations between parties to an action, including the
interpretation of contracts (I.C. § 10-1203), deeds, and other writings (I.C. § 10-12012), and also
provides that the court may grant either negative or affirmative relief (I.C. § 10-1201 ), or such other
relief as may be requested between the parties (I.C. § 10-1205).
4 3.

Further relief may be granted on a petition for declaratory judgment whenever deemed

necessary or proper (LC. § 10-1208), whether or nor that further relief has been, is, or could be
claimed (I.C. § 10-1201).
44.

The Court can, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights will be

adjudicated by the proposed declaratory judgment, to show cause why further relief should not be
granted. (I.C. § 10-1208).
45.

The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants seek declaratory relief establishing that the

Fuquays Counterdefendants have exceeded the nature and scope oftheir permissive right to use King
Lane for ordinary and infrequent residential use.
46.

The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants seek declaratory relief establishing that the

Fuquay Counterdefendants have no legal or equitable right to use King Lane for the current uses
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being made of that access by means of large commercial trucks on an almost daily basis.
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM
PERMANENT INJUNCTION

47.

The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants reallege all ofthe foregoing as if fully set forth

48.

As alleged in the general factual allegations supporting these counterclaims, the

herein.

actions of the Fuquay Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants in using King Lane as it crosses the property of
the Heart K Ranch is in direct violation of the protectable property rights of the legal and equal
ownership rights held by the owners of Heart King Ranch.
49.

There is no adequate remedy at law for the injury that is being inflicted by the actions

and conduct of the Fuquay Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants.
50.

Unless enjoined the continued actions and conduct of the Fuquay Plaintiffs/

Counterdefendants will produce great irreparable injury upon the Defendants/Counterclaimants.
51.

When the right at issue has is clearly defined, and the possibility of future and on-

going interference remains, then the entry of a permanent injunction is the appropriate remedy.
52.

A permanent injunction is an especially appropriate remedy when the transgressing

party retains the means of promptly resuming a prohibited practice, even if he declares that he no
longer intends to do so.
53.

A permanent injunction can be granted under Rule 65(e), I.R.C.P., "When it appears

by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief, or any part
thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the actions complained of ...
perpetually.
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54.

The bond requirement under Rule 65(c) only applies to "restraining orders" or

"preliminary injunction[s]" such that no bond is required for the issuance of a permanent injunction.
55.

The Fuquay Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, including their employees, invitees, agents,

and other representatives should be ordered and restrained by entry of permanent injunction as
follows:
a.

From any entry onto, or use of, King Lane by means of any motor vehicle,
whatsoever, as the private roadway is owned by and held out only for the use of, the
Heart K Ranch and its invitees; and

b.

From any in any way, or by any means, interfering with or obstructing the gates,
chains, or any locks, or other hardware related to the structure and operation of those
gates, which may have been placed across the entries to King Lane; and

c.

By undertaking to obstruct, by any means, or to molest or harass the users, in the
rightful use of King Lane by the owners and invitees of Heart K Ranch.
THIRD COUNTERCLAIM
QUIET TITLE

56.

The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants reallege all of the foregoing as if fully set forth

57.

The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants request a determination that no prescriptive or

herein.

adverse rights exist in King Lane as it crosses their property, and that a decree quieting title in them,
and extinguishing any such claims, or easements, be entered by this Court, such as can be recorded
in the land title records of Owyhee County.
WHEREFORE, this Court is requested to entered judgment for the Defendant/
Counterclaimants Heart K Ranch, as set forth below:
1.

Denying all the claims made by the Fuquay Plaintiffs in this action.
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2.

Granting the Heart K. Ranch declaratory relief as requested in this action.

3.

Granting the Heart K Ranch a permanent injunction as requested in this action.

4.

Quieting titled in the Heart K. Ranch as requested in this action.

5.

For such other relief as this Court may find is merited in this action.

Respectfully submitted

tru:fZ--

day of September, 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

t?

day of September, 2014,a true and correct copy of
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
the foregoing document was served upon tliefullowing:

Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law GROUP
1200 6th A venue, Suite 620
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone:
206-224-6003
Facsimile:
877-655-5281
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf.com

[ ]
[ ]

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Other - - - - - - - - - -
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RONALD P. RAINEY TSB #1022
Attorney ut Luw

P.O. Box 26
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Phone (208)459-3659
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K. Rnnch Trust UTA December 28, 2012
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD,
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
vs.
)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.
)
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING )
R9SE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendants.
)

______________
GILBERT KING, u~ Trustee; and
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,

DECLARATION OF

ENICE

COLLEIT IN SUPPO

OF DEFENDANT'S
TIFFS' EX-PARTE

OBJECTIONTOPLA
MOTION FOR TEM

RARY
RESTRAINING ORD R

)

)
)
)

)
)

)
Counterclaimants,

)
)

vs.

)
)

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD

)
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FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY )
)

Counterdefendants.

)
)
)

______________

Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Jdaho, the ndersigned declares:

t.

I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in t is action and am not
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events · this declaration and
could testify to them in a court proceeding.

2.

I reside on Collett Lane, Orennn, Idt1ho nnd huve been " bu::1 driv r for the Grundview

School DiRtrict for 33_years.
3.

I start my bus route at my residence by driving down Collett L nc to Oreana Loop,

driving west on Oreana Loop to the Fuquay mail box where I pick up

_.,.,0.""'4-«_,.,..,,4 .......,
(7

0

___

Fuquay, son of J.C. Fuquay. l proceed west on

reana Loop through

the village of Oreana up to the west end of Oreana Loop and High ay 78 east to the east
of Oreana Loop where I make another stop. J do not make a sch ol bus stop at Kings
Lane. When I return the children home, I reverse the route on Orea a Loop and Highway
78 dropping off

•/. -

on Collett L.rne.

~

Fuquay at the Fuquay mailbox and tlle1 I go to my residence

~

~

~

.

7, I V ~ ~
c<.X.

~,aA-

"' (7/

·

.~

~

!JC.

.

d-

~ ~ ~

,_.~.

I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO HE LAW OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AN CORRECT.
Dated this <j' day of September, 2014.

Denice Collett
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I. Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certify that on this_ day of Sept· nber, 2014, J caused
a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be delivered to the dverse party, via the

method indicated below, addressed as follows:

_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

_Facsimile Transmission

Delivery

Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 020
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone: 206-224-6003
Facsimile: "'77-655~5281
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf,com
Ronald P. Rainey l
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RONALD P. RAINEY ISB #1022
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 26
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Phone (208)459-3659
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K. Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD,
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
)
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING )
)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
)
GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and
)
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
)
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
)
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
)
)
Counterclaimants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)

Case No. CV-2014-0278
AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING

_______________
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FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY )
)

Counterdefendants.

)
)

________________.)
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Owyhee

)
) ss:
)

Rose King, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am one of the defendants\counterclaimants in the above-entitled matter, I am over

the age of majority, and I make this Affidavit based upon facts within my own personal
knowledge.
2.

My deceased husband, Gordon King and I purchased our ranch which included

King Lane on September 17, 1973. At the time of purchase, King Lane was only a path through
grass and weeds. My husband and I constructed what is now King Lane, an all weather road.
We use this road several times a day in our family and ranching operation.
I later named this road King Lane.
3.

Attached to this affidavit are true and correct copies of photographs that I recently

took of the area in question concerning King Lane, Castle Lane, the gates on King Lane, and the
current location of the school bus stop, where children who attend the local school are picked up
and dropped off. Each individual photo is captioned as to what it reveals
DATED This 9th day of September, 2014.

-L~
~ff

Rose King
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

6

I, Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certify that on this
day of September, 2014, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrumen~livered to the adverse party,
via the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
X U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Facsimile Transmission _Hand Delivery
Matthew ·R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone: 206-224-6003
Facsimile: *77-655-5281
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf.com
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View of the East Gate to King Lane
Looking to the West

View of the East Gate to King Lane
Looking to the West

90

Current West Gate to King Lane Being Constructed
Looking to the West

Area of the Current West Gate to King Lane Before Construction
Which Indicates the Location of the Former Wire Gate

91

View of Castle Lane
All Weather Surface Road
Looking to the North from its
Intersection with Oreana
Loop Road

View of Castle Lane
All Weather Surface Road
Looking to the North

92

Entry to Castle Lane All-Weather Surface Road from the Oreana Loop Road
Looking to the North

Mail Boxes at the Intersection of the Oreana Loop Road and Castle Lane School Bus Stop
Looking to the South

93

View of the Castle Lane All-Weather Surface Road
Looking to the North

View of the Castle Lane All-Weather Surface Road
Looking to the North

94

RONALD P. RAINEY - ISB # 1022
Attorneys at Law
110 North Ninth Avenue
Post Office Box 26
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Telephone:
(208) 459-3659
Facsimile:
(208) 459-9067 or 459-6147
Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

)

vs.

)
)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
)
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendants.
)

GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
Counterclaimants,

AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT KING

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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VS.

)

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY
Counterdefendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Canyon

)
)
)
)
)

)
) ss.
) ·

GILBERT KING, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:

1.

I am a party in the above-captioned action, over the age of majority, competent to

testify, and I make this affidavit upon personal knowledge.
2.

Attached as Exhibit A to this affidavit is a true and correct copy of a "Bing Map" as

obtained and downloaded from the Internet, which provides an accurate representation of the Oreana
Loop Road.
3.

State Highway 78 is highlighted in yellow on Exhibit A with the Oreana Loop Road

itself highlighted in green. King Lane is highlighted in orange and another access from the Oreana
Loop Road to King Lane that is known as Castle Lane is highlighted in blue. Although the size of
this map does not reveal the actual location of the connection, the Oreana Loop road connects with
State Highway 78 at both ends of that loop road.
4.

Attached as Exhibit B to this affidavit is a true and correct copy of the same "Bing

Map" in a closer view, which reveals the actual names of the roadways in question, but this closer
view no longer reveals the location of State highway 78 to the north.
5.

Attached as Exhibit C to this affidavit is a true correct copy of an Owyhee County

reference map which shows the same area with a an overlay of sections, quarter sections, and
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indications of townships and ranges.
6.

I have indicated the approximate location of the Fuquay Plaintiffs' properties on

Exhibit B.
7.

As indicated on Exhibit B, the approximate length of King Lane is Yi mile, whereas

Castle Lane has a length of approximately 1 3/4 miles.
8.

As should be apparent from the maps that have been attached to this affidavit, and

by the photographs attached to Rose King's affidavit, and by the other declarations that have been
made and submitted by affected parties in this action, the Fuquay Plaintiffs property is neither
landlocked, nor dependent upon the use of King Lane in order to access their property, but instead
is readily accessible for all purposes by the all weather Castle Lane road.
9.

The Fuquay Plaintiffs have no legal right to compel the continued use of the private

King Lane, which use has at all times has been entirely permissive.
10.

In the absence of any demonstrated necessity, or any manifest adverse claim, the

Fuquay Plaintiffs have no right to any continued use of King Lane.
11.

Because King Lane is an entirely private roadway, as the owners of that roadway, the

Heart K Ranch is entirely within its rights to place gates across that entries to that roadway in order
to limit and restrict its use the owners, their invitees, and other given express permission.
12.

I have received neither written nor oral notice from the Plaintiff's attorney explaining

what the nature and extent of any "immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage" that will result
to the Fuquay Plaintiffs ifa Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) is not issued, without first allowing
our attorney to be heard in opposition to the issuance of that requested order.
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.
Further affiant sayeth not.

SUBSCRIBED ANO SWORN to before me this ~eptember, 2014.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho
My Commission expires: /.ft

7

.

/;;r,/9 C/ff'
;,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this r/ day of September, 2014,a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served upon th~ following:

rr

Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law GROUP
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
[ ]
Seattle, Washington 9810 l
[ ]
[ ]
Telephone:
206-224-6003
Facsimile:
877-655-5281
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf.com

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Other - - - - - - - - - -
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RONALD P. RAINEY -ISB # 1022
Attorneys at Law
110 North Ninth A venue

Post Office Box 26
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Telephone:
(208) 459-3659
Facsimile:
(208) 459-9067
Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

)
Plaintiffs.

)

)
vs.

)

AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD P. RAINEY

)

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
)
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendants.

)

)

GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and

)

ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA

)

DECEMBER28, 2012,
Counterclaimants.

)
)
)
)
)
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vs.
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD

T-518 P003/004 F-663

)
)
)

FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY )
)
Counterdefendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Canyon

) ss.
)

)

RONALD P. RAINEY, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:
1.

I am counsel for the Defendant and Counterclaimant, Heart K. Ranch Trust, in the

above-captioned action, am over the age of majority, competent to testify, and I make this affidavit

upon personal knowledge.

2.

On or about _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (date) Gilbert King provided to me the Plaintiff

Fuquay' s paper's in request for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
3.

At no time since the serve of those papers, has the attorney for the Fuquay Plaintiffs,

Matthew Cleverly, made any attempt to contact any of the King Defendants, nor has he provided to
this Court, as required by I.R.C.P. 65(b), an explanation of the efforts, if any, that he has made and
the reasons why notice should not be required before the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
4.

As supported by the complaint filed in this action, the Fuquay Plaintiffs have no

colorable right to the claimed prescriptive easement, nor will they suffer any "immediate and
irreparable harm," in the absence of the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
5.

As supported by the Affidavit of Gilbert King, the Fuquays have had at all times

immediate and adequate access to their property through alternate routes, primarily Castle Lane.
6.

Because the Fuqauy Plaintiffs have not established the requirements for the issuance
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of either a TRO or a preliminary injunction under I.R.C.P. 65(c), their motion should be denied.
Further affiant sayeth not.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~y of September, 2014.
··'I
/,
J

i~.

Notary Publi
Residing at

or Idaho
,..p.,,, , Idaho
My Commission expires: 117-tlf---J/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this~ day of September, 2014,a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served upon the following:

Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law GROUP
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, Washington 98IOI
Telephone:
206-224-6003
Facsimile:
877-655-5281
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@inf.cQ_m

[;,<.]
[ ]

[ ]
( ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Other - - - - - - - - -
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T-528 P002/003 F-683

FROM-

RONALD P. RAINEY ISB #1022
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 26

Flt.ED

,J.t.Sl_A.i,.1. ___ PJ.Ji.

110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Phone (208)459-3659
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067

SEP 15 201~
A~
f(JGG~"IJ!
A
~
1_r; ,-.r::.,:,··
.....
~, .......
. ,t.,
Depuf\. Clerk · -

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K. Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD,
FUQUAY and IWLEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-0278

DECLARATION OF SCHWANN
DELIVERY PERSON

)

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,

_______________
Defendants.

GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and

ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
Counterclaimants,

vs.

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
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FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY

)
)

)

Counterdefendants.

_________________))
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the undersigned declares:

1.

I am over the age of 18. I am not related

to

any of the parties in this action and am not

involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and

could testify to them in a court proceeding.
2.

I have been delivering Schwann products to people in the Oreana area for approximately
five years.

3.

I have delivered Schwann products to John Fuquay and Clinton and Hailey Fuquay by
traveling up Oreana Loop Road then Castle Lane to their residences. The road was
completely passable allowing me to travel it all year round. I was prevented from using
this road when the gate was locked across Castle Road. I would still use Castle Road
to make deliveries if the locked gate was not there.
I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO THE LAW OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

Dated this IZ'.,..L,..day of September, 2014.

Shawn~r...>
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, 19/16/2014
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TUE

FAX

~005/007

FILED

S. BRYCE FARRIS

~.M._.____ P.M.

[ldilho State Bar No. S636]

SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Golden Eagle Building
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110
P. 0. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 629-7447
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com

SEP 16 2014

Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY;

Case No. CV-2014-0278

Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF SUSIE LOW
vs.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY;
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
AI
) ss.
County of l:J.!j
)

Susie Low being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says that:
1.

I am over the age of 18 and I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge

and I am competent to testify to the matters contained herein.
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2.

FAX

~006/007

I have lived at 21101 Oreana Loop Road in Murphy, Idaho since September of2005

and I am familiar with the roadway located on or between the property currently owned by Heart
K Ranch Trust and the property currently owned by myself and my husband which as been
referenced in this matter as "Kings Lane."
3.

Since I have lived there, and during my observations of the roadway referenced as

"Kings Lane" there has always been a minimum of two gates across the roadway which have been
closed to prevent livestock from roaming onto and off of the property owned by Heart K Ranch
Trust. Any person attempting to utilize the roadway has had to stop, open and close the gates.
~

DATEDthis

;r

day,of

~~~ ,2014.

Susie Low
Sworn to and subscribed before me this

i£fa; of

fUN"6.r, 2014.

otary Public for ldaho

Residing in /lkrllk, Idaho
My Commission Expires:

?../:'~C:::
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the
following on this &day of September, 2014 by the following method:

MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 - 61h Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: {206) 224-6003
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

RONALD P. RAINEY
RONALD P. RAINING PA
110 N. 9th Ave.
PO Box 26
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026
Telephone: (208) 459-3659
Facsimile; (208) 459-9067
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and Rose
King

[ ><J U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
LJ Federal Express

Ll

Hand Delivery
L] Facsimile
[x] Electronic Mail or CM/ECF
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U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid
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Lt] Electronic Mail or CM/ECF
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[Idaho State Bar No. 5636]

SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Golden Eagle Building
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110
P. 0. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83 707
Telephone: (208) 629-7447
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY;

Case No. CV-2014-0278

Plaintiffs,
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS SUSIE
AND CAL LOW AND COUNTERCLAIM

VS.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY;
Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter collectively referred to as
'"Low"), by and through their attorneys of record, Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC, and hereby answers
Plaintiffs' Complaint, and complains and alleges as follows:
The Lows hereby deny each allegation contained in the Complaint unless specifically
admitted herein.
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1.

With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the first

sentence of the paragraph appears to be a statement by Plaintiffs and to which no response from the
Lows is required.

To the extent, a response is required or necessary, the allegations and

characterizations contained therein are denied. With regard to the second sentence of paragraph 1
the Lows deny the allegations contained therein and affirmatively assert that the properties of
Plaintiffs are not accessed, and have not been historically accessed via the disputed roadway which
Plaintiffs have referred to as King Lane.
2.

With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the

paragraphs appears to be statements by Plaintiffs and to which no response from the Lows is
required. To the extent, a response is required or necessary, the allegations and characterizations
contained therein are denied.
3.

With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Lows

admit the allegations contained therein.
4.

With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Lows

admit that Exhibits A, B and C appear to show the general area of the properties in dispute but the
Lows deny the remainder ofthe characterizations or allegations contained therein or which have been
imposed upon said Exhibits by Plaintiffs.
5.

With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the

Lows are without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny the allegations contained
therein and therefore the allegations or characterizations are denied. The Lows affirmatively assert
that the documents referenced in said paragraphs speak for themselves.
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6.

With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 8 and 10 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the

Lows admit that the Lows own certain real property located south of'"King Lane" and that Exhibits
F and H contain legal descriptions of said real property. The Lows deny any further allegations or
characterizations contained therein.
7.

With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Lows

deny that Avco Financial Services of Idaho Falls, Inc. claims an interest in the real property
identified in Exhibit F and affirmatively assert that any interest of Avco Financial Services ofldaho
Falls, Inc. has been satisfied and paid.

The Lows deny any further allegations or characterizations

contained therein.
8.

With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of Plaintiffs'

Complaint, such allegations appear to be directed towards other parties to this action and the Lows
are without sufficient knowledge or information to admit the allegations and therefore deny the
allegations or characterizations contained therein.
9.

With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 14 and 15 of Plaintiffs' Complaint,

the Lows admit the allegations contained therein.
10.

With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 16, 17, 18 and 19 of Plaintiffs'

Complaint, the Lows deny the allegations contained therein.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

The following defenses are not necessarily stated separately as to each claim for relief or
allegation made by Plaintiffs' Complaint. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where
appropriate, to any and all of Plaintiffs' claims for relief. In addition, the Lows, in asserting the
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following defenses, does not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained
in the defenses are upon the Lows but, to the contrary, assert that by reason of denials and/or by
reason of relevant statutory and case authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of
the defenses and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the
defenses is upon Plaintiffs. Moreover, in asserting any defense, the Lows do not admit any
responsibility or liability of the Lows but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations
or responsibility and liability in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to State a Claim)
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Waiver, Estoppel, Laches, Consent and Unclean Hands)
Plaintiffs are prevented from recovering damages or relief sought, if any, pursuant to laches,
waiver, estoppel, abandonment, consent and unclean hands.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Permissive Use)
Any claimed easement or right-of-way by Plaintiffs was not adverse, was at most permissive,
and was not for the prescriptive period as required by I.C. sections 5-203 et seq.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Mitia=ate and Preventative)
The Lows deny that any relief alleged or requested by Plaintiffs in this action are appropriate
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but Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate by reason of Plaintiffs failure to properly secure access to
Plaintiffs' property via alternative routes which have been historically used to access Plaintiffs'
property and which do not involve access across or over the property of Lows.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Reservation of Additional Affirmative Defenses)

The Lows reserve the right to amend this Answer to assert additional defenses or abandon
affirmative defenses once discovery has been completed.
COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

As a result of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Lows have retained attorneys to defend the
Complaint and are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs against Plaintiffs pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-121, and any other applicable statute or rule.
COUNTERCLAIM

COMES NOW, the Lows/Defendants/Counter-Claimant, and as a Counterclaim against the
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendant, complains and alleges as follows:

1.

Counter-Defendants own real property in Owyhee County, Idaho adjacent to the real property

owned by Counter-Claimant. Said real property is more particularly described in the Complaint filed
by Counter-Defendants which initiated this action and which relates to the roadway referred to in
said Complaint as Kings Lane.

2.

Counter-Defendants use of their property has resulted in Counter-Defendants' livestock

damaging fences between the property of Counter-Claimant and Counter-Defendants. CounterDefendants have also failed to control their livestock to prevent damage to Counter-Claimant's
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fences and other property and from coming onto Counter-Claimant's property without the consent
of Counter-Claimant.
3.

Counter-Defendants have allowed other animals, namely dogs, debris and trash from

Counter-Defendant's property to come onto Counter-Claimant's property or to be deposited on
Counter-Claimant's property without the consent of Counter-Claimant.
4.

Counter-Defendants use of the roadway, referred to as Kings Lane, has exceeded the scope

of any historic use and Counter-Defendants are using the roadway for hauling livestock and with
large trucks which did not and have not historically used Kings Lane for access to the CounterDefendants' real property and there has been no prescriptive or historic use of said roadway by these
large trucks.

Such use by Counter-Defendants, which is beyond the scope of any prior use, is

causing damage to the roadway, culverts and bridges and causing additional maintenance which
would not be necessary but for Counter-Defendants' unauthorized use.
COUNT ONE - TRESPASS
5.

Counter-Claimant incorporates all of the foregoing allegations set forth in this Counterclaim

as though fully set forth herein.
6.

Counter-Defendants have exceeded the scope of any historic use of Kings Lane causing

additional maintenance and damage to the roadway, bridge and culverts for said roadway. Such
unauthorized use, beyond an prior, historic or prescriptive use, exceeds the scope of any rights of
Counter-Defendants and results in an illegal trespass upon the property of Counter-Claimant.
7.

Counter-Defendants have allowed their personal property, consisting oflivestock, dogs, trash

and debris to trespass onto Counter-Claimant's property without the consent of Counter-Claimant.
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Counter-Defendants have allowed such trespass to continue and have failed to take necessary actions
to control the use or trespass on Counter-Claimant's property.

Counter-Defendants have also

allowed livestock to damage fences of Counter-Claimants and have failed to take necessary action
to control said livestock and prevent the unnecessary damage to Counter-Claimant's property and
fences.
8.

As a result of Counter-Defendants' trespass, Counter-Claimants have been damaged in an

amount to be proven at trial, including all costs and attorney fees incurred for prosecuting this action.
COUNT TWO - INJUNCTION AND AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF

9.

Counter-Claimant incorporates all of the foregoing allegations set forth in this Counterclaim

as though fully set forth herein.

10.

The unauthorized use and/or trespass by Counter-Defendants is in violation of Counter-

Claimant's property rights and Counter-Claimant is entitled to an order enjoining CounterDefendants from any further trespass and an order which mandates that Counter-Defendants control
their personal property, including livestock and dogs, to prevent such property from damaging
Counter-Claimant and/or from trespassing on Counter-Claimant's property.
11.

Counter-Claimant is entitled to an order from this Court compelling Counter-Defendants to

immediately cease any unauthorized use of Counter-Claimant's property including use ofKings Lane
by commercial or large trucks and trailers which cause damage to the roadway and which have
increased the maintenance for Kings Lane.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Counter-Claimant is entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in the prosecution
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hereof pursuant Idaho Code § 12-121 and any other applicable statute or rule.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendants/Counter-Claimant hereby demands a trial by a jury of not less than twelve jurors
on all issues triable before a jury.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Lows respectfully prays as follows:
1.

That this Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety and that Plaintiffs take

nothing thereby.
2.

For an Order ofthis Court restraining Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' agents from trespassing

on the Lows' property with livestock, dogs, debris, trash and unauthorized vehicles as well as
compelling Plaintiffs to control their livestock to prevent further damages to the fences between their
adjoining property.
3.

For a money judgment against Plaintiffs in an amount to be proven at trial for the

damage caused by Plaintiffs.
4.

That the Lows be awarded their reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in

defense of Plaintiffs' Complaint and in prosecution of the Lows' Counterclaim.
5.

For such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable in the

premises.

r

I ·fr

DATED this __j__}Q_ day of September, 2014.

SA ~ T H L.:: OFFIC~S, PLLC
by: ~ , . , , - 0
~Farris

r----
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby cert,ipr that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the
following on this
day of September, 2014 by the following method:

Jf

MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 - 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 224-6003
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

12S] U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid

RONALD P. RAINEY
RONALD P. RAINING PA
110 N. 9th Ave.
PO Box 26
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026
Telephone: (208) 459-3659
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and Rose
King

[~] U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
LJ Federal Express
LJ Hand Delivery
LJ Facsimile
[ .Kl Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

LJ
LJ
LJ
LJ
~

U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
Federal Express
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Electronic Mail or CM/ECF
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FILED

RONALD P. RAINEY !SB #1022
Attorney at Law

~.M.

P.M.

.. SEP 1o 2014

P.O. Box 26
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Phone (208)459-3659

Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067
Attorney for Defendants

Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K. Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIIIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHNE. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, )
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)

VS.

Case No. CV-2014-0278

DECLARATION OF SCOTT SNYDER

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
)
2012; AVCO FINANCJAL SERVICES Of )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE CONIPANY,
)
)
)
)

______________
Defendants.

GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,

)
)
)

)
)

)

Counterclaimants,

vs.

)
)
)
)

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLil\'TON WARD

)
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FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY )
)
Counterdefendants.
)
)

Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the undersigned declares:

l.

I am over the age of 18. I am nor rela,ed to any of the parties in this action and am not
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of che events in this declaration and

could testify to them in a court proceeding.
2.

I am a deputy sheriff of Owyhee county had ave been in law enforcement for _q~_years.

3.

On May 29, 2014, I was dispatched to the residence of Gilbert King, 19100 King Lane.

Oreana and the residence of John Fuquay at 18907 Castle Lane, Oreana, regarding a dispute
concerning fences on private property. Then I met with Gilbert King and John Fuquay.
4.

Attached as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of my incident report regarding this
matter.

I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO THE LAW OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECf.
Dated this

/7

day of September, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE
I, Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certify that on this _JJ_'d.ay of September, 2014, I caused
a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be delivered to the adverse party, via the
method indicated below, addressed as follows:
_
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_.A_.facsimile Transmission _Hand Delivery

Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle. Washington 98101

Telephone: 206-224-6003
Facsimile: 877-655-5281
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf.com

S. Bryce Farris
P.O. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83707

Telephone: 629-7447
Facsimile: 629-7559
Email: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com

Susan Wildwood
2911 S. Holden Ave
Boise, Idaho &3706
Telephone: 336-4433
Email: Oceanbreez.es75@gmail.com
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INCIDENT REPORT
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lnlrhat NOC:
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D
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MURP
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Phone I:

Phone 2:

Incident Officers

Officers (0/J Reports)

SNYOER.SCOli

31

SNYDER.SCOTT

31

05l29f2014

Ropone4 D•t-=ITlme

&VENT 59390
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19100 KING LN
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Dl1trtcc:
Rptcd le1:

fKJ

Deuriptlon
NEIGHeOR 015PVTE ONGOING OVER 60UNOARY Fl;NCES.
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Incident Namu
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UPORRD PARTIES • • •

l11c,dent Name E11t

KING, GILBERT GENE
DOB:

Age:

01..N:

SS!-h

...

POB0:K38
MURPHY ID 8Jl'l50

Home:
Wprlc:

Rac.e:
Ilg&:

WHITE
-

Wgt;

11711s;

Date: 0512912014

Cot1llet:
MALE
. . Rlalr:
Cell:

. . .
)Uhn1

NOT MIBPANIC

Eyes:

-
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11 • •

OTHJ:RS * • •
Incident N11nae Ent

l!'UQUAY. JOHN KDM.OND
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Incident Arre1t11
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OWY).JBB COUNTY SHEP..1fF•g omcE
Report l40l450.001

NATURE OF COMPLAINT: Civil Dispute of Fences and Gates
On 5/29/2014 I was dispatched to King Lone, and 18907 Catillo Lan

Oreana, Ow)'hee

County, Idaho for a neishboT dispute conocrning fences on private propeny.
I fint mAde (;Ontact with John Edmund Fuquay at his residence, 18907 Cas e Lane. On the
way to John', re~idence, from the King's property, I had passed through two fences with the

gates closed. I also observed cattle in the area. I asked John ifhe had any t
the private road that is routed from the King property to John's residence. J
have easement that came from many years past. I advised John. the Kings a
legal easement, but permission was given to John use the road at any time, a
were closed. they needed to remain closed due to taU\e in the area.

e of easement for
hn advised he does
vised there was no
long as if the gates

1 advised John of Idaho Code 35-112 Establishment of gates ... , in which if any damoges
occurred to fences or gates. any claims made by the propeny owner, would c doubled ln a coun
of law. John advised if any damages were to occur to any fence or gates, or o any canle related
to an open gate. he would take full responsibility. John advised he was not oing to close any
gates on the road in question, as he felt he had a right of way or easement. J hn also advisod he
would not close any gates, because he didn't want his older relatives to have to strugsle with the
gate, or step in cattle manure. John advised he was involved with multiple a tomeys ooncernine
the propeny and easements.
l tln~n IGft John's residence, and returned to the King residence. f made co tact with Gilbert
Gene King. 11nd advised Gilbert of my discussion with Jahn. mainly to infor Gilben of possible
gates left open while Gilberts' cattle were •n the area. I also advised Gilbert of Johns intentions

of possibly not dosine the gates. Gilbert did have cows in the area that wo d be affected if
gates were left open.

S2.QJ! Snyder 203 l

ocsg

omcer·s Signature
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KATTLE KORRAL
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- FILED
i·.Vf _A.M.
P.M.
RONALD P. RAlNEY lSB #1022

SEP 18 2014

Attorney tit Lt1w

P.O. Box 26
110 North Ninth Street

AN~ {l~Ej~' ~RK
Deputy Clerk

Caldwell. Idaho 83606-0026
Phone (208)459..3659
Pnc~imile Transmission No:459-9067
Attorney for Oefend ants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K. Ranch Trui,t UT A December 28, 2012

1N THE DISTR1CT COURT OF 'THE THIRD JUDICIAL DtS1RICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 'THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD.
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)
)
)

vs.

Ci.Hie No. CV·2014·0278

DECLARATION OP SETH THOMAS

)

)

SUSTE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, )
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO PALLS, JNC.; OORDON G. l<lNO)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TlTLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)

Defendants.

)

·--------->·)
OlLBERT KING, as Trustee: 1md
ROSE M. KING, as Benefiuiur)' 1>f the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,

)
)
)
)

)

CounterclaimuntH,

)

vs.

)
)
)

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD

)
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I<ATTLE KORRAL

H. :.t!U~8.

:Ub.L

.i,1Ab.1!,;.

FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY )
)

CounterdefemJmts.

)

____________

)

.)

Under penalty of perjul'y under the luws of the stnte of Idaho, the undersigned declm·es:
1.

I am ovt=r the age of 18. I an, not related to any of the parties in this action and am not
involved in the l1ligation. I have personal knowledge of the e\lents in Chis declaration and
could testify to them in

2.

at.

court proceeding.

Please see the attached Exhibit "A" for my statem~nt,

1 CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO THE LAW OF THE

STATE OF 1DAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.
Dated this 16th day of Sept~mber, 2014.

'1eihthomas
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KATTLE KORRAL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
11 Ronald P. Rainey, hereby cenify that on this_ day of September, 2014, l caused
a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be delivered to the adverse parry. via the
method indicated below, addressed as follows;
_U.S. Mail, Postllge Prepaid
..X•._Fncsimile Trnnsmi~ition _Hand Delivery
Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity Nation1l Low Group
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
s~attlc, Washington 98101
Telephone: 206·224-6003
Facsimile: 877-6SS-5281

Email: Matthcw,Cleverly@fof.cl"lm
S. Brye~ F~tri~
P.O. Box 7985

Boise, Idaho 83707
Telepho1,c: 629-7447
FacGimile: 629-7559
Email: bryce@sawtoothlttw.com

Ronald P. Rainey
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KATTLE KORRAL

R
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tObl.

l'A(.;.!!; •

September 13, 2014

To Whom It May Concern:

Our winter range is adjacent to the property of Heart K Ranch Trust. we graze our
cattle there during the winter months. It is beneficial to us if an landowr,ers that border
us keep their gates closed. This helps to insure cattle are secured on our property and
not out.

Thank you,

("'
, A/
.,.~d
~-&1'4~--j
Seth Thomas
Oreana, ID 83650
208-834-2251
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200-61h Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

FILED

_ __.A.Me,-J'- P.M.
OCT 29 201~
ANGE~·.:A61KELL,CLERK

_J1m~puty Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,

Case No. CV-14-0278

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW

Plaintiffs,

v.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING~ FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

I.

MOTION

Pursuant to IRCP 56, Plaintiffs moves this court for a summary judgment against Susie
Low and Cal Low (the "Lows") as to Plaintiffs' easement rights against Low Parcel l and
Low Parcel 2 because there are no disputed issues of material fact and Plaintiffs are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. This Motion is limited to Plaintiffs' claims of prescriptive
easement as to the Lows' parcels and does not address Plaintiffs' prescriptive rights as against
the King Parcels.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST LOWS - 1
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Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access their properties since 1977 and have established
prescriptive rights over Low Parcel 1 and Low Parcel 2. Those prescriptive rights accrued
before the Lows acquired the property and are therefore superior to the Lows rights. Because
the prescriptive easement was established long before the Lows became the owners of their
property, whatever rights the Lows acquired in their prope1ties are subject to Plaintiffs'
previously established prescriptive rights.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The properties at issue in this case are located east of the city of Oreana, Idaho in Owyhee
County. For illustrative purposes, a street map showing the general location of the area is
1

shown on Exhibit "A." An aerial map showing the Owyhee County Assessor's lot boundaries
is shown on Exhibit "B." A close-up aerial view and showing the general road boundaries and
identities of the affected parcel owners is shown on Exhibit "C."

A. Property History

1. Clinton Fuquay Parcel
Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuquay
Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once pait of the John Fuquay Parcel. The legal
description for the Clinton Fuquay Parcel is shown on the wmnnty deed attached as Exhibit
"D." Clinton and Hailey Fuquay purchased the Clinton Fuquay Parcel from John Fuquay on
June 24, 2014. Prior to that time, the Clinton Fuquay Parcel was part of the Jolm Fuquay
Parcel.

1

The documents referred to are attached to the Declaration of Matthew Cleverley.
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2. John Fuguay Parcel

John Fuquay owns the parcel (the "John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the
Clinton Fuquay Parcel. The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the
Trustee's Deed dated October 13, 1989 attached as Exhibit "E," (Jess the Clinton Fuquay
Parcel).
Pdor to John Fuquay's purchase of the John Fuquay Parcel, it was owned by James C.
Fuquay, John Fuquay's father.

John Fuquay has lived continuously on the John Fuquay

Parcel since about January 1, 1977.
3. Low Parcel 1 Ownership Histonr
Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel l'') located south of King Lane.
There are two parcels which were conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for the
Low Parcel 1 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F."
•

Based on the public records, on January 17, 1973, Elmer 0. Johnston and May M.
Jolmston conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Charles W. Steiner and Florence W. Steiner.

•

Based on the public records, on March 21, 1980, Charles W. Steiner and Florence W.
Steiner were divorced and Low Parcel 1 was awarded to Florence W. Steiner.

•

Based on the public records, on September 20, 1987, Samuel Steiner, as personal
representative of Florence W. Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel Steiner.

•

Based on the public records, on January 23, 1995, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane
Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner.

•

Based on the public records, on July 15, 2005, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner
conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST LOWS - 3
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Based on the public records, on January 27, 2006, Pioneer Exchange Accommodation
Titleholder #69, LLC conveyed Low Parcel 1 to the Lows.

4. Low Parcel 2
Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2") located south of King Lane.
Oreana Loop Road crosses the northwest comer of Low Parcel 2. The legal description for
the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "I-1."
•

From the public records, on May 6, 1942, D. Fred Henderson acquired Low Parcel 2.

•

From the public records, between May 6, 1942 and March 18, 1997, the Low Parcel 2 was
owned by D. Fred Henderson, individually.

•

From the public records, on March 18, 1997 D. Fred Henderson conveyed the Low Parcel

2 to D. Fred Henderson and Mary F. Henderson as husband and wife.
•

From the public records, on February 11, 2000, Mary F. Henderson conveyed the Low
Parcel 2 to Mary F. Henderson, individually.

•

From the public records, on July 8, 2005, Mary Frances Henderson conveyed the Low
Parcel 2 to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC.

•

On January 27, 2006, Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC conveyed
Low Parcel 2 to the Lows.

B. Plaintiffs' Use of King Lane

John Fuquay has lived continuously on the John Fuquay Parcel since about January 1977,
when he was 12 years old. At that time, he lived with his father, James C. Fuquay. John
Fuquay purchased the John Fuquay Parcel from the bankruptcy court on October 13, 1989.
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From January 1977, John Fuquay, his family and guests have regularly and continuously used
King Lane to access the John Fuquay and Clinton Fuquay parcels.
Between 1977 and the present, Plaintiffs and their families have openly and continuously
used King Lane for the following types of purposes to benefit the owners and residents of the

Jolm Fuquay Parcel and the Clint Fuquay Parcel:
•

Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily basis
for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking up mail
from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and from
personal errands.

•

Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John Fuquay
Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when James Fuquay had his trucks and
the use continued when John Fuquay began operating the John Fuquay Trucking
Company.

•

Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving fann equipment from
one location to another.

•

Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop previously
located at the comer of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.

•

Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' properties.

Plaintiffs never asked any of the prior owners of Low Parcel 1 or Low Parcel 2 for
permission to use King Lane. Plaintiffs have always used King Lane as a matter of right for
access to their properties.
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C. Utilities Along King Lane

The overhead electric lines that service the houses located on the Clint Fuquay Parcel run
from Oreana Loop Road along King Lru1e to the Clint Fuquay Parcel.
The underground Centurylink telephone lines run from Oreana Loop Road along King
Lane to the Clint Fuquay Parcel. It then runs south along Castle Lane to my house on the Jolm

Fuquay Parcel.
Overhead electric lines for the house on the John Fuquay parcel run north through the
prope1iy to the south of the John Fuquay Parcel.

D. Use of King Lane
At its west end, King Lane connects to Castle Lane. There are no other properties that use
King Lane for access.

Ill.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion for Summary Judgment
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all facts and inferences from the
record in favor of the non-moving party and the moving party has the burden of proving the
absence of genuine issues of material fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d
165, 168 (1997).

S1mm1ary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach

differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian
Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,718,918 P.2d 583,587 (1996).
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B. Prescriptive Easement
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by presciiption "must prove by clear

and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open and
notmious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with
the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory
period." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003).
The statutory period in question is five years.2 LC. § 5-203; Weaver, 134 Idal10 at 698, 8
P.3d at 1241. A claimant may rely on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse use by the
claimant's predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such
predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite five continuous years
of adverse use." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,230, 76 P.3d 969,973 (2003).
Once the claimant presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began, he
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Wood v. Hoglund,
131 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,680,
946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to
show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement.
Wood, 131 Idaho at 703, 963 P.2d at 386; Marshall. 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. The
nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property."
Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 975. The state of mind of the users of the alleged

2

I.C. 5-203 was amended from 5 years to 20 years in 2006, but the 5 year time frame still
applies to prescriptive claims established before 2006. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Id 212, 222.
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easement is not controlling; the focus is on the nature of their use. Id. at 231-32, 76 P.3d at
975-76. Akers v. D.L. White Const.. Inc., 142 Idaho 293,303, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005).

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiffs Have Established Prescriptive Rights as to the Low Parcels.
The key for this case is to look at any 5-year time pedod from Plaintiffs' first use of King
Lane in 1977 to the present. Once Plaintiffs present evidence that their use was open,
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted for those 5 years, the burden of proving permissive use
shifts to the Lows. That means that the Lows must present evidence of permissive use for
petiods prior to the Lows' ownership. If they do not do so, then Plaintiffs presumption stands
and Plaintiffs prevail against the Lows as a matter oflaw.
If Plaintiffs prescriptive rights matured against any of the prior owners of Low Parcel 1 or
Low Parcel 2 during any 5-year period between 1977 and 2006, then Lows cannot prevail in
this matter because they cannot defeat Plaintiffs' prescriptive easement which was established
prior to the Lows acquisition in 2006.
Plaintiffs' prescriptive easement matured as to Low Parcel 1 during any of the following
alternate time periods:
•

Between January 1, 1977 and March 20, 1980 as against Charles W. Steiner and
Florence W. Steiner.

•

Between March 20, 1980 and September 30, 1987 as against Florence W. Steiner.

•

Between September 30, 1987 and November 1, 1995 as against Samuel Steiner.

•

Between November 1, 1995 and July 8, 2005 as against Samuel V.C. Steiner and
Mary Jane Steiner.
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Between July 8, 2005 and January 6, 2006 against the Pioneer Exchange
Acconunodation Titleholder #69, LLC.

•

January 6, 2006 to the present as against the Lows.

Similarly, Plaintiffs established the elements of a prescriptive easement as to Low Parcel 2
at any of the following times:
•

Between 1977 and 1997 as against D. Fred Henderson.

•

Between 1997 and 2005 as against Mary Frances Henderson.

•

Between July 8, 2005 and January 6, 2006 against the Pioneer Exchange
Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC.

•

January 6, 2006 to the present as against the Lows.

In this case, the ownership history of Low Parcel 1 and Low Parcel 2 is undisputed and a
matter of public record. Based on John Fuquay's declaration, Plaintiffs' use of King Lane as
to the prior owners of Low Parcel 1 and Low Parcel 2 met the elements of a prescriptive
easement as to those parcels at many different 5-year periods, the earliest beginning in 1997.
Plaintiffs' prescriptive rights of access over King Lane were established by operation of law
as soon as Plaintiffs met the elements of a prescriptive easement. Those rights were
established long before the Lows purchased Low Parcel 1 or Low Parcel 2. It does not matter
whether the prescriptive rights were recorded or whether Plaintiffs sought prior judicial
declaration of those rights. The prescriptive easement was conclusively established as a matter
of law.
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As a matter oflaw, Plaintiffs are entitled to their declaratory judgment as to the Lows that
their prescriptive rights of access over King Lane matured prior to the Lows acquisition of
Low Lot 1 or Low Lot 2 and Plaintiffs access rights are superior to any rights of the Lows.
C. Alternate Access over Castle Lane is It-relevant
The defendants in this case may argue that Plaintiffs have access to their properties over
Castle Lane, and that Plaintiffs therefore do not need access over King Lane. The argument is
iITelevant and fails for several reasons:
1. "Necessity" is not a requirement for establishment of a prescriptive easement.

It

doesn't matter whether the Plaintiffs' need access over King Lane. The only issue is
whether they established prescriptive rights by prior use of King Lane.
2. Castle Lane is not a public road. It crosses other private property as well as land
owned by the US Government.

This court has no jurisdiction to order the US

Government to let Plaintiffs use King Lane. It is entirely possible that the US
Government could decide to close all road access through the BLM property. If it
were to do so, Plaintiffs would be without any access to their property at all-thus that
could create an element of necessity. However, Plaintiffs are not required to wait to
be landlocked before seeking a declaration of their rights over King Lane.
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v.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs established prescriptive easement rights over Low Parcel 1 and Low Parcel 2
against the predecessors to the Lows prior to the Law's acquisition of their prope1ties.
Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to smnmary judgment that they have prescriptive rights over
King Lane as to the Lows.

Final determination of the exact location of the roadway can be

accomplished by a survey at a later time.

Dated: October 27, 2014
Matthew R. Cleverley,
Fidelity National La Grau
1200-6111 Avenue, S ite 6- 0
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 223-4525, ext. 103
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment and the supporting Dec1arations of Matthew Cleverley and Jolm Fuquay
on the following individuals in the manner indicated:
Ronald P. Rainey
Attorney at Law
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, ID 83606
208-459-3659
erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorney for Kings

S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W, River Street, Suite 110
Boise, ID 83707
208-629-7447
brvce02sawtoothlaw. com
Attorney for Lows

[RJI U.S. MAIL
I
DI LEGAL MESSENGER I
[RJ\ EMAIL
I
DI HAND DELIVERED l
DI EXPRESS DELIVERY I
DI FACSIMILE
I
[RJI

DI
[K]I

DI
DI
DI

U.S. MAIL
LEGAL MESSENGER
EMAIL
HAND DELIVERED
EXPRESS DELIVERY
FACSIMILE

l

Dated: October 28, 2014
Kriste
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
I 200 - 6th A venue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew. Clever1ey@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

__
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,

Case No. CV-14-0278

DECLARATION OF MATTHEW
CLEVERLEY IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
LOWS

Plaintiffs,

v.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

Under penalty of pe1jury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the 1.mdersigned declares:

1. I am the attorney for Plaintiffs in this matter.
2. I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in this action and am not
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and
could testify to them in a court proceeding.

3. The documents attached to this Declaration are copies of public records and are not in
dispute.
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4. The properties at issue in this case are located east of the city of Oreana, Idaho in Owyhee
County. For illustrative purposes, a street map showing the general location of the area is
attached as Exhibit "A." An aerial map showing the Owyhee County Assessor's lot
boundaries with identifying labels is attached as Exhibit "B." A close-up of the Owyhee
County Assessor lots boundaries with identifying labels is attached as Exhibit "C."

John Fuguav Parcel
5. A copy of the Warranty Deed from Bob. D. Collett and Ruth M. Collett to James Fuquay
dated December 31, 1976 and recorded on October 30, 1989 as Owyhee County
Instrument Number 200901 is attached as Exhibit "D.''
6. A copy of the Personal Representatives Deed from Jolm Fuquay to John Fuquay dated
January 1, 1987 and recorded on April 2, 1987 as Owyhee County Instrument Number

191948 is attached as Exhibit ''E."
7. A copy of the Bankruptcy Tmstee's Deed for the Estate of .Tames Fuquay to Jolm Fuquay
dated October 19, 1989 and recorded on October 19, 1989 as Owyhee County Instrument
Number 200795 is attached as Exhibit "F."
Clinton Fuquay Parcel

8. A copy of the Warranty Deed from Jolm Fuquay to Clinton Fuquay and Hailey Fuquay
dated June 24, 2014 and recorded on June 26, 2014 as Owyhee County Instrument
Number 284171 is attached as Exhibit "G."
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Low Parcel 1

9. A copy of the Deed from Elmer 0. Johnston and May M. Johnston to Charles W. Steiner
and Florence W. Steiner dated November 15, 1972 which was recorded on January 17,
1973 as Owyhee County Instrument Number 134636 is attached as Exhibit "I-1."
10. A copy of the Divorce Decree dated March 20, 1980 between Charles W. Steiner and
Florence W. Steiner which was recorded on March 21, 1980 as Owyhee County
Instrument Number 162981 is attached as Exhibit "I."
11. A copy of the Quitclaim Deed dated September 30, 1987 from Samuel Steiner as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Florence W. Steiner to Samuel Steiner, individually, which
was recorded

011

September 30, 1987 as Owyhee County Instrument Number 214740 is

attached as Exhibit "J."
12. A copy of the Quitclaim Deed dated January 11, 1995 from Samuel V .C. Steiner and
Mary Jane Steiner to Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane Steiner which was recorded on
January 23, 1995 as Owyhee County h1strument Number 214740 is attached as Exhibit
''I(."

13. A copy of the Wananty Deed dated July 8, 2005 from Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J.
Steiner to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69 LLC which was recorded
011

July 15, 2005 as Owyhee County Instrument Number 252608 is attached as Exhibit

"L."
14. A copy of the Special Warranty Deed dated January 6, 2006 from Pioneer Exchange
Accommodation Titleholder #69 LLC to Susie Low and Cal Low which was recorded on
January 27, 2006 as Owyhee County Instrument Number 254987 is attached as Exhibit
"M."
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Low Parcel 2
15. A copy of the Gift Deed dated May 6, 1942 from Bessie Stein to D. Fred Henderson
which was recorded on June 15, 1942 as Owyhee County Book 32 Page 398 is attached as
Exhibit "N."
16. A copy of the Quitclaim Deed dated March 18, 1997 from D. Fred Henderson to D. Fred
Henderson and Mary F. Henderson which was recorded on March 18, 1997 as Owyhee
Cmmty Instrument Number 221274 is attached as Exhibit "0."

17. A copy of the Personal Representatives Deed dated February 9, 2000 from Mary F.
Henderson to Mary Frances Henderson which was recorded on February 11, 2000 as
Owyhee County Instrument Number 231423 is attached as Exhibit "P."
18. A copy of the Warranty Deed dated July 8, 2005 from Mary Frances Henderson to
Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69 LLC which was recorded on July 15,
2005 as Owyhee County Instrument Numbe1· 252607 is attached as Exhibit "Q."
19. A copy of the Wananty Deed dated January 6, 2006 from Pioneer Exchange
Accommodation Titleholder #69 LLC to Susie Low and Cal Low which was recorded on
January 27, 2006 as Owyhee County Instrument Number 254988 is attached as Exhibit

"R."

I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND THAT 1 UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY OF PER.JURY.

Dated: October 27, 2014
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/ogl~d:h-cr '-·.tit.h ,:;.] .t \·.·;.:1., ..:.r .1:·d:
.-!~;
of \,'!'21y fa1- wat,..:d· ;1;-•. 1 ;i :. ~.,.·:·.-:~;-;,
of Rc.:!clamatir::1! r-:-if" t lt.-.. :~·... ~tt
Buo:i, 11494, ::.s::2. ·;, 1,:.., :,: 1 ,:, , .. :,,
·=

, ..

l ...

appurtenant to

.rL~?~1•.·::-::~~:

i:.iropet·r.y iH•.'nt.!c! b:/ :n1-

1(,

To~rcthcr \•!itl·. a I! :,t;
ment:!.:; anr.': -:1~J!)nrtc·nn:1,·,
\•.t.i.!:a:i ap!11'..:rtui11.:i11c.

• I

1~

!;~Uhj i:.~C !...

1S

-..cro:;;s
Ru 118' i::

L-..:i t:!~-! t
!)\!.:!

·. :·

St·· 1.

21
22

'I

1

"!!

f\J s
o :. :: .--~~-_. .''. ·
contint!i:~i: opt.:.-1-.~~:~ir.•n
spect:.ion Q?':i~= i""·-~tJl,.1r... r•,::.··~·;:;_
dist:i:ibution ,'l:-:c.! ,.,;J._·t·':c,:
i

19

····-'.· .....
!;

:· .• ·••· ; ;

t..:o the 1 dah:::- ?•Y.·:,:-: i· C·:~:--:, ·.:.,_
July :!1, 195<.) ir. ;j,f,./·.
Coun I;~-' Heco r-::~ :::; .

25

Subject: l
ch.-:.. t·_ .-.: . ::r ! :1
and Hut!: '·!. Coll,::,~~,
: i. ) •. •
__ ... , ...
fer tcr1~ of ~.:c~:·, ~:·1. .-! 1·-~ · ······· ··.;;-·;.
prov131ons t :°,:'1r- ~Jif~
tho Pl·~r.:isGS i <:!;;-:: .._ .:1 ·-L
p::.·oducin~, -:.ir:: l:,:.: .::.;~.: :>·r
_·~. ~ __
s tor. i nq, t1t::il i z i n:.:1, .i:.-:,,,_~i., ~.; .._.; !. :--

26,

sh.i.pp ing ,1nc1 n::i.:·::c~ in,~: .-1 ~ -~ -;- ..-,.resourcs-r-;, and srd1 Ji..l·:t- Lt.., t.lh:· ~::c::; :'.·.:;

·''
27!

recoi:ded J'une !B,
Coi1nty Rccorcl s.

29':

Suhjcct. to r;as cind D: l 1,,:::1:,sL '" :.
Huth~-\. C~llc-tt:. his ·.·~_. . fr:!( -r. ti~·:_-.····

~

23

29:
30:

1

ter~ of ten i~brs

1

•

!.97 3

t~~~

;,.is,

J.:.:,;cci-~_,·,,:.,H·

~)~~!

t)

of c~~piori.r.q t~~ qc:o-phy.;;i..::~: i:.:-: --~-~·---~··
:.inti producirlo g~,~ and f":.11, 2.?.·.-.in(: ~,!;:·.;s.-:.--.:-;! :·:·
tel-egraph li~es, builrJ.tn9 t.c.:1}:s, ~·\ '.\ii:.:., ··-:·:ei.,i·,,.::.·r
r0latcc! facilit.ic::; .:ind :; tr>.:cLurc,; ,,11•.l ,.,11;., ;u;I,; ,,,.·
and conditicrns 1.:ontai.ncd t:wr,~in; :··::-,,,;!,·:·! :i.,i·.
1

31
32

as In::;t:.rumeni: Eo. 13?:'.)ft..-;, i.°'~·-·yhc,..1 t~n 1.:r- 1 .·: l~:··r·r·.1-.·~
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'l'O I-IAV!: ,i:!D :'O !!OLD the sair~ µi:c:r,isos, 1d.tl,. UK1r app1.1rte1·,1.1ncc,s ar~to t.h<? said Gran tee,

th-1t they c:.r~ the m,·nei:s in :.::-:: sinplc~ of sai.cl pro:~i.ses; ::h~t sair:
f.

pr.:;mises arc free from all incumbranc~is and that thor will warrant

E and defend the sam~ fr~u nll lawful claims whatsopv~r.
7

Dat8d this Jlst day of nocc,-;a.b~?r, 197€.
I

I

Ai":""'"

.'

.r

'_...____,,,_,.,.,_i_,
'I
:.·.

10
11

ss.
14 County of Canyon

On this 3.ts\: d.:i~· of Dccc.w,bor, 197G, before me, the undersigned,
!6 n ~ot~~Y Public in and £or said State, personally appeared BOE D.
17. COLLE.frT and RJJ~~H ~.~. COLLET?, husband and wife, knot•rn to rne to be

16 the persons v~ose names arc subscribed to the within instru~cnt,
·19 illHI

ro

acl~nowledgcd ta ma that they executed the: same.
Iii NITHESS Hl!EREOP,

I have hereunto set my hand and affi;.:ed

21 n~ official seal the day and year in this certificate first above

/{j

'·,.:'.

Notary Public ·for, Idaho

Residing at Caldwell, Idaho

25
26

.

"'
:

,~/o/

2S

1?9.'

·,

301
31:
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~
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!>Cl_~)tl.1;.! Hf.r'RESE1~·rt.'l'I1/E 'S DE::c

Janu,1ry, 1987, b;· ,ind

't'H,,; U!D!::'.lrdiU,, Madc- ,,,; of this 1st day of
J ,\:·\:·:::;

't':pr-c,.;,::1t,1t.
0(

'-

'Ji'!

.

FUQU!\'f,

nf t.h~ F::::tate vf l·Jzinda 1:.

first µ,1rt,

I:!\~

iH\d

,1,\MF:S C.

1>uguay,

!"UQIJ:1':',

:ictin.g

Personal

deceased,

tnc part.;

a single man,

of Box :?240,

Mur~ny, Idaho, the party of the 3Ccond pact;

WITNESS ETH:
under date ~anuary 17,

WH!RCAS,

~ppointm~nt

of

an

Ap~lication for Informal

1905,

Administratn~ w~s duly and

regularly

filed

in the nl~trict Court of th~ Third Judlcidl District

pro~dt~

in ~nd for the :a~nty of Owyhee,

for

uf

the

and on J~nuary 18,

1905 ~~ctars of Administration and n~th ~er~ issuwd by said court,
sJld Matc~r,

ta J~mos C,

in

Fuquay, and the said James C, Fuguay ls now

d~ly 1udliEled and acting personal repres~ntctive of the estat0 of the

said ~anda

e.

NOW,

Puqu•y, deceasedi and,
in

'l'HEHEr'OR.13 1

consideration

distribution

of said decedent's estat~,

de,;;;~

set over,

hcc~by

s~cond part,

of

the

pcemises

and

the party of the first

grant and convey unto the said party

his heirs and assigns forever,

in
parL

of

all of the t:'ight,

the

title,

interest and estate of the said ~anda E. Fuquay, deceased, at the time

of nee death,
naid estate,
oth~r
time

than
of

and also all of the ri9ht,
by

title and interest that tne

operation of the law o, otnerwise, may have acquir~d,

ur in addition to that part ~f the said decedent

11,;r

de.:ith,

and to9ether ·.Jitl1 al;, eight,

title and

whi~h said decedent ac her estate shall hereafter acquire,
1111

r.hat

(eal

property sit1rnte in the County of

Owyhee,

at

the

interest

in and

to

St.;te

of

PERSON/\L. Rl,PHESl,Wl't\'rIVE 'S DEED - l

157

Idaho, and particularly described as follous, to-wit:
The SW1:;NE14 ,

the W~SEl:i,
and the 5El:1St·I\ nf Sectir.1 34,
S., R, l E., B.M., Owyhee County, Idaho.

To

have

described

and

to hold,

premises,

all and singular,

the

above

together wit1, tile appurtenances,

T. 4

mc:nt.ll)ned

~nd

unt•) the

:.;,;,id

party of the second part, his h~irs and assigns forever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

che said party of the first

representative as aforesaid,

part,

personal

ha~ hereunto subscribed h;s nam~ the day

and year herein first abova writte".

/~.:t1-f~u~¢~7----------C......persona1 Repre 1ntative of the
Estate of Wanda E, Fuquay, Deceased.

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S D8ED - 2
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s·rNrF. OF

J

CDAllO

) ss.
COUN'rY OP OVl'!HEI!:

on
rnd

!:!1is

undersigned,

.J.f.fi!:.
a

appea c ed ,1 l\tlE5 c.
subscribed to

:iay

he,

)

day

Notdry

2?6£~:-: .,

?ublic

!:llQUr<i,

r.he wi::nin

?f

1tnow•1 ':,, ,r.1! to ll•~

lnstrum,ant,

as such personal rapresriatat l•,,;,

,"'!,,

tiH~

i: r,e

p•~ c:;un ,,,hos,:; nam,;, .. s

[NI', ')lliil r~pr;l!rnnt.ati•:s, of

,~;~~c:,11:,~.;

th•:

:FJllt•".

writ.ten.

!Tl
:~-.}

0

I

!~-~~

;;::,

rn

c-;;
0

;:::J

.;

...

0
r,l"I

0

PERSONI\L REPRE:SE:Wl'A'rrve· s DE:ED -

J
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l'-9.:1975 I.II

r~~"!~~.Ji~i;;'•,:·
TI\\JSTF.l".' S lll'.l'.D

rrn1 VALUE llEC:E[V@
.IO!l.'I J:tmliNE!Hllll'.I:, .as cruse.::.., for ti,.., hanl;r1111c
\::;t11tc ,:,f .f.tClCli C. l'ltl\11.'l:'

SEi.t Hild CO~~VE\'

(;f«,U!'rllttf.••}, dt.h.•:;{d11j ht:n!hy tii{.U~l, li,\H1·:,\i.:;.
,iii 1~y right, Lilt.,. au,1 luU.!r<?st u11L11 .

.Jnha Ell1nu11d l'sJqu,r-.1 ;1ni! ;..:;:lft.~H l.,.:1·
hu:,b.·~nd .:11Hl w.i i' 1_1

u,.._, :~it-J111..dng d1·]~,;rih;•d r1;.d p~i,itt.•rv;
::1ur"'·

1Hltt

1

d .....1·L1.:1,., c'.t!i.l!iL~·, :i1..n...• .,:

ii!

!cHldrl:, tlcr,1-:-rJi,~·d .-1:; 11,l In...·:,-,,

r111pi;.I:',,'

~J.1b·1

t...tit.:

l11

j~' 'fO\-;fi!~HJ!• ,-, ~;;,1v·1n. i{:1~~i;l; j L\~~T. n.:1. ti~\'.'dlt·J; CHi'.;:;v.
~!:,~L!,.,a 3.-,: :;i;!:'IL!, ·--~;!t;r ..~. ;il:.~:;~.~!t .:.;i,,~sr!
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i,
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-
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t.:i

.:.:.-:i
'l1• h:i-'·h' dlld
11?,;; i.t~lll~l!S

·i r 1.1 ·~t 1.'t' •
;,r i:,hnuld

I~~

l .; 1)1_•l•I !,il·-·

·. +i=il

•, \ !

~

:'.

IHI

t

In" ; ;

:!)·.•

l,,1.:,.. \ll;>!;•

.1::,

! :I !'.-:l, I~/ 1
f,· ·., i rt , ! l '

i., Ji ·:i· _, •. ·1,n·:,,
~flTHE.S;_; ~-;Hl',l~l~(,:·p i
:.;;i,L

1.h I:;, LirL ;L.·. ;-;:

}i'H:-l~:,.·,

,,~;~i;11~;, <.l~U;~~~:~'.:·i:;1 ~-h,. :r ~

n.1·:i
! '.Jf:• ..

r,•,:1·,r-
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Instrument# 284171
0

~o~~:0~!2s vti~~~~2i 0

~~f Pa es: 1
Recorded for. ALLIANCE T!TLE • ~OISE PRODUCTIC
ANGELA BARKELL
Fee: S10.00
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy: map

lnoo, To: DEED WARRANTY

Electronically Recorded by Simplifila

WARRANTY DEED
Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. Order No.:217172
FOR VALUE RECEIVED
John E Fuquay , a divorced man

thegrantor(s), do{es) hereby grant, bargain, sell end convey unto
Clinton Ward Fuquay and Halley Rose Fuquay, Husband and Wife
whose CJ.!ITent address is
18907 Castle Lane
Oreana, ID 83650

the grantee(s), the following described premises, in Owyhee County, Idnho, TO WIT:

In Township 4 S0ut11, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho.
Section 34: The Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter and the North,vest
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter

EXCEPT any mobUe home or house trailer located thereon
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the snid premises, with their appurtenances unto the snid
Grantee, heirs and assigns forever. And the snid Grnntor does hereby covenant to and with the
said Grantee{s), that (s)he is/are the owner(s) in fee simple of snid premises; that they are free
from all encumbrances Except: Current Year Taxes, conditions, c:ovennnts, restrictions,
reservations, easements, rights and rights of way, apparent or of record.
And that (s)he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.
Dated;

June 24, 2014

MnEF/1=~
} ss

I

\

JANANNE KEATING
NOTARY PUBLIC
$TATE OF IDAHO

Filo No. ll71n

284171
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·-------P-·-------- •
WARRANTY DEED
l'or Vnhte Recei~cd

E:LMER

o.

JOHtlSTOt! and MAY M. JOHllS'!Otl, husband and wife,
I s/k/a ViARGARE:'l' M. JOHNS'l'Otl
h.ireb)' I\Tilllt, b11ri::1in, sell nnd con,•cy unto

CHARL:::S W. ST::'!NE:!l and PLOREHCi:: \•l, STETNE:R 1 husband and wife,
th~ ~r:intees , lite fn\lowlnit de1<c1·ibed prcmlaus, to-wit:
IN 'IOW?1Sli!li' 4 SOUTH I RAI-IG5 l E::\ST, B. 1-1., 0\1YHEE COUN'rY, !D"HO
Section 34: s:~s::;~, SE.\NS~
Sec ::i:m 35: Wl!SW!:;, swl.N'.·1;. EXCE!?TING l~ acres in ~he sWl!NWi,1 of
Soc tion 35, Township 4 Sou ch, Range 1 East I B. M.,

descri!:le::! as follow.;: Commencing a:: the NL cornet:
of the SWl.llW;..; of said Sec ti:>:. 1 i:unning th.:nce in a
w1;:sterly direcclon 630 :fee~; thence in a southerly
direction 104 feet; ::hence in an easterly dirc~tion
630 feet; thence in a northerly di~c~tion 104 feet
to the pluce of beginning.

:m TO,WSHI? 5 Sou:h, RANG:: l

E:AST, a. M., o:·l'iH:EE: COUN'r:t, IDAHO

Sec~io~ 2: Loe 4
Se=t~on 3: Lo~ 1
II! w:•/:ISHIP S 30UTH, RANG:: 2 i'let.t, 5. l':.

Se:-;cion 1::

1

O'tlYHEE COUNTY' 1 IDAHO

~!Lm::;.,

i-1l1ss;,, s~1;:;s::J;.
Se:: ::ion 21:
Se.c~i:)n 22: W;, S'rh., sw;.. s::,.
Sec::ion 27:
Sl~!/E:l.; 1 :-M;,1, S:C:i,.

Sec~i~n ::.1:

;~?!\1~f• •

Ta:-: L.:.:~s !tu.::be:.:e:d , a~d ! .ir. sec!:i.~:is 14, 23 ::HH! 21s, 'rowr:shlp
7 5cu~t 1 Ra~ge l Wes~, s. M., as shew~ by the =ec~rds in ~h~
c:=:.!..c~ ::J= :.!'".: .;~se:::sor c: t:·.-,yhc~ C-:!.!:i.-::,, l.:laho and :n~cc par:!.c,..1.1.a~!.y :!esc.~:.becl a:i ~ht; e:.::~h !.edc M!.r.~ng c1a:..rr. 1 Thr.- s1,.1.c
.Jar Lccle !·:1::!.nq !::ii.!.~ 1 l'i".. E- s~nse:: !..~de Mir.ir.g Claim, The :•Jr~:,
L:ie !1~~~~g C:9!~ 1 T~e !~?ari~l L~tc Min~~; Clniffi 1 Tha Magpie

!..::~l-~ ?•:ir.:i~; :1a.:.:r~, T:'.~ Bl'..!·:: .:ay :,;i:..: Sit~ and -:h~ Eirr.:h. Mill
Si~e, all ~i~ua~c !~ =h~ P~~l~1 s~~~~ ~!!11!ng Dis:ri=~ !n
c·,·:;•:i::-e C.:.H;:i.:::,·, !,;a:"".io.

TO l!A '.'E A1'D TO i!OLlJ the s:1id pi,:misc,, with their npJ!Ut"lcnanc~s 11nto the said Granl1:e ::_,
,he:.::h~ir$ ;,nd a.s,i,:'11,, forc·,·~r. Anti the s11id Grantur.: do
herebr co\•e11ant to mul
witi1 th,, said GmnteoS , that · he•,
thr, ownct·:; in fE1, simple of ~:tld prcmiscn; thnt $1:ld
Jin:m1bt:s ~ac fret: fron: nll incumhrnnci::s
j
~

:,mi lhat

i

h~ •: •,,•ill wa1·r:inl :rnd d~fend the •nme from all h,wful claims \\'hublol!\'cr.
•

Dat~d:

I

I

'ti":>1.u.Jyi'J:ti,,.,,,d.L:~
·;.-::-_ - - --"'-' ,..- •••• -- ...... ' •••.. 1.· __:--; . ·-------- _, ___________
"

,;;xn: 1;;- mMm, cou~n· or C~r;!: ,,~,iu;,; uC ;;:'.'.;.,:..
• i~.1 72,
t,•:fo:r. :!:::-•• 1- r;1J~:u-.,· ~ubhc. ,n £\1111 for !<~id ,tit:d...·• fH:-r-:-.11r1t1il1

~p~ati~I

. :~;\'\/':.h~!J·:?c,
/::i(-~,' ·. _/ ·.
~ .• :•.,;_·:·~..._
;·Y.l
...-••.•

~.:.··.,,,,. ......•

!

.... t ' ° I ~ ./},
·

' ,.,.,·

.•

·-

-

i

U~i!rnua·lll \\-ti,..

litr,J for

ii
I,_;

~t.•i:·unf: nl.

..~ '.·;:

I -

I!."

jO

7J , m rn;·

of lh,~11:i flt

~ .. ,

!',:r1:a.ry 1·~1bl1c
.l~h'J

: ·.:-. "l ~-

minUk11o

~"''

10

17th ,1 14 r .,r

!E
t =::
i r-l
{ !:j

u•c.lm;k "'",."'"'

Jan

I

tJUkr, nnrl ,JuJy rt:cutdr.11 h1 book

~

~tc

I I"•

,iJ~,

ll.\~F)r~::tA JI, iO

- - - - -, - '/ . .- - - - Ii.
. ~·,:
CJ

1-:x .. or11r:i .. ller.:nnlr/ ..

.,4/·

....-.'."""':

l

~

-

11r O;..J1tt.?e 'l"itle a.o.

,.

j,:,.:.::-p]1;·.
C.)1:ur.. t:.Xpirt::\

Tfw r;·111H:,,,.

,11;,

f.:.t

..

·-···--·-

I b•n·l,y l.'.rttify ih.tl !lii.1'

-4-i,

=:~y\\:~~".r; tu ti,:< U;.e-.t"'it~"ln
wh•.1:rc r.:..11\,. ;-: a~."€.';
i-=!ri::i-1:11 t,i thr.c:,,uin l~!ltntmr:nl •. ~nil 111::ic.11.i:i-,1."ii:dt:f.'•I tc
:i~;t'.
:.OiiiJ\..\ ·:.':i~_'::
c(t·.r.:u.tr.:,J the: :1-un,•.
~·· ••

- -• •

C. ~ch~:-~:1 a~~!

~:~~:
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gu:;:TCL.Ul·! DEED

Pursuant to the Lai:;t Hill and Tes-c.aruent of F.1.orencG \•1,
Steiner, now deceased, THE ESTATE OF I-'LOllENCE \'1, S'l'E:INER, acting
through its Personal Representative, Samuel v.c. Steiner, the
G:ranto::, dces hereby conve:'l', :re.lease, reinise, and
foJ.·evar
quitclaim unto SAMUEL v.c. STEINER, jndividually, the Grantee,
whose address is H.C. 7!>, Box 2235, Oreana, Idaho 03650, tbe
following described premises, t:o-wit:
IN TOWNSHIP

4

SOUTH, RANGE

1 ti\ST,

B,

M.,

OW~HEE COUNTY, IDAHO
Section 34: El/2S£1/4, SEl/4NEl/4
Section 35: W1/2SWl/4, SWl/4NWl/4 EXCEPTING
l. l/i! acres in the SW1/4Ul'll/4
of
section J5, 'l'ownship 4 South,
Range 1 E~st, B. M., described aa
follows:
Commfmci ng at the HE
corner ::>f the SWl/4NIH/'1 of said
section, running thence in
a
westerly di~ection
630
feet;
thence in a southerly ::lirecti.on
10.-. fnot: thence in an easterly
Jirectlon 6JO feet; thence in a
northerly direction 10.; fact to
the place of beginning.
IN TOWNSHIP

5

SOUTH, R.J\HGE

l EAST,

B,

H,

2 WEST,

B.

H,,

O'WYHEE COUHT¥, IDAHO
Section=: LOt 4
Section J: Lot l
DI TOWNSHIP

9

SOUTH, Rl\UGE

1

OWYHEE COUU'l''t, IDAHO
Section 15: ~1/2
Section 21: EW1/4HE1/4, Nl/2SB1/4, SWl/~SEl/4
Section 22: tn./2, SWl/4, Cl-ll/4SE1/4
Section 27: NWl/4NEl/4, S1/2HE1/ll, N\oil/11, SEl/t,
Section 34 ! Nl/211El/ 4
Tax Lots Numbered l.

and 2 in Sections 14,

JJ

and 21,, Township 7 S01.\th 1 Re::ige 1 West, B. H.,

as shown bi the records in the office of
Assessor of owyhee county, Idaho.

tho

Together with their appurtenances.
E>.'.CLUDIMG, HDi·1EVER, THE MIIIERAL Iq:GH'J'~J_Q_THE

FOREGOING PR0PEP.Tf,
QUITCLAIM DEED - l
CAl:l.~8
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THE EST;.TE OF FLORENCE W. STEIHER

By:~mukr-v:c .:,~fin~~, ..J

h.~~

Persona] Representative
ST.'\'!'E OF IDAHO

:ss
)

County of Ada
.

:::..',,.

~

. d

·'on)~h ;s)· ~-,:--:=:'-

.

_.

. r··.

.

ay or -:,,;.~~;'+:!.!,!'.(.:L, 1:137, b';?fore ine,
/LbJ..:cZl:.. _., Notary Publ10 in and for said State,
person~} y appeared SAMUEL v.c. STC:ItlER, known o:: identified to
me to be the pel.·son whose nume is subscribed to the within

,-7· .

~ ;..L'.ft

,i

instrument as Peroonal Representative of The Estate of Florence
N. Steiner, deceased, and acknowledg"d tone that he executed the
same as ?ersonal Represcnt:ai:ive of said Estate.

~.

',.

..\'

-" ~,,.:-,,.:1,/ ~ .__.__ ?.,: •."t,~ .-'"'r·
}·

(SEAL(· .
.
,.• ;.· r~ ~ '· ,•

Uotary P,u\3'iic ~or Idaho
Residing at _.:/t,.Z;?'i__, Idaho
comnlission Expires: ./ •, . ,,,:1 ,,;-,.;.i

.,,..,>
,.,

~-

"

u.>

!.

ir

f_,,;

'·'

_...,

'::"~

QUITCLAIM DEED - 2

CAl: 1. ,:a
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THI$ rC"'JIM Fs.'itt~l~UE:0 COll"-TESY Of:
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READ A APPIIO\!El.i 1!\' GM•1Tms1: - - - - - -

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _...:,._ _ _ SPACE l,DOl/f TIPS Ll!lE ran nECORD!l,O DATIi

Ordet" NO.: S'rE-!.14052553 ~

OtDtlUm!:.

QUITCLAIM DEED
FOR VALUE RECEIVED

if:!J lo.,~ 11

~

SAl-!UE!.. V.C. STE:I.NER (AICA SA1•1 STEINER) J\ND MMY JANE

STEINER, HUSBAND AND WIFE

SH

a..

dotes) ll!lrcbv CONVEY, RELEASE, REMISE and FOREVER QUIT CLAIM unto

GRANTOR(SI
S/\MU,:L V .C.

th
60

STEINER AND MJ'\.RY J. STEINER, IIUSBAND AND WIFE

in
Ro

GRANTEE(Sl

Ea

83650
Coumy, St1110 c,f ld.:iho,

whose currcr;t mallino oddrcss is:
HC 79 BOX 2235, OREANA, ID
lho followino dcscrlt>ed propcny tocatod in
OWYHEE
more roniculurly described ns follows, to wit:

tlo

pi
1/

20

As sot forth on the attached EXHIBIT "A", which by reference
bocomea a part hereof.

Th

da

th

Na

OF

fe
fe

.-~

I'};

!ii
Se
:fo
H
110

.::,
,.,

!lt

po
E!I
p.:;

0

Ill

Se
do
SIi

togatllcr with choir appurumonc:cs.
Oatlld: January 11, 1995

in
GJ

,...,

OF
lll
J~

de

Wa
co;
STATE OF IOMfO

COUNTY OF
On 1hls

i; LftlFtt.

/.?-IJ:. day of ::fp,.,t'/lf't

, in

P11bllc in nnd for saicl S1010, pur.onally oppc.ircd

tho vunr of I

?7> , bcloro

SCHEDUU:

me, tho ,mdorainnucJ. a Newry

1. •• ·-,r,;f.~1m
P-IMJt·.11 Fmff

9AHUEL V. C. STEINER and M/\ltY J/\NE S'l'EitlE.R

known, or illcnliUncJ 10 me to be tho pe:so11lsJ whose namc!s) is/oro subscrib11d,to .tJ,.u within Instrument. and
~cknowludood 10 mo 1hn1 holshclthuy ;,xacutud the samo.
, , . :: :·.

,> .

Sio11a1uro:
Nome:

~?$,;&,~-:.---·----

}_"/4,!f

_L!!.!..!}I~~ ti -:1'; .fti/1J (~,.,_:

____

. -~··.. -~·:.,,·.,.,1,~ti•. ~si~,

Ro:.idinCJ ~r,

!!J:11i;,;.,b.uf,!::,~--·---·-..- . _

Mv Commission

~;-;,~i.f.~,G}'._C-_-:-_~~ . ___ _
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a•NI-EE Tl TLE 0

._...,'Hr

P/1•:::E

03

C O M PfI · . E N T f O A T I T L E I N 5 U A A N C I;

SCHEDULE 0
.=110 Humber:

~E_.Q.._..8.._7._.1_ _ _ _ __

ThO lond' roforrGd to Jn 1n10 comn111mon1 ID 11oso111101.1 us rcllowo:

PARCEL NO, lt
A parcel of lantl Gituate in the SE3SEt of Section 34 and
sw!sWl of section JS, 'l'ownship 4 South, Range 1 Ennt, n.M.,
Owyhee County, Idaho, more particularly desc,:ibed aG follown:
COMMENCING al: a braso cap mar:klng t.he Waal: 1/16 corner on
the Sout~ line of Section JS, ~4S, RlE, D,M,; thence Nor~1
60"26'36" West a distance of 1•163.74 f1;1et to a 1/2 inch irol\ pin
in a fence line on the Wentarly Right-of-Wny line of Castle Creek
Road' ancl. the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING i ttrnnce Mor th 2 7" J s I 39 11
E~st a distance of 208,71 feet to a 1/2 inch i~on pin, thence
North 62q24 1 21" West a distance of 208,71 feet to a 1/2 inch iron
pin1 thence South 27~35 1 39~ West a diatnnoo of 20B,71 foet to a
1/2 inch iron pint thence South 62°24'21" Eaat a diatanae of
208.11 feet to the nEl\L l?OltlT OF BEGINNING,
Together with an easement for maintaining and uno of a well,
This easement to be 10.00 feet on either side of the following
described power line: COMMENCING at a 1/2 inch i.ron pin marking
the Northeast corner of the previously d~scribed parcel1 thence
North 62"2•1'21" west a distance of 93,26 feet to the REJ\L POINT
OF BEGIHN!NGr thence North 9°32'~0" East a distance of 151,00
feet to a point1 thence North 5°02 1 00" East a diat:anoe of 222,00
feet to the end of aaid eaaement,

H

I

l

II

PARCEL NO II 1
IM TOWNSHIP 4 SOOTH, RAUGE 1 EAST, B.M., OWYHEE COUNTY, IDl\l!O
section 341 SElNEl, E~SEj EXCEPTING a tract of land det1cribr;id as
folJ.ows:
COMMENCING .:it sectjon corner common to Sectionns
34 and 35, T4S, RlE, and Sections 2 and 3, T5S, RLE, B.M.7 thence
North 89"59' West a distance of 550 foet to t~e REAL POIH'r OF
BEGINNING1 thence North B9°59 1 Wost a dist~nce of 208 feet tc a
point1 thence North 0°B9 1 Wast 208 feet to a point; thence South
89~59' East 208 feet ton point1 thence South o•ag- Enst to tho
REAL POINT OF BEGINNING,

nI TOWNSHIP 4 SOU'l'H, MNGE l EI\S'l', H. M, , OH:!'IIEE COUN'rY, IPAJIO

Section 351
W\ Sl'll, SWiUW! EXCEl?TUtG 1 1/2 acres in SWlHWl
described as follows I
COMMEHCING at the ~lortheast corner of
SWlNW!, Sec. 351 thence in a westerly direction 630 feet; thence
in a southerly direction 104 feet, thence in a easterly direction
630 feet: thence in o. northerly direction l04 feet to the PLl\CB
OF ElEGINNING,
LESS the following doaoribed parcel of land;
1\ pnrcel. of
land situato in the 6E!6~l of Section 34, and swlsWl of Section
J5, T4S, n1E, B.M., Owyhee county, Idaho, more particularly
described as follows:
COMMEHCING at a h.raas cap mn.rk.ing the
l~est l/16 Corner on the. south line of Soction 35, T4S, RlE, B.M, 1
continued

SC!'':OULE: C
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CM1·£E TllLE C
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COMMITMENT FOR TITLE JNSUl:JANDE
CONTINllAilON

SCHEDULE~...._~~~~
Cc;mnltmont l\\umb(in _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
871
thence North 60°26'36" West a distance of 1463.74 feat to ft l/2
inch iron pin in a fence line on the Weste~ly Right-of-Way line

R!;J Numban

PO

of Castle Creek Road,
and the REAL POINT OF I3EGINNUIG: th1;1ncC:1
North 27°35'39" East a distunce of 201l.71 feet ton 1/2 inch i.rnn
pin, thence North 62"24 1 21" West a distance of 2013. 71 feet to a
1/2 inch iron oinJ thence south 27"J5 1 39" Wcot a dist:ancc of
208.71 £net to a i/2 inch iron pin; thence Soul:h 62°24'21 11 Enst 11
distance of 208, 71 feat to the RF.:AI, POIN'r OF DEG!NN.ING,
TOGETHER with an ~asemont for malntalning and use of a well.
This easement ie to be 10.00 feat on either s!ae of the following

c!esc:i:ibed powe:r line; Cornmancing nt

11

i inch iron pin marking the

Northeast corner of the previou9ly described parool1 thence N
62°24'21" W a distance of 93,26 feet to the Real Point of
Beginning;
thence N 9"32'00" E A distance of 151.00 feet to u
point, thence M 5"02 1 00" En distance of 222.00 fnat to the end
of said easement,
IN TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH I RJ\NGE l EI\.ST, D. M.

Section 2;

Lot 4

Section 31

Lot l

1

OWYHEE COUNTY, IDi\llG

PARCEL NO. 3 ~
rN 'l'OWNSliIP 4 SOUTII, AANGg 1 EI\S'l' 1 B. M., OWYHEE COUNTY, IDAHO

at section cornor oormion to secs. 34
Secs, 2 and J, TSS, nlE, B, H,1 thence
l1orth ll9"59'
West a distance of 550 feet to the RE1\.L POHl'l' OF
BF.GlNtHHG;
thence North 09°59' West a distt1nce: of 206 feet to o
point1
thence Horth 0°09' lfa!lt 208 feet to ll poinl:t thenca south
Section 34:

and

35,

n9•59•

T4S,

East

co~~IENC!NG
RlE, and

209 feet to a point; thence South o•eg• East to the

REAL POINT OF BEGINHZNG,

*

P~go

3

1Jf.

6

CONTIIIUATIOH
C'CITU",'lllt:itf\l
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Jnstrument # 252608
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO

Recorded for : PIONEER TITLE CO
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN
Ex.(>fficlo Recordor Ouputy
•

:'B

bl!I. Jt.p Fee:

9.00

lndu I<>: DEED. WARRANTY

WARRANTY DEED
FOR VALUE RECEIVED SAMUEL V C STEINER and MARY J
HUSBAND AND WIFE

STEINER,

the GrantorS, do hl?rcby gr:1111, lm~ain, sell and convey u n t o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ x _ t i ~
HlJ.SEm'NIJ.~~X PTOl\'FF.ll FYCPI\.NC:F, ACCOl'-!.1'10DATTOl\' TTTI F.Hfll DER /I fio, ll r.

the Grantees, whose address is 2511 EAST HIT,L ROAD, EAGLE, ID

83616

the following described premises, to-wit:

SEE ATTACHED LEGAL DESCRIPTION
FURTHER

GRANTED

WATER

RIGHTS

AS

DEFINED

IN

ATTACHMENT

"WATER

RIGHTS"
TO HAVE AND TO l!OLD 1he said premises, wi1h their appurtenances unto lhe said GramccS, THEIR heirs and
assigns forever. Ami the saiLI GrantorS do hereby covenam Lu and with the said GranleeS, tl1at TheY ARE the owners in fee
simple of said premises; that sn id premises ari: free from all encumbrances; except for general taxes and assessments for che year
2005 and subsequent years, covenants, conditions, restrictions and easements of record; and that TheY will warrant and defend
the same from 1111 lawfol cl:1im, wl1:11~ncver.

~_A,'-t;2 MARY
dJ ~ /
STE:CNER

PIONEER TITLE COMPANY
OF CANYON COUNTY
100 10TH AVE SOI 'Tl!

NAMPA, IDAHO ,'

51

423 SOUTH KIMBALL

CALDWELL, ID 83605
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P07036

In Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho.
Section 34:
Section 35:

E1/2 SE1/4, SE1/4 NE 1/4
W1/2 SW1/4, SW1/4 NW14

EXCEPTING 1·1/2 acres in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35,
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as

follows:
COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
of said Section, running thence in a Westerly direction 630 feet; thence in a Southerly
direction 104 feet; thence in an Easterly direction 630 feet; thence in a Northerly direction
104 feet to the PLACE OF BEGINNING.
In Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho.
Section 2:
Section 3:

Lot 4
Lot 1

First Arnerican TiUe Insurance
Schedule B

182
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--------------1---WATER RIGHTS
1.
2.
3.
4.

No. 57-89. 4-1-1874 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation and Stock Water. 0.240 CFS.
No. 57-95. 4-1-1885 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation.
0.360 CFS.
No. 57-104. 4-1-1887 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
0.200 CFS
No. 57-I I 6. 4-1-1895 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
0. 100 CFS
5. No. 57-120. 4-1-1896 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
0.300 CFS
6. No. 57-127. 4-1-1899 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation.
0.400 CFS
7. No. 57-149. 4-1-1906 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
0.200 CFS
8. No. 57-2104. 10-5-1920 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
1.280 CFS
Total
3.080 CFS
Total Acres: 145.

CD L_

i:.J
µd
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Recording Requested By and
When Recorded Return to:
SUSIE LOW

CAL LOW
21220 Oreana Loop Road
Oreana, ID 83650

•
Instrument # 254987
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO
2006.01-27
04:35:41 No. of Pag11s: 4
Recorded for: PIONEER TITLE COMPANY
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN
IL ~ ~Foe: 12.00

Ex-Officio Recordor Ooputy__,.".:..o::-"-"-'"-t-=-=.c.----

1nd.. 10: CE~D. WARRANTY

SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED (this "Deed"), made as of the 6th day of January, 2006, is between
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"),
whose legal address is: 21220 Oreana Loop Road, Oreana, 1D 83650.
WITNESSETH, That Grantor, for and in consideration of One Dollar and Noll 00 ($1.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and
confirm, unto Gmntee, its successors and assigns forever, all the real property, together with
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State ofldaho, more particularly described as follows:
See legal description described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto
Futhcr Granted Water Rights as Defined in Attachment "Water Rights"

TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in
law or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of
wuy and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water,
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which are
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the
property (collectively, the "Property").
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors and assigns,
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in law, in fee
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in
manner 1111d form as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants,
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature
whatsoever, as of July 15, 2005 .
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above-bargained premises in the quiel
and peaceable possession of Grantee, ils successors and 11Ssigns, against all and every person or persons
claiming tile whole or any part thereof BY, THROUGH OR UNDER Grantor.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Grantor has executed this Special Warranty Deed as of the date set
forth above.

PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC,

an Idaho limited liability company
By:

Pioneer 1031 Company, Member

By:

STATE OF IDAHO

)

) ss.
COUNTY OF ADA

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 6d'day of January, 2006, by Alicia
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer 1031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company.

WJTNESS my hand and official seal.
My commission expires: 9.9.09.

----

Notary Public
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EXHIBITX
P07036
In Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho.
Section 34:
Section 35:

E1/2 SE1/4, SE1/4 NE 1/4
W1/2 SW1/4, SW1/4 NW14

EXCEPTING 1-1/2 acres in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35,
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as
follows:

COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
of said Section, running thence In a Westerly direction 630 feet; thence in a Southerly
direction 104 feet; thence in an Easterly direction 630 feet; thence in a Northerly direction
104 feet to the PLACE OF BEGINNING.
In Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian. Owyhee County, Idaho.

Section 2:

Lot 4

Section 3:

Lot 1

Fil'l!t American Title Insurance
Schedule B
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EXHIBIT~
WATER RIGHTS
1. No. 57-89. 4-1-1874 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation and Stock Water. 0.240 CFS.
2. No. 57-95. 4-1-1885 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation.
0.360 CFS.
3. No. 57-104. 4-1-1887 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
0.200 CFS
4. No.57-116. 4-1-1895 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
0. 100 CFS
5. No. 57-120. 4-1-1896 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
0.300 CFS
6. No. 57-127. 4-1-1899 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation.
0.400 CFS
7. No.57-149. 4-1-1906Priority. CastleCreek. Irrigation.
0.200CFS
8. No. 57-2104. 10-5-1920 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
1.280 CFS
Total
3.080 CFS
Total Acres: 145.
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QUITCLAIM DEED
F'or Value Received

D.

~re...d

He.Y"\de..'rSOf\

do hereby convey, release, remise and forever quit claim

Q. F<ed \-\ende,rson a!"ld Man; f '1endert)on J
\-\u~bctr-,d a.nd \.ui~e..- 1 \lOS &t..\-\w11,.,41o, fiaod1n;,I.D

unto

the following described premises to-wit:

8 33,3 O -

\J

Sl.3(.,

NcSWJSWN~JSENW)~W0E
.Sec..t,of\ 35.) )own6hif Lt ..3ou.i.hJ ~nqe. \ Ett~t.
Ch,.fd-he-e__ C,u.Y\~, ldQhu

-.,

together with their appurtenances.
DATED:

\SUt[rz
I 7 ~

S'rATE OF IDAHO, CO\JNTY OF

o~yllm

A

On this
/%ri.- clay of J.'(Mt.
, 19fl,
before me, a notary public in and for sa i.cl
State, personally appeared l:> . ..i;:cc.~ ~"}'\.~c.... "'"°"""\l.~ ~ ~L-:n~1;c.:;.=n known to me to be the
p e r ~ name subscribed to the within

~~:i;;legd~!~c~~.~·t~~·=•••·

u

r.

~.~~

county of Owyhee, State of Idaho

t ,.

.,;IC.) '7)1

'

~"'«;-

~ ...m t6J,e,.t- .

-: .!.(IP I
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PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S DEED

TfDS DEED, mnde by Mary Frances Henderson, Pcrsonnl Representative oftbe estate of D.
Fred Henderson, deceased, Grontor, to Mary Frances Henderson, whose :iddre&s is 1705 Stnte
HWY46, Gooding, ID 83330, Grantee,
WHEREAS, Grantor is the qualified pcrSOnal representative of said estate, filed ns
Probate Number 99-SP-00-0000 I, in Gooding County, Idaho;
THEREFORE, in accordance with the will of the deceased filed herein and for vllluable
consideration received, Grantor sells and conveys to Grantee the following described real
property in Owyhee County, Tdaho:
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF OWYHEE, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST,
BOISE MERIDIAN
Section 35: SWl/4 NEJ/4, SEl/4 NWl/4, NWI/4 SEl/4, NEI/4 SWJ/4

with u1J appurtenances.
EXECUTED this _f

J1.day of Fehrunry, 2000.

ces Henderson
Per al Representatives of the estate of
Fred Henderson
STATE OFIDAIIO )
)ss.
County of Gooding )

f

On this
~ay of Febnuuy,2000, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally
qppcared Mary Frances Henderson, lcnown to me or proved to me on oath, to be the personal
representative of the estl1te of Fred Henderson, and the person whose numes are subscnoed to
the witl1in instrument, and aclcnowledged to mi: that he/she executed the some as said personal
representative.

IN WTTNES S WHEREOF, I I1ave set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and year
above written ..
AT SW. ENSON, JR.
OTARY PUBLIC
/\TC Of· ID/\HO
H"'skJing nt l.,1XJdi11g

Commission expires 03/13/2004

.~tiqb_-,1~
' .:J,:;:0

9'1 :111,v •. , 8'"'1

• ·, .J.:J oa
n~..,,
-.:,u,.10:rw. a111:1
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WARRANTY DEED
FOR VALUE RECEIVED MARY FRANCES HENDERSON, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN
the Grantor, doES hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey untc1~xm~~stN¥.mH~'
~X~~I~

Pioneer Exchange Accommodation

the Grantees, whose address is 2511 EAST HILLROAD,

'J'j

tlehol.cler f'f, 0

EAGLE, ID

83616

the following described premises, to-wit:

SEE ATTACHED LEGAL DESCRIPTION

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with 1heir appurtenances unto the said Gnm1L-cS, THEIR heirs end
assigns forever. And the said Grantor doES hereby covenant to and with the said Grantees, !hat She IS the owner2005 in fee
simple of said premises; that said premises are free from all encumbrances; excc:pt fur general laxes and assessments fur the year
Sand subsequent years, covenanL~. conditions, restrictions and easements of record; and that he will warrant and defend the same
from all lawful claims whatsoever.

DATED:

PIONEER TITLE COMPANY
OF CANYON COUNTY
I00 I 0TH A VE SOUTH
NAMPA, IDAHO 83651

423 SOUTH KIMBALL
CALDWELL, ID 83605

Instrument # 252607
MURPHY,OWYHE~IDAHO

zoo 5.07-1 5

04:38:JJ No. of Pages: 2

Recorded for: PIONEER TITLE CO

< _

CHARLOTTE SHERBURN ~
_Fee: &.00
Ex-Ofticlo Recorder Deputy~. ~

lndnb>: DEED, WARRANTY

....z:c...:_..::..;:..;:;.:=----
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P07066
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho;
Section 35: Northeast Quarter Southwest Quarter; Southwest Quarter Northeast Quarter;
Southeast Quarter Northwest Quarter; Northwest Quarter Southeast Quarter ~
****INCLUDJNr, WATER 'R.IC:f!T fl 57-HI045 and /157-1004fi

~

'ciPI

1 - ; ,•

First American TIiie
Schedule A
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Recording Requested By and
When Recorded Return to:
SUSIE LOW
CALLOW
21220 Oreana Loop Road
Oreana, JD 83650

Instrument# 254988
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO
2006--01-27
04:38:59 No. of Pages: 2
Recorded for: PIONEER TITLE COMPANY
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN
~ ~ .JJeo: 6.00
Ex.Officio Rocordor Deputy !J!. _...&a.L.
Index lo: DEED. W~llRAM'Y

SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED (this "Deed"), made as of the 6111 day of January, 2006, is between
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"),
whose legal address is: 21220 Oreana Loop Road, Oreana, ID 83650.
WITNESSETH, That Grant or, for and in consideration of One Dollar and No/I 00 ($ 1.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sutliciency of which are hereby acknowledged,
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and
confirm, unto Grantee, its successors nnd assigns forever, all the real property, together with
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State ofidaho, more particularly described as follows:
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; Section 35: Northeast Quarter
Southwest Quarter; Southwest Quarter Northeast Quarter; Southeast Quarter Northwest Quarter; Northwest
Quarter Southeast Quarter; Including Water Right 1157-10045 and #57-ID046

TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in
Jaw or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of
way and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water,
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which arc
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the
property (collectively, the "Property").
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors nod assigns,
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in law, in fee
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in
manner and form as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants,
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature
whatsoever, as of July 15, 2005 .
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above-bargained premises in the quiet
and peaceable possession of Grantee, its successors and assigns, against all and every person or persons
claiming the whole or any part thereof BY, THROUGH OR UNDER Grantor.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Grantor has eicecuted this Speciul Warranty Deed as of the date set

forth above.

PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER#69, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company

By:

Pioneer IOJ I Company, Member

STATE OF IDAHO

COUNTY OF ADA

)
) ss.
)

The foregoing instrumen1 was acknowledged before me this 61liday of January, 2006, by Alicia
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer I031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.
My commission expires: 9.9.09.

(NOTARIAL SEAL)
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 - 6th A venue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 9810 l
(206) 224-6003
Matthew. CJeverJev<@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
V.

Case No. CV-14-0278

DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the undersigned declares:

1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this action. I have personal knowledge of the facts in this
declaration, and I am competent to testify at tdal as to the matters herein.

2. I am submitting this declaration in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment against Defendant Lows.
3. Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuquay
Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once part of the John Fuquay Parcel before I

DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 1

D ORIGINAL

FIDELITY NATIONAL LA w Gnom•
120ll-6TII A\'ENUE,SU1TE620

SE:Ant.1·:. WA 98101
(2116) 2!3-4525
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sold it to Clinton and Hailey Fuquay. The legal description for the Clinton Fuquay Parcel
is shown on the waITanty deed attached as Exhibit "D" to the Motion.

4. I also own the parcel (the ••John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the Clinton
Fuquay Parcel.

The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the

Trustee's Deed dated October 13, 1989 attached as Exhibit ·'E" to the Motion (less the
Clinton Fuquay Parcel).
5. I began living on the John Fuquay Parcel in January 1977 when it was purchased by my
father. I was about 12 years old when we first moved onto the John Fuquay Parcel. My
parents bought a mobile home and put on the property and we lived in that for years.
6. From January 1977 forward, my family continuously used King Lane for access to Oreana
Loop Road. My parents drove personal vehicles of all types over King Lane. From the

time I was 12, we also walked over King Lane to get to the bus stop at Oreana Loop Road
and to pick up mail from the mail box which is at the comer of King Lane and Oreana
Loop Road.
7. Our family's guests regularly and continuously used King Lane to access our house.

8. My father, James Fuquay, owned large semi-trucks and cattle trucks that he used in his
famung and ranching operations. He would regularly drive those trucks over King Lane
to and from Oreana Loop Road.
9. At about age 14, I began driving large trucks for my father. Those included cattle trucks
and semi trucks. I would drive them over King Lane to and from Oreana Loop Road.

DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 2

FIDELITY NATIONAi. l~.\W GROUP

1200-6"' AVENUE, Srnn: 620
SEATTLE, WA

98101

(206) 223--1525
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IO. At about age 21, I obtained my Idaho chauffeur's license which is the predecessor to the
CDL license. It pem1itted me to drive commercial trucks. I started driving large trncks
commercially at that time and have done so ever since. I currently drive commercial
trucks under the assumed business name of John Fuquay Trucking.
11. Since 1977, I have continuously used King Lane to access both tl1e John Fuquay Parcel
and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel.
12. I have always believed that I have the right to access the John Fuquay Parcel and the
Clinton Fuquay Parcel over King Lane and I have always acted in accordance with that
belief.
13. At its west end. King Lane c01mects to Castle Lane. Castle Lane continues south until it
reached Oreana Loop Road again. There are no other properties that use King Lane for
access.

LOWPARCELl

14. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel l ") which is located south of
King Lane and east of the Clinton Fuquay Parcel. There are two parcels which were
conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for the Low Parcel 1 is shown on the
Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F" to the Motion.
15. Prior to the Lows ownership of Low Parcel l, my family openly and continuously used
King Lane to access the John Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for more than
5 years.

DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 3
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16. Based on the public records, on January 17, 1973, Elmer 0. Johnston and May M .
.Johnston conveyed Low Parcel I to Charles W. Steiner and Florence W. Steiner.
17. Based on the public records, on March 21, 1980, Charles W. Steiner and Florence W.
Steiner were divorced and Low Parcel l was awarded to Florence W. Steiner.
18. Based on the public records, on September 20, 1987, Samuel Steiner, as personal
representative of Florence W. Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel Steiner.
19. Based on the public records, on January 23, 1995, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane
Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner.
20. Based on the public records, on July 15, 2005, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner
conveyed Low Parcel I to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC.
21. Based on the public records, on January 27, 2006, Pioneer Exchange Accommodation
Titleholder #69, LLC conveyed Low Parcel I to the Lows.
22. From January I, 1977 through March 21, 1980, I never asked Charles W. Steiner and
Florence W. Steiner for permission to use King Lane. Charles W. Steiner and Florence
W. Steiner never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane.
23. From January I, 1977 through March 21, 1980, my family used King Lane for access to
the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily basis
for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking up mail
from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and from
personal en-ands.

DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 4
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b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-tmcks to and from the John Fuquay
Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his trucks and
continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment from
one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop previously
located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e.

Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
properties.

24. From March 21, 1980 through September 20, 1987, I never asked Florence W. Steiner for
pem1ission to use King Lane. Florence W. Steiner never gave my family, my guests or
me permission to use King Lane.
25. From March 21, 1980 through September 20, 1987, we used King Lane for access to the
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the Jolm

Fuquay Parcel. Th.is use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.

DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 5
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c. Regular farn1 vehicle use of King Lane for cattle tmcks, moving fann equipment
from one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the comer of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e.

Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
properties.

26. From September 20, 1987 through January 23, 1995, I never asked Samuel V.C. Steiner

and Mary Jane Steiner for permission to use King Lane. Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary
Jane Steiner never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane.
27. From September 20, 1987 through January 23, 1995, we used King Lane for access to the
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the Jolm
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment

from one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.

DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY-6
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e.

Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
properties.

28. From January 23, 1995 through July 15, 2005, I never asked Samuel V.C. Steiner and
Mary Jane Steiner for penuission to use King Lane. Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane
Steiner never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane.
29. From January 23, 1995 through July 15, 2005, we used King Lane for access to the
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal e1Tands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.
c. Regular fann vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving fann equipment
from one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e.

Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
properties.

30. From July 2, 2005 through January 27, 2006, I never asked Pioneer Exchange
Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC for permission to use King Lane.

DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 7
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Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC never gave my family, my guests or me
pennission to use King Lane.
31. From July 2, 2005 through January 27, 2006, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:

a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.

c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment
from one location to another.

d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.

e.

Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
prope1ties.

32. From January 27, 2006 through the present I never asked the Lows for pennission to use
King Lane. The Lows never gave my family, my guests or me pennission to use King
Lane.
33. From January 27, 2006 to the present, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay Parcel
and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:

DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY-8
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a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, talcing children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the Jolm Fuquay Trucking Company.
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle tmcks, moving fann equipment
from one location to another.

d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the comer of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'

e.

properties.

LOWPARCEL2
34. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2") located south of King Lane.
Oreana Loop Road crosses the northwest comer of Low Parcel 2. The legal description
for the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "H" to
the Motion.
35. Prior to the Lows ownership of Low Parcel 2, my family openly and continuously used
King Lane to access the Jolm Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for more than
5 years.
36. From the public records, on May 6, 1942, D. Fred Henderson acquired Low Parcel 2.
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3 7. From the public records, between May 6, 1942 and March 18, 1997, the Low Parcel 2 was
owned by D. Fred Henderson, individually.
38. From the public records, on March 18, 1997 D. Fred Henderson conveyed the Low Parcel

2 to D. Fred Henderson and Mary F. Henderson as husband and wife.
39. From the public records, on February 11, 2000, Mary F. Henderson conveyed the Low
Parcel 2 to Mary F. Henderson, individually.

40. From the public records, on July 8, 2005, Mary Frances Henderson conveyed the Low
Parcel 2 to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC.
4 I. On January 27, 2006, Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC conveyed
the Low Parcel 2 to the Lows.
42. From January 1, 1977 through March 18, 1997, I never asked D. Fred Henderson for
pe1mission to use King Lane. D. Fred Henderson never gave my family. my guests or me
permission to use King Lane.
43. From January 1, 1977 through March 18, 1997, we used King Lane for access to the
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and

from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John
Fuquay Parcel. 1l1is use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.
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c. Regular fanu vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving

fann equipment

from one location to another.

d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
properties.

44. From March 18, 1997 through July 8, 2005, I never asked D. Fred Henderson or Mary F.
Henderson for permission to use King Lane. D. Fred Henderson or Mary F. Henderson
never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane.
45. From March 18, 1997 through July 8, 2005, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:

a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
tmcks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment
from one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
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e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'

prope11ies.
46. From July 2, 2005 through January 27, 2006, J never asked Pioneer Exchange
Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC for permission to use l(jng Lane.

Pioneer

Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC never gave my family, my guests or me
pem1ission to use King Lane.

47. From July 2, 2005 through January 27, 2006, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the maiJ box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John
Fuquay Parcel. This use bas been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Tmcking Company.
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle tmcks, moving farm equipment
from one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the comer of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e.

Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
properties.
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48. From January 27, 2006 through the present I never asked the Lows for pennission to use
King Lane. The Lows never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King
Lane.
49. From January 27, 2006 to the present, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay Parcel
and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the fo11owing types of purposes:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John

Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.

c. Regular frum vehicle use of King Lru1e for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment

from one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of IGng Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
properties.

UTILITIES
50. The overhead electric lines that service the houses located on the Clint Fuquay Parcel run
from Oreana Loop Road along King Lane to the Clint Fuquay Parcel.
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51. The underground Centurylink telephone lines run from Oreana Loop Road along King
Lane to the Clint Fuquay Parcel. It then runs south along Castle Lane to my house on the
John Fuquay Parcel.

~

l/ ,e.rf " " ~
52. Je&gr8ffl'ld electric lines for the house on the John Fuquay parcel run north through the
property to the south of the Jolm Fuquay Parcel.

I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE
AS EVIDENCE 1N COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY OF PERJURY.

Dated: Octobe,_,2014

U V.~~

pohn
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DEC O9 2014

ERK

Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY;

Case No. CV-2014-0278

Plaintiffs,

RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.

KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY;
Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Low"), by and through their attorneys ofrecord, Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC, and hereby submits
this response and objection to the motion for swnmruy judgment filed by Plaintiffs. The Low's
response and objection are supported by the Affidavits of Rose King, Samuel Steiner, and S. Bryce
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Farris filed concurrently herewith, as well as the record already before this Court, including, but not
limited to, the Declarations of Rose King, Gilbert King, the Mailperson and Denice Collett
previously filed with the Court on or about September 9, 2014.

I. INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY
On or about October 28, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Low
but not against the other Defendants named in this action (hereinafter collectively referred to

as

"King"). However, Plaintiffs' motion is inappropriate and ought to be denied for following reasons:

1.

Prior Testimony and Decision of this Court. This Court bas already ruled that

Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence for a preliminary injunction following a hearing on
September I 8, 2014 which included the testimony of John Fuquay, Clint Fuquay and J.C. Fuquay.
Plaintiffs have not provided any new evidence and in fact have failed to acknowledge or address
their prior testimony at the hearing before this Court. As discussed in more detail below, Plaintiffs
own testimony establishes material issues of fact which would preclude summary judgment and there
have been no additional facts presented which are undisputed and which would warrant summary
judgment as requested by the Plaintiffs.

2.

Motion only as to Low. Plaintiffs have only sought summary judgment against the

Lows and not against the Kings. Presumably, Plaintiffs believed that because Lows have owned
their property for less time than the Kings they are less likely to rebut their allegations. However,

by not including Kings and by not establishing/surveying the ownership of road in question there are
obvious material issues of fact which exist. Plaintiffs cannot establish their alleged use of the
roadway was adverse under a claim of right if they cannot identify the owner of the road they are

RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2

216

•

•

supposedly adversely using. 1 Moreover, just because Plaintiffs have not sought summary judgment
against the Kings does not mean that the Kings cannot rebut Plaintiffs' allegations of use which they
have specifically done through the Affidavit of Rose King filed concurrently herewith. Ms. King's
affidavit rebuts the alleged use of the road by the Plaintiffs regardless of whether it is owned by
Lows or the Kings. Finally, Samuel Steiner, Law's predecessor in interest, has submitted an
affidavit rebutting Plaintiffs claims that the use was regular and under a claim of right.

3.

Prescriptive Easement Elements. Plaintiffs must show that there are no material

issues of fact AND that they have established each and every element by clear and convincing
evidence in order for the Court to grant summary judgment. As discussed in more detail below,
there are numerous material issues of fact and Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence the elements ofa prescriptive easement More specifically, Plaintiffs'
motion is based primarily upon the allegations or statements contained in the affidavit of John
Fuquay concerning the alleged use of the road.

However, these allegations are unequivocally

rebutted by Rose King, Samuel Steiner, Plaintiffs' own testimony and others that there has not been
regular, continuous or adverse use of the road by Plaintiffs.

To the contrary, any use has been

occasional, with implied permission and has not interfered with the joint or common use by the
servient estate holders.

As to some of the statements of such alleged use by delivery folks,

mail persons or large trucks, these allegations are completely rejected and denied because said use

Plaintiffs are currently attempting to survey the location of the road but the deadline under Rule
56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to submit affidavits in support of their motion for summary
judgment has passed. In any event, and as discussed herein, there remain material issues of fact even if
Plaintiffs had submitted a survey of the road which would preclude summary judgment.
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simply did not occur or it is completely impossible for the alleged use to occur. In fact, the Affidavit
ofRose King makes it clear that use of the road as alleged by Plaintiffs was impossible during much

of the period alleged by Plaintiffs because the road was in reality simply a muddy path which is
impassable during much of the year.

II. DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT
Plaintiffs have summarized the facts supporting their motion for summary judgment in five
(5) bullet points which support their contention that between 1977 to presentthey have prescriptively
used King Lane. Plaintiffs' Motion, page 5.

These points can be combined and summarized into

two points which relate to alleged use by personal vehicles and alleged use by large trucks. These
points are Listed below and facts rebutting/disputing each point are stated subsequent thereto:
I.

Regular personal vehicle use to and from Oreana Loop road on a near-daily basis for regular
residential purposes such as eoin2: to and from the store, picking up mail from the mail box.
taking children to and from the bus stop. going to and from personal errands.
a.

Samuel Steiner, who lived at the property since 1959, has stated that the use was not

regular but rather was occasionally used as a short cut. Mr. Steiner further states that the road was
an old "fann access roadway" which would become muddy in wet weather and the majority of the
vehicle use was down Castle Road to Oreana Loop Road.
b.

Rose King, who has lived at the property since 1973, states that there has not been

regular use of the road, that the primary access for Plaintiffs' properties has been Castle Lane, that
the "road" was only a path when the purchased the property, was muddy and impassable most of the
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year, 2 and that Plaintiffs and their children catch the bus at the end of Castle Lane. Ms. King goes
on to state that she can observe and hear all traffic that uses King Lane from 1973 to present and she
disputes any allegations "that King Lane has been used since 1977 for regular personal vehicles on
a near daily basis ... pedestrian traffic to and from the bus stop and guests going to and coming from
the Fuquay properties." Affidavit of Rose King, paragraph 16, pg. 6. The Affidavit of Rose King
also rebuts any alleged use of King Lane by guests, delivery persons. mail persons, UPS or Schwans
to the Fuquay properties with the exception of the one time Ms. King gave permission to the
Schwans' delivery person. Affidavit ofRose King, paragraphs 11 and 12.
c.

The declaration of the Mail person filed on or about September 9, 2014 states that mail

to the Fuquays at one mail box on Oreana Loop at the end of Castle Lane and that the only people
that receive mail at the end of King Lane is the King family.
d.

The declaration of Denise Collett filed on or about September 9, 2014 states that she

has been the bus driver for the Grandview School District for 33 years and the bus stop for the
Fuquays, which is currently J.C. Fuquay's son Jess, and which included Clint and J.C. Fuquay when
they went to school was at the end of Castle Lane. She does "not make a school bus stop at Kings
Lane."

2

Rose King's Affidavit states that the road in question was a path which was muddy and
impassable when they purchased the property and that even her own children when the rented the houses
currently occupied by Plaintiffs could not use the road to come to her house. This is further evidenced by
the testimony of Plaintiffs' own witness Raymond Jayo who testified that lane was marsh, a big mud hole
and "pretty messy" for at least I 0-15 years while it was being improved. See Affidavit of S. Bryce Farris,
Exhibit A (Tr. pg. !OS, Ins. 16-24).
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Testimony of Plaintiffs. 3
1.

As to Clint Fuquay's property, Clint Fuquay testified that he has lived in his

current house for the past eight years (Tr. Pg. 48, lns. 1-6). This is clearly outside the prescriptive
period, which as explained below, must be for 5 years prior to July 1, 2006. J.C. Fuquay, who
occupies the other residence on Clint Fuquay's property testified that he has only lived on the
property in the past eight years also, which again means this other residence, and any alleged use,
is outside the prescriptive period. (Tr. pg. 72, Ins. 12-16).
11.

John Fuquay, Clint Fuquay and J.C. Fuquay testified that their addresses and

mailboxes are located at the end of Castle Lane and that Castle Lane is an all weather road used to
access their properties. (Tr. pgs. 25-26, Ins. 18-25 and 1-3; pg. 48, lns. 11-15).

2.

Reirular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John Fuguay Parcel.
This use has been consistent since 1977 when Jan1es Fuguav had his trucks and the use
continued when John Fuquay began operating the John Fuquav Trucking Companv.

a.

Samuel Steiner, again who lived at the property since 1959, states that "I don't believe

I ever saw anyone take a large truck out tlmt way, logging trucks or cattle trucks." Affidavit of

Samuel Steiner, paragraph 8.
b.

Rose King has emphatically states in her affidavit that from 1973 to 1989 there were

"never" large trucks on King Lane because King Lane was not suitable for said use given that it was

3

References herein to testimony refers to the testimony previously provided by Plaintiffs at the
hearing on September 18, 2014 in which this Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.
A transcript of said hearing and said testimony is attached to the Affidavit of S. Bryce Farris filed
concurrently herewith.
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muddy and there were two welded barrels across the lane. Rose King Affidavit, paragraph 16.4 Ms.
King then goes on to state from 1989 to 2011 she has not observed any large trucks, cattle trucks or

farm equipment of the Fuquays using King Lane and that the use oflarge trucks has only been in the
past four to five years. Id.
c.

Testimony of Plaintiffs. Perhaps the most telling evidence on this issue is the prior

testimony of J.C. Fuquay at the hearing on the preliminary injunction in which he testified that he
and his brother have only been driving large trucks or cattle trucks down the lane in the last five
years, and his brother, Clint Fuquay has been doing it for less than five years. (Tr. Pg. 92, Ins. 1-25).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment must be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Friel v. Boise

City Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484,485,887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). The court must liberally
construe the facts in the Ii2ht most favorable to the party opposing the motion, (Defendants/Lows],
drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Friel, 126 Idaho at 485,887

P.2d at 30 (citing Farm Credit Bank ofSpokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,272, 869 P.2d 1365,
1367 (1994); Harris v. Dept. qf Health and Welfi1re, 123 Idaho 295,298,847 P.2d 1156, 1159
( 1992)) (emphasis added). Ifreasonable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting
inferences from the evidence. a summary judgment motion must be denied. Stevenson, 125 Idaho

4

Again, Ms. King's statements that the road was a muddy path are substantiated by the Affidavit
of Samuel Steiner and the testimony of Plaintiffs' own witness, Raymond Jayo.
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at 272,869 P.2d at 1367. (emphasis added).

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

Prescriptive Easement Law. An easement "is the right to use the land of another for a

specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property owner." Beckstead v.

Price, 146 Idaho 57 (2008) (citations omitted). lnAkersv. D.L. White Construction, Inc., 142 idaho
293, 303, 197, 127 P.3d 196 (2006), the Idaho Supreme Court succinctly laid out the elements for
a prescriptive easement. Easement by Prescription requires the party seeking the easement to prove

bv clear and convincine: evidence the use is:

a.

Open and Notorious;

b.

Continuous and Uninterrupted;

c.

Adverse and Under a Claim of Right;

d.

With Actual or Imputed Knowledge of the Owner of the Servient Tenement;
and

c.

For the Statutory Period [20 years at the time of Filing pursuant to LC. § 5203].

"Recognizing that '[p]rescription acts as a penalty against a landowner[.]' this Court has
stated prescriptive rights 'should be closely scrutinized and limited by the courts."' Beckstead v.

Price, 146 ldaho 57, 64. Accordingly, "[e]ach element is essential to the claim, and the trial court
must make findings relevant to each element in order to sustain a judgment on appeal." Hodgins

v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,229 (2003). Moreover, "where there is more than one claimant [i.e. Jolm
and Clint Fuquay] to a prescriptive easement, the trial court must make findings sufficient to support
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each claim." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court went on to explain that "where, as here, the claimants
purchased their property at different times and used the subject property for different purposes and
with different frequency, the trial court must make findings specific to each Property Owner's claim.
Such findings are necessary, in part, because prescriptive rights are defined by actual prescriptive
use of the property over the statutory period."' Id (citation omitted). Thus, both John Fuquay and
Clint Fuquay must prove each of the essential elements by clear and convincing evidence as to their
respective use and this Court must make specific findings as to each. This is important for purposes
of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because Plaintiffs have made no specific allegations,
nor provided any evidence, of use of the property owned by Clint Fuquay. 5

1.

Statutory Period. An initial question which must be addressed is the statutory period

which applies to the other elements of a prescriptive easement. As Plaintiffs correctly point out,
Idaho Code § 5-203 was amended, effective July 1, 2006, to provide that the statutory period for
adverse possession and prescriptive easement is now twenty years. In Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho
212,280 P.3d 715 (2012), cited by Plaintiffs, the Court explained that the twenty year period does
not apply to an easement by prescription acquired prior to the amendment and thus the party claiming
the prescriptive easement must prove "the elements of an easement by prescription for a five year
period prior to July 1, 2006." Id. at 222. This means the prescriptive elements must be proven as far
back as at least July 1, 2001. This date is important because Clint Fuquay has only lived on his

5

Again, Clint and J.C. Fuquay have occupied the residences for less than the prescriptive period
and Rose King's Affidavit states that her children previously occupied the residences and did not, and could
not, use King Lane on a regular basis because it was simply impassible. Affidavit ofRose King, paragraphs
7 and 8.
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property in the past eight years and Plaintiffs have not attempted to offer any evidence of specific
use of King Lane by residences currently owned or occupied by Clint Fuquay and J.C. Fuquay.
2.

Use by Each Plaintiff. A prescriptive easement arises because of the adverse "'use"

of another's land. It is the "use" that creates the easement and the scope of the easement. A claimant
may: (a) rely on his own '"use" for the prescriptive period; (b) rely on the adverse "use" by the
claimant's predecessor for the prescriptive period; or (c) combine the predecessor's "'use" with the
claimant's own use to establish the requisite period of continuous adverse use. Akers v. D. L. While
Construction, Inc., supra. However, and as discussed, supra, the use must be established for each
claimant independently.
3.

Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,229.

Adverse Under a Claim of Riz:ht.

Plaintiffs have not surveyed the road referred

as King Lane and have not identified those portions owned by Low which they claim to have
adversely used under a claim of right. In other words, if the Plaintiffs do not know and have not
provided a survey to determine the ownership of the road, how can they meet their burden of
showing their use was adverse and under a claim of right?

This is a threshold question before

Plaintiffs can meet their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that their use was
adverse and under a claim of right as to the Lows. At a minimum, a material issue of fact exists as
to the ownership of the road and whether Plaintiffs have adversely used said road under a claim of
right as against Low.
a.

Joint/Common Use. In Becksread v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 64, the Supreme

Court reiterated that Idaho law has recognized two exceptions to an adverse use presumption when
the roadway was jointly used or used in common with the underlying property owner. First, "the
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adverse use presumption has been rebutted by evidence of 'use of the driveway in common with the
owner and the general public, in absence of some decisive act on the user's part indicating a separate
and exclusive use .... "' id. (citations omitted). Second, "when 'a landovvner 'constructs a way over
[the land] for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way
interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of ... permission"' Id. The Court, referring
to its prior decision in Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,481 (2006), stated such exceptions remain
applicable as an "approach to determining whether a claimant had met the elements for a prescriptive
easement by clear and convincing evidence." id.

In other words, the joint or common use of the

roadway by Lows/Kings and/or the construction of roadway by Lows/Kings remains applicable to
determining whether Plaintiffs use of the road was in fact adverse. It is within the province of the
district court to weigh such conflicting evidence concerning such joint/common use. Id. More
importantly, and for purposes of Plaintiffs summary judgment motion, the Lows/Kings joint use of
the roadway creates conflicting evidence and/or a material issue of fact which renders Plaintiffs'
motion inappropriate. It is undisputed in this case that the roadway, King Lane, has been jointly used
by Lows and Kings to access their respective properties. Plaintiffs' assertions of occasional use in
common with the Lows and Kings fails to meet their burden by clear and convincing evidence that
such "casual" use is adverse under a claim of right. 6

6

In determining whether a prescriptive easement had been acquired for a public roadway
the Court in Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497,502 (2010) stated "[t]his Court has repeatedly
found that casual or sporadic use is not enough - the use must be regular and continuous." The
Court cited to Kirk v. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 282-84 (1941 ), which held that "casual and desultory"
use by "miners, hunters, fisherman, and persons on horseback, even ofa well-marked road was not
public use."
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Adverse Use.

Since the use must be more than simply casual use and it must be regular and continuous use,
Plaintiffs' suggestion that their use of Castle Lane is irrelevant is misplaced. While Plaintiffs have
not asserted an easement of necessity, and which has been essentially rejected by this Court already
when it denied Plaintiffs' motion for an injunction, the fact that Plaintiffs have regularly used Castle
Lane for regular access to their respective properties rebuts Plaintiffs' claims of regular,
"continuous" use of what has been termed King Lane. Since Castle Lane is an all weather road
accessible by each of the Plaintiffs' residences, which provides access to the Plaintiffs' mail boxes
and the Plaintiffs' bus stop and which, according to the A_ffidavits o.fSamuel Steiner and Rose King
is the primary access for the Plaintiffs' properties, it is more than relevant concerning Plaintiffs'
allegations of regular and continuous use. At a bare minimum, there is a material issue of fact as

to the regular, continuous use by Plaintiffs of King Lane when they have acknowledge and admitted
that their primary access to their properties is via Castle Lane.
Finally, Plaintiffs themselves have acknowledged that their alleged use of King Lane has not
been adverse to the servient estate owners. John Fuquay previously testified that he has never done
anything to kick the Kings off the disputed property or "interfered" with the use of the property. (Tr.

pg. 37, Ins. 2-15). Likewise, Clint Fuquay testified that he has never attempted to exclude the Kings
or to interfere with the use. (Tr. pgs. 66-67, Ins. 20-8). Finally, J.C. Fuquay testified that no one

from his family has done anything that '·interrupted" or interfered with the use of King Lane. (Tr.
pgs. 86-87, lns. 16-14).

II
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Scope of the Easement.

Again, the scope and character of a prescriptive easement is defined by the use. While the
scope and character can be defined by the use, it is also necessary to define the width and location
of the easement. "[A]judgment determining the existence of an easement across the land of another
must also set forth the width and location of the easement." Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 141 Idaho
570, 572, 114 P.3d 128, 130 (2005). The width of an easement is a question of fact which will not
be disturbed on appeal ifit is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. In Argosy Trust,
the Court analyzed several cases in which it remanded those cases to find and decree the character,
location, width and length of the easement. Thus, not only have Plaintiffs not identified the owners
of the road to which they claim to adversely used under a claim ofright, they have not defined the
scope and location of the alleged easement.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ought to be DENIED.

DATED this 8th day of December, 2014.
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC

by:~

yryceFarris

--i__-
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Facsimile: (208) 459-9067
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorneys.for Defendants Gordon and Rose
King

~

U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid

LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
LJ Federal Express
LJ Hand Delivery
LJ Facsimile
£..L] Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

~

U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid

L] U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid

LJ
LJ

Federal Express
Hand Delivery
[_] Facsimile
~ Electronic Mail or CM/ECF
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FILED

___JtM8: ~2-P.M.

DEC O9 2014

S. BRYCE FARRIS
(Idaho State Bar No. 5636)
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Golden Eagle Building
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110
P.O. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone (208)629-7447
Facsimile: (208)629-7559
E-mail: Bryce@sawtoothlaw.com

~G~~ERK
Deputy Clerk

Attorney for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD nIDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD,
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)

Plaintiffs 1

Case No. CV-2014-0278

)

)

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING

)

)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
)
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING )
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)

Defendants.
)
______________

)

ST ATE OF IDAHO
County of Owyhee

)
)ss.
)

Rose King being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and says that:
1.

I am a Defendant in the above-titled action, over the age of 18 and I make this

affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and I am competent to testify to the matters
contained herein. I have reviewed the Declaration of John Fuquay dated October 28, 2014. The
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statements set forth by Mr. Fuquay in his declaration are inaccurate for the reasons hereinafter
set forth:
2.

My deceased husband, Gordon King and I purchased our ranch on September 17,

1973 which included a field lane which has been refe1Ted to as "King Lane" in this litigation.

At the time of our purchase, King Lane was only a path through grass and weeds and was wet
and muddy most of the year with a culvert constructed of 55 gallon barrels at the west end. We
desired to access our fields through the use of this field lane, therefore, we started hauling rocks
to build a base for this road so that it would be passable for our farm equipment. We did this
annually until we decided to sell the ranch in 1982.
3.

My husband and I sold our ranch to Zane Block in 1982 but had to repossess it

in 1986.

During this four year period I was still familiar with the use of King Lane as I

frequently observed the property and the operations of the ranch. After we repossessed the ranch,
the lane was in terrible condition and we had to construct and improve the road and tl1e crossing
where the road crosses an irTigation ditch which provides water to our ranch.

There was a

culvert made from 55 gallon barrels at the west end of the land and these were rusty and leaky.
We replaced the welded barrel culvert in 1988-1989 with a concrete culvert. Prior to that time
it was impossible for large trucks to cross over the welded barrels. This lane still requires annual
maintenance to make it passable for our ranching operation.

4.

The path/road which has been referred to as "King Lane" was not named King

Lane until 2002 when emergency 911 came into existence and Gary Aman requested a name for
the lane to access of emergency vehicles. I informed him that the access would be named "King
Lane."

At that time, addresses were provided for the four houses located on the King
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property/ranch with an address of King Lane. Mailing addresses for the four residences on the
King property/ranch then became King Lane. There was no determination that the path/road be
named King Lane would continue any further than the access to our residences.

For purposes

of the rest of this Affidavit I will refer to the roadway at issue as King Lane but this does not
alter my understanding that King Lane ends at the residences for my ranch.
5.

What has been refened to as King Lane for purposes of litigation bas also been

used by Cal and Susie Low, who own the property generally to the south of the King
property/ranch and their predecessors in interest. When my husband and I purchased our ranch
in 1973, the property now owned by Lows was owned by the Steiner family, and the Steiners
used the road to access their property to get to and from their fields. This use has continued
since 1973 to present, including now that the property is owned by Cal and Susie Low.
6.

I am familiar with the property currently owned by John Fuquay and Clint and

Hailey Fuquay which is located generally to the south and west of the King ranch.
7.

My son, Greg King, rented the house which is now occupied by J.C. Fuquay from

1979 to 1982. During said time my son worked for us and could not use King Lane on a regular
or frequent basis because the road was wet and impassible approximately ninety percent (90%)
of the time. Many times when he came to our house or for work he had to walk or drive a
tractor to do so because the road was not suitable for regular vehicle use. It was not until the
concrete culvert mentioned above was installed in the irrigation ditch that allowed more frequent
use of the roadway.
8.

Our daughter, Karla Love, rented the main house on the Fuquay property for a

couple months in the 1980's. She traveled up and down Castle Lane to Oreana Loop for access
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even when coming to visit us because King Lane was so impassible.
9.

From 1973 to present the primary access for the properties owned by John and

Clint Fuquay has been Castle Lane. Any use by the Fuquays of King Lane has been occasional
use, but not on a dai]y or regular basis. This use has been casual use on occasion as a matter of
convenience. This is because, among other things, as mentioned above, King Lane is in fact
impassible dming certain times of the year and cannot be used because it becomes too muddy.
Such occasional/casual use by the Fuquays has been allowed because we wanted to be
neighborly, their use did not interfere with our use of the road and it was done so with implied
permission. The Fuquays use has been so infrequent that is has not bothered us until recently,
or more specifica11y within the past five years, when the Fuquays have attempted to increase their
use by bringing large trucks through our (King) property.
10.

There has always been a fence and a gate on the west end of our property along

what is referred to as King Lane to prevent our livestock from getting to the BLM property to
the west. We have also used this fenced area where King Lane is located for our own livestock
to graze and to pen up for sorting. While the Fuquays have occasionally/casually used the road

on an infrequent basis they have previously respected the fence and gates across the roadway.
It was not until recently, within the past year, that John Fuquay asserted they did not have to
close the gate.
11.

Prior to this lawsuit, I am not aware of any use by UPS, post office or other

delivery services of King Lane to provide services to the Fuquay properties. To the contrary the
mailboxes for the Fuquays are located at the end of Castle Lane and I have not observed any
services using King Lane to provide deliveries to the Fuquay properties. The only mailbox at
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the end of King Lane is for the Kings.

•
Since this lawsuit has been initiated by the Fuquays, I

have been asked if Schwans delivery person can use King Lane to access the Fuquay property
because John Fuquay has locked the gate on Castle Lane directing them to use King Lane. I
verbally gave permission to the Schwans delivery person to use King Lane that one time which
was within the past six months.

12.

I am not aware of any guests of the Fuquays using King Lane to access the Fuquay

properties. Since my husband and I have owned the King ranch, there has been occasional use

of King Lane by hunters or others who have asked permission.
13.

Any use by Clint Fuquay of the road/King Lane to access the property now owned

by Clint Fuquay has been in the last 8 years. Again, any use been occasional and not on a
regular or primary access.

14.

With regard to children catching the school bus at the end of King Lane, my

children caught the bus there. I do remember that on occasion Megan, John's sister, did come
down King Lane to catch the bus. I do not recall John Fuquay ever catching the bus at the end
of King Lane. If he rode the school bus, he caught the bus at the bus stop at the end of Castle
Lane. Clint Fuquay's children and J.C. Fuquay's children catch the bus at the end of Castle
Lane.
15.

Until the spring of 2014, I have never seen the Fuquays operate farm equipment

on King Lane.
16.

From 1973 to 1988-1989 there were never any large trucks used on King Lane

because, among other things, the trucks could not use the Jane and pass over the welded barrels
mentioned above and King lane was not suitable for said use. From 1988-89 to 2011 I have not
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observed any large trucks or for that matter much traffic at all from the Fuquay properties using
King Lane. The heavy truck traffic seemed to commence about 2011.

In summary I have lived on the King Ranch from 1973 to current except for the four
years between 1982-1986. I can observe and hear all of the traffic that uses King Lane.

I

dispute Mr. Fuquay's allegations that King Lane has been used since 1977 for regular personal
vehicles on a nearly daily basis, semi trucks consistently since 1977, regular farm vehicles such
as cattle trucks and moving farm equipment, pedestrian traffic to and from the bus stop and
guests going to and comeing from the Fuquay properties.
The King family uses King Lane several times a day in our ranching/farming operations.
Any use if any of King Lane by other people including the Fuquays has never interfered with our
use of King Lane and in order to be neighborly we have allowed the use by others. Such use
has been with implied pennission.

~~r=
Rose King

otary Public for Idaho
Residing in Caldwell, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 12/18/2018
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a tme and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the
following on this
day of,~J;G/,nM·~ 2014 by the following method:

E'

MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 - 6'h A venue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 224-6003
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorneys for Plaintif.(s

[ '}(] U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Jlrepaid
LJ Federal Express
LJ Hand Delivery
LJ Facsimile
W Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

RONALD P. RAINEY
RONALD P. RAINING PA
110 N. 9 111 Ave.
P0Box26
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026
Telephone: (208) 459-3659
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and Rose
King

[ X] U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid

LJ
LJ
LJ
LJ

U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
Federal Express
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
us] Electronic Mail or CM/ECF
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S. BRYCE FARRIS

-

[Idaho State Bar No. 5636]

SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Golden Eagle Building

FILED P.M.
- 1•;11~11_
·"'
_}\.IV\.

OEC O9 20\4

1101 W.RiverSt.,Ste.110
P. 0. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 629-744 7
Facsimi]e: (208) 629-7559
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low
IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY;

Case No. CV-2014-0278

Plaintiffs,
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL V.C.
STEINER

vs.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY;
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

}

COUNTY OF ADA

)
)

SAMUEL V.C. STEINER being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:
1.

I and my wife Mary are the predecessors in title for Cal and Susie Low who purchased
our properties located adjacent to Oreana Loop Road in Owyhee County in 2006.
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2.
I was born 1957. My parents purchased these properties in 1959. I was two (2) or
so when we moved onto the parcel in 1959 that is located across Oreana Loop Road from where
Lows built their residence. Our farm reside.nee was within a half mile of the road everyone is
referring to as King Lane.
3.
I inherited the properties from my mother in 1984. I had lived on the parcel referred
to above until 1975 when I lived in Boise and went to college. I returned to the property in 1980.

4.
There was an old one-room school building located on what is referred to as Castle
Road close to the Foreman Reservoir, but c1asses were not held there. I believe the building was
moved off sometime in the 1980s. I understood that it had been an active school site for a number
ofyears before being closed down when another school building was built that was more convenient.
5.
I do not know who, if anyone, constructed King Lane. This was an old fann access
roadway that was used occasionally by a variety of people. My dad always told me that he thought
the lane belonged to him. Neither my parents nor myself tried to stop anyone from using the road.
As long as they did not interfere with our operations, we didn't object to them using the lane.

6.
Sometimes hunters used it to go back to the reservoir on the BLM ground. Kings
used it to go to the geothermal well they had leased on the BLM ground. Renters on the old Munger
property, now owned by Fuquays and previously owned by Bob Collett used it occasionally as a
short-cut to Grand View. I think that Jim Fuquay used it occasionally when he lived in the mobile
home located near the rental property now owned by Clint Fuquay. Jim and John Fuquay lived in
the old Foreman fatm residence down by the Foreman Reservoir for many years and while they
generally drove out Castle Road, they also used the lane as a short-cut to Grand View. When Jim
Fuquay moved on a mobile home at the corner of what would be King Lane and Castle Road, he
would occasionally use IGng Lane, probably as a sho11-cut when he went out to Grand View.
7.
However, the majority of the vehicle use was down Castle Road to Oreana Loop Road
to the west. This was especially true during wet weather because there is a slough at the common
west comer of the F ouquay, Low' s and King's properties that was pretty muddy in wet weather. It
was pretty difficult to get through then. When Zane Block had the King property m1der contract, he
and Jim Fuquay did some work on the lane one year.
8.
While there was some use of King Lane by passenger vehicles and pickup trucks, I
don't believe I ever saw anyone take a large truck out that way, logging trucks or cattle trucks.
Those kind of vehicles always went out Castle Road. However, I think that John Fuquay may have
brought an empty cattle truck in that way a few times.
DATED this

ff) f.~y of November, 2014.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ft day of November, 2014.

Au,11,"'A ~ lf.ctit tz!Jtc(
NOTARY PUBaI~ FD,~ THE. STATE OF IDAHO
Residing at
.~ il l,'4-t
, Idaho
My Commission ex.pi.res: Ci I -,J / ~ i 7
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served
on the following on this 8th day of September, 2014 by the following method:

J)c.e.J11/r-r
MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW
GROUP
1200 - 61h A venue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 224-6003
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorneys for Plai11tifls

( )<(] U.S. First Class Mail, Postage
Prepaid
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage
Prepaid
LJ Federal Express
LJ Hand Delivery
LJ Facsimile
~ Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

RONALD P. RAINEY

[2;J U.S. Fi_rst Class Mail, Postage
Prepaid
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage
Prepaid
LJ Federal Express
LJ Hand Delivery
LJ Facsimile
~ Electrotric Mail or CM/ECF

RONALDP.RAININGPA
110 N. 911t Ave.
P0Box26
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026
Telephone: (208) 459-3659
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attomeys for Defendants Gordon and
Rose King

S. Bryce Farris
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S. BRYCE FARRIS
[Idaho State Bar No. 5636]

•
FILED/

~.M..:.2,hi.P.M.

SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Golden Eagle Building
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110
P. 0. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83 707
Telephone: (208) 629-7447
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com

DEC O9 20t4

Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY;
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2014-0278

AFFIDAVIT OF S. BRYCE FARRIS

vs.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY;
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)

S. Bryce Farris being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says that:
1.

I am the attorney for the Defendants, Cal and Susie Low, in this matter, I am over the

age of 18 and I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and I am competent to testify
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to the matters contained herein.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the transcript ofthe hearing

held on September 18, 2014 in the above-captioned matter and before the above titled Court.
DATED this

/)· -/1-

6

-;-,.,.

day, of ( )t,CU!Jtk~. 2014.
/

/?

/

~
/.;;:#U,Z.,,-/

/,..~ - /-=--

~ -

S. Bryce Farris
Sworn to and subscribed before me this_[_ day of

bl<.. eit,-tu; 2014.

y;~

Notary Publi~ for Idaho .
Residing int'&, 5,'S , Idah~
My Commission E x p i r e s : ~

/'7,,, J,_
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby cerqfy that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the
following on this r;r-a.ay of Septerrroer, 2014 by the following method:

J):c.c:wh,,.
MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 - 61h Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 224-6003
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Altorneys for Plaintiffs
RONALD P. RAINEY
RONALD P. RAINING PA
110 N. 9'h Ave.
PO Box 26
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026
Telephone: (208) 459-3659
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net
Allorneysjor Defendants Gordon and Rose
King

[x] U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid

LJ
LJ
LJ

U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
Federal Express
Hand Delivery
[_] Facsimile
~ Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

~

U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
[_] Federal Express
LJ Hand Delivery
LJ Facsimile
[ X ·1 Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

/~?

~u~-

s. Bryce Farris

AFFIDAVIT OF S. BRYCE FARRIS - Page 3

242

•

•

EXHIBIT A
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1 .

{Proceedings begin at 1:28 p.m.)

2

COURT: All right. We're taking up the case of

A

Thirty-seven years.

3

Q

Okay. And do you own the property where you live?

4

others. Mr. Cleverley; Is that correct?

4

A

Correct.

Q

And you recently said a part of your property to

5

MR. CLEVERLEY: That is correct, Your Honor.

5

6

COURT: He's here for the plaintiffs. Mr. Ralney's

8

determlne the merits of the case. It's only a hearing

6
7
8

9

today to determine whether there should be a preliminary

9

0

Injunction Issued.

11

2

months down the line and today we're going to determine

3

whether·· what happens to the road between now and then.

5

, .6

17

amongst yourself for an accomodatlon between now and then

12
13
14
15

or do you want the Court to make a decision on the use of

16

the road pending the trlal?

17

So Is there any-· do you care to make any discussion

8

1 ·9

MR. RAINEY: We're prepared to go ahead, Your
MR. CLEVERLEY: We'll go ahead, Your Honor. That's

' 1 fine.

122

A

MR. CLEVERLEY: May I approach, Your Honor?
MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, I have a copy. Would
the Court !Hee a copy?
COURT: Yeah, go ahead. Thanks. This Is No. 1?
MR. CLEVERLEY: This will be Exhibit 1.

BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

Q

Mr. Fuquay, do you recognize what that Is?

A

Yeah. It's a map of Highway 78 and Oreana Loop

Road.

Q

Okay. Does that show generally where you live?

A

ln general, yeah.

20
21

MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, we'd ask 1 to be
admitted.

22

COURT: Plaintiffs were granted a temporary

Correct.
COURT: Sure.

18
19

Honor.

. 20

Clint Fuquay?

10

In other words, we'll get a lriul set several

j 14

I

And how long have you lived there?

John Fuquay and others versus Susan Low, Heart Ranch and

j 11

I

Q

3

7 here for the defendants. Today is not a hearing to

l

•

1
2

COURT: Any objection?

?J

injunction so they can go forward. Go ahead and proceed.

23

MR. RAINEY: No, Your Honor.

4

MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, how would the Court

24
25

COURT: Okay, l's admitted.

125

like to proceed? Just go ahead and call witnesses?

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1 admitted.)

4

1
2

3

MR. CLEVERLEY: Al! right. We call John Fuquay to

COURT: So kind of step behind the seat and you can
swing in that way.

8

16

map, there are some lines In
what those llnes In blue arei'

Okay. And on that

They look to me to be the Oreana Loop Road and then

WITNESS: It's John Fuquay, F-u-q-u-a-y.

10

also the lane going to and from our property and to -- in

11

and out of our property there.

12
13
14

QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY:
Thank you. Mr. Fuquay, you're a plaintiff In this

case?

Q

And you say your property. That's-~ your property

is off to the left-hand side of that?

A

Correct.

Q

Okay. And Is that the one that's marked John

Correct.

15
16

Fuquay?

Where do you live?

17

A

Correct.

Q

And the one above It, was that the property that

·7

A
Q

8

A

18907 Castle Lane, Oreana, Idaho.

18

19

Q

And can you give me kind of a thumbnail sketch of

19

0

A

9

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q

Q

blue? Can you explain

COURT: Thank you. Go ahead and proceed.

2

5

I

some of Lows' property and some of Kings' property and

7

~4

Yeah. It's a map of my property It looks like and

Oreana Loop Road.

COURT: Start out by stating your name and spell

13

A

6

8

your last name.

Mr. Fuquay, I'm handing you what we're going to be

5

WITNESS: Okay.

I~~

Q

marking as Exhibit No. 2. Do you recognize what that is?

4

7
9

BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

2
3

(JOHN FUQUAY is sworn.)

5

:

1

the stand, please.

4

6

6

COURT: Sure.

where that Is?

you sold to Clint?

20

A
Q

And that one's labeled with Clint Fuquay?

A

Correct.

Q

Now, to the best of your knowledge, is the property

Correct.

1

A

It's off of Oreana Loop Road.

21

22
3

Q

Okay.

A

And off of Castle Creek.

22
23

What's the closest city to you?

24

marked Susie and Cal low parcel 1, Is that generally the

25

Q
A

Grand View.

25

location of the Lows' property?

I
,-4

5

7
"""" 4

to 7 of 126
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A

Correct.

Q

And then farther to the east, there's a property

1
2
3

marked Susie and Cal Low, parcel 2. Is that, to the best

4

of your knowledge, about where that property is?

5

A

Correct.

Q

•

1
2
3

MR. RAINEY: Well, with the same caveat, correct.
COURT: Right. So we'll let 3 in for illustrative
purposes.
{Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 3 admitted.)

4

5

BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

Q

And then to the top or to the north, there's a

6

7

property that's marked Heart K Ranch Trust. Is that

me, please?

8

generally your understanding of what that property Is?

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

we'll explain that this King's Lane Is not where It's

17

it's got a red square around that?

located on this map.

18

6

9

A

Correct.

10

Q

And then a small square that's labeled with Rose M.

, ·11

King, is that generally where her property would be

12

located?

13

A

Yeah, correct.

14

MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, we'd offer 2.

15

COURT: Any objection?

16

MR. RAINEY: Your Honor, 2 somewhat duplicates --

17
18
19

Mr. Fuquay, could you take a look at Exhibit 3 for

COURT: Let me get it marked real quick. He's got

a copy,
WITNESS: I'm ready.
BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

Q

Can you explain and show on this map where you

live?

A

I live on the south side of the BO there marked

John Fuquay.

Q
A

Okay. So there's a parcel marked John Fuquay and
Correct.

COURT: Is it on the King side or the Low side?

19

Q

You would be on the left-hand side of that?

20

WITNESS: lt's in the middle.

20

Correct.

21

COURT: Are the Lows here?

A
Q

22
23
24
25

MR. RAINEY: I can't hear you.

21
22

COURT: Are the Lows here?

23 live?

MR. RAINEY; Yes.

24

A

Correct. The house and trees.

MR. FARRIS: Yes, Your Honor.

25

Q

So Is there a road that runs through your property?

There's a little dark spot there. Can you explain

what that Is? Is that close as a good marker for where you

B
1
2

COURT: Oh, okay. Are they represented by you, Mr.
Rainey, as well or do you just represent the Kings?

3
4

MR. RAINEY: No. Lows are represented by Bryce
Farris.
COURT: I'm sorry. Okay. All right. For

5
6

Illustrative purposes, do you have any objection?
MR. RAINEY: Well, l want the record clear that

7
8

what is called King's Lane is not accurate.
COURT: You can take that up on cross-examination.

9

10
1
2

3

A

I believe that's called Castle Lane.

Q

Okay. And how long has that road run through your

6

property?

7
8

A Thirty-seven years that I know of. I don't know
how much longer. I can only say for how long I've been

9

there.

10

11
12

COURT: We'll let it in just for illustrative

11

MR. RAINEY: Okay.

14
15

16
17
18

{Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2 admitted.)

Q

And Mr. Fuquay, I'm handing you what we'll mark at

Exhibit 3. And does this show the same information as the
prior map?

19

A

As best I c:an tell, yeah.

20

Q
A

A little closer detail?

21

12
13
14

15

BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

16
17

18
19

Yeah.

20
21

MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, we'd offer 3 for

22

22
23
24

illustrative purposes.

25

objection to 3 for illustrative purposes only?

23

COURT: And Mr. Farris, Mr. Rainey, do you have any
9

And what's that road that runs through your

property?

5

MR. RAINEY: Okay.

13

Correct.

4

10

purposes.

A
Q

24

25

Q

Where does that road go if you follow It south?

It will bring you out on -- it forks up there a
little ways from my house and then it goes out to Oreana
A

Loop Road.

Q

Okay. And how far ls it from your house to Oreana

loop Road?

A

Going that way --

Q

Going south.

A

-- probably approximately four miles. Three or

four miles.

Q

Okay. And then if you follow that road north,

where does it go?

A

It will hook into Castle Lane -- or it goes into

Oreana Loop Road also.

Q

So if we follow that road north out of your

property, what's the first thing that you would come to

11

245

10/22/2014 l 1 :13:04 AM

•

1 'after yo\J pass -- let'~ just kind of walk it through.

2
3
, 4

After you pass your property, where are you?

A

Then I would -- atter I go out of my property, I

would hit the BLM land.

1
2
3

Okay.

5

And then I would go to -- stay on the SLM land and

6
7

0

11

rental house and then It goes from there into Castle Lane

/ 14

8
9

and goes -- the next house would be the King residence.

10

There's four of them there I believe.

11

. 2
Q
I 3 you?
A

And If you keep going east, where does that take
You'll cross the creek, Castle Creek, right there

I:~

j 4

125

A

It's just a gravel -- gravel dirt road all the way

Q

And about how wide is It?

A

The actual road part, I'm going to say maybe 20

feet In gravel maybe.
Q

Okay. Are there any fences along Castle Lane?

A

The south side of the road, yes.

Q

Okay. Does that fence go all the way through the

17

from Loop to Loop Road. It's just all gravel.

the south side of the lane?

14

I~~
1

So from the northwest corner of Clint's property,

And that runs from Clint's property how far east?

Highway 78.

i

Q

there's a fence that runs all the way along what would be

Approximately a half a mlle.

16

120

goes to Lows' on easterly.

Q

15

like as far as what type of a road or how wide It ls?

Yes. But It changes ownership I believe there and

A

Oreana Loop Road would venture on up and connects into
Can you describe, please, what Castle Lane looks

A

13

by their yard and it would end up on Oreana Loop Road.

Q

Okay. And when that fence gets to the Intersection

12

; 5

8
19

Correct.

Q

continue?

Q
A

9

A

of Clint's property and the Lows' property, does that fence

6
7

it would come up to Clint's house, goes around Clint's

18
19

Lows' property?

A

Oh, no. It would be about

1

There's fences that border us there on my property

I was

Q

Okay. And then does that -- where does that fence

line end?

20

A

21
22

Q

Well --

A

Or the continuing fence?

Q
A

The continued fence.

Q

So if you were to follow that fence line from the

23
24
25

Clint's fence or Lows' fence?

It must end down on Oreana Loop Road.

14
1

northwest corner of Clint's property, that fence line would

2

and then It borders Cl!nt's property and then lt turns Into

2

continue along the south side of Oreana Loop -- excuse me,

3

a lane where Lows are on one side of the lane and Kings are

3

off King's Lane or Castle Lane all the way to Oreana Loop

4

on the other side of the lane.

4

Road?

Q

5

A

Correct.

where you're talking about -- somebody reading this wlll

6

Q

Are there any other fences along what's marked as

7

understand where you're talking about so if I ask a few

8

questions llke this asking you to explain, that's partly

7 !(Ing Lane?
8
A There's a fence on the north side of that road.

9

for the record of what we're doing.

9

5
6

10

111
. 2

13

5
16

. •7

!B
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I

A

a quarter mile.

wrong. It continues into Lows' property, yes.

12

I

•

4

5

B house toward the east and then you would hit Clint's other

Clint's property?

A
Q

So what I'm dolng so we can have the record reflect

10

So when you're talking about the road getting up to

11

A

Correct.

12

Q

Where does that fence start? Take from the west --

of Clint Fuquay's property?
Correct.
And then when that road turns east, does it change

condltion? Does it change how wide it is?

A

lt varies In and out but it's basically the same .

I mean It's just a gravel road.

Q

So there's a fence on the south side of the road

Okay.

Clint's property, you're talking about the northwest corner

A
Q

Q

Now, what Is -- let's take this kind of in

and then there's a fence on the north side of the road?

13

if you would, the west side. Where does It start on the

14

west side?

15

A

It would start approximately where Clint's property

16

ends, in that gt?neral area, and it runs east to -- crosses

17
18

the creek and 1 assume lt hooks Into Oreana Loop Road there

19

somewhere.

Q

Okay. So if you're driving down King's Lane on

D sections. From the corner -- the northwest corner of

20

this roadway from Oreana loop Road to Clint's property,

1 Clint's property to the northeast corner of Clint's

21

would there be a fence on both sides?

22

:3

I~:

property, are there any fences along that road?

22

A

Just along Clint's side -- Clint's property llne.

23

Q

So there's a fence on Clint's side of the properly

24

that follows the road all the way across lhe north side of

25

A
Q

Correct.
Has there always been a fence on both sides of that

road?

A

Correct.

15

246
,; nf 15 sheets

1
2
3

a

fior 37 years?

A
Q

•

•

1

Q

And where were they located?

Correct.

2

A

One was on the end of that lane and then the other

Have you ever had any gates -- let me -- have there

3
4
5

next to I guess it would be their shop or kind of where it
closest narrowest part of the lane.

4

ever been any gates across that section of road between

5

Clint's property and Oreana Loop Road?

one would have been on the east side of the lane kind of
makes a corner there or turn right there. Kind of the

6

A

Yes.

6

7
8

a

Okay. What have they been?

7

A

The last few years, they've been like a four or

8

side would be approximately where Clint's property ends and

9

connects with the Lows' property?

9

five-wire·- barbed Wire strand gate.

10
11

Okay. And before the last four or five years, so

10

between the time when you bought your property and the last

11

12

four or five years, have there ever been any gates across

12

there?

13
14

:13
14

15
16

17
18

Q

A
Q

No. It's always been open.
In the last four or five years, when did you start

noticing that there was a gate being put up?

A

Well, the kids would call or we would see that they

had cattle locked in the lane so they would fence them in

19

there so they wouldn't escape I guess and eat the lane

20

down, eat the grass or the forage.

Q

Q

Okay. And so the west -- the fence on the west

A

Correct.

Q

And then on the east side, would it be -· can you

kind of point out where it would be on the east side?

A

Well, It would be Just -~ just kind of behind their

shop building and maybe kind of across the way from Gil's

15
16
17
18
19
20

house now.

21

time, It might be a couple weeks and It just kind of varied
on how many -- I think probably how many cattle he put in

Q

You're pointing to the small squares on the map?

A

Yes. Yeah.

Q

And how long would those gates be up?

A

I think It varied. Anywhere -- it started out for

a few days and then it would be a week and then the next

21
22
23
24

It's just a five -- four or five-wire stick gate

22
23

and lt just kind of crosses the lane, approximately 10 feet

24

Q

25

IDng, 15 feet long I guess. I don't know.

25

located?

When you say there was a gate, describe what this

five-wire gate Is. What Is that?

A

there.
When you say cattle, where were those cattle

16

18

1

Q

Is lt made of barbed wlre7

1

2

A

Barbed wire and there may be some metal stakes or

2

3

4
5

sticks that vary probably.
Q

3

So yDu would have, explain, five strands of barbed

wire?

Okay. In between the two fences that are bordering

the road?

A

Correct.

5

Q

And then a fence gate on both sides -- both ends?

A

Correct.

Q

Would that be considered normal pasture area for

Yes.

6

7

Q

And then how would it attach to the fence on either

8

side?

7
8

9

A

those cattle?

9

They had just loops that you would loop over the

They were Inside that lane.

4

A

6

A
Q

MR. RAINEY: Objection, Judge. There's no

10

end stick and you would have to put the bottom in and push

10

foundation for him to be an expert on pasture.

11

the post up and put a loop across the top and that would

12

hold the gate up.

11
12

BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

13
14
15

attached to sticks on either end?

Q

13

So on either end of the barbed wire, It was

A

Or the fence.

'i6

Q

Or the fence?

14
15
16

17
18

A

Or a post or something there, yeah.

17

Q

And In order to open that, how would you open·-

19
20

have to open that?

A

You would 11ave to get out and just push the post

18

19
20

COURT: I'll sustain It.

Q
A

Okay. Do you have cattle, Mr. Fuquay?
Yes.

Q

Do you graze caltle?

A
Q
A
Q

Yes.

A

I don't have very many. Maybe 15.

Do you know what good grazing land ls for cattle?
Sometimes.
Okay. And how many cattle do you own?

21

in, lift the loop up, pull the gate around off of the road,

21

Q

And how long have you had cattle?

22

drive through, pick it up -~ pick it up and hook It all

22

A

Most of my life.

23

back up.

23

Q

Based on your knowledge and experience of having

24

a

And how many gates were there that were like this?

24

cattle, would you say that the area in between the fences

25

A

Two.

25

where the road ls Is a normal cattle grazing area?

17

19
D~....,n
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1

A

Some times of the year, sure.

•

1

2

Q

Okay. And for how long?

2

3

A

Again, it would depend on th_e number of cattle that

3

•

coming and going and accessing the property.

Q

Okay. So where do you typically -- how do you

access the property that -- yours and Clint's property?

4

you put in that area, you know. If you put too many or a

4

5

lot, It would last a few days and if you put a handful, it

6

might last a month.

and beyond. It depends on what direction I'm going.

7
8

5
6
7

area?

8

access your property?

Q

MR. RAINEY: Objection, Judge. He doesn't know

9

0

What would be the PUrPOSe of putting cattle in that

what the Kings l1ave in mind.
COURT: I'll let him answer.

11

2
WITNESS: l would assume to grow beef. To produce
3 livestock, weight.
14
5
.6
17

8

,9

i 25

9

And how long have you regularly used that area to
MR. RAINEY: Again, Your Honor --

10

WITNESS: Thirty-seven years.

11
12
13

MR. RAINEY: -- the issue on the restraining order
was the emergency. The extreme emergency and dire health.
That's what we focused our affidavits on.

prove the easement rlght now.

affidavits -- in the memorandums and affidavit by Mr.

16
17
18

to answer the question. I'm not going to make a ruling on

Cleverley himself setting out the emergency.

19

the permanency on the use of the land. Just whether there

COURT: Okay.

20

should be use of the road pending the trial. You said 37

MR. RAINEY: Now describing the land and all

21
22
23
24
25

years.

supported this temporary restraining order and the proposed
injunction. They have specific allegations In their

this -COURT: Let's go ahead and move along. I get it

. "3

i

Q

COURT: Right.

1

4

Through -- through that lane. From Oreana Loop

14
15

MR. RAINEY: Your Honor, I'd further object. We're
getting beyond the purpose of their allegations that

20

: 22

A

Road through the lane to Clint's property to my property

that they pasture the cattle there to keep the grass down.
BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

MR. RAINEY: Not this easement. He's trying to
COURT: I understand. I'll go ahead and allow him

WITNESS: Thirty-seven years .
COURT: Go ahead.
BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

Q

Are you aware of any emergency vehicles that have

20

1

Q

1

ever had to come down to your properties or in that area?

2

permanent fence anywhere -- excuse me, a permanent gate

2

3

anywhere along what -- between Clint's property and Oreana

3

4

Loop Road?

4
5

Q
A

Grand View.

6

Q

And where is that in relationship to you?

5
6

MR. RAINEY: Judge, again, I object. They made
specific --

A

Yeah. Over the years, they've come and gone

through that way.
Okay. Where is the nearest ambulance located?

7

COURT: I think that goes to the -- I think when

7

A

It would be east of us approximately 15 miles.

8

the gate was put up goes towards the injunction. So I'll

B

Q

Okay. And If an ambulance was to come from Grand

9

allow him to answer that. When the permanent gate -- not

9

·10
11

I

' 2

13

44
5

16

1'7

Ia
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0

I

So when was the first time that -- that there was a

22

1

22
:3

!;:

the barbed wire gate. You can go ahead and answer that.

View to your house, how would it need to get to your house?

10

MR. FARRIS: Objection. Calls for speculation.
COURT: Are there other accesses to your house?

about a month ago, a month and a half ago approximately.

11
12

BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

13

COURT: Can you explain what those are?

14

WITNESS: They would go -- If they couldn't come

WlTfllESS: The permanent gates I believe has been

Q

Did anybody tallc to you about that gate being

installed?

A

They installed them while I was gone.

Q

Okay. Did you know that they were going to be

installing the gates?

A

1 didn't know that they were going to be installing
Does the Installation of those gates create a

that way, they would have to continue on Oreana Loop Road

and follow the creek down. I think all the way around

17

there, it's another four miles.

1B

COURT: What's the difference in mileage?

19

WITNESS: About four miles.

21

22

problem for you?

A
Q
A

15

16

20

them, no.

Q

WITNESS: There are.

COURT: Okay.
BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

Q

So in order -- an ambulance would have to take an

Yes.

23

additional four miles to the Loop Road or It would be

Why?

24

total of four miles that it would be?

It's interfering with our normal dally activity of

21

25

A

a

It would be an additional four miles. From the

23

248
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•

1 ,lane all the way around, lt would be approximately four

2

miles around.

1
2

Q

•

Okay. And all of your addresses are on Castle

Lane. Isn't that correct?

3

Q

And how long would that take in minutes?

3

A

Correct.

4

A

Ten minutes I guess. Ten minutes.

4

In fact, give me the address for Clint.

Q

Okay. So the other road, the Castle Lane Road, can

Q
A
Q

A

Castle Lane and I think the rental house Is 18903 I

7

A

No. It's gravel. Castle Lane is all gravel.

5
6
7

8

Q

But if there was an emergency, it would take at

8

believe.

9

Q

Okay.

10
11

A

I think.

Q

So again, all three of your -- you and your two

5
6

9
10

1·1
12
13
14
15
16
17
1B
·19
20

you drive -- is that a paved surface?

least -- take ten minutes more for them to go and traverse
that way?

A

coming I guess, you know.

Q

To the best of your knowledge, would an emergency

vehlcle have to stop at each one of those gates to open it?

A

As It is currently, yes.

Q

Have you had any conversations with any of the

defendants about your ability to get through or whether or
not those gates were going to be locked?

A

I haven't -- since they've put up these gates, I

haven't had any conversation wlth any of them, no.

Q

21

22

23

Approximately. Depending on which way they're

Okay.
MR. CLEVERLEY; I don't have any further questions

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22

I think his is 18902.
Castle Lane?

sons live on Castle Lane.

A

Correct.

Q

Okay. And there's no gates. You don't gate that

then. Somebody --

A

I gate mine --

on

my piece of property, I gate that

at times, yes.

Q

So you would be obstructing the emergency vehicle

corning up Castle Lane then, huh?

A

If they come up that Castle Lane, yes.

Q

Okay. In your affidavits -- let me start out, in

your motion for this temporary restraining order, you

23

stated that you are in Immediate need of access to the

24

COURT: Who would like to do cross first?

24

property over King Lane. Do you remember saying that?

25

MR. RAINEY: I'll go first.

25

A

Okay. Sure.

1
2

Q
A

Do you remember?
Sure, yeah. I don't know. Sure.

3
4

Q

Okay. But you have access on Castle Lane, don't

you?

for you, Mr. Fuquay.

24

26

1

COURT: Mr. Rainey, Go ahead.

2

MR. RAINEY: Thank you.

3
4

CROSS-EXAMINATION
QUESTIONS BY MR. RAINEY:

Mr. Fuquay, first of all, let's be clear. That

5

A

Correct.

6

Castle Lane has been t11ere for years and years and years.

6

All the way up.

7

It's an ancient road, isn't it?

7

Q

5

A
Q

8
9

As far as I know, yeah.

8

Q
A
Q

In fact, there was a schoolhouse up there by your

9

A

Correct.

Q

So you don't have an immediate need for King's Lane

A
Q

Correct.

10
11

So Castle Lane is basically a public road, Isn't

12

A

I don't know.

Q

Isn't It what we call the ancient -- let's see. An

10
11
12

house. Isn't that correct?

13
14

it?

15

16
17

18
19

A

I don't know.

13
14
15
16
17

Q

There is an all-weather road that goes right to

18

SR247T,'

your house, isn't there?

A

There's

21

Q

It's all-weather, isn't lt7

21

that goes --

A

I guess.

22

23

Q

And It goes on around to In front of Clint's place

23

24
25

and then In front of J.C.'s place. Isn't that correct?

A

A

Correct.

Q

Okay. You also say -- and this is paragraph 20 of

your motion.
MR. CLEVERLEY: I'm going to object to the extent

that counsel's rererrlng to the motion. If he wants to
refer to Mr. Fuquay's declaration, l have no problem with
that.
MR. RAINEY: This motion was made on his behalf.

Correct.

COURT: Go ahead and ask the question and see what

20

22

24

25

All three houses.

because you could use Castle Lane, right?

19

a gravel road

20

Correct.

it Is.

MR. RAINEY: Yeah.

BY MR. RAINEY:
Q

"The gates interfere with normal delivery services

used by plaintiffs such as Fed Ex, UPS and Schwann's."

25

27
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A

Correct.

2

Q

We did get an affidavit from the Schwann delivery

3

man. He would come up --

4

MR. CLEVERLEY: Objection. We don't know what he

excuse me. The gates interfere with plaintiffs' access to

2

emergency services such as police, fire and ambulance. You

3

say that?

4

A
Q

Correct.

6

7

COURT: Go ahead and ask the question.

7

A

Correct.

MR. RAINEY: Yeah.

8

Q

Okay. So going through King Lane doesn't interfere

9

0
11

' 2

I

•

1

5 would say.
6
MR. RAINEY: The affidavit's in record.
8

i

•

1

A

' 8

19
120
!I 1
22
1
'?3
I 4
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through Castle Lane. Isn't that right?
No. It delays IL

Q

It doesn't Interfere; is that right?

MR. CLEVERLEY: Objection. There's no foundation

13

A

It delays it.

Q

Well, you're really not telling the judge It takes

Correct.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Okay. Then you say that they interfere With the

21

WITNESS: Correct.
Okay. And then so UPS and Fed Ex would come right

up Castle Lane too, wouldn't they?

Q

with you and your family getting emergency services up

A

BY MR. RAINEY:

A

Lane all the way up to J.C.'s house, can they not?

12

COURT: Does the Schwann guy use the road?

Q

10
11

Well, these emergency vehicles can come up castle

Okay.

for that.

: 5

,~;

You're familiar with the affidavit. I sent it to

your attorney.

3

14

9

BY MR. RAINEY:

Q

5

ten minutes to go four miles, a vehicle drlvlng 60, 70
mlles an hour.

A
Q

Not on Oreana Loop Road, It's not.
You just got one curve and right down into your

place. Isn't that right?

A

There's two curves, three curves, four curves.

Q

Anyway, the whole point Is that you have access to

22

emergency vehicles, general services, school and all

A

Correct.

23

those -- the bus stop. Yeah. All those services are right

Q

There's one chl!d and that's J.C.'s chlld; Is that

24
25

there at Castle Lane.

children's ability to get to school.

right?

A

Hlstorfcally, they've come through Klngs'.

30

28

A

Correct.

1

2

Q

He's, what, five or six?

2 below the hill on Castle Lane, aren't they, as of today's

3

A
Q

Correct.

3

And he's picked up at Oreana right across from

4

A

Sure.

5

Q

Now, that's the same allegation that you made in

4
S

, 6
7

Castle Lane, isn't he?

A

Actually, he was picked up -- until the gates went

up, he was picked up at Highway 78 where Oreana Loop Road

8

connects to Highway 78 and refer to that as the top of the

9

hlll and that's where he was picked up.

13
~4
5

Q

That's clear up on the highway?

A

Correct. Until they put up the gates.

Q

Okay. So now the bus driver picks him up right

below your house then?

A

I guess so, yes.

Q

Okay. So rather than driving clear to the highway,

12
13
14
15

16

all you have to do Is just drive down over the hill lo

16

•7

your·· to Oreana Road -- Oreana Loop, right?

17
18

Ia

Sure.

Q
A

And that's where your mailbox Is, Isn't it?

19

' 0

The current one, yes.

20

1

Q

As of today's date, your ma!lbox Is on Oreana Loop

21

19

I

22
3

They are coming right there to your place down

date?

6 your affidavit, isn't it?
7
A Okay,
8
Q Pardon me?
9
A Okay.
1O
Q But the truth of the matter is that all those
11 services and all those people can get to Castle Lane and up

A

J

Q

1

to your house as of today's date, right?

A
Q

I guess, with a delay.
I'm not going to argue with it. Judge Nye knows

how long it takes to go four mlles.

A

Okay.
MR. CLEVERLEY: Objection. Argumentative.
COURT: Let's move on.

BY MR. RAJNEY:

Q

In fact, the police department or sheriff's office

has been to your house, have they not?

and the boy going to school ls picked up on Oreana Loop

22

A

Lots.

right by Castle Lane.

23

Q
A
Q

And they come right up Castle Lane, don't they?

_4

A

Correct.

24

125

Q

So then you say that the emergency vehicles --

25

29

They come up both ways.
Well, you recognize Gary Aman, the former sheriff?

31
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1 '

A

Sure.

2

Q
A

He's been to your house?

3

Sure, lots.
MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I didn't

4

5

realize that there were additional witnesses, non-parties

6
7

in the room.
COURT: Do you want to have them excluded?

8

MR. CLEVERLEY: I would.

9

COURT: He would like to exclude all witnesses

10
' 11

until they're called and I'll -- I think that's Mr. Aman

1
2
3
4
5

•

We'll explain that here in a few minutes.

A

Okay.

Q

Isn't that correct?

A

Yep.

Q

You had to get out and you had to lift the loop up

6 over··
7
A Sure.
B
Q -- the fence post to get the gate out.
9
A Sure.
Q Now, the new gates are metal. They're metal gates
10

walking out there. So I'll go ahead und grant that

1 'I

and they have a plunger lhat goes into the hole in the gate

request. If anybody's scheduled to testify In this

12

on the opposite side of the plunger. Isn't that correct?

13

hearing, you got to wait outside till you're called. Don't

13

A

I have no idea. I haven't went up to them gates.

14
15
16
17
18
19

discuss your testimony until you're called.

14

Q

Well, didn't you tell the deputy sheriff you were

12

20
21

MR. FARRIS: If I may, you're referring to nonparties.
COURT: Yes, parties can stay here. Parties can
stay here. Just witnesses. Non-party witnesses.
Okay. Go ahead.
BY MR. RAINEY:

15
16
17

not about to lock the gates or close the gates?

18

BY MR. RAINEY:

19

A

Kings' locked gates.

20
21
22
23
24

Q

Pardon me?

25

Q

Just to make the record clear, the only hindrance

22

on Castle Lane going all the way up with emergency vehicles

23
24
25

would be your locked gates.

MR. CLEVERLEY: Objection. Foundation.
MR. RAINEY: Well, okay.

Q

Didn't GIibert l<ing call a deputy out because you

were fussing with him about having the gates put up and the
gates closed?

A

Correct.
MR. CLEVERLEY: Objecting as to time and -·

MR. RA[NEY: I'll get to that.
COURT: Go ahead and set the time.

32

1

A

34

2

to the Oreana Loop Road. To Oreana Loop Road is my

1
2

3

understanding.

3

4

Q

Kings' gates. Castle Lane goes all the way through

Well, you've been calling the part on Kings'

5 property King's Lane. That's what you said in all your
G pleadings.

4

Okay.

7

8

Q

So I'm talking about the Castle Lane going up to

8

'11
12

13
14

15
16

the last-· you call It the rental house.

A
Q
A

9

Okay.

10

And the only hindrance on coming up through that

11

area Is just your locked gates.
Okay.

12

13

Q So you're creating any delay in the use of Castle
lane, isn't that correct?

Q
A

Tell me when that conversation took place.
Approximately May.
COURT: This year.

6

A

9

BY MR. RAINEY:

5

7

10

MR. RAINEY: Yeah.

WITNESS: This year.
BY MR. RAINEY:

Q

So In May, you had a conversation with Gilbert and

he was going to shut the gates to keep his cattle In,
right?

A

Correct.

Q

And also the gate keeps the range cattle, the BLM

cattle from corning into the Kings' place, right?

14

A

15

there.

Historically, there's not been any range cattle out

A

At certain times of the year I guess, yeah.

16

Q

17

Q

What time of year do you lock your gates?

17

A

I've heard that.

18

A

Hunting season.

18

Q

Your cattle were out there on that range for a

19

Q

What's that?

19

20

A

Hunting season.

21

Q

But It's open other than hunting season?

20
21

22

A

In general, if you can open the gate, yeah.

22

23
24

25

You know it's rented this year.

while.

A
Q

Sure.
Then you told the deputy sheriff you're not about

to close the gates. Isn't that right?

23

A

Correct.

Okay. Now, you do admit there were wire gates

24

Q

Okay. And in order to make sure the gates were

across this King's Lane -- what you're calling King Lane.

25

They're not locked. They're just shut.

Q

33

closed, then Gilbert put a lock on it, correct?

35
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1

A

I,don't know. I've never seen them locked.

1 some of these.

2

Q

So you haven't gone back there since the

2

3

4

conversation?

A

3

Since I went back through there, the gates have

5 been -- I've been gone for the last month so I mean he put
S the cattle in there and I assume he opened the gates back
7 up and there's not been an issue.
8

Q

Well, let's make the record clear, Mr. Fuquay. The

9

Kings use that lane to graze cattle and to actually corral

0

the cattle too, don't they?

A Yeah. I don't know what they -- yeah, sure. They
2 graze it.
3
Q Okay. But they use it kind of as a holding pen

11

14

5

I don't know what -- I don't know about that but --

.s

Q

Well, there's cattle in there .

17

A
Q

Yep.

8

19

20
1
22

"3
4

25

There's cattle in there an awful lot of tile year,

isn't that correct?

A

Sometimes, yeah.

Q

Okay. And they also -- Kings use that road to get

to their flelds, don't they?

A
Q

5

QUESTIONS BY MR. FARRIS:
Q

Mr. Fuquay, my name is Bryce Farris and I represent

the Lows.

6

A

Okay.

7

Q

You've been talking about this roadway that they've

8

referred to or referred to as Castle Lane and from what I

9

understand is that lane comes off Oreana Loop up to your

10

property? If you'd look at probably Exhibit 3 if you have

11

it in front of you.

12

A

Okay.

13

Q

You see where there's an arrow that says Castle

14

then?

A

4

•

CROSS-EXAMINATION

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Lane?

A
Q

Yeah.
That Castle Lane originates at Oreana Loop further

to the south of the area of your property?

A

Correct.

Q

That's the road you've been talking about and it

comes up, goes through your property'?

A
Q

Correct.
And then goes up to the property that you've --

that someone's identified as Clint Fuquay?

Correct.

23

They've used that road ever since you've lived ln

24

A

Correct.

25

Q

Okay. With respect to that Casl:1e Lane, from what

that property.

36

38

1

A

Correct.

1

I'm understanding your testimony is, that's where your

2

Q

And never have you tried to kick the Kings off the

2

mailbox is currently?

3

A

Currently, yes.

4

A

Not that I recall.

4

Q

Okay. That's your address?

5

Q

Well, you never have, have you?

5

A

Yes.

6

A

Not that I recall, no.

7

Q

So in other words, you've never interfered with the

3

8

property, have you, off the road?

Kings using their own property, have you?

9

A

other than the gates.

,o

Q
A
Q

Pardon me?

11

Other than the issue with the gates.

2
Well, they put up gates. Particularly when they
13 had cattle in there, they had gates in there. Isn't tl1at
~4 right?
A Yeah.
5
16
Q Okay. Now, you can't tell Judge Nye whether it's
·7 easier to open the metal gate than to put the wire over the
8

19
0

posts with the loop, can you?

A

'22
I

.3

I've not opened them metal gates. I haven't been

11

A This one?

12
13

Q

14

COURT: Oh, I've got it. It's this one here.
Yeah.

15

16
17
18
19

Yes, yeah.

WITNESS: Okay.
BY MR. FARRIS:

Q

You see where at the top of that it says "map

address" and it says 18907 Castle Lane?

A Correct.

20

Q

That's your address?

MR. RAINEY: That's all the cross I have, Your

21
22

A

Correct.

Q

So that's -- if you want to put In your address to

COURT: Mr. Farris .

23

find your property, that's the address you put in, Castle

MR. FARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try not

24
25

Lane?

through there since.

1

Q That's where Schwann's or other delivery folks
7 deliver to?
8
A Currently.
9
Q Okay. Currently. As we sit here today. And if
10 you'd look at Exhibit 1, do you have that In front of you?
6

Honor.

to be redundant. Let me see if I can put a fine point on

A

Correct.

39
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Q

~nd that would be the same if it's an emergency

1

Lane?
affidavit In there.

3

A

Correct.

2
3

4

Q

Okay. Now, the other thing I want to make sure

4

2

vehicle trying to find your residence, wouldn't It be?

I'm understanding is that you don't dispute there's

5

5

that

6

been fences across this -- we'll call it King's Lane for

6

7

now.

7

8

A
Q
A

You don't dispute there's been fences across there?

Q

It's been for four or five or more years?

A
Q

Five -- yes.

9

10
·11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

COURT; I'll give lt the weight that It takes. He
can answer that.

MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, I'm going to object to
him referencing the affidavits.

B

Okay.
No.

They have been there for cattle, to keep cattle

inside that lane?

A
Q
A
Q

MR. RAINE't': Objection, Your Honor. He's got an

Correct.
Okay. There's been a fence at each end.
Correct.
Okay. There's

new fences that have been

constructed more recently, right?

A

Correct.

Q

And the way l understand your testimony there at

22
23

the end of your discussion with Mr. Rainey is that you

24

difficult to open at this polnt.

don't know whether those new fences are easier or more

25

A

Correct. I've not been out there.

1

Q

Okay. The other thing I wanted to make sure I

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

COURT: Just go ahead and ask your question.
BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

Q

Does the Schwann's person, historically has he come

up Castle Lane?

A

No.

Q
A

Up what they're referring to as King Lane.

Where has he come?

Q

And do you receive UPS packages?

A

Correct.

Q

Where does that dellvery driver come today?

A

Today, I guess they would have to come up Castle

Lane.

Q

Okay. A month ago, where did he come?

A

He would -- historically, he would come through

King Lane.

Q

Okay. And for the 37 years before that?

A

King Lane.

Q

Same thing with the Schwann's delivery?

1

A

Yes.

Q

Have you ever seen the Kings use Castle Lane to get

42

40

2

understand Is that for the Castle Lane, the first lane that

2

3

we talked about coming up Oreana Loop to your property

3

4

where your mailbox --

4

A

I've seen them come through there, yes.

5

Q

Okay. Is that frequent?

6

A

A few times a year maybe.

7

Q

Has anyone ever questioned your use of the gate

Q And it's not uncommon for you to put a lock across
that lane?
A Correct.
Q A locked gate?

9

A

No.

10
11

a

Have you ever seen cattle grazing free on the BLM

A

Q

8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15

19

Okay.

8

No, other than ours when they get out.

Q

Are you aware of any cattle that have gone from BLM

a

Okay.

14

MR. FARRIS: That's all I have, Your Honor.

15

COURT: Thank you. Redirect.

16

not seen any come -- outside cattle come In there, no.

17
18

have been placed in there?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
QUESTlONS BY MR, CLEVERLEY:

Q

Mr. Fuquay, as Mr. Rainey said and as Mr. Farris

21

things are and I want

22

from the way that they are today?

24

A

13

said, as we sit here today, those things are the way that

25

property?

12

Correct.

20

23

across Castle Lane?

A

1G
17
18

to their property on a regular basis?

-- your address, deliveries come from, It's not
uncommon for you to put gates across that lane?
A Correct.

5
6

7

..

to ask you did things recently change

or your property Into what's the King Lane fenced area?

A
Q

A

19

20
21

Just not -- just Kings' cattle. None come -- I've
The only cattle that would have been in there would
Probably, yes.
MR. CLEVERLEY: I don't have any further questions

for Mr. Fuquay.

22

COURT: Thank you. Next witness.

A

Yes.

23

MR. CLEVERLEY: Clint Fuquay, please.

Q

So as they are today, the Schwann's guy delivery

24
25

COURT: Yes, leave those there.

rerson comes up Castle Lane. Has he always come up Castle

WITNESS: Do I leave these here?

43
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(CLINT FUQUAY Is sworn.)

2
3

4

•

DIRECT EXAMINATION
QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

Q

Mr. Fuquay, you are also one of the plalntlffs in

A

Yes.

Q

When was that?

3

A

June of 2013.

4

Q

Can you explain briefly what happened?

A

Gil's son Jeff wrecked his motorcycle and was

S

S this action?
6
A Yes.

6

7

Q

7

B

A

18903 Castle Lane.

8

9

Q

And you purchased that property recently from your

9

0

father?

11

2
3

14
5

.6
17

8
19

20

1
22

Can you tell me where you live?

knocked unconscious.

Q

If you take a look at Exhibit 3, can you give me an

Idea of where that was?

A

It would be right on the corner of my -- there's a

10

little box there In the northwest corner and that's my

A

Yes.

11

house and it was just on the outside of my property line

Q

Have you lived on that property for -· prior to

12

right there on BLM.
happened?

For how long?

13
14
15

your purchase?

A
Q
A

Yes.
Eight years.

16

Q
A
Q

And where did you llve before that?

17

In his house.

18
19

Okay. And so have you lived your entlre life In

20

that area?

Q

Okay. Were you present when that accident

A

Yes.

Q
A
Q

I did not, no.

A

Yes.

Q
A

Gil and Joe asked what my address was and I gave

Did you call for emergency services?
Okay. Were you there when they came?
Where did they come from?

And did you go to school?

21
22

them my address and they came down what they're calling

A

Yes.

23

King Lane from Grand View.

Q

Where did you go to catch the bus for school?

24
25

Q

so It came from Grand View over Oreana Loop Road?

A

Yep.

1

Q

And then they would have turned onto the King

A
Q

A

Yes.

When we were little, we caught the bus on King Lane

46

44
1
2

·3

•

1
2

down by the Loop Road.

Q
A

And you have a child?

2

Lane --

I do.

3

A

Yes.

Okay. And how old is he?

4

Q

-- area? And then ended up at your house?

Two.

5

A

Yes.

Okay. Does he -- let me back up. ts J.C. your

6

Q

Okay. And do you recall how long that took for the

6

Q
A
Q

7

brother?

7

8

A
Q

Yes.

8

And he has a child as well?

9

'10
11

A

Yes.

10

Q

How old is that child?

2

A

Six.

11
12

and then come back up?
accident was, it would have taken longer to go around.

4

5

9

I

emergency services to arrive?

A

Not from the phone call, I don't. I can't remember

how long it took.

Q

From your understanding, would it take longer if

they had to go all the way down to King ·- to Castle Lane

A

Q

Six? And do either of those children go to school?

A

The six-year-old son does, yes.

13
14

Q

And do you know where he caught the bus?

15

Q

I\

He used to catch the bus on the top of the hill on

16
17

A

I don't.

Q

Do you know how long It t.ikes for you to drive from

Highway 78.

Q

Okay. And when was the bus -- If you know. If

not, that's okay. Do you know when the change was made to
pick him up at the Castle Lane and Oreana Loop Road?

A

I do know that he changed after the gates -- the

new gates were put up a month ago.

Q

How long have you -- back up. Are you aware of any

I feel like it would take longer. Where that
Okay. Do you know about how much longer?

18

the comer of Oreana Loop and King Lane around to your

19
20

house?

21

around.

22
23

Q

accidents or injuries to anyone that has occurred near your

24

property?

25

A

I would say it's an extra five, ten minutes to come
Okay. Where do you typically get to and from your

house?

A

I usually went down King Lane -- what they're

referring to as King lane.

47

45
n,~n

,1~ ' "

47 of 126

14 of 35 sheets
254

1

•

Q

1

And how long have you used that as -- I mean ls

•

what time periods are you talking about?

2

A

3

A

Yes.

3

October.

4

Q

And how long has that been your primary access?

4

Q

A

Since I've lived there so for eight years, my wife

5

2

5
6

7

that your primary access?

and I have lived there.

Q

Would you expect to see cattle penned in there

during the times other than the summertime?
MR. RAINEY: Object to that, Judge. That's

6

7

Does -- do the fences interfere with your mail

I would say from the end of May to the first of

speculation.

8

delivery -- the gates on either side of what we're calling

8

WITNESS: No.

9

King Lane, do they interfere with your mail delivery?

9

COURT: I'll allow him to answer.

A I would say UPS, yes.
11
Q Okay. And where is your mailbox currently?
12
A My mailbox is the same as John's.
13
Q Okay. And that's located at the corner of Oreana
14 Loop and Castle Lane?
15
A Yes.
16
Q And since you've purchased that property, is there
17 an Intent of changing that mailbox?
18
A Yes. I want to put -- my mailing address right now
19 ls 18907 and I plan to change It to 16903 to where the old
20 mailbox is still existing.
21
Q So you used to receive mail at King Lane and Oreana
10

22

Loop Road?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

And there's still

25

A

Yes.

1

Q

Do the -- have you seen the cattle grazing inside

a mailbox there?

WITNESS: No.

10

11
12
13

BYMR.CLEVERLEY:

Q

All right. How cold does It get in this area?
MR. FARRIS: Objection. Calls for --

14

(Fire alarm. Recess taken.)

15

MR. RAINEY: Judge, before we start, l have one

16

witness that has been in here but because of the testimony

17

we've just heard and I had not intended to call her but she

18

is going to be a rebuttal witness. I can have her step out

19
20

now.
COURT: If you could. So we're back on the record.
I get this all printed out as she's typing It and the last

21

22
23

questions were how cold does it get in the area?

24
25

last question?

MR. CLEVERLEY: I'm sorry, Judge. What was the

COURT: "How cold does It get in the area?" You

50

48
2

3
4
5

the boxed area of King Lane?

A

were talking about cattle and whether they're there in the

1

Yes.

Q Would it be normal for that •• those cows to be in
there year round?

2

summertime, In the w·intertime and when the fence Is there.

3

That's kind of where we left off.

4

BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

Q

5

All right. Mr. Fuquay, let me go back to the

6

A

No.

6

accident that we were talking about earlier and you recall

7

Q

How long In your experience have you seen cows

7

telling us that that was a motorcycle accident In front of

8

your house?

8
9

10

within that boxed area?

A

They'd put them on and off there only in the

summertime.

9

A

10

Q
that?

Yes.

And that was -- who was the person Involved in

: 11

Q

And for how long at a time?

11

12

A

It varies. Like you said, it depends on how many

12

A

Jeff King, GIi's son.

Q

Okay. Do you know where he llved at the time?

A

He lives down at Kings'. l think he has his own

13

he puts In there. Sometimes a week, sometimes a couple

13

14

weeks.

14

1 15

'16

Q

Okay. And when there's cows and cattle in there,

are there other means of keeping those cattle in other than

17

fences?

18
19

A
Q

20
21
22

23

No.
Okay. And when there are cattle In there, have you

in the past opened and closed the gates?

15
16
17
18
19
20

house there within the four homes that are there.

Q
A

Yes.

Q

How serious was It?

Okay. Was that-· was that a serious accident?

A

He was unconscious or fn and out of consciousness.

Q

And emergency medical was called?
Yes.

A

Yes.

21

A

Q

What about in January? Would there be cattle in

22

Q

And an ambulance came?

23

A

Yes.

Q

And what did the ambulance do -- what did the EMS

that road in January?

24

A

No.

24

25

Q

When you say that they're there during the summer,

25

workers do from the ambulance?

49

51
A,..
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•

;rhey stabilized Jeff.

2

Q

And did they transport him to the hospital?

2

COURT: Thank you. Mr. Rainey.

3

A

No.

3

MR. RAINEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

1

4

Q

Who did?

4

5

A

Life Flight came.

5

6

Q

And was that a helicopter?

6

7

A

Yes.

7

8

Q

Where did that land?

8

9
0
11

A Next to their hot pond on BLM next to my house.
Q And then they transported him to the hospital?
A

Yes.

Q

About how long was It from the time that the

9

10

at this point, Your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
QUESTIONS BY MR. RAINEY:

Q

With regard to Jeff's accident, that actually

happened on SLM ground, did it not?

A

Yes.

Q

And actually his mother's the one that called the

emergency.

A

Yes.

Q

And she -- do you know whether or not she even knew

14

A

I would say ten minutes.

11
12
13
14

5

Q

If the ambulance would have gone all the way down

15

Q

How do you know that?

A

She asked me what my address was.

2

3

J

•

A

1

ambulance arrived to the time that the helicopter arrived?

your address?

A

l know she did.

.6

and around, based on your estimate of the time that that

17

takes, which would have occurred first, the ambulance

16
17

Q

And that's after she got the ambulance coming?

arriving or the helicopter arriving?

18

A

Or before.

19
20

Q

The whole point Is that the Kings came first

8

119

A

I would say the helicopter.

20

Q

And you indicated that you have small children?

' 1

A

Yes.

Q

How old are they?

'?J

A

Two and three months.

4

Q

Okay. Are you concerned about being able to call

i

122
j zs

and have emergency access for them if you need it?

21
22
23
24
25

through that lane and they opened the gates so the
ambulance would come through to their son, right?

A

They weren't closed at that time. There was no

cattle there and they were not closed to my recollection.

Q

Are you sure of that?

A

Yes.

54

52
1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Up until the installation of the gates last month,

Q
1
2 you?

lf the Kings disagree, are they more accurate than

A

I wouldn't say they was.

Q

Now, let's talk about this Castle Lane. You know

3 were you concerned about the time that it would take for
4 emergency service personnel to arrive if you called for

4

5 assistance?

5

that -- excuse me. Let me back up. I'm sorry, Judge.

If the gates would have been dosed, yes.

6

I'll strike that question and ask -- how old are you?

7

A
Q

If the gates were open, that would be less time?

7

A

Twenty-seven.

e

A

Yes.

8

Q

And you say you've lived on the property for eight

9

Q

For as long as you can remember up until four or

9

years?

6

1·,o

11

2

113~4
I5
116
'. •7
8

119

.o

No.

10
11

five years ago, were there ever gates locking the road?

A
Q

3

And from the time four or five years ago when you

12

Q

So you were 19 years old then?

13

A

Yes.

to be closed?

14

Q

And then where did you live before that?

15

A

In the 18902 address.

16

Q

Okay. And did you at any time live off the

A

l11ey would keep them closed with cattle in there

for a day or three days.

Q

And then what would happen with the gates?

17

A

They would open them and take the cattle out. They

18
19

would leave them in for two or three days and then take

Q

They would do that a couple times a year?

20
21

\ 22

A

Yes.

22

Q

So they weren't in there all the time?

23

A

No.

24
25

I~:

I've lived In that address 18903 for eight years

started seeing gates, how long would It be for those gates

1
.3

A

and the house I'm currently living ln.

them out because the grass was ate.

MR. CLEVERLEY: I don't have any further questions

53

property?

A

Yes.

Q

When was that?

A

From when I was 12 to 18 -- or 13 to 18. ! lived

on the other side of Oreana.

Q

Okay. So from 12 to 18, you didn't even live on

that property.

A

r stayed

Q

My question is from 12 to 18, you didn't live on

on the weekends.

55
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•

1 'that pro·perty?

1

•

castle Lane. Isn't th,H right?

2

A

Not permanently.

2

A

3

Q

Okay. Then you moved back when you were 18 and

3

Q

And the bus driver is Denise Collett, Isn't it?

4

A
Q

Yeah.

4

moved into the double-wlde? Is that --

Yes.

5

A

No.

5

6

Q

Where did you llve?

A

18902 address. Then that's what Is the rental

A
Q

Yes.

7

8

house.

Q

You moved Into the rental house first.

A
Q

To Oreana Loop Road you mean?

9

6
7
8
9

10

A
Q

Yes.

10
11

A
Q

Yes.

Okay. Now, Castle Lane has been there all your

11
12

12

lifetime; Is that correct?

And Denise lives up on Collett Road.
She just comes down to Oreana, correct?
Oreana Loop.
Makes a left-hand turn and goes c1bout 100 feet to

your bus stop?

13

A

Yes.

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

And it's an all-weather road, isn't it?

14

Okay. And that's where your son gets on the bus --

What do you mean by all-weather?

Q
A
Q

A

Yes.

Q

Okay. So the gate on King's Lane doesn't interfere

16

Q

You can get up and down any time of the year.

15
16

17

A

Yes.

17

Q

And it's wide enough for emergency vehicles to get

18
19

15

18
19

20
21

A

up and down?

Not my son.
Your nephew then.

with your son getting on the bus stop at the stop where
Denise picks him up?

It's wide enough for the Schwann man to get up and

20
21

where he gets on the bus.
Isn't interfered by King Lane, Is that correct?

A

Yes.

Q

A

It did. That's why my brother said that he changed

22

down?

23

Yes.
And the Fed Ex man to get up and down?

24

25

A
Q
A

22
23

Yes.

25

A

No.

1

Q

And the UPS person can get up and down?

1

Q

And I suppose somebody has to drive the boy down to

2

A

Yes.

2

Q

And the pollce cars have actually been up to your

3
4
5

24

Q

My question Is where he gets on the bus right now

56

3

4
5
6
7

property, haven't they?

A

18903?

Q

Well, up in that area, the Fuquay property.

A

Yes.

8

Q

They came up Castle Lane.

9

A

Not to my recollection. I've seen them use both

10

Q

The police cars that come up Castle Lane.

12

A

From Kings', I've seen them come that way and

Castle Lane.

the bus stop.

A
Q
A

Yes.

Is that your sister-rn~law?
We all have.

6
Q Okay. So you folks drive him down to the bus stop.
7 The bus comes and picks him up right on Oreana Loop·.
8
A Yes.
9

10

ways.

11
13

58

11
12
13

Q

So all of these emergency conveniences -- have you

seen your motions?

A

No.

Q

You're one of the plaintiffs. Has your attorney

given you any of these motions?

14

Q

Okay. You admit that they use Castle Lane?

14

A

Yes.

15

A

Yes.

15

Q

You've seen them all?

16

Q

Okay. So that road is good enough for emergency

16

A

I've seen them, yes.

17

Q

You l<now the allegations In the motions?

18

A

Yep.

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

Okay. So whether King's Lane Is closed or not, you

19

a

That the gate interferes with access to emergency

17

20
21
22

23

vehicles?

still have a way to get In and out through Castle Lane,

20

vehicles. You've Just told me they can come up and clown

correct?

21

Castle Lane.

A

Yes, yes.

22

A

Yes.

Q

Okay. And so all of these things, the emergency

23

Q

Right? So that isn't true, is It?

24
25

A

No.

Q

Okay. Also the Fed Ex, UPS and Schwann man is

24

vehicles, the Schwann deliveries, the mall person -- excuse

25

me, the mail person delivers the mail down at the bottom of

57

59
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•

1 • coming' up and down Castle Lane, isn't that correct?
2
A They have, yes.
3
Q Okay. So the gate on King's Lane doesn't interfere
4

5
6

Q

Well, you're taking ten minutes to open gates?

A

Yeah.

3

Q

Okay. And that's opening and closing them?

A
Q

Yes.

A

No.

4
5

Q

And we talked about emergency vehicles. You agree

6

with those delivery people, does It?

7
8
9

that they can come up and down Castle Lane?

0

the emergency vehicle?

7
8

A

Yes.

Q

And the gate on King's Lane does not interfere with

9

So it's about the same time as coming up Castle

Lane any way you look at it?

A
Q

Yeah.
And you know the Kings are ranchers. They're

cattle ranchers, aren't they?

11

A

Well, I would say it interferes.

10
11

2

Q

Pardon me?

12

A

Yes.

3

A

I would say that lt interferes.

Q

And there's times of year that they have the cattle

Q

How does it interfere with them coming up and down

13
14

14
5

20

Castle Lane?

A

It don't, no, not down Castle Lane, no.

Q

They can come up and down Castle Lane no problem.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay. So all the allegations you've set forth here

are untrue, aren't they?

1

A

No.

22

Q

That gate doesn't interfere with any of these

?J
4

25

people using Castle Lane?

A

It takes tonger time and my recollection Is Castle

Lane continues all the way down from Oreana Loop to Oreana

A
Q

Yes.

1

Loop.

2

Q

3
4

5

6
7

on the mountain?

A
Q

Yes.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A

Yes.

Q

And when they bring them home, they have just about

1

every Jot filled up, don't they?

A

Sure.

Q

They have a lot of cattle, don't they?

A

Yes.

Q

So you wouldn't dispute the fact that they use that

Jane to sort and work their cattle either, would you?

A

I haven't seen them sort and work there, no.
62

Q

Would you dispute the fact that they put them in

there to hold them for a period of time while they're

3
4

working cattle?

Because they put a sign up that says l<'.ing Lane. I

remember a sign that said Castle Lane there at one time.

5

nothing like that.

called King's Lane?

A
Q

6

You Folks have called it King Lane in your

7

pleadings, haven't you?

8
9

Q

You have to dodge around cattle.

A

Yes.

Q

So you open at least two gates and dodge the cattle

Q

Do you want to see your motions?

A

No.
How long does it take you to stop and open the

11
12

16

'7

gates that the Kings are entitled to have on their Jane?
MR. CLEVERLEY: Objection to the characterization.

13

MR. RAINEY: I'll rephrase it.

14
15
16
17
18

BY MR. RAINEY:

Q

How long does it take you to stOJl and open the

gates on l<!ng Lane?

Okay. So when you use King's Lane, you got to

dodge cattle then.

10

9

·,o
2

Q

They're In there. I haven't seen them work them or

What's that?

I can't recall.

Q

A

A

A

13
14
5

And then they bring them home for a period of time?

2

Why is it called -- why rs the address at Kings'

8

11

And they raise a lot of cattle.

15
16

60

l

•

1
2

to use King lane?

A
Q

Yes.
But on Castle Lane, you can drive straight up,

correct?

A
Q

Yes.
No Interference at all on Castle Lane; Is that

8

A
Q

And there's three gates, aren't there?

19

A

Yes.

0

A

There was only two last time I saw. I haven't been

20

Q

Not any cattle roaming around there that you have

119

1
22

I

:3

.:4
125

I'd say five minutes per gate.

21

through there since.

Q

There's still a wire gate half way down the Jane,

isn't that right?

A

I can't recall. I haven't been down there since

the new ones.

correct?

to watch out and dodge?

22

A

No.

23

Q

That would be the same way with any of these

24

vehicles. Emergency vehicles, delivery people. They would

25

have to stop and open gates and dodge cattle, correct?

63
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1
2
3

A

Sure.

Q

Coming up Castle Lane, that's a straight shot

without stopping for anything, correct?

1

Q

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

-- to go through the Kings'?

A
Q
A
Q
A
Q

Yes.

A
Q

Yes.

4

Now, when did you get your driver's license?

5

A

When I was 15.

6

And so you say you're 27 now.

7

Yes.

8

So that's twelve years ago?

9

10
11

Q
A
Q
A
Q

12

else.

13
14

A
Q

15

16

4

5
6
7
8
9

17
18

19
20

21
22
23
24

25

Yes.

So It's just a matter of convenience for you --

Only convenience. That's the only reason.
It's quicker.
Could be?
It's quicker.
It's quicker. Well, that's what I'm calling

Yes.

10
11
12
13

So you've only been on this property for six years.

14

A

No. Eight. Since I was 19.

15

Q

You don't claim any right to it, do you?

Q

Can you give me the years when you were gone, from

16

A

What's that?

17
18
19

Q

You don't claim any right to King's Lane, do you?

A

I've been using it so I just always assumed that I

could.

20
21

lane?

And six of those twelve years you lived somewhere

when to when?

A

I would say from 2001 to 2005.

Q

Well, that's five years.

A

Four. I don't remember when in 2001. Moved back

the summer of 2005.

Q

When you got your driver's license, you were gone.

22

convenience.

A
Q

It's easter, yes.
Okay. So you want to use King's lane just because

It's convenient.

A

Q

Because that's what I've always used.

Have you ever excluded the Kings from using that

A

No.
Have you ever told them to get off?

23

Q

A

I stayed there on the weekends.

24

A

No.

Q

Other than weekends but you didn't live there on a

25

Q

Have you ever told them that they couldn't use it

You didn't even live on that property.

66

64
1
2

day-to-day basis.

3

Q You were not watching the Kings' operation on a
day-to-day basis.

4

A

1

Correct.

2
3

A
Q

So In a way, have you interfered with the Kings?

4

A

No.

Q

Have you given them any hassle about when you use

5

A

Correct.

5

6

Q

In fact, you've never watched Kings on a day-to-

7

day -Correct.

9

A
Q

6
7
8

Is that right?

9

10

A

Correct.

11

Q

Just occ:aslonally seeing what's going on, right?

12

A

13

Q

8

14

15
16

Okay.
MR. FARRIS: Your Honor, I don't have anything to

13

QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

14

What are you talking about?

15

Well, there's periods of times you said they never

16

18

you're not there on a day-to-day basis, are you?

18

I drive that road on a day-to-day basis but In that

20

time, I wasn't there on a day-to-day basis so at that time,

21

I can't say what tl1ey did on a day-to-day basis.

Q

No.

So when you say that they've never had cattle in

17

22

A
Q

Correct.

had cattle and never locked gates. You don't know because

A

the lane?

add.

17
19

No,

10
11
12

there, you don't know, do you?

A
Q

if you're using ft?

Okay. And is there any reason you don't go down --

19
20
21
22

COURT: Okay. Thank you. Redirect.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

Q

You Indicated that Castle Lane is what Mr. Rainey

calls an all-weather road?

A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

Yes.
Is that -- who maintains that road?
We do.
Do you maintain King Lane?
Yes.
How do you maintain it?
We've bladed it with a road grader and a land

23

when you're driving, you don't go down to Oreana through

23

plane.

24

Castle Lane?

24
25

Q

What else?

A

We've -- a backhoe. FIiied in potholes with a

25

A

It's quicker to get where I'm going going that way.

65
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that?

Yes.

3

A

I don't know.

Do you maintain it all the way to the entire length

Q

Okay. You're telling Judge Nye that you and your

of the loop?

4
5

Do you put gravel on it?

3

A

4

Q

6

A

Yes.

6

7

Q

Through the Kings' property as well?

7

A

Yes.

8

a

Have you ever seen the Kings maintain that road?

A

Yes.

Q
A
Q
A

117
8

,9

120

Q

And where were the Kings when you were doing all

brother have done maintenance work on that road every year?

A

Yes. I might have skipped a year once in a while

but just about every year, yes.

9
10

Q

Where did you buy your gravel?

A

From Rldley's but I never said I hauled gravel on

it.

And what have they done to maintain it?

11

Q

Welt, you were asked if you put gravel on it.

Gordon land planed It.

12

A

My dad put gravel on it. He got It off the air

What does tl1at mean?

13
14
15
16

base.

17

been gravel put on by your father?

It's a leveler for a field behind a tractor. It

smoothed it.

.6

•

Q

2

Q

5

•

1

1 • backhoe\

2

And what else have you done ta want to maintain

that road?

A

That's it.

Q

Does it take you longer to get where you need to go

now that you've been blocked from using King Lane?

Q

When was that?

A

I don't remember the year. Maybe 2012.

Q

So you're saying the last three years, there's

18
19

A
Q

20

A

I couldn't answer that. It was not me.

Q

Okay. You don't know why your father put the

A piece of it, yes.

That was in exchange for hay?

' 1
22

A
Q

Is that different than what it's been In the past?

21
22

1'.IJ

A

Yes.

23

A

Yes.

4

Q

Was that all since the gates were insta[led a month

24

Q

Okay.

125

ago?

Yes.

gravel on that?

25

MR. RAINEY: That's all, Judge.

68

1

70

Yes.

1

COURT: Mr. Farris.

2

MR. CLEVERLEY: I don't have anything else.

2

MR. FARRIS: l don't have any.

3
4

COURT: Thank you.

3

MR. RAJNEY: Your Honor, he brought up some new

4

A

5 stuff.

MR. CLEVERLEY: No, Your Honor.

5

6

COURT: Pardon me?

6

COURT: Okay. Thank you. You may step down.

7

MR. RAJNEY: He brought up some things that I

7
8

WITNESS: Thanks.

9

MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, we call J.C. Fuquay.

8

didn't ask on cross-examination.

9

COURT: On the road maintenance?

·10

MR. RAINEY: Yes.

11

COURT: Yeah, go ahead.

I

2
13
"4

i

COURT: Any other questions for redirect based on
this narrow --

10
11
12

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
QUESTIONS BY MR. RAINEY:

Q

When did you grade that road, Mr. --

5

A

I didn't personally grade It. My brother J.C. did.

16

Q

When did he do that?

·7

A

In the fall of 2013.

8

Q

Just last winter?

'19

A

A year ago, yeah.

0

Q

And when before that?

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

1

A

Just periodically in the spring, we would -- we

21

I22

3
-4
125

22

would land plane it.

Q

I'm having a hard time hearing you.

23

A

Periodically every spring, we would try and blade

24
25

It, land plane it.

COURT: Go ahead.
COURT: Go ahead and come forward and we'll swear
youin.
WITNESS: All righty.

(JOHN COLT FUQUAY is sworn.)
COURT: Klnd of step behind this seat. It's
easier -WITNESS: It's nailed down there?
COURT: Yeah, it is.
WITNESS: All right.
COURT: If you would start out and state your name
and spell your last name.
WITNESS: My full name is John Colt Fuquay,
F-u-q-u-a-y.
COURT: Go ahead.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
QUESTJONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

69
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1 '
2

3
4

Q

1

2

Do you mind If I call you that since we have a Jot

3

4

of Fuquays?

A

a

•

Yes. When the gates were closed, there were cattle

in the lane.

How often would they be closed or how long of a

time period?

A

It varied from a week to ten days to a month. It

A

That's fine.

5

6

Where do you reside?

6

just varied on how many head of cattle they had in the

18902 Castle Lane.

7

Jane.

8

Q
A
Q

And where Is that in proximity to Clint Fuquay's

8

a

And were the cattle grazed in there?

9

house?

9

A

No, they weren't raised in there. They were put in

10
·11
12

A

10

It Is probably a quarter of a mile east of my

brother's house.

11

Q

So they were grazing?

A
Q

They were grazing the grass, what grass was there.

Is that on the property that Clint owns?

13

A

Yes.

13

14

Q
A

How long have you lived there?

14

I've lived there since Clint owned it since June.

15
16

16
, 17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Prior to that, I've lived there almost eight years.

Q

And prior to that, where did you !Ive?

17

A
Q
A

I was in college in Twin Falls.

18

And did you have any issues with opening and

closing the gates during that time?

A
Q
A
Q

A

Not at first, no.
It became more problematic?
As time went on, yes.
Okay. Why was that?
It was just a hindrance mainly for my wife. I work

Okay. Did you grow up in that area?

19

I grew up at the home place at my father's

20
21

a hindrance to me also but to the wives and friends and

At John's house?

22

neighbors.

Yes.

23
24
25

Q
A
Q

And he lives with you in your house?

1
2

A
Q

Yes, sir.
Does he go to school?

3

residence, 18907 Castle Lane.

Q
A

there to feed them there.

12

Q

15

I

•

Q 'Mr. Fuquay, do you go by J.C.?
A I do.

5

7

I

.

Q

Until you were how old?

A

I was -- I think I was 14 or 15 when they separated

out of town quite a bit so I mean when I was there, It was

You have a son?
Yes, I do.

74

72
1

2

and we moved with my mother to across town.
Q Okay. During -- and did you regu{arly come back to

3

your father's house --

A

Yes, I did.

4

A
Q

He does.

4

5

Q
A
Q
A

-- after that?

5

A

He goes to Grand View Elementary in Grand View,

Yes, I did.

6

Idaho.

How often?

7

Q

And when -- how does he get to school?

Pretty regular. I would say three or four times a

8

A
Q
A

He gets on the school bus.

6

7
8
9

week I mean up untll I graduated high school and then after

10

that, you know, a few times a month probably. It just

11
12

varied.

13

what we're calling l<ing Lane?

14
15
'16

17

18

Q

Do you recall there ever being any gates across

A

No.

Q

Do you recall when the first time you saw a gate

14

across King Lane was?

A

It's been four or five years ago when they started

putting up the wire gates.

19

a

20

gates?

21

A

9

10
11
12
13

Where does he go?

Where does he get on the school bus?
As of right now, he gets on on the north side of

dad's property at the end of Castle Lane. Prior to that,
it was the top of the hlll -- what they call the top of the
hill, Oreana Loop Road and Highway 78 on the east side of
the Loop Road -- of that loop.

15

Q

How would you get him there?

16

A

Through my house east down King Lane I guess

17

they're calling It, around Kings' place, across the bridge

18

onto Loop Road and east on up to the top of the hill.

Okay. And did -- how did you get through those

19

Same as any other gate. You pull up and get out

Q
A

Why do you take him up there for the bus stop?

22
23
24

and open the gate and drag it across the road and pull

20
21
22

through and drag It back and hang it back up.
Q Were there cattle enclosed in the pens during that

23
24

that was originally his designated bus stop.

25

time?

25

stop?

some of the buses and they changed the routes around and

Q

73
21

or 35 sheets

A couple -- last year -- last year I think, they

had some cutbacks at school and they had to cut back an

Prior to that, where did

the school

bus typically

75
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1
2

3
4

A

Prior to that

O

•

well, last year, he was In pre K

1

and that's where he got on the bus also.
Q Okay.

A

2

Prior to that, I mean he didn't go to school so I

..

Q

-- recently? What have you seen?

A

There's a concrete block right next to the bridge

3

where the gravel and the bridge meet right there. They put

4

a concrete block there.

Q

5

mean that was -- when we started taking him to school is

5

6

when··

6

7

Q

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

How does that interfere with that?

9

A

It makes it extremely hard to get around that block

8
9

When did he start -- did he change locations of

where the bus is picking him up now?

A

We have, yes.

Does that Interfere with your ability to access

over the road?

0

Q

When did that occur?

10

with a trailer of -- even a gooseneck horse trailer up to a

l11

A

That happened about three weeks ago, maybe four.

11
12

semi trailer.

2

I'm not 100 percent sure. When the gates went up -- the

3

permanent gates went up, my wife contacted the bus driver

114
5

and asked to pick him up over there until this matter was
resolved.

1·6

Q

8

A

I did.

Q

What was -- what was the conversation you had with

Okay. Did you have any conversations with anyone

17 while those gates were going up?

1 ·9

20 who?
I
A I had a conversation with Gil when they were
1

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q

When was that block placed there?

MR. RAINEY: Judge, we're way beyond the -COURT: Is this on King Lane?
BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

Q

This is on King Lane?

A This the right nex:t to their property -- right next
to the bridge, yes.
COURT: On the disputed road?
WITNESS: On the disputed road, yes.

122

building the permanent gate on the east side of the bridge

22

"3
' 4

of their property there.
Q What was that conversation that you had?

23

COURT: I'll let him answer that.
BY MR. CLEVERLEY:
Q When was that placed there?

24
25

Somewhere in that vicinity.

125

A

21

He Just told me that he didn't have a problem with

A

I want to say six months ago. I'm not 100 percent.

78

76

!

1

me and Clint. It was with my father and that we'd been

2
3

4

the gates weren't closed, he was going to lock them.
Q And untll there had been these gates installed, had

5
6

A
Q

Yes.

you ever had to worry about locked gates?

A

I have one child six and one that's about to turn

5
6
7
8

9

·,o
11

A

Yes.

were going to open and close gates and the first time that

3

Q

Does It interfere with your ability to make it up

4

A

No.

7

Q
A
Q
A

Have you ever maintained what we catl King Lane?

8

Yes.

9

What have you done to that?
We've hauled gravel --

a load of gravel

10
once

11

and down the road?
You have one child who's six?

three.

Q

Okay. And if you had any emergency medical -- let

me ask, do they have any emergency medical issues?

A

My son is allergic to bees and, you know,

12

penicillin, things like that but in our part of the world

believe it was two years ago, I got a grader -- a motor

13

there, it's bees and he's deathly allergic to them.

roto grader and graded the road from the west side of the

14

5

bridge which goes into Kings' yard. There's a lfttle Y

,

property. Rebuilt -- regraded the road.

15
16
17

13
~4
'16

..

8

19
0

I
I

Okay. Has It been consistently there since then?

between the bridge and the Oreana Loop Road. And then l

2

!

Q

pretty good to get along with but he wasn't and that we

1
2

1

22
3

~4
2!i

there and I graded that road all the way to my dad's

Q

Have you generally been the ones to maintain the

road?

A

Yeah. I mean we all do but I mean -- I mean yeah.

From -- we've been the one to maintain the road from my
house basically to my father's plus theirs also.
Q Have you seen any obstacles placed in the
roadway --

A

Yes.
77
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Q

MR. FARRIS: Objection. Calls for hearsay, calls

for opinion testimony. Calls for ail kinds of stuff.
MR. CLEVERLEY: I asked whether he had any

18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Okay. Have you had conversations with a physician

about the impact of him getting stung by a bee?

conversations. That's all.
COURT: Okay. That's a yes or no question.
WITNESS: Yes.

BY MR. CLEVERLEY:
Q Are you aware if -- what would happen to your son
if he were to get stung by a bee?
MR. FARRIS: Objection. Calls for the same thing.
79
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1

2
J
4

•.

-

Q

They can get up Castle Lane, correct?

1

A

They can.

2

Q

And there's no obstructions going up Castle Lane at

all?

5

A

It depends on the year.

6
7

Q

A

8
9

0
11

2

Okay. And that's happened once since -It's happened numerous times over the years.

Do you know that this lane from the bottom of your

house around the corner from your house to Oreana is Kings'

Well, what happens In an off year then?

6

private property?

Weil, there's the ditch that can wash out.

7

Q

Who's locking you out?

8

A
Q
A

I said there's a ditch that can wash out.

9

Q

You didn't know that Kings owned that property?

Okay. And --

10

A

I knew that they owned the property on the north

And that's -- that's the only one I can think of at

11

the moment.

3
14

When was the last time the ditch washed out?

A

Two years ago I want to say and we replaced the

5

culvert.

,6

Q

Okay. You got the culvert all replaced?

17
8
19

A

Uh-huh.

Q

And so it's a fine road now?

A

Uh-huh.

20

Q

Is that a yes?

1

A

Yes.

22

Q

Okay. So again, the emergency vehicles can go

25

Q
A
Q

5

Q

"'3
4

3

4

•

the water.

right up Castle Lane wlthout any obstructions, correct?

A

Yes.

Q

And these delivery people can go up Castle Lane

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A

No, I wasn't aware of that. It's always been an

open lane since I've been around.

side of that lane.

Q

You didn't know that they owned the lane?

A

No. I did not. I always assumed it was an

easement or private road ·- or an access point to our
property. It's never been disputed up untll now.

Q

Wefl, have you ever Interfered with the Kings' use

of that land?

A
Q

No, I have not.
Have you ever told them to get out? It's your

lane. You're going to use it?

A

No, sir, I have not.

Q

Have you ever done anything that interrupted their

use? And they being Kings. Have you ever done anything to
interrupt the Kings' use of that lane?

A

No, sir,

r have not.
86

84

.1
2
J
4

without any obstructions, correct?

A
Q

1

Yes.

2

And the mail person that defivers your mall right

down at the bottom of Castle Lane and Oreana Loop.

Q

Do you know if anyone in your family has ever

interrupted the Kings' use of that lane?

3

A

Not to my recollection, no.

4

Q

And so bottom line is nobody from your family, as

5

A

Yes.

6
7
8

Q

So you have to go down the lane to get your mart.

6

Kings' use of that lane we're -- in the pleadings, it's

A

Yes.

called King's Lane. Do I need to rephrase that again?

Q

And you do that at least once a day?

7
8

A
Q

Can I say one thing?

9

10

11

8

19
0
1
22
J

.4
25

10
11
12
13
14
15

WITNESS: Okay. Ari right.

13

16
·7

9

No.
COURT: Wait until he asks you a question.

2

"'4
5

5

COURT: Your attorney can follow up.
WITNESS: All right.
BY MR. RAINEY:

Q

far as you know, have ever hindered or interfered with the

A
Q

Yeah, go ahead. Yeah.
can you recall anybody in your family, you, your

brother, father, that's lnterfered with Kings' use of that
lane called Kings' Lane?

A

Between my house and their houses?

Q

Yes.

A
Q

So -- and you don't know who pays the taxes on that

No.

16 lane I take it?

All these services are available through Castle

Lane; Is that correct?

17

A
Q

You don't?

A

No, sir.

Q

Now, the gates you're talklng about, have you ever

No, I do not.

A

Yes, yes.

18

Q

And one more time, there's not one obstruction

other than maybe a ditch washing out once In a while or a

19
20

culvert?

21

A
Q

Uh-huh.

22

A

Which gates?

And that only washes out when you don't clean out

23

Q

The new gates.

24
25

A
Q

Have you ever opened tile new gates?

the debris, right?

A

Or if the creek is flooding and we can't control

looked at those gates?

87

85
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1 •
2

3
4

A

,I have not. I have not been through there since

Q

1

So you're getting by going down to Castle Road

3

A

Forced to go around, yes.

5

6

Q

Well, my question was you're getting by going

6
7
8

straight down Castle Road to Oreana Loop.

8

A

Yes.

9

Q
A

That's not the adequate way. That's the way that

10
11
12

13
14

15
16
i 17

18
19

20

21

Now, why do you use this King Lane? Is It just for

convenience?

A

We've always used It.

Q

Is that just a matter of convenience?

A

It is a matter of convenience and it is the

shortest way to my •• to where I reside, where I llve from
Grand View which is 85 percent of where I do my business is
in that area.

Q

Okay. So it's just closer and more convenient to

go down and use the Kings' property?
A

It Is.

23

Q

And that's the only reason you're using it?

24
25

A

No.

Q

Why?

22

9

That is the adequate way, is that correct?

we are forced to go at this point in time.

Q

A
Q

Okay. So until this matter's resolved, you're

content to go down Castle Lane?

A
Q
A

I'm not content but I'm doing it.
Okay. It doesn't hurt you, does it?
Yeah, it does. It costs more fuel and It's a

hindrance.

10

Q

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

than --

25

Because I've been waiting tfll this matter's

resolved.

4

then?

5
7

gone up and looked at the gates?

2

the new gates went up.

To go that extra mile down Castle Lane rather

A

It's not an extra mile, sir.

Q

The length of Castle Lane is only a mile and three

quarters.

A

You're referring to just the lane. I'm referring

to the Loop Road as well all the way around.

Q

No, I'm talking about from your house down to

Oreana Road -- Oreana Loop Road.

A
Q
A
Q

Okay. That's a mile, yes.
That's about a mile.
Yes.
And it's three quarters of a mile to go down

through the Kings' property, isn't lt?

A

No, It Is -- I thought it was a mile -- three

quarters of a mile from my house to the Loop Road. To go

88
1
2

A

90

That's the way we've always gone since I can

1

2
3

remember.

3

Q

But again --

4

A

I've llved there for eight years and I've had no

5

disputes up until recently about going that direction.

house to Loop Road going through my father's property.

6

7

A

When I got married -- when I was married and

7

moved -- officially moved into the house that I live in.

8

11
12

Q
A

You got married in 2007, didn't you'?

Q

A

Yeah. ln this day·· this day and age, fuel is

expensive, sir.

Q

Does It cause you any hurt •• physical hurt'?

A

No, it does not cause any physical hurt.

So from 2007 till now, you're saying you use King

11

Q
A
Q

Just the inconvenience that l asked before.

12
13
14

A

Yes.

Q

-- was there to keep the trucks from running ••

Lane'?

A

Yes.

Q

And then before that, you were gone with your

brother and mother somewhere else?

A

So you objected to driving that extra mile?

9

13

1G

Q

10

Yes.

14

15

No, sir, I'm sorry. I was wrong. It Is not. It

is -- from my house, lt Is more like two miles from my

So eight years ago would have been about --

9

You said it was a mile.

4

Q

10

Q

A

5

6

8

around through my father's property, it's more than that.

15

Yeah. Well, I moved -- when l was 15, as l said

16

Yep.
This block by the bridge --

breaking the bridge down? Isn't that why il's there?

17

earlier, I moved from my father's house to where my mother

17

A

Nobody ever said one way or the other to us.

18

resides now. And then after that, after I graduated high

18

Q

You started driving trucks up and down that lane;

19
20
21

school, I moved to Grand View and then I went to -- I lived
and worked in Grand View and went to college In Twin Falls

19
20

and then in 2007, I guess you'd say, is when I moved back.

22
23

24
25

Q

Okay. So this continuous use has only been since

2007.

haven't you?

A

We've always drove trucks up and down that lane.

21

Q

I mean these cattle trucks.

22

A

Yeah.

23

Q

And that's just been In the last five years, hasn't

A

Yeah.

A

My continuous use, yeah.

24

Q

Yeah. Okay. I guess I'm curious. Why haven't you

25

it?

89
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5

6
7
8
. 9

!

I

0

11

i 2
3

114
5

,6

117
8

19
120

Q

•

have started driving cattle trucks up and down King Lane.

No.

Q

And again, It's just convenience. Just shorter to

3

Q

And those cattle trucks are breaking in the bridge,

4

aren't they?

drive down the Kings' property than go down Castle Lane?

5

A

That's the way we've always gone.

Is it shorter?

A

No worse than theirs are, sir.

6

Q

Are your cattle trucks adding to the breakdown of

7

that bridge?

8

A They are not helping it if that's how you want to
put Jt.

9

Q
A
Q
A

10

Q

That's why you have a block there to keep you from

running across the corner of the bridge. Isn't that right?

A
Q
A

sheriff's office and such, have been up Castle Lane?
They've been called to your··

A

They have been called to the property, yes.

Well, Isn't that correct?

Q

And so they've made it up and down Castle Lane

They put that there to keep us from taking cattle

15
16
17

Okay. But you've only been doing this cattle

18

There have been trucks in and out of that lane all

along, sir.

19
20

You've only been doing It for the last five years.

22

A

1 -i3

Q

without any trouble?

A

The ones that I know of have came up King Lane.

Q

You're not aware of the ones that came to your

brother's or father's place up through Castle Lane?

A

I wasn't there for all of them.

Q

And again, Kings' property being

they have cattle everywhere, correct, all through the

Yes.

22

pastures and the corrals?

Your brother's only been doing it for less than

23
24
25

Yes.

A

Who's this?

Q
A

Kings.
Yes.

94

92
1
2

3
4

5
6

Q

So since '06 Is when you-· at least '06 and past

is when you started using the big trucks?

A

Yeah. Of my own, yeah.

Q

And you would agree that those big trucks are hard

on the road and hard on the bridge?

A

They are extra weight than a typical vehicle, yes,

7 but we also help to maintain the road.
B
9

, ·10
'11
2

13

Q

My question is are those big trucks hard on the

bridge and hard on the road?

A
Q

They're hard on everything, yes.
Okay. And that's an increase in use that you've

I wasn't aware that the bridge was under question.

•4
5

I thought it was the lane.

16

big trucks there?

Q

·7

A

1
Q
2 Lane?
3
A If there's cattle in the Jane, yep.
4
Q And you have to open the gates?
5
A Yep.
6
Q Something you don't have to do on Castle Road?
7
A No, That is BLM.
8
Q You're not dodging cattle on the BLM ground?
9
A Not as of yet, no.
10
Q And that road's been in there for what? As far as

And you have to dodge around cattle coming up King

11

12

been doing just In the last six years, five years?

A

a cattle ranch,

21

five years.

A

Yes.
Okay. And you're well aware that the 911 vehicles,

14

trucking --

A

And that's why you use it?

13

trailers across that way.

Q

11
12

It's shorter.

Those are your words.

Q

125

A

Yes.

1

4

2

A

Q

•

1 obstruct a big truck to go up and down Castle Lane?

'So In the last five years, you and your brother

But you've just Increased your use by driving the

you know -- you're 31?

A
Q

I'm 30.

Q

Now, describe U,e school bus. Denise Collett is

13
Thirty, okay. So as far as you know, it's been
14 there 30 years?
15
A Yes.
16

Yeah, I did.

17

the school bus driver.

B

Q

Your brother did too?

18

A

Yes.

. 19

A

That is how I make my living.

19

Q

And Collett Road Is just -- comes into Oreana Loop,

0

Q
A
Q

And your brother also?

20

And that's how he makes his l!ving.

21

A

Yes.

And you and your brother could go up and down

22

Q

And Denise comes down Collett Road where she lives.

1
22
3

Castle Creek -- Castle lane with your big trucks?

•4

A

We could.

25

Q

And there's nothing -- no obstructions that would

what, 200 feet past your mailbox?

23

A

Yep •

24

Q

Turns left on Oreana Road.

25

A

Yes.

93
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1 '• Q
A

Stops at the mailbox and picks up your ooy.

1

A

As of right now, no.

Yes.

2

Q

And your mail comes there at the end of Castle Lane

3

So··

2

4

Q
A

3

As of now, yes.

5
Q So right now, the bus stop is convenient for
6 everybody, isn't It?
7
A lt's convenient for Denise, yes.
8
Q And you don't have to drive clear to the top of the

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And the way I'm understanding the bus stop is that

6

A

We changed It, yes.

Q

Okay. And they agreed. The bus driver agreed.

A

The bus driver drd agree, yes.

Q

So It hasn't been an issue.

A

No.

Q

And the only issue is that it Is an extra mile

10

A

No.

11
12
13

Q

Because there is no bus stop at King Lane. You

11

hill.

12

know that, don't you?

A

I do.

13

14
15

14

MR. RAINEY: That's all I have.

15

COURT: Mr. Farris.

16

MR. FARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Just

17

follow-up questions and maybe sum things up.

10

19

a few

CROSS-EXAMINATlON

drive for you?

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay. The blocks that you were talking about. Is

it block or blocks?

17

A

It is one block.

18

Q

One block, okay. You're saying that's been there

six months ago.

So the way I'm understanding things is what we've

20

been talking about Is Castle Lane. You know, when l refer

21

been -- yeah, six months or maybe more. I'm not 100

22

to Castle Lane, I'm talking about from Oreana Loop through
John Fuquay's property and up to your residence.

22
23

percent.

23
24

Q

It's not anything that's new?

24

A

Not as of rec:ently, no.

25

Q

So that is not something -- you didn't file a

20

21

25

Q

16

19

QUESTIONS BY MR. FARRIS:

you've changed -·

7

8
9
10

9

there at Oreana Loop, right?

A

Yes.

Q

That's what we've been talking about as Castle Lane

A

I can't for sure tell you. It's been·· It's

98

96

1
2

today?

A

Yeah.

2

A

No, we just worked around it.

3

Q

From what I'm understanding is Castle Lane is an

3

Q

So It's not an issue and hasn't been an Issue --

1

lawsuit six months ago to address It.

4

adequate road to provide emergency services? Is that

4

A

We just worked around it.

5

right?

5

Q

-- for six months?

A

We just worked around It.
Will you let me finish my questions?

A

It could be.

6

7

Q

It does. It has in the past.

7

Q

8

A
Q

It has, yeah.

8

A

Yeah.

It provides deliveries whether It's Schwann's or

9

Q

It hasn't been an Issue for the last six months,

6

9

10
11
12
13

UPS or anyone else?

A

As of a month ago, yes.

Q

It has In the past even before then also?

A

The majority that I can recollect, a majority of

24
25

Not anything that warranted you having to bring a

legal action?

house, to my residence, to my brot/1er's house and then ta

16

A

Yes.

my father's house.

17

Q

And obviously anybody would want emergency services

through l<ing Lane to my property, to my brother's-· to my

23

It has but private! y.

Q

You mentioned that your son is allergic to bees.

15
16
17

21

A

12
13

A
Q

the UPS, Schwann's man and any other services have came In

22

has it?

14
15

14

18
19
20

10
11

Q

Don't they when they get your address, they look up

your address and It's Castle Lane, isn't It?

A

Yes.

Q

How do they know to even come down what you've

called King's Lane anyways?

18
19
20

as quick as possible.

A

Sure, sure.

Q

Right? Okay. If an emergency service were to come

21

down what we've been talking about as King's Lane, wouldn't

22

they have to stop at gates and open those gates?

A

Because they've done that for years, sir.

23

Q

The point Is, at least currently, there's nothing

24

that restricts that ac:cess.

25

A

As of right now, yes.

Q

For tile last four or five years, you've said that

there have been gates.

97
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1, ·

A

They were not steadily opened -- or closed.

2

Q

You've said there have been gates for the last four

3

or five years.

4

A

5
6

present.

7

service would have to stop at possibly two gates?

B

Q

There have been gates, yes, when there was cattle
Okay. So depending on the day, an emergency

1
2
3

•

A

It was.

Q

Okay. So you've Increased the use by at least two

different drivers by two different trucks?

4

A

Yes, yes.

5
6

Q

That's been In the last five years?

A

Yes.

7

MR. RAINEY: That's all.

A
Q

Possibly.

8

COURT: Any questions, Mr. Farris, based on that?

9

Dodge cattle.

9

MR. FARRIS: No, Your Honor.

0

A

Possibly.

10

Q

Make sure those gates are dosed before cattle get

11

MR. CLEVERLEY: Nothing else, Your Honor.

12

COURT: Thank you.
MR. CLEVERLEY: And Your Honor, I have I believe

111

2

back out.

3

A

Possibly.

Q

Okay. How long would that take?

13
14

5

A

Well, it would take an extra -- I would say it

15

I14
.6

117
8
19
1 20

1

Q

That's been the situation for the last four to five

A
Q
A

1 "3

just one quick witness. Raymond Jayo.
COURT: All right. Sir, come on up. We'll swear
you in and then you can take a seat here.

17

(RAYMOND JAYO is sworn.)

Yeah.

18
19

That's your testimony.

20

WITNESS: Raymond Jayo, J-a-y-o.

Yes.

21

COURT: Okay. Proceed.

MR. FARRIS: I think that's all I have.

22

COURT: Thank you. Redirect.

23

years, hasn't it?

22
4

125

16

would take an extra five minutes.

COURT: Mr. Cleverley, any questions?

24
25

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

COURT: Step around that chair and start out by
stating your name and spelling your last name.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

Q
A

Mr. Jayo, where do you live?
At the current time, I live at John Fuquay's In my

102

100

Q J.C., did you ever drive trucks up and down King
2 . Lane with your father?

1

1

camp traller.

2

Q

Okay. And how long have you lived there?

3

A

I did.

3

A

Since May.

4

Q
A

Prior to when you started driving trucks?

4

Q

Of~-

I did.

5

A

Off and on. I work out of town too.

Q

To the best of your knowledge, how long have trucks

6

Q

Since May of this year?

7

A

Yeah.

8

Q

Did you live -- where have you lived before then?

9

Oreana all my life. Fifty-eight years.

11

A
Q
A

12

Q

Are you familiar with where his house is?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Have you been there on numerous occasions?

A

Yes, sir.

5
6
7

8

been driven up and down that road Into King Lane?

A

All of my life.

9

Q

What type of trucks?

·10

A

Semi trucks, tractor traller trucks, dump trucks,

I

11

ten-wheelers, single -- single-wheeled trucks, two-ton

! 2 trucks to commercial vehicle trucks.
13
14

10

Q

Your using trucks of your own is not a new use?

A

No.

13
14

MR. CLEVERLEY: I don't have anything further.

15

COURT: Thank you.

5

And have you known Mr. John Fuquay for a long time?
Ever since he moved to Oreana.

A

Yes.

16
Q Okay. And you're familiar with what we're calling
17 King Lane, the road between Oreana Loop Road and Clint
1B Fuquay's house?
A Yes, sir.
19
20
Q And did you have an occasion recently to see gates
21 being installed?
22
A Yes. I come home I think around the 13th of last
23 month. I come around Oreana into John's house. The next
24 morning, I went out Castle Lane and realized the gate was

Q

Before, It was just your dad?

25

16
•7

MR. RAINEY: Judge, may I Inquire on that last one.
COURT: Very briefly.
MR. RAINEY: Real quickly.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
QUESTIONS BY MR. RAINEY:

Q

Now you and your brother are both driving trucks up

and down this King's Lane.

there and when I shut the gate, I see a no trespassing
103

101
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•

•
T

2
3

4

•

sign. l1hen I went on out and talked to Gil on the backhoe

1

down there.

2

A

I have no idea who put it there.

Q

Okay. But at least It got fixed up?

A

It got fixed up. It's a lot better passing the

Q

Okay. And what did he tell you?

3

A

I told him, "I guess I was trespassing," and he

4

in there and fixed it up.

road now.

5

said, ''Yeah, I guess you were," and he said he didn't think

5

6

it would be any problem as long as I kept the gates shut.

6

Q

Yeah, so now it's usable.

I just told him all right and then Rose come out and asked

7
8

A

Yeah.

Q

And how long have -- did you pause and talk to the

7
8
9
10
11

me when I come back to go around so then I told her I

Q

She asked you not to go through the gates?

9 Kings as you were driving through?
A Yes, I wave at them. I've known Kings ever since
10

A

Yeah. Asked me to go around the other way when I

11

they come here and the Lows. I've been neighbors. I got
caught in the crossfire here is what happened.

would. That's where I've been going ever since.

15

A

Camp trailer, yeah.

12
13
14
15

A

Yes.

16

Q

In the 58 years that you've been in Oreana, have

16

Q

That's their main road In the whole farm, isn't it?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

To get to the back area. That's their main

12

13
14

come back from Grand View.

Q

Now you've gone all the way back around to get back

to your place?

Q

Well, what I'm getting at is you're well aware that

the Kings use that road to access their fields.

17
18

you seen gates on this road before?

19

know how many years ago when I first went up that lane,

20

there was no gates. Where Rose and Gil live, at that time,

19
20

21

they run milk cows up there. Just turned them out. There

21

Q

-· to the west side of the farm.

22

was no gates. Cows come home at night. They'd milk them.

22

A

Yeah.

23
24
25

Q The Installation of the gates that are there now
are just new within the last six weeks or so?
A Yes, sir.

23

Q

And that's fairly obvious to anybody driving down

A

Just recently. The barbed wire gates. I don't

24
25

driveway to get to the area --

A

Their farm ground, yes.

that lane because they've got gates along there, isn't that
right?

106

104

1
2

MR. CLEVERLEY: I don't have any further questions,

Your Honor.
COURT: Cross.

3

6

7
8
9

on both sides.

A

Correct.

6
7

Q

That's how both of them access their property.

A

Yes.

What's that?

8

Q

Now, to your knowledge, the Kings are the only ones

You've been up and down the King's Lane for 58

9

Mr. Jayo, are you telling us that you've been up

and down the King's Lane --

10
11
12

with my dad. Went to where Kings llve then and Rollins

i 13

years?

A

3
5

QUESTIONS BY MR. RAINEY:

A
Q

Yeah. Lows got gates along their fence line too.

That fence line's been there for as long as I can remember

Q

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Q

A

2
4

4

5

1

Yes, sir. First time I was 8 years old when I went

Mr. Low has gates on hrs side of it?

that put cattle in there?

10

A

What's that?

11

Q

Kings are the only ones that put cattle in this

12

lane?

Farmln (phonetic) lived there and then we went to where

13

A

As far as I know, yeah.

14

John Fuquay lives and talked to Kirby Foreman and then we

14

Q

How often have you been up and down there In the

15
16

went out across the desert back to Oreana.

15

16

A

Oh, l couldn't really tell you.

17

property, that lane was nothing but a marsh -- a big mud

17

Q

When did you move In with John Fuquay?

18

hole. Isn't that correct?

18
19

A

May.

Q

The truth is when the Kings moved onto that

19

A

The first time I went there, yeah.

20

Q

And pretty messy?

21

A

It was pretty messy.

22
23
24

Q

And it was messy for at least 10 to 15 years while

25

20
21
22

23

they fixed it up. Isn't that right?

A

Yes, yes.

24

Q

And the Kings are the one that put all the gravel

25

last six years?

Q

Of this year, 2014?

A

Yeah. Pulled my camp trailer over there and put it

under a shade tree and whatnot and In the area, that's
where I stay.

Q

Fuquay's house down to Oreana Loop Road, are you?

A

No. Not no more.

107
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1' '
2
3
4

'Pardon me?

A

Not no more. After Rose asked me to go around, I

1

started going around,

Q

Okay. And that's what I'm getting at. You're able

•

ience cattle out in open range?

2
3

A
Q

And that is open range out there, isn't it?

4

A

Yep.

Q

And so to keep the cattle from the SLM property

Correct.

5

to go down from John Fuquay's house to Oreana Loop Road and

5

6

there's no obstructions, right?

6

from trespassing onto the Kings', they have to have a fence

7

or

7

A

No. I got to go around that way because she asked

8
9

me not to come down that lane no more.

0

on Castle Lane Road?

11
2
. J

114
5

i

•

Q

i~~

Q

You're missing my point. Is there any obstructions

B

a gate, right?
A Yep. Yes,

9

Q

sir.

Okay. Did you stop and look at tlie gate, the new

10

one?

If I'm going to Grand View to see all my relatives,

11

A

Yes. I went through it.

it's easier to go down that lane to go to Grand View but I

12

Q

And it opens with a plunger, doesn't it?

go around now. It's four miles.

13

A

Yeah.

14

Q

It's just got a hole in one post and a plunger?

15

A

Yep.

A

Q

So you go down to Oreana Road and hit the gravel --

or paved road.

A

Yes.

16

Q

And you just pull-·

Q

And then you go on up the highway.

A

Spring-loaded.

' 8

A

Yep.

17
18

Q

And then a spring pushes it back In?

·19

Q

And so you're saying it's just more convenient to

19

A

Yep.

20

Q

The old gates, the wire gates, you had to lift a

l

70

I::i
4

125
I
i

use the Kings' place?

A

Yeah. It has been for all my life but now it's

21

not.

Q

But again, It's just a matter of convenience.

A

Yeah.

1

Q

2

A

A

Correct.

23

Q

And you had to push the post up close enough to get

24

There's nothing --

wire up over the post?

22

that done.

25

A

Yep.

No urgency that requires you to go through Kings'.

1

Q

So actually, the new gates are a lot

No. Not right at this point unless I have a heart

2

108

3
4
5

110

attack or something.

Q

Well, the whole point Is that there's nothing wrong

with Castle Lane Road.

more

convenient, aren't they?

3
4

A
Q

And they swing open7

5

A

Yes.

Q

So like-· ol<ay. Bottom line Is the Kings have

Yes, they .ire.

6

A

No.

6

7

Q

Perfectly drivable for motor vehlcles, cars.

7

made an improvement on the road with easy-open gates.

B

A

Yeah, you just got to go slow.

8

Right?

: 9
10
1
. -11

Q

Trucks.

9

A

You got to go slow.

10

; 2

13
"4
5

1G

·7

11:

Io
1 1

I22
3

Q
A
Q
A
Q

A

Yes, they're easily opened.
MR. RAINEY: Nothing further.

Well, you go slow on King's Lane too, don't you?

11

COURT: Redirect·· or Mr. Farris. I'm sorry.

Yes, I do.

12

MR. FARRIS: I don't have anything, Your Honor.

You have to open gates on King's Lane, don't you?

COURT: Redirect.

gates were closed thougl1. They didn't have cattle In there

13
14
15
16
17

when I went through there.

18

A

Q

Now we do.

Well, there were wire gates before.
Yeah, I never did go through there when those wire

The times you've been through In the past, there

were no cattle In there.

19
20

MR. CLEVERLEY: I have nothing else, Your Honor.
COURT: Okay. You can step down. Thanks. Can
this witness be excused?
MR. CLEVERLEY: He may.

-

COURT: You can be excused, sir.

MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, I don't have any
additional witnesses to call.

A

That's correct.

21

Q

Okay. And you know that BLM ground west of

22

MR. RAINEY: Well, we've got five.

23

COURT: You're going to wrap It up by 5:00.

the l<lngs'?

...4

A

Yep, SLM ground clear to Oreana.

24

125

Q

You know that ranchers, property owners have to

25

COURT: Mr. Rainey, how many witnesses do you have?

MR. RAINEY: Unlikely, Your Honor. I'd like to
make a motion right now.

109
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i '

•COURT: Go ahead.

2

•

MR. RAINEY: I understand that the plaintiffs have

the post and all you have to do is pull the plunger back,
open the gate. When you close it, you release the plunger
and it goes back into the hole.

3

closed their case and rested. At this point, we would make

3

4

a motion to dismiss their motion or quash their motion to

4

5
6

grant a preliminary injunction.

5

7

8

There's no question because John Fuquay told the
deputy sheriff he was not going to lock -· to close the

6

gates. There's no question about it. Gilbert locked the

its own terms tomorrow. I guess I'd be asking that the

7

gates. Right now, they're not locked but the landowners as

temporary restraining order be dissolved today, that the

8

a matter of law have a right to use their easements or use

The temporary restraining order actually expires on

9 Court dismiss the motion to grant a preliminary injunction
10

•

1

2

9 their entire !and.
10

at this point.

There's the testimony that they've never Interfered

11

This temporary order, Your Honor -- and I can well

11

with the l<ings' use so the issue of whether or not there's

12

see when you read these affidavits, it sounds horrible. We

12

this Immediate emergency that they allege in their

13
14
15
16

can't get emergency vehicles. We can't get mail. We can't

13

affidavits over and over again just doesn't exist and we've

get the deliveries. We can't get the child ta the school

proved ·- and the Court has read by now the affidavits of

even the attorney put together, it makes it sound like

17

they're landlocked and the only way they can get out Is

18
19

through King's Lane.

14
15
16
17
18
19

reference to any affidavit. We have live testimony.

20

weather road that went straight down to this Oreana paved

21
22
23

road. There is absolutely no necessity shown and they

21

certainly haven't proved any necessity today.

22

bus. When you read their affidavits and their brief that

They didn't tell you, Judge, that they had an all-

Now, they use the language like "immediate need of

24

access. The gates Interfere with normal deliveries."

25

Well, all deliveries can come right up Castle Lane. They

the Schwann man. He has no problem comlng up castle Lane.
In fact, would do It until John started locking his gate
but get back here. Again, in the affidavit -MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, 1'111 going to object to

20

COURT: This is just argument. Go ahead. I'll
note the objection. Go ahead.
MR. RAINEY: Okay. Well, what I'm getting at, Your

23

Honor, their allegations ta you to get the temporary order

24
25

They had immediate threat to health and safety of the

were horrible. You know, they're blacking the roadway.

112

114

1

admitted that. There's nothing that blocks the deliveries

1

plaintiffs. It blocks emergency vehicles. Delaying and

2

from coming up Castle L.ane.

2

giving notice to the defendants. It blocks their access to

3

all these services. None of that's true, Judge.

3

The ability of the children to go to the school bus

4

stop. The bus stop is right down at the bottom of their

4

5

property. It's just 100 feet from where -- 200 maybe from

5

6

where the school bus driver makes the curve onto the paved

6

Fuquay,, they have more than an adequate access to their

7

road so it's convenient for everybody. There's no

7

own property.· There's not one reason to grant this

8

emergency there picking the chlld up at the mailbox.. The

8

preliminary injunction. They could use the Castle Lane

9

mailbox is down at the bottom of the hill. They admit they

10

have to go down the hill to get to the mail so there's no

·11 emergency there.
12
And then these emergency services, police, fire,
13 ambulances, everybody that they testified, all the Fuquays
14 and their family and even Mr. Jayo admitted that Castle
15 Lane is a good all-weather road that doesn't obstruct

We've proven through the affidavits and we've
proven actually through their awn testimony. These

9

like they've been doing and at the end of the day when we

10

have the trial, you will decide whether or not they end up

11

with an easement.
But until that time, this is the Kings' property.

12

13 They're entitled to gate lt as a matter of law. These
14 people have other access. There's absolutely no emergency.
15 No reason for preliminary injunction and I'm sure if you

16
17

anybody. Their only reason they want to go through Kings'

16

they say is it's more convenient and it saves them maybe

17

restraining order was Issued, you would probably would not

18

five or ten minutes.

18

have issued a restraining order knowing all the facts that

19

you do now.

19

The Kings are ranchers, Your Honor. They run a lot

had all the facts on the September 4 or 5 when the

20

of cattle. l11ey wlll tell you how many cattle they run and

20

21
22
23

they need every ind1 of that ground when they bring those

21

the motion to grant a preliminary Injunction. Dissolve the

cattle out of the hill. They have those fence gate --

22

temporary restTaining order and let's have the trial on

excuse me. They have that lane gated. It used to be wire

23

this easement. Let's get to the full facts.

24

fences. Now, Gilbert King has installed these swinging

24

We have -- this case has just barely begun. Our

25

gates that have a plunger. The plunger goes into a hole In

25

time for appearance just barely expired. We both ·- Mr.

So I'm asking this Court, Your Honor, to dismiss

113
31 or 35 sheets

115
Page 112 to 115 or 126

10/22/2014 11:13:04 f\M

270

•

.

•

1 ···Farris and I have both filed Answers but we're Just 20 days

1

COURT: Thank you. Mr. Cleverley.

2 Into this. We've got a lot of discovery. This will

2

MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, I think what the Court

3

probably be a summary Judgment case but at this point, Your

3

has heard is that there is other access from Castle Lane.

4

Honor, there is absolutely no reason to grant a prellmlnary

4

I don't think there's ever been a dispute. It doesn't

5

matter. It's not relevant. The Issue Is has there been a

5 injunction.
COURT: Thank you. Mr. Farris, anything you'd llke

6
7

B

to add?
MR. FARRIS: Yeah, just a few thlngs. I'd join In

6

change in the status quo by the defendants where they put

7

up gates to block access to a roadway that was otherwise

8

used by the plaintiffs.

9

his motion. I think we could spend the next half hour

9

0

listening to more testimony from the Kings and others

10

11

lestifying aboul the use of the road or the lack of the use

11

140 Idaho 451. It's a 2004 case. The Suprerne Courl said

2

of the road but what is very clear from the witnesses that

12

that this Is an issue of discretion for the trial court,

3

we've heard today Is there Is no irreparable -- immediate

the issuance of this Injunction Is, and that It Is needed

or irreparable injury which is the threshold requirement in

13
14

because the continual -- in this case, the continuance or

order to issue a preliminary injunction.

15

allowing the Boozers' barriers to stay In place would

16

reduce waste. The waste envisioned by the district court

14
5

.6
17
8

It's an extraordinary relief to even grant a
preliminary injunction and the threshold requirement -we've gotten off tracl< on a lot of things today.

Part of that reason is that the Supreme Court's
addressed this particular Issue in Walker versus Boozer,

17 was that which might result to the Quaker Haven owners
1B because the barriers restricted the Quaker Haven owners

19

Maintenance of the road, whether It was maintenance,

19

reasonable access to their property. Therefore the

20

whatnot. But when you got down to It, the bottom Hne on

20

district court dld not error by granting the preliminary

do they have access from a well-maintained road, Castle

21

injunction because the Boozers have not shown an abuse of

22

Lane, that connects to Oreana, yep, they do. They have It

22

discretion.

"3

for emergency services. That's where their addresses are.

23

This Court has the discretion to enter this

4

That's where their mailboxes are. That's where Schwann's

24
25

quo to be maintained. Obviously there's a dispute as to

1

25

can deliver. That's where UPS can dellver. That's where

preliminary injunction. Ali we've asked for is the status

118

116
1

they've moved their bus locatlon for the bus stop also for

1

this easement but the problem Is that you now have the

2

the boy to be picked up and that's actually more convenient

2

defendants who have Installed these permanent gates who

3

for the bus driver who has agreed to do It.

3

have now told the Fuquays not to go across the gates.

4
5

Injury here and the status quo Is there's gates across

Emergency services can't go in. They have to -- or are

5

expected to go around. All of the delivery service people
are now expected to go around. That's not the status quo.

6

there. They've all testified there's been gates there for

6

at least the last four to five years.

7

B

Now, whether or not -- whether or not that will be

9
·10

would be granting the relief to the defendants and allowing

relevant when we get to the ultimate issue on whether or

9

them to block the lane. That's not the way that this has

not there's a prescriptive easement, for purposes of today

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

ever been. It's not the way that It's been even accepting

and whether or not we grant an injunction, a preliminary

2

injunction, the testimony from them Is the status quo ls
there's been -- there's been gates across these -- across

4

this King's Lane, multiple gates. You have to stop and

5

open them. There's cattle in the lane. You got to dodge

16
1

! '7

8

119

By denying the preliminary injunction, the Court

8

13
4

4

7

I11

!

So there's been no showing of Irreparable Immediate

the cattle, et cetera, et cetera.

that there have been occasional gates there that were there
for days at a time when they would have cattle in there but
there was never any indication that there was ever any
prohibition of access.
The testimony was that the Kings and Mrs. l<lng In
particular Is now denying access and told Mr. Jayo not to

17

go through there. That's an absolute denial of his right

shown and there's no basis for a preliminary injunction.

18

of access.

There is no Immediate or Irreparable Injury being
So you know, I think putting on this additional testimony

19

So what we're asking for is the court to simply

0

and whatnot, based on their own testimony that there ls no

20

Issue the Injunction prohibiting them from closing and

1

such Irreparable injury, that they can access it from

21

locking the gates and prohibiting the Kings from denying

Castle Lane and J.C. testifying that that has an extra mile

22
23

the fuquays from having access to the property that they've

Inconvenience is not sufficient in this case or any other
case to warrant granting the exceptional remedy of a

24

asking for. We're asking the Court to slmply allow what

preliminary injunction. Sol join In Mr. Ralney's motion.

25

has always been to continue to be during the pendency of

I22

3

I ~4
l 25

always had. This Isn't something that's new that we're

119

117
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1 -·this trial.
If at the end of the trial the Court decides that
2

1 easement and if there Is a prescriptive easement, then
2

that's all undone. If there isn't a prescriptive easement,
we'll cover it there,

3

there's no prescriptive easement and that it's reasonable

3

4

for the Kings to put gates at both ends and lock them and

4

5

prohibit the Fuquays from using the road, that's a trial

5

6

issue. But for today,

7

an

But for now, just for now, l'm granting a
preliminary injunction that prohibits defendants from

6

blocking police -- emergency vehicle access. Police, fire,

We're not asking for any relief other than to prevent the

7

ambulance. And they will make the call whether they want

8

denial of access that's a[ways been there. That's an issue

8

to use the road. If the police show up and say, ''Open the

9

of discretion.

9

10

we're asklng Is the status quo.

There's nothing wrong with the Court issuing an

gate. We need to get through," open the gate or the fire

10

or the -- if his child gets bit by a bee and goes into
anaphylactic zhock, you're goino to let them go down the

•j•i

order that says you leave your gates open. You can't lock

11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

the people -- the Fuquays out from accessing their house.

12 road that way too but it has to be an objective emergency.

At least for the status quo until we get done with trial,

13

that's the way that it ought to be.

14 to have to make the long route around until we style this
15 case for trial and have a hearing. Until then, you got to
16 make the long route. So Mr. Rainey and Mr. Farris, can you

This wasn't an issue until four weeks ago when they
put the gates up. They're the ones that have created the
access that they've had and then we'll deal with all of the

17
18

issue. Just allow the Fuquays the reasonable unrestricted

otherwise It's closed to the public. You're going

draft that?
MR. FARRIS: One of us will.

issues when we get to trial. But at least for now, until

19

20

we get to trial, they ought to have the exact same rights

20

21
22

that they had before those gates were put up.

COURT: Yes. Unless It's an emergency and an
21
22 objective emergency and I'm going to allow emergency

23

rule says -- this is Rule 65. "Preliminary injunction may

24
25

be granted for the following cases when it appears by the

24

it's up to them whether they want to use It. If they think

Complaint that the plaintiff Is entitled to relief

25

it's faster to go the other way, then that's it. But if

COURT: Thank you. I've reviewed the rule. The

23

MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, is the Court denying
the Fuquays any access?

vehicles, police, ambulance, fire. They come up ·- and

122

120

1

demanded." Part 2 says, "When it appears by the Complaint

2

or Affidavit that the commission or continuance of some act

3

during litigation would produce waste or great irreparable

1
2
3

4

harm to the plaintiff." And It appears -- part 3, "When it

4

case? I've handled these kind of cases. There's usually

5

appears during litigation that the defendant ls doing or

5

something else underlying these cases. Judge Dunn I think

6 will be In town In -- he does it for free. Anyway, I'm not
7 going to force you into it. If you think you can mediate
8 it, fine. If not --

6

threatens to do something that's in violation of the

7

plalntiffs' rights respecting the action." And 4, It talks

8

about disposing of property. It doesn't apply.

9

In this case, we will set this case for a trial and

9

10
11

later next week, I'll send out a scheduling order asking

10
11

the parties to give me their available dates. I'm not

they knock on the Kings' door and say, "Open the gate. We
need through," you open the gate.
So would you guys consider mediation at all on this

MR. RAINEY: Okay.
COURT: I'm just throwing that out there. You guys
consider it. I'll send out a scheduling -- a request for

12

going to rule on the merits of the case at all today.
Today, the only thing is what are we going to do about the

12
13

unavailable dates next week so that we can get this styled

13

14
15

road pending the trlal and how -- and who's going to use

14

CLERK: He's here the 28th for mediation so I don't

the road.

·\6

15

It's a discretionary call, particularly when I read

for a trial.
know if he'll be --

16

COURT: He's here the end of October. Just keep

17

part 2 about whether there's acts that are likely to

17

that in mind. Let me know. And Mr. Cleverley, Judge

18
19

produce great or Irreparable harm. I don't see that here

18

Dunn's a judge from Pocatello, other end of the state. He

at all, with this caveat. I'll grant a preliminary

19

comes here about twice a year and mediates ten cases. Two

20

injunction that prohibits the defendants from keeping
emergency vehicles -- if the police, fire or ambulance come

20
21

every day for five days and he does a good job but some

21

22

up and want to open a gate, open the gate. Otherwise, It's

22

23

closed to the publlc.

24
25

23

No one -- this is just for now. We'll have a
litigation to determine whether there's a prescriptive

cases can't be mediated. lf this is one that can, then -MR. FARRIS: Your Honor, could I ask a question for
clarification?

24

COURT: Sure.

25

MR. FARRIS: There was a temporary restraining

121
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1 ··order.. That obviously would be quashed, dismissed,

2

whatever you want to call it.

3

COURT: Yes.

4
5

It's modified to a preliminary

injunction to allow -- to prohibit them from -- prohibiting
you guys from blocking emergency vehicles.

MR. FARRIS: Yeah. The temporary restraining order

6

7
8
9

goes away.

0

thousand dollars, is that going to remain while this --

COURT: Yes.
MR. FARRIS: The bond that has been posted, the

111

COURT: Yes.

2

MR. FARRIS.: Okay. Okay.

3

COURT: Anything else?

114
5
.6

MR. CLEVERLEY: Who would you like to prepare the
order?
COURT: Well, who wants to?
MR. FARRIS: One of us will.

117
8
19

COURT: Let's let the defendants do it. Anything
else on this case?

1 20

MR. RAINEY: We have nothing further.

COURT: All right. We'll be in recess. Like I
1
22 said, I'll got a request for scheduling dates out prollably

1"'3

next week.
On the pretrials, Mr. Cleverley, I'll probably have

"4

125

you appear telephonically but It wouldn't have worked

124

1

today. This is being recorded In Owyhee County.

MR. CLEVERLEY: I would have been here today

2

~3

anyway. For the TRO, I would have been telephonic.

4
5

COURT: The pretrial status conference, we might be
able to have you appear telephonlcally.

MR. CLEVERLEY: Thank you. Your Honor, can I

6

7

request that -- although I think we're off the record, a

8

quick trial date, are we looking at something -- do we

9

know?

·10

I

11
2

13
~4
5
16
·7
8

COURT: It would be a court trial I'm presuming and
I don't know If we could get it set by the end of the year
or not. Maybe.
MR. FARRIS: Your Honor -COURT: It would be done in Murphy.
MR. FARRIS: -- I filed the counterclaim but did
request a jury trial related to damages.
COURT: Okay.
MR. FARRIS: So something to keep in mind.

119

COURT: So that puts it off till next year.

i

MR. CLEVERLEY: Did we bifurcate --

O

: 1

j 22

COURT: You're asking me a lot of questions I'm not
prepared to answer right now.

i 3

(Proceedings concluded at 4:36 p.m.)

.4
125
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 - 6th A venue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

...J\.M 1.J:,\ia_P.M.

DEC 17 2014

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
V.

Case No. CV-14-0278

WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
LOWS

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs withdraw their Motion for Summary Judgment against Lows and request that
the hearing set for December 23, 2014 be stricken. The parties also request that the court set a
status conference with the parties to discuss scheduling issues.

Dated: December 15, 2014

Withdrawal of Motion - I

Fm~:LITY NATIONAL LAW GIIOUP

1200- 6111 AVENUE, SUITE: 620
SEATTLE, WA 98101

(206) 22J-.i525

274

•

•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing document on the
following individuals in the manner indicated:
Ronald P. Rainey
Attorney at Law
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, ID 83606
208-459-3659
erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorney for Kings
S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W, River Street, Suite 110
Boise, ID 83 707
208-629-7447
brvce(a).sawtoothlaw.com
Attorney for Lows

DI U.S.MAIL
D[ LEGAL MESSENGER
CKJI EMAIL
DI HAND DELIVERED
DI EXPRESS DELIVERY
DI FACSIMILE
DI U.S.MAIL
DI LEGAL MESSENGER
[R]j

EMAIL

DI HAND DELIVERED
DI EXPRESS DELIVERY

DI FACSIMILE

I
l
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Dated: December 15, 2014

Withdrawal of Motion - 2

FIDEi.iT\; N,\'l'IONAL LAW Gnour

1200-6"' AVENUE,SUITE620
SE.\1TLE, WA

98l01

(206) 223-4525
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JAN 2 9 2015

RONALD P. RAINEY -ISB # 1022
Attorneys at Law
110 North Ninth Avenue
Post Office Box 26
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Telephone:
(208) 459-3659
Facsimile:
(208) 459-9067 or 459-6147
Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)

vs.

)

)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
)
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendants.
)

GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary ofU1e
HEARTKRANCHTRUSTUTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
Counterclaim ants,

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT KING IN
SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT
HEART K RANCH'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT KING IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT
HEART K RANCH'S JUOTION FOR SUkJMARY JUDG!vlENT-PAGE 1
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)

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON \VARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY
Counterdcfendant.~.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Canyon

)
) ss.
)

GILBERT KING, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:
1.

I am a party in the above-captioned action, over the age of majority, competent to

testify, and I make this affidavit upon personal knowledge.
2.

I have previously submitted affidavits in this action in opposition to the Fuquay

Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction (9/9/14).
3.

It was not until sometime in 2011 that the Fuquay Plaintiffs began any use of King

Lane by large semi-trucks.
4.

This use appeared to be unrelated to uses occurring on the Fuquay property itself, but

instead seemed to be for general commercial trucking purposes unrelated to the property itself.
5.

On or about f't.. ,. 15 - {?

(date) I had a large cement block placed at or near the

location of a bridge over C,M)*:4 crJ(..(state location) in any attempt eliminate this use of King Lane
by the Fuquays which was contributing to damage to this bridge.
6.

On or about

ti .. Z.Z, - I l.\

(date) I had two former wire gates on King Lane

replaced with metal swing gates, so as to be able to better ~ontrol entry onto and through King Lane.

AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT KING IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT
HEART]( RANCH'S MOTION FOR SUJJ1!11ARY JUDG1J1ENT-PAGE 2
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Further affiant sayeth net.

stitA ~·

Gilbert K i n g [

AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT !(/NG IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT
HEART K RANCH'S MOTION FOR SUAIMARY JUDG!Jt/ENT-PAGE 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this _ _ day ofJanuary, 2015,a tme and correct copy of the
foregoing document \Vas served upon the following:

Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law GROUP
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone:
206-224-6003
Facsimile:
877-655-5281
Email: Matthew.Cleverlv(@.fnf.com

[ ]
[ ]

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Other

---------

Attorney for Plaintiffs

S. Bryce Farris

[ ]

Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W. River Street, Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone:
208-629-7447
Facsimile:
208-629-7559
Email: b1:ycet'@sawtoothlaw.com

[ J
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Other _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Attorney for Low Defendants

Ronald P. Rainey

AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT KING IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT
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e
FILE

---,A.M.U.~P.M.
RONALD P. RAINEY - ISB # 1022
Attorneys at Law
110 North Ninth A venue
Post Office Box 26
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Telephone:
(208) 459-3659

Facsimile:

JAN 2 9 2015

A/W~~ARKEL~ . ~EFlK
-~µ~
1,d"
Deputy Clerk

=-6'.?t ........-

(208) 459-9067 or459-6147

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
)
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)

Defendants.

GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
HEARTKRANCHTRUSTUTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
Counterclaimants,

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING IN
SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT
HEART K RANCH'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT
HEART K RANCHtS lt10TION FOR SUM!tlARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 1
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vs.
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FL QUAY
Counterdefcndants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Canyon

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
) ss.
)

ROSE KING, being first duly swam, upon oath deposes and says:
1.

I am a party in the above~captioned action, over the age of majority, competent to

testify, and I make this affidavit upon personal knowledge.
2.

I have previously submitted affidavits in this action in opposition to the Fuquay

Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction (9/9/ 14), and in response and objection to the Fuquay
Plaintiffs request for summary judgment against the Low Defendants (12/9/14), each of those
affidavits is incorporated by reference herein.
3.

I have reviewed the Declaration of John Fuquay, as filed with this Comt on October

29, 2014, and submitted in support of the Fuquay Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against
the Low Defendants, and the claims for prescriptive easement made in that declaration concerning
the Fuquay Plaintiffs use of the roadway that has been identified in this action as "King Lane."
4.

As made and declared within the Declaration of John Fuquay, it appears that the

Fuquay Plaintiffs are asserting a presciiptive easement claim to the use of King Lane for the period
beginning January 1, 1977 to the present.
5.

As declared in my affidavit submitted in opposition to the Fuquay Plaintiffs' motion

AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT
HEART I( RANCH'S lv/OTION FOR SU.fl,fMARY JUDG.fl,/ENT-PAGE 2
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for summary judgment against the Low Defendants, the King Defendants have owned the property
alleged to burdened by the alleged prescriptive easement claimed by the Fuquay Plaintiffs since
1973, except for a four year period between 1982 and 1986.
6.

At all times prior to 2014 the Fuquay Plaintiffs' any use of King Lane, whether by

regular passenger vehicles of the Fuquays and their guests, the infrequent use of semi-trucks in the
course of the Fuquays' farm and ranch operations, other farm and ranch vehicle use, or simple
pedestrian use, has been in common with, and without interference to or disruption of, the Kings'
own use of that roadway, or without damage to that roadway or its bridges. As also stated in my
earlier affidavit, the heavy truck traffic conducted by the Fuquay Plaintiffs on King Lane did not
conunence until about 2011, and until the spring of2014 I had never seen the Fuquays operate fa1m
equipment on King Lane.
7.

At no time prior to about 2011 did any of the Fuquay Plaintiffs ever overly assert or

claim any right or use in respect to King Lane in derogation to the rights of the Kings, or that was
in any way exclusive or proprietary, such that it was adverse to the rights of the Kings in that
roadway.
8.

At no time prior to 2011 did any of the Fuquay Plaintiffs ever perform any act or

make any declaration that would constitute a clear, open, and notorious assertion of a claim to an
adverse and prescriptive right claim to the use of King Lane.
9.

It was only about in 2011 that the Fuquays did suddenly, and without explanation,

attempt to drive large semi-trucks for commercial purposes which increased use began to damage
a bridge at the east side of King Lane. It was at this time that a cement block placed at that location

AFFIDA VJT OF ROSE KING IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT
HEART I( RANCH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG.MENT-PAGE 3
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e

e

which prevented further use of those trucks, and it was also at this time that the former wire gates
were replaced with metal swing gates.
10.

As stated in my earlier affidavit, at no time prior to about 1988-89 could any large

trucks use King Lane because the condition of the road and the welded-barrel culvert simple was not
allow that use.

11.

Because any claim by the Fuquay Plaintiffs to a prescriptive easement based upon

uses that commenced after 2006 would be subject to the 20 year statutory period for such easements,
those uses could not ripen into an actual prescriptive easement claim at any time before 2026.

Further affiant sayeth not.

Rose King

AFFIDA V/T OF ROSE KING IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this~;1day of January, 2015,a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served upon the fa ·owing:

r

Matthew R. Cleverley
l
Fidelity National Law GROUP
[ J
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
[ ]
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone:
206-224-6003
Facsimile:
877-655-5281
Email: Matthew.CleverJv(@.fnf.com

.rr

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Other

---------

Attorney for Plaintiffs

S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W. River Street, Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83 707
Telephone:
208-629-7447
Facsimile:
208-629-7559
Email: brvce@sawtoothlaw.com

[ ]
[ ]

tt

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Other

---------

Altorney for Low Defendants
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RONALD P. RAINEY - ISB # 1022
Attorneys at Law
110 N011h Ninth A venue
Post Office Box 26
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Telephone:
(208) 459-3659
Facsimile:
(208) 459-9067 or 459-6147

JAN 2 9 2015

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

)

vs.

)
)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
)
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendants.
)
GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY
Counterdefendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD P. RAINEY

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Canyon

)
) ss.
)

RONALD P. RAINEY, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:

1.

I am counsel for the Defendant and Counterclaimant, Heart K. Ranch Trust, in the

above-captioned action, am over the age of majority, competent to testify, and I make this affidavit
upon personal knowledge.
2.

Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is a copy of the cited testimony of J.C.

Fuquay, John E. Fuquay and Clinton Ward Fuquay as given in open court on September 18, 2014
during the preliminary injunction hearing.

Fmther affiant sayeth not.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisA'.'7/l day of January, 2015.

blic for Idaho
Residin at Caldwell, Idaho
0,-tJ "i-19
My Commission expires:

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this £Oday of January, 2015,a true and coITect copy of the
foregoing document was served upon the f~wing:
Matthew R. Cleverley
[ ]
Fidelity National Law GROUP
[ ]
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I knev1 that thev ow112d the property on the north

Q

You didn't know that they owned tt,e lane?

A

No. I dic:.J not. 1 always assumed it was an

A

Two years ago I want to say .Jnd we replaced the

14

easement or private road -- or an access point to our

15

property. It's never been disputed up until now.

culvert.

16

Uh-huh.

17

(l

Q

And so it's a fine road now?

18

! 1!l

A

Uh··huh.

19
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Q

Is that a yes'

20

A

Yes.

Q

Okay. So again, the emergency vehicles can go

right up Castle Lane without any obstructions, correct?

4

A

Yes.

j 2s

Q

And these dt!livery people can go up Castle Lnne

i

without .iny obstructions, correct?

2

3

Q

And the mail person that delivers your mall right

3

down at the bottom of Castle Lane and Oreana Loop.

Q

Have you ever told lhern to get out? It's your

A

No, sir, I ha•,e not .

Q

Have you ever done anything that interrupted their

A

No, sir,

r have not.
86

Cl

Do you know if anyone in yoLJr family has ever

interrupted the Kings' use of that Ii.me?

4

Yes.

No, l have not.

interrupt the l<ings' use of that 1.:ine?

1

Yes.

A

use? And they being Kings. Hilve yoLJ ever done anything t.eo
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A

Well, have you ever interfered with the Kings' use

l.ine. You're going to use it?

. 21
22
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of that lancP
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When was the last time the ditch washed out?

Okay. You got the culvert all replaced?

!
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·,1ears.
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the moment.
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A

Not to my recollection, no.

Q

And so bottom line is 11obody from your family, as

far as you know, have ever hindered or interfered with tile

6

Q

So you have to go down the lane to get your mail.

6

Kings' m;e or t11at lane we're -- in the pleadings, it's

7

A

Yes.

7

cal!ed King's Lane. Do l need to rephrase that again?

8

Q

And you do that at least once a day?

8

A

Yeal1 1 go ahead. Yeah.

9

A

Can I say one thing?

9

Q

Cm you recall anybody in your family, you, your

,~~

Q

No.

10

brother, fol:hcr, that's interrered wilh Kings· use of that

COURT: Wait until he asks you a question.

·11

lane called l<inus· Lane?

WlTNESS: Okay. All right.

12

A

Between my house and their hcuses?

COURT: Your attorney can follow up.

13
14

Q

Yes.

A

No.

Q

Sa ·- and you don't know wllo pays the t.ixe~; nn 1·11i1l

2
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i 'Hi
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Q

·f(j

All these services are available through C<1stle

Lane; is that correct?
Yes, yes.

Q

And one more time, there's not one obstruction

other than maybe a ditch washing out once in a while or a

1

culvert?

21

A

Uh-huh.

Q

i\nd that only washes out when you don't clean out

22
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3

the debris, right?
A

lane l take it7
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A

o

i 22
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IW MR. R1\INEY:
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I

vVITNESS: Ali right.

Or if the creek is flooding and we can'L control

A
Q

You don't7

A

No, sir,

Q

Now, the gates you're talking .:ibout, have you ever·

No, J do not.

looked at those gates?

A

Which gates?

Q

The new gates.

A

Not up close, no.

Q

Have you c:ver 0~;11C:?d the new gales? ________ ...!

I
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e

e
A
Q

I don't know. I've never seen them locked.
So you haven't gone back there since the

conversation?

A

Since I went back through there, the gates have

14

3

QUESTIONS BY MR. FARRIS:

4

been -- I've been gone for the last month so I mean he put

5
6

up and there's not been an issue.

7

Q Well, let's make the record clear, Mr. Fuquay. The
Kings use that lane to graze cattle and to actually corral

8

A

as

some of these.

the cattle in there and I assume he opened the gates back

the cattle too, don't they?

11,~

1
2

Yeah. I don't know what they -- yeah, sure. They

9

the Lows.

A

Okay.

Q

You've been talking about this roadway that they've

referred to or referred to as Castle Lane and from what I
understand is that lane comes off Oreana Loop up to your

11

lt in front of you.

Q

13

14

A
Q

Okay.
You see where there's an arrow that says Castle

Lane?

A

Yeah.

Q

That Castle Lane originates at Oreana Loop further

""6

A
Q

Well, there's cattle In there.

15
16

17

A

Yep.

17

Q

There's cattle in there an awful lot of the year,

18

A

Correct.

19

Q

That's the road you've been talking about and it

8

I don't know what -- I don't know about that but --

Mr. Fuquay, my name Is Bryce Farris and I represent

property? If you'd look at probably Exhibit 3 if you have

12

then?

Q

10

graze it.
Okay. But they use it kind of as a holding pen

CROSS-EXAMINATION

isn't that correct?

A Sometimes, yeah.

20

Q

21

A

Correct.

22

Q

And then goes up to the property that you've --

Okay. And they also -- Kings use that road to get

to their fields, don't they?

125

to the south of the area of your property?

comes up, goes through your property?

A

Correct.

23

Q

They've used that road ever since you've lived in

24

A

Correct.

25

Q

Okay. With respect to that Castle Lane, from what

that property.

that someone's Identified as Clint Fuquay?

36
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Q

And never have you tried to kick the Kings off the

2

mailbox is currently'?

3

A

•. 4

A

Not that I recall.

4

Q

Okay. That's your address?

5

Q

Well, you never have, have you?

5

A

Not that I recall, no.

6

A
Q

Yes.

Q

So in other words, you've never interfered with the

7

'3

I

16
·. 7:

property, have you, off the road?

Kings using their own property, have you?
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That's where Schwann's or other delivery folks

deliver to?

8

A

Currently.

9

Q

Okay. Currently. As we sit here today. And if

Q

Other than the gates.
Pardon me?

A
Q

Other than the issue with the gates.
Well, they put up gates. Particularly when they

11

A

This one?

12

Q

Yes, yeah.

had cattle In there, they had gates In there. Isn't that

13

right?

14 Yeah.

10

A

Yeah.

15

Q

Okay. Now, you can't tell Judge Nye whether it's

16

easier to open the metal gate than to put the wire over the
posts with the loop, can you?

A

17

18

you'd look at Exhibit 1, do you have that In front of you?

COURT: Oh, I've got It. It's this one here.
WITNESS: Okay.

BY MR. FARRIS:

Q

You see where at the top of that it says "map

address" and it says 18907 Castle Lane?

19
20

A
Q

MR. RAINEY: That's all the cross I have, Your

21
22

A
Q

COURT: Mr. Farris.

23

find your property, that's the address you put in, Castle

MR. FARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try not

24

Lane?

25

A

I've not opened them metal gates. I haven't been

through there since.

···1
22

Currently, yes.

Honor.

to be redundant. Let me see if I can put a fine point on

37
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Correct.
That's your address?
Correct.
So that's -- If you want to put in your address to

Correct.

39
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1

2
3
4

,A
Q

1
2

Sure.

So It's just a matter of convenience for you -Yes.

Yes.

4

3

without stopping for anything, correct?

A

Q

A
Q
A

Coming up Castle Lane, that's a straight shot

-- to go through the Kings'?
Yes.

5

Q

Now, when did you get your driver's license?

5

Q

Only convenience. That's the only reason.

6

When I was 15.

6

A

It's quicker.

7

A
Q

And so you say you're 27 now.

7

Q

Could be?

8

A

Yes.

8

A

It's quicker.

9

Q

So that's twelve years ago?

9

Q

It's quicker. Well, that's what I'm calling

10

A

Yes.

10

11
12
13
14
15
16

Q

And six of those twelve years you lived somewhere

11

17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

else.

A

Yes.

Q

So you've only been on this property for six years.

A

No. Eight. Since I was 19.

Q

Can you give me the years when you were gone, from

17

when to when?

A
Q
A

I would say from 2001 to 2005.
Well, that's five years.
Four. I don't remember when in 2001. Moved back

the summer of 2005.

Q

When you got your driver's license, you were gone.

You didn't even live on that property.

A
Q

12
13
14
15
16

I stayed there on the weekends.
Other than weekends but you didn't Jive there on a

convenience.

A

It's easier, yes.

Q

Okay. So you want to use King's Lane just because

It's convenient.

A

Because that's what I've always used.

Q

You don't claim any right to It, do you?

A

What's that?

Q

You don't claim any right to King's Lane, do you?

18
A I've been using it so I just always assumed that I
19 could.
Q Have you ever excluded the Kings from using that
20
21 lane?
22
A No.
23
Q Have you ever told them to get off?
A No.
24
Q Have you ever told them that they couldn't use It
25
66
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1

2
3
4

5
6

1

day-to-day basis.

A

Correct.

Q

You were not watching the Kings' operation on a

day-to-day basis.

A

Correct.

Q

In fact, you've never watched Kings on a day-to-

2
3
4
5
6

A

No.

Q

So in a way, have you interfered with the Kings?

A

No.

Q

Have you given them any hassle about when you use

A

9

Q

Is that right?

10

A

Correct.

8

11
12
13
14
15

No.
Okay.
MR. FARRIS: Your Honor, I don't have anything to

Q

Just occasionally seeing what's going on, right?

11

A

Correct.

Q

So when you say that they've never had cattle in

12
13
14

QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

15

calls an all-weather road?

there, you don't know, do you?

A
Q

What are you talking about?

COURT: Okay. Thank you. Redirect.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

Q

You indicated that Castle Lane Is what Mr. Rainey

16

A

Yes.

17

had cattle and never locked gates. You don't know because

17

Q

Is that -- who maintains that road?

18

you're not there on a day-to-day basis, are you?

18
19

A

We do.

Q

Do you maintain King Lane?

20
21
22
23
24
25

A

Yes.

16

19

20
21
22
23
24
25

A

Well, there's periods of times you said they never

I drive that road on a day-to-day basis but In that

time, I wasn't there on a day-to-day basis so at that time,
I can't say what they did on a day-to-day basis.
Q

Okay. And Is there any reason you don't go down --

when you're driving, you don't go down to Oreana through
Castle Lane?

A

It's quicker to get where I'm going going that way.

Q

How do you maintain it?

A

We've bladed it with a road grader and a land

plane.

Q

What else?

A

We've -- a backhoe. FIiied In potholes with a

65
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the lane?

Correct.

day --

I
I
I

If you're using It?

7
A
Q
8
9
10 add.

7

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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COMES NOW the Defendant, HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA., acting by its Tmstee,
GILBERT KING and ROSE KING, by and through their counsel ofrecord, RONALD P. RAINEY,
and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56 submits this MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. This motion
is supported by the accompanying affidavits of Rose King, Gilbert King, and Ronald P. Rainey, and
the prior affidavits submitted in this action by Rose King and Gilbert King, which are of record, and

by the supporting memorandum on this motion for summary judgment.

DEFENDANT HEART K RANCH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- PA GE 2

292

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I.
STATUS OF THE CASE
This action seeking the declaration of a prescriptive easement on King Lane was commenced
by a complaint filed by the Fuquay Plaintiffs on August 11, 2014. The Heart K Ranch Defendants
filed an answer denying the requested relief, and counterclaiming for declaratory relief as to the
scope of pe1missive use on King Lane, requesting permanent injunctive relief, and quiet title.
On Thursday September 4, 2014 the Fuquay Plaintiffs requested, and on the next day, Friday
September 5, 2014, this Court granted, a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), as based upon
uncontested affidavits submitted in support ofthat motion. The matter went to hearing on September
18, 2014 on Plaintiffs' request for entry of a preliminary injunction, which the Court denied by an
order entered on September 29, 2014, with a limited exception for emergency vehicles.
The Fuquay Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the Low
Defendants only on October 29, 2014, which motion was withdrawn on December 17, 2014.
As based upon the testimony provided in open court at the September 18, 2014 hearing on
the motion for preliminary injunction and the prior affidavits which have been submitted by the
paiiies in this action, ai1d it now appearing that the Fuquay Plaintiffs caimot sustain the necessary
evidence to prevail on ai1 essential element oftheir prescriptive easement claim, the King Defendants
now move for summary judgment on the Fuquay Plaintiffs' prescriptive easement claim in King
Lane.

II.

UNDISPUTED FACTS
The maps attached to the Affidavit of Gilbert King previously submitted concerning the
motion for preliminary injunction clearly illustrate the current conditions on the ground in the area
of alleged dispute. King Lane is a private road located entirely upon private lai1d that is about one
half mile in length. It roughly runs in an east-west direction from the Oreana Loop Road until it
connects with Castle Lane, which itselfthen proceeds on to the south where it connects to the public

DEFENDANT HEART K RANCH'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 2
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Oreana Loop Road. Recent increased use of Kings Lane by the Plaintiffs by large commercial
trucks, including loaded logging trucks, is rapidly degrading a bridge that was never designed to bear
such loads.
Perhaps of even greater significance is the fact that Heart King Ranch conducts its livestock
operations on, and about King Lane, and actually "grazes-out" King Lane itself, which requires a
respectful use of that roadway, and the gates at each end of the roadway, which prevents the Heart
King Ranch livestock from leaving its property, and also restricts livestock owned by others from
entering the Heart King Ranch property. The state of Idaho - and especially Owyhee county remains "open range" country. See e.g., Greer v. Ellsworth, 113 Idaho 979, 751 P.2d 675
(Ct.App.1988) (discussing "open range" in the area of Oreana in Owyhee County). In Maguire v.
Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 590 P.2d 85 (1978) the Idaho Supreme Court briefly explained the history of

open range in Idaho:
Western cattle states generally rejected the common law, holding that
livestock roaming at large connnitted no trespass when they strayed on unenclosed
private land. [footnote 1 omitted] See Scott, The Range Cattle Industry: Its Effect
on Western Land Law, 28 Mont.L.Rev. 155 (1967). Idaho, concurring with the
approach of its neighboring states, also rejected the common law rule. Kelly v.
Easton, 35 Idaho 340,207 P. 129 (1922); Johnson v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., 7
Idaho 355, 63 P. 112 (1900). The Idaho rule was stated as follows: "The
common-law rule that every man must confine his own cattle to his own land does
not obtain in this state, and in Strong v. Brown, 26 Idaho 1, 140 P. 773, 52
L.R.A.,N.S., 140, Ann.Cas. 1916E, 482, itis held that under our statute (C.S., c. 82),
if a landowner fails to fence out cattle lawfullv at large, he may not recover for
loss caused by such livestock straying upon his unenclosed land." Kelly v.
Easton, 35 Idaho at 344, 207 P. at 130 (citations omitted). However, one who
willfully and deliberately drives his stock upon the lands of another, whether
enclosed or unenclosed and grazes them upon such land without the permission of
the owner, is liable in damages for the trespass. Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81, 14
S.Ct. 477, 38 L.Ed. 363 (1894); Swanson v. Groal, 12 Idaho 148, 85 P. 384 (1906).
99 Idaho at 832, 590 P.2d at 88 (bracketed reference to, "footnote 1 omitted," added; emphasis
added). See also, I.C. § 25-2118 (""Open range' means all uninclosed lands outside of cities,
villages and herd districts, upon which cattle by custom, license, lease, or pennit, are grazed or
permitted to roam.").
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So long as neighbors located on "open range" remain on good terms, it is possible for that
open range to be shared on fair terms. But when these friendly and accommodating arrangements
between neighbors break down, then fences, gates, and even locks become necessary. In this case,
as already mentioned above, the Heart King Ranch periodically grazes-off the area encompassed
within King Lane. Reasonable means are therefore required to keep the Heart King Ranch livestock
on its own property, and the livestock of adjoining landowners off the property of the Heart King
Ranch. Consequently, gates and fences are necessary, and must be respected to accomplish this
purpose in an area of open range.

As the additional affidavits that have been submitted in support of this motion for swnmary
judgment and the earlier motions filed in this case by Rose King and Gilbert King amply illustrate,
King Lane itself was in such a state of development that it could not sustain the decree of use that
the Fuquay Plaintiffs claim at any time prior to 1988-89. Although arguably the Court could
conclude that there remain genuine issues of material fact that would preclude entry of summary
judgment as between the parties as to their contested issues of use of the road, there appears to be
no contested genuine issue of fact in this case, as to any act or conduct by the Fuquay Plaintiffs that
would have placed any of the named defendants in this action on notice of adverse prescriptive use
claim made by the Fuquay Plaintiffs to King Lane. Therefore, it appears that this action is ripe for
summary judgment.

III.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid useless trials. Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho
3 37, 340-41, 563 P.2d 395, 398-99 ( 1977). The party moving for summary judgment initially carries
the burden to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,404,848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.
1992). The court must detennine whether the moving party has shown that there is a lack of any
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genuine issue of material fact as to each issue raised by the motion for summary judgment. Coghlan

v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,401,987 P.2d 300,313 (1999). TI1is burden maybe met
by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to
prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 31 l, 882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct.App.1994). Such an
absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing that is accomplished with
the moving patty's own evidence, or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence in view of
the contention that such evidence fails to establish a required element of the non-moving party's
claim. Heath v. Honker's lvfini-Mart, h1c., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App.2000).
Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the party
opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discove1y responses or by affidavits, that there
is indeed a genuine issue for trial, or if the non-moving party is able to offer a valid justification for
the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874,
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). "The nonmoving party cannot rely on mere speculation, and a
scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of mateiial fact." Bollinger v. Fall River

Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632,637, 272 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2012).

IV.
ARGUMENT
The Fuquay Plaintiffs' Claim Of A Prescriptive Easement To King Lane Fails For Lack Of
Clear And Convincing Evidence Of An Adverse Claim Of Right With The Actual Or Imputed
Knowledge Of The Servient Landowners For The Required Prescriptive Period Of Time
Easements by prescription are not favored under Idaho law. Lorangv. Hunt, l 07 Idaho 802,
803, 693 P .2d 448, 449 ( 1984). A plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence each of
the five required elements necessat)' to establish a prescriptive easement as declared by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 700,963 P.2d 383 (1998):
To establish an easement by prescription, the claimant must prove by clear and
convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: ( 1) open
and notorious; (2) continuous and uninte1TUpted; (3) adverse and under a claim of
right; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner ofthe servient tenement
(5) for the statutory period. See I.C. § 5-203; Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 173,
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16 P.3d 263, 270 (2000). Each element is essential to the claim, and the trial
court must make findings relevant to each element in order to sustain a
judement on appeal.
139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973 (emphasis added). The 2003 Idaho Civil Jury Instructions define
the "clear and convincing" standard of proof as follows:
When I say a pa1iy has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and
convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that
such proposition is true. This is a higher burden than the general burden that the
proposition is more probably true than not true.

IDJI 1.20.2 (underlined emphasis added). See also, In re Adoption ofDoe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141
P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006) (Clear and convincing evidence, "is generally understood to require
' [e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.'").
Because the burden of proof at trial to establish a prescriptive easement by clear and
convincing evidence is placed upon the Fuquay plaintiffs as to each element of their claim, on this
motion for sunnnary judgment the defendants need only establish that the Fuquay plaintiffs cannot
establish material facts on any single essential element of their prescriptive easement claim in order
to prevail on this motion for summary judgment. This standard of proof on summary judgment was
declared as follows by the Idaho Supreme Court in Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165
(1999):
Where the non-moving pruiy will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party's
burden may be satisfied by showing the absence of material fact with regard to any
essential element of the non-moving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The absence of a genuine issue
of fact with regard to an essential element of the plaintiffs claim renders any other
potential issues of fact irrelevant. Once the absence of sufficient evidence on an
element has been shown, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. The nonmoving party crurnot merely rely upon its
pleadings, but must produce affidavits, depositions, or other evidence establishing
an issue of material fact. R.G. Nelson, A.LA. v. Steer, l l8 ldal10 409,410, 797 P.2d
117, 118 (1990). The norunoving party need not submit evidence on every element
upon which it will beru· the burden at trial, but only those elements about which the
moving party successfully carried its burden. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc. 126
ldal10 527, 887 P.2d 1034 (1995).
132 Idaho at 810-11, 979 P.2d at 1168-69.
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The Fuquay plaintiffs have argued that they have established a prescriptive easement over
King Lane at various times during the period of time during which the five year prescriptive use
prevailed prior to the change in the period of time to twenty years in 2006. On this motion for
summary judgment the King Defendants argue that all times during this time (prior to 2006), any use
by the Fuquay plaintiffs or their predecessors, was use in common with the Kings and Lows that in
no way inte1fered with their use of King Lane and therefore under Idaho law was deemed

permissive and could not be prescriptive. This rebuts elements three and four (adverse use that
is known to the servient landowner) making any prescriptive claim during this period impossible.
The fact that the Fuquay plaintiffs may have used King Lane in a manner that has in fact interfered
with the King and Low Defendants use of the road after 2006 (e.g., use by large trucks commencing
in 2011) places that use within the twenty year prescriptive period, which use cannot mature into any
prescriptive right until at least 2026.
In Chenw. Conway, 116Idaho 901, 781 P.2d 238 (Ct.App.1989), the Idaho Court ofAppeals
provided the following summary ofthe essential characteristics of prescriptive easements, including
that conduct which is deemed pennissive use:
The law in this state regarding prescriptive easements is well settled and was
thoroughly summarized in Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idal10 40 I, 404, 724 P .2d 13 7, 140
(Ct.App.1986):
A claimant, in order to acquire a prescriptive easement in Idaho, must
present reasonably clear and convincing evidence of open, notorious,
continuous, uninten-upted use, under a claim of right, with the knowledge of
the owner of the servient estate for the prescriptive period. State ex rel.
Hamanv. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 594P.2d 1093 (1979); Westv. Smith, 95 Idaho
550,511 P.2d 1326 (1973); Kauppv. CityofHailey, 110 Idaho 337, 715 P.2d
1007 (Ct.App.1986). The prescriptive period in Idaho is five years. I.C. § 5203. A prescriptive right cannot be obtained if use of the servient estate is by
permission of the owner. State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, supra.
The general rule in Idaho is:
[P]roof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the
claimed right for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to ho-w the use
began, raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of
right. The burden is then on the owner of the servient tenement to show that
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the use was penuissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement.
[Quoting Westv. Smith, 95 Idaho at 557,511 P.2dat 1333; emphasis added.]
In Melendez, we noted that two exceptions have been recoe9ized to the
general rule stated in West. One of these exceptions is found in Simmons v.
Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941). There, the Supreme Court
said:
The rule would seem to be that where the owner of real prope1ty
constructs a way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use
thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be
presumed to be by way of license or permission.

A1elendez goes on to explain this variation in the general rule where a roadway,
established and maintained by the owner of the servient tenement, is jointly used by
the owner and others:
Understanding the basis for the Simmons rule helps to detennine the limits
of its application. There should be no presumption that the use originated
adversely to the owner unless the use itself constitutes some invasion or
infringement upon the rights of an owner. Where one person merely uses
a roadway in common with his neighbor, without dama1:e to the
roadway, without interfering with the neighbor's use of the roadway,
and where the neighbor has established and maintained the roadway on
his own propertv for his own purposes, only the most minimal intrusion
is made into the owner's dominion over his property. Logically, a use
which is not in fact adverse to the owner provides no basis for the
presumption that the use is adverse. However, where the use made of the
property for the prescriptive period is shown to constitute some infringement
or invasion of the owner's rights, it is more appropriate to apply the general
rule, presuming the use to be adverse, that is, without permission of the
owner.
111 Idaho at 405, 724 P.2d at 141.
116 Idaho at 903, 781 P .2d at 240 (emphasis added).
As the Idaho Supreme Court quite recently observed in, HF.LP., LLC v. The City o.fTwin
Falls, 2014 WL 6865494 at *8, 14.22 ISCR 45, 54 (December 8, 2014) "Moreover, if the

presumption ofpermissiveness applied when the use began, the presumption continues until a hostile
and adverse use is clearly manifested and 'brought home' to the servient property owner. Backman
v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,398,210 PJd 75, 83 (2009); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789, 792,

537 P.2d 631,634 (1975)." The presumption ofpennissive use in common with the Defendant
Kings and Lows applies in this case, and there is no evidence that any hostile or adverse use contrary

DEFENDANT HEART K RANCH'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 8

301

to that pemrissive use was ever "brought home" to the Kings, as was testified to by J.C. Fuquay at
the preliminary injunction hearing in September 2014:
Do you know that this lane from the bottom of your house around the
Q.
corner from your house to Oreana is Kings' private property?
A.
No, I wasn't aware of that. It's always been an open lane since I've
been around.
Q.

You didn't know that Kings owned that property?

A.

I knew that they owned the property on the north side of that lane.

Q.

You didn't know that they owned the lane?

A.
No. I did not. I always assumed it was an easement or private road - or an access point to our property. It's never been disputed up until now.

Q.

Well, have you ever interfered with the Kings' use of that land?

A.

No, I have not.

Q.

Have you ever told them to get out? It's your lane. You're going to

A.

No, sir, I have not.

use it?

Q.
Have you ever done anything that inte1rupted their use? And they
being Kings. Have you ever done anything to interrupt the Kings' use of that lane?
A.

No, sir, I have not.

Q.
Do you know if anyone in your family has ever interrupted the Kings
use of that lane?

A.

Not to my recollection, no.

Q.
And so bottom line is nobody from your family, as far as you know,
have ever hindered or interfered with the Kings' use of that lane we're - - in the
pleadings, it's called King's Lane. Do I need to rephrase that again?
A.

Yeah, go ahead. Yeah.

Q.
Can you recall anybody in your family, you, your brother, father, that's
interfered with Kings' use of that lane called Kings Lane?
A.

Between my house and their houses?

Q.

Yes.
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A.

No.

Preliminary Injunction Tr., pg. 86, L., 4 to pg. 87, L. 14. (as attached to the Affidavit of Ronald P.
Rainey).
John E. Fuquay and Clinton Ward Fuquay have also acknowledged that they did not interfere
with King's use of the

fa.1111

lane known as King Lane. John E. Fuquay's testimony is recorded in

the Preliminary Injunction Tr., pg. 36, L., 21-25 and pg.37, L., 1-15 and Clinton Ward Fuquay's
testimony is recorded at pg. 66, L, l 8-25 and pg. 67 L. I -7.
The fourth element required to establish a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing
evidence is that the claim is made, "with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the
servient tenement," it is closely related to the "open and notorious use" third element, and requires
proof that the servient landowner had actual knowledge of the claimed prescriptive use, or that the
use was of such a character that upon reasonable inquiry that the servient landowner ought to have
known that such a prescriptive use existed. See e.g., Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 173, 16 P.3d
263, 270 (2000) ("The open and notorious use must rise to the level reasonably expected to provide
notice of the adverse use to the servient landowner maintaining a reasonable degree of supervision
over his premises.). This fourth requirement was further addressed by the Ida110 Court of Appeals
in Hall v. Strawn, 108 ldal10 111, 697 P.2d 451 (Ct.App.1985):
The trial court found that prior to 1981, Hall's use of Strawn's roadway was "not of
such character as to give defendant notice of any adverse claime [sic] thereto by
plaintiff." On appeal, Hall asserts that the trial court erred in requiring him to
affirmatively prove that Strawn had knowledge of his use of the Police Cabin Road
under a claim of right. He argues that his open and notorious use of the roadway for
longer than the prescriptive period was sufficient to charge Strawn with knowledge
of his claim. We recognize that a person is charged with knowledge of the status and
condition of his or her land, and that, in the usual case, where a claimant succeeds in
establishing open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted use under a claim of right
for the statutory period, knowledge of the owner may be presumed. See 2 G.
Thompson, Commentaries on the Modem Law of Real Property,§ 341, at 194-95
(1980 Replacement); Sanchez v. Dale Bellamah Homes ofNew Mexico, h1c., 76 N.M.
526,417 P.2d 25 (1966); Jurgensen v. Ainscow, 155 Neb. 701, 53 N.W.2d 196
(1952); 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses§ 61, at 470. However, mere use
alone is insufficient to establish an easement. The use must also be exclusive in
the sense that it is proprietary in nature and exercised independently of the
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rights of all others. Thompson, supra, at 195.

In the present case, Strawn testified that, with her permission, the Association
and several of her neighbors used the road in question. Hall, himself, testified that
he thought he was using a public road. Where, as here, the same degree of use upon
which the adverse claim is based has been exercised indiscriminately by the general
public, individual acquisition of a prescriptive easement has generally been held
impossible. Annot., 11 I A.L.R. 221 (1937). In such a case, the claimant must
perform some act whereby the adverse nature of the claim is clearly indicated
to the owner of the servient estate. Id.
The case at bar is analogous to Cusic v. Givens, 70 Idaho 229,215 P.2d 297
(1950). In Cusic the plaintiffs sued to establish a prescriptive easement over a road
crossing the defendant's property. The road had been opened by a Mr. Duffy, the
defendant's predecessor. In rejecting plaintiff's claim our Supreme Court stated:
The record shows that the road was laid out and established by Mr. Duffy, for
his own use, prior to the sale to McMullen. Through the years following
it was used by the owners and by all who had occasion to go to either of
the adjacent farms, by the ditch rider, the milk trucker, hay buyers and
the occupants of the farms in their farming operations. This use was
entirely permissive. Mr. Duffy made no obiection. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that any user claimed an adverse right. Mr. Morgan, a
predecessor of plaintiff's in the ownership and occupation of the west eighty,
and who fam1ed that land in 193 9, 1940 and 1941, said he used it because he
thought it was a public road. The plaint("f}.' Cusic himself. testified he thought
ii ·was a county road and that the county oi1111ed it. A prescriptive right
cannot be acquired by such use. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.]

Id. at 231. 215 P .2d at 298. We agree with the trial court that the appellant did not
demonstrate that his use of the Police Cabin Road was of such character as to give
respondent notice of his adverse claim.
108 Idaho at 112-13, 697 P.2d at452-53 (Italicized emphasis in original, underlined-bold emphasis
added). This requirement was further addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Anderson v. Larsen,
136 Idaho 402, 34 P.3d 1085 (2001):
In order to establish a private prescriptive easement, a claimant must present
reasonably clear and convincing proof of open, notorious, continuous, and
uninten-upted use under a claim of right and with the knowledge of the owner of the
servient tenement for the prescriptive period of five years. See I.C. s 5-203; Baxter,
135 Idaho at 172, 16 P.3d at270; Westv. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,511 P.2d 1326 (1973).
The purpose of the requirement that prescriptive use be open and notorious is
to give the owner of the servient tenement knowledge and opportunity to assert
his rights against the development of an easement by prescription. The open
and notorious use must rise to the level reasonably expected to provide notice
of the adverse use to a servient landowner maintaining a reasonable degree of
supervision over his premises. See Kaupp v. City of Hailey, 110 Idaho 337, 340,
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715 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Ct.App.1986).
136 Idaho at 406, 34 P.3d at 1089 (emphasis added). See also, Halvorson v. North Latah County
Highway Dist., 151 Idaho 196, 204, 254 P .3d 497, 505 (2011) (citing Anderson on the "open and

notorious use" issue).
The affidavits of Rose and Gilbert King, as submitted in support of this motion establishing
that at no time prior to 2011 did the Fuquay Plaintiffs engage in any use of King Lane that was not
considered, as described under the standard of lvfelendez and Chen decisions set out above, as not
simply being in common with the Kings and Lows, and in no way interfering with their use of King
Lane. It was only when the persistent use of the very large trucks began sometime in 2011, or
thereafter, that any inte1ference or damage to the road and its bridge began. Any alleged adverse or
prescriptive use which commenced at that time would be subject to the twenty year prescriptive use
period which went into effect in 2006, and would not yet have ripened into a prescriptive right. With
all use prior to that time being by implied permission, no prescriptive use right arose under the
previous five year statute either. Therefore, in the absence any facts that can establish the required
adverse use, an essential element of the Fuquay Plaintiffs' prescriptive easement claim fails,
rendering all other facts irrelevant, and rendering the entry of summary judgment for the defendants
appropriate.

V.
CONCLUSION

Under the standard that the absence of a genuine issue of fact with regard to an essential
element of the plaintiffs claim renders all other potential issues of fact irrelevant. the Fuquay
Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their prescriptive easement claim to King Lane due to an absence of any
evidence in support of ru1 open and notorious adverse claim known to either the Kings or the Lows
that would have put the Kings or the Lows on notice of that prescriptive use easement claim. In the
absence of this essential element of the Fuquay plaintiffs' claim, all other issues of fact are rendered
irrelevant, and entry of summary judgment for the defendant on the Fuquay Plaintiffs' prescriptive
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easement claim is appropriate.
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this response to the motion for summary judgment submitted by Defendant Heart K Ranch
(hereinafter "King").
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On or about January 29, 2015, King's submitted a Motion for Swnmary Judgment along with
a supporting memorandum and supporting affidavits which seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims for

a prescriptive easement because Plaintiffs have failed to establish the requisite elements.

Low

respond to the Kings' motion by supporting it. The Lows previously submitted affidavits and a
memorandum in response to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, which was subsequently
withdrawn by Plaintiffs, but the arguments in support of King's motion are similar to those made
by the Lows. Thus, the Lows support the King's motion and contend that if such a motion is
granted then Lows reserve the right to bring their own motion dismissing the claims against the Lows
based upon similar grounds that Plaintiffs cannot establish the necessary elements for a prescriptive
easement.
Additionally, Plaintiffs have not established the ownership of the land where the roadway
(King Lane) is located and thus if summary judgment is granted to King then it should also be
granted to Low. Moreover, to the extent summary judgment is granted to King and King own any
portion of the roadway referred to as "King Lane" then Plaintiffs would not have an easement for
the roadway from Oreana Loop to their property. Put another way, once one link of the chain is
broken then there is no easement and any easement across the property of Low would be moot or
useless to Plaintiffs because it does not create an access easement from their property to Oreana
Loop.

Accordingly, Low not only support the King's motion for summary judgment but reserve

the right to seek summary judgment/dismissal of Plaintiffs' action against the Lows if it grants
swnmary judgment to the Kings.
DATED this,l#1ay of February, 2015.

DEFENDANT LOWS' RESPONSE KINGS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2

309

02/10/2015 TUE 14:56

~010/010

FAX

SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC

~~
b
y
: _F_arr_i_s
~ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
A...,,.soe..
_B_ry_c_e

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the
following on this .ja!day of February, 2015 by the following method:

MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 - 61h Avenue, Suite 620

Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 224-6003
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
RONALD P. RAINEY
RONALD P. RAINEYPA
110 N. 9th Ave.

PO Box 26
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026
Telephone: (208) 459-3659
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067
E-Mai I: erainey@qwestofflce.net
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and Rose
King

L] U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid

[_J U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
L] Federal EKpress
LJ Hand Delivery
[2d Facsimile
L] Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

L] U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid
L] U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
L] Federal Express
LJ Hand Delivery

W

Facsimile

L] Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

DEFENDANT LOWS' RESPONSE KINGS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

310

FILED
_....A.M.~P.M.
Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 - 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

FEB 13 2015
ANG.
erk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
Case No. CV-14-0278

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
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RANCH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
V.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

I.

BACKGROUND

This is a case where Plaintiffs are seeking judicial confirmation of their prescriptive
easement rights over the defendants' properties.

The defendants have installed gates to

prevent Plaintiffs from accessing their homes, even though Plaintiffs' prescriptive rights were
established years ago.
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to their prescriptive easement claims
against the Lows in in October 2014. In November 2014, the Lows responded to the motion
and submitted an affidavit from Rose King that clearly created disputed issues of fact. In
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December 2014, Plaintiffs withdrew their Motion and canceled the hearing because it was
obvious from the declarations filed with the court that there were disputed issues of material
fact that would require the Court to deny Plaintiffs' motion.
Heart K Ranch has now filed its own motion for Summary Judgment, notwithstanding that
Rose King's testimony created the disputed issues of fact in the first place. None of the facts
have changed, and the disputed testimony before the Court requires the Court to deny any
party's motion for summary judgment.

II.

LEGALSTANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all facts and inferences from the
record in favor of the non-moving party and the moving party has the burden of proving the
absence of genuine issues of material fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d
165, 168 (1997).

Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach

differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian
Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,718,918 P.2d 583,587 (1996).
B. Prescriptive Easement

A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription "must prove by
clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open
and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4)
with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the
statutory period." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003).
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Once the claimant presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began, he
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Wood v. Hoglund.
131 Idaho 700, 702---03, 963 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair. 130 Idaho 675, 680,
946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to
show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement.
Wood. 131 Idaho at 703, 963 P.2d at 386; Marshall. 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. The
nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property."
Hodgins. 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 975. The state of mind of the users of the alleged
easement is not controlling; the focus is on the nature of their use. Id at 231-32, 76 P.3d at
975-76. Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293,303, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005).

III.

DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT

A. Testimony Before the Court
There are numerous declarations and affidavits before the Court.

For the court's

convenience, they are compiled and submitted with this response. They include:
•

Declaration of Raymond Jayo dated August 27, 2014

•

Declaration of John Fuquay dated August 27, 2014

•

Affidavit of Rose King dated September 9, 2014

•

Affidavit of Susie Low dated September 15, 2014

•

Affidavit of Gilbert King dated September 8, 2014

•

Declaration of Denise Collett dated September 9, 2014

•

Declaration of Scott Snyder dated September 17, 2014
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•

Declaration of Seth Thomas dated September 16, 2014

•

Declaration of Schwann Delivery Person dated September 12, 2014

•

Declaration of John Fuquay dated October_, 2014

•

Affidavit of Rose King dated December 4, 2014

•

Affidavit of Samuel Steiner dated November 10, 2014

•

Affidavit of Ron Rainey dated January 29, 2015

•

Affidavit of Rose King dated January_, 2015 (unsigned)

•

Affidavit of Gilbert King dated January_ 2015

In addition to the testimony, there are numerous exhibits and public records for the court
to consider.
IV.

ARGUMENT

A. Disputed Facts Preclude Summary Judgment

In order for this court to grant Heart K Ranch summary judgment, the Court would have
to review all of the declarations and affidavits on record and made a determination that there
are no disputed facts and that Heart K Ranch will prevail as a matter of law. That ruling is
impossible in this case. As the testimony shows, historical use of the roadway is not only
disputed, it is hotly disputed.
Heart K Ranch invites the court to weigh the testimony and find that Rose King and
Gilbert King's declarations outweigh contrary declarations. Heart K argues that the court
should weigh whether the evidence is "clear and convincing." Weighing evidence or testing
credibility of witnesses is impermissible on a motion for summary judgment. For summary
judgment, the court must find that that there are no disputed issue of material facts and that
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only legal issues remain. The court must also grant all reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the facts to the Plaintiffs. When the Court applies the proper standard here, the court cannot
grant summary judgment.
The following table shows some of the material facts that are disputed:
Name
Raymond Jayo

Testimony
Disputed Testimony
Used King Lane to access
Plaintiffs properties for over 5
years

Denise Colette

School children do not use
King Lane

John Fuquay

Children used King Lane to
get to school
Her children used King Lane
to get to school

Rose King
Susie Low

King Lane has always been
gated

John Fuquay
Gilbert King

King Lane was never gated
until the last few years
Fuquay' s use of King Lane has
been permissive

John Fuquay
Gilbert King

Use of King Lane has always
been without permission
Fuquays have no right to use
King Lane

John Fuquay

Scott Snyder

Fuquays have always used
King
Lane
have
and
prescriptive rights
Fuquays said they
refuse to close gates

would

John Fuquay
Seth Thomas

Fuquays did not close gates
over the road
Graze cattle on adjacent land
and need gates closed

John Fuquay
Shawn Drew

Cattle are only occasionally
grazed in the area
Gates prevented him from
delivering
to
Fuquay
residences

John Fuquay
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the gates were locked at the
inception of this litigation
John Fuquay

Plaintiffs began using King
Lane in 1977

Rose King
John Fuquay

Fuquay did not start to use
King Lane in 1977
Fuquay family and guests used
King Lane since 1977

Rose King

John Fuquay

Fuquay family and guests
always used Castle Lane but
not King Lane
James Fuquay used King Lane
for access for large semi trucks
and cattle trucks since 1977.

Rose King

John Fuquay

Fuquays did not use King
Lane for large trucks until
2011
Operated
Fuquay
John
trucking company and used
King Lane regularly for trucks

Rose King

Fuquays did not use King
Lane for large trucks for
business until 2011
Fuquays could not use King
Lane prior to 1988-89 when
they replaced the culvert.

Rose King

Samuel Steiner
John Fuquay

Fuquays used King Lane for a
short cut.
Used King Lane on a neardaily basis for residential
purposes

Rose King
John Fuquay

Fuquays did not use King
Lane for residential purposes
Used King Lane without
permission from Steiners

Samuel Steiner
Samuel Steiner

Steiners did not object to
anyone using King Lane
Zane Block and Jim Fuquay
did work on King Lane

Rose King
Rose King

Fuquays
have
maintained King Lane

never

"I

have
reviewed
the
Declaration of John Fuquay **This statement alone shows
dated October 28, 2014. The that there is a disputed issue
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statements set forth by Mr. of fact
Fuquay in his declaration are
inaccurate ... "
Rose King

Between 1979-1982 King Lane
was impassable 90% of the
time

John Fuquay

Used King Lane since 1977.
The Fuquays have always
respected the gates

Rose King
Rose King
Rose King

The Fuquays have refused to
close the gates
The Fuquays have damaged
the roadway

In short, it is clear that there are disputed issues of material fact in this case and summary
judgment cannot be granted. As the Lows argued in their objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment in November 2014:
"There are numerous material issues of fact .... More specifically, Plaintiffs' motion is
based primarily upon the allegations or statements contained in the affidavit of John
Fuquay concerning use of the road. However, these allegations are unequivocally
rebutted by Rose King, Samuel Steiner, Plaintiffs' own testimony and others that there
has not been regular, continuous or adverse use of the road by Plaintiffs."
The Lows then went on to argue why there are disputed issues of fact that precluded
Plaintiffs' motion for summary Judgment. Those arguments are just as sound now as they
were then. Plaintiffs recognized that summary judgment could not be granted and chose to
withdraw the motion rather than waste everyone's time at a hearing. Those same disputed
facts still preclude summary judgment for Heart K Ranch.
B. Heart K Asks the Court to Determine "Reasonableness" - which is a Fact Issue

Heart K has asked the court to rule that Plaintiffs use of King Lane "did not rise to the
level reasonably expected to provide notice of the adverse use." The obvious problem is that

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO HEART K MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7

FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 - 6™ A VENUE, SUITE 620
SEAITLE, WA 98101

(206) 223-4525

317

what is "reasonable" is a fact issue, not a legal issue. The court cannot look at disputed
evidence on affidavits and make a determination of what was reasonable or what was not
reasonable. Those are clearly issues of fact that must be deferred to trial.
Heart K argues that the affidavits of Rose King and Gilbert King show that Plaintiffs did
not adequately use King Lane prior to 2011 and that the use was permissive. Again, Heart K
ignores the disputed issues of fact. John Fuquay has testified that he is the owner of a trucking
company, that his father also owned a trucking company, and that they used King Lane for
trucks since 1977. Fuquays deny that they ever had permission to use the roadway. The
evidence is obviously disputed.
Finally, it appears that Heart K believes that adverse use must mean that Fuquays
intentionally interfered with the defendants' use of the roadway - that somehow Fuquays
must have tried to prevent the defendants from using the roadway. That is not the meaning of
adverse and hostile for prescriptive easement claims. The nature of the use is adverse if "it
runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property." Hodgins. 139 Idaho at 2~1, 76
P.3d at 975. No legal standard requires a prescriptive right claimant to force the servient
owner off of the property.
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December 2014, Plaintiffs withdrew their Motion and canceled the hearing because it was
obvious from the declarations filed with the court that there were disputed issues of material
fact that would require the Court to deny Plaintiffs' motion.
Heart K Ranch has now filed its own motion for Summary Judgment, notwithstanding that
Rose King's testimony created the disputed issues of fact in the first place. None of the facts
have changed, and the disputed testimony before the Court requires the Court to deny any
party's motion for summary judgment.

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all facts and inferences from the
record in favor of the non-moving party and the moving party has the burden of proving the
absence of genuine issues of material fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d
165, 168 (1997).

Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach

differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian
Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,718,918 P.2d 583,587 (1996).
B. Prescriptive Easement

A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription "must prove by
clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open
and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4)
with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the
statutory period." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003).
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Once the claimant presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began, he
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Wood v. Hoglund.
131 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair. 130 Idaho 675,680,
946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to
show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement.
Wood 131 Idaho at 703, 963 P.2d at 386; Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. The
nature of the use is adverse if"it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property."
Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 975. The state of mind of the users of the alleged
easement is not controlling; the focus is on the nature of their use. Id. at 231-32, 76 P.3d at
975-76. Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293,303, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005).

III.

DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT

A. Testimony Before the Court

There are numerous declarations and affidavits before the Court.

For the court's

convenience, they are compiled and submitted with this response. They include:
•

Declaration of Raymond Jayo dated August 27, 2014

•

Declaration of John Fuquay dated August 27, 2014

•

Affidavit of Rose King dated September 9, 2014

•

Affidavit of Susie Low dated September 15, 2014

•

Affidavit of Gilbert King dated September 8, 2014

•

Declaration of Denise Collett dated September 9, 2014

•

Declaration of Scott Snyder dated September 17, 2014
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•

Declaration of Seth Thomas dated September 16, 2014

•

Declaration of Schwann Delivery Person dated September 12, 2014

•

Declaration of John Fuquay dated October_, 2014

•

Affidavit of Rose King dated December 4, 2014

•

Affidavit of Samuel Steiner dated November 10, 2014

•

Affidavit of Ron Rainey dated January 29, 2015

•

Affidavit of Rose King dated January_, 2015 (unsigned)

•

Affidavit of Gilbert King dated January_ 2015

In addition to the testimony, there are numerous exhibits and public records for the court
to consider.

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. Disputed Facts Preclude Summary Judgment
In order for this court to grant Heart K Ranch summary judgment, the Court would have
to review all of the declarations and affidavits on record and made a determination that there
are no disputed facts and that Heart K Ranch will prevail as a matter of law. That ruling is
impossible in this case. As the testimony shows, historical use of the roadway is not only
disputed, it is hotly disputed.
Heart K Ranch invites the court to weigh the testimony and find that Rose King and
Gilbert King's declarations outweigh contrary declarations. Heart K argues that the court
should weigh whether the evidence is "clear and convincing." Weighing evidence or testing
credibility of witnesses is impermissible on a motion for summary judgment. For summary
judgment, the court must find that that there are no disputed issue of material facts and that
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only legal issues remain. The court must also grant all reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the facts to the Plaintiffs. When the Court applies the proper standard here, the court cannot
grant summary judgment.
The following table shows some of the material facts that are disputed:
Name
Raymond Jayo

Disputed Testimony
Testimony
Used King Lane to access
Plaintiffs properties for over 5
years

Denise Colette

School children do not use
King Lane
Children used King Lane to
get to school
Her children used King Lane
to get to school

John Fuquay
Rose King
Susie Low

King Lane has always been
gated
King Lane was never gated
until the last few years

John Fuquay
Gilbert King

Fuquay's use of King Lane has
been permissive
Use of King Lane has always
been without permission

John Fuquay
Gilbert King

Fuquays have no right to use
King Lane

John Fuquay

Scott Snyder

Fuquays have always used
King
Lane
and
have
prescriptive rights
Fuquays said they
refuse to close gates

would

John Fuquay
Seth Thomas

Fuquays did not close gates
over the road
Graze cattle on adjacent land
and need gates closed

John Fuquay
Shawn Drew

Cattle are only occasionally
grazed in the area
Gates prevented him from
delivering
Fuquay
to
residences

John Fuquay
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the gates were locked at the
inception of this litigation
John Fuquay

Plaintiffs began usmg King
Lane in 1977

Rose King
John Fuquay

Fuquay did not start to use
King Lane in 1977
Fuquay family and guests used
King Lane since 1977
Fuquay family and guests
always used Castle Lane but
not King Lane

Rose King

John Fuquay

James Fuquay used King Lane
for access for large semi trucks
and cattle trucks since 1977.

Rose King

John Fuquay

Fuquays did not use King
Lane for large trucks until
2011
Operated
John
Fuquay
trucking company and used
King Lane regularly for trucks

Rose King

Rose King

Samuel Steiner
John Fuquay

a

Fuquays used King Lane for
short cut.
Used King Lane on a neardaily basis for residential
purposes

Rose King
John Fuquay

Fuquays did not use King
Lane for residential pll!])oses
Used King Lane without
permission from Steiners

Samuel Steiner
Samuel Steiner

Steiners did not object to
anyone using King Lane
Zane Block and Jim Fuquay
did work on King Lane

Rose King
Rose King

Fuquays did not use King
Lane for large trucks for
business until 2011
Fuquays could not use King
Lane prior to 1988-89 when
they replaced the culvert.

Fuquays
have
maintained King Lane

never

have
reviewed
the
Declaration of John Fuquay **This statement alone shows
dated October 28, 2014. The that there is a disputed issue

"I
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statements set forth by Mr. of fact
Fuquay in his declaration are
inaccurate ... "
Rose King

Between 1979-1982 King Lane
was impassable 90% of the
time

John Fuquay
Rose King

Rose King
Rose King

Used King Lane since 1977.
The Fuquays have always
respected the gates
The Fuquays have refused to
close the gates
The Fuquays have damaged
the roadway

In short, it is clear that there are disputed issues of material fact in this case and summary
judgment cannot be granted. As the Lows argued in their objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment in November 2014:
"There are numerous material issues of fact .... More specifically, Plaintiffs' motion is
based primarily upon the allegations or statements contained in the affidavit of John
Fuquay concerning use of the road. However, these allegations are unequivocally
rebutted by Rose King, Samuel Steiner, Plaintiffs' own testimony and others that there
has not been regular, continuous or adverse use of the road by Plaintiffs."
The Lows then went on to argue why there are disputed issues of fact that precluded
Plaintiffs' motion for summary Judgment. Those arguments are just as sound now as they
were then. Plaintiffs recognized that summary judgment could not be granted and chose to
withdraw the motion rather than waste everyone's time at a hearing. Those same disputed
facts still preclude summary judgment for Heart K Ranch.
B. Heart K Asks the Court to Determine "Reasonableness" - which is a Fact Issue

Heart K has asked the court to rule that Plaintiffs use of King Lane "did not rise to the
level reasonably expected to provide notice of the adverse use." The obvious problem is that
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what is "reasonable" is a fact issue, not a legal issue. The court cannot look at disputed
evidence on affidavits and make a determination of what was reasonable or what was not
reasonable. Those are clearly issues of fact that must be deferred to trial.
Heart K argues that the affidavits of Rose King and Gilbert King show that Plaintiffs did
not adequately use King Lane prior to 2011 and that the use was permissive. Again, Heart K
ignores the disputed issues of fact. John Fuquay has testified that he is the owner of a trucking
company, that his father also owned a trucking company, and that they used King Lane for
trucks since 1977. Fuquays deny that they ever had permission to use the roadway. The
evidence is obviously disputed.
Finally, it appears that Heart K believes that adverse use must mean that Fuquays
intentionally interfered with the defendants' use of the roadway - that somehow Fuquays
must have tried to prevent the defendants from using the roadway. That is not the meaning of
adverse and hostile for prescriptive easement claims. The nature of the use is adverse if "it
runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property." Hodgins. 139 Idaho at 2~1, 76
P.3d at 975. No legal standard requires a prescriptive right claimant to force the servient
owner off of the property.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Very simply, the court cannot grant summary judgment for any party in this case. The
parties have submitted enough disputed testimony that it is impossible for this case to be
decided without a trial. The court must deny Heart K's motion.

Dated: February 12, 2015

Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment and the supporting Declarations of Matthew Cleverley and John Fuquay
on the following individuals in the manner indicated:
Ronald P. Rainey
Attorney at Law
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, ID 83606
208-459-3659
erainey@gwestoffice.net
Attorney for Kings
S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W, River Street, Suite 110
Boise, ID 83707
208-629-7447
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com
Attorney for Lows

DI U.S.MAIL
I
DI LEGAL MESSENGER

I

001 EMAIL
DI HAND DELIVERED
EXPRESS DELIVERY
DI FACSIMILE

001

Dlu.s.MAIL
I
DI LEGAL MESSENGER I
EMAIL
DI HAND DELIVERED
EXPRESS DELIVERY
DI FACSIMILE

001

I
I
I
I
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Dated: February 12, 2015
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_Fl.~~-M.
FEB 1j 2015

Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200-6111 Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. CV-14-0278
COMPILATION OF TESTIMONY

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
The attached declarations and affidavits have been previously submitted to the comt. This

compilation is for the Court's and parties' convenience.

Dated: February 12, 2015
418
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Plaintifrs Motion for
Summary Judgment and the supporting Declarations of Matthew Cleverley and John Fuquay
on the following individuals in the manner indicated:
Ronald P. Rainey
Attorney at Law
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, ID 83606
208-459-3659
erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorney for Kings

S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W, River Street, Suite 110
Boise, ID 83707
208-629-7447
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com
Attorney for Lows

DI U.S.MAIL
DI LEGAL MESSENGER
IX:11 EMAIL
DI HAND DELIVERED

[K]I EXPRESS DELIVERY

DI FACSIMILE
DI U.S.MAIL
DI LEGAL MESSENGER
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DI HAND DELIVERED

[K)I EXPRESS DELIVERY
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I

Dated: February 12, 2015
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 - 61h Avenue, Suite 620

Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,

v.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON 0. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No. CV-14-0278
DECLARATION OF RAYMOND JAYO
IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE MOTION
FOR TEMORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER

Defendants.

Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state ofldaho, the undersigned declares:
1. I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in this action and am not

involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and
could testify to them in a court proceeding.

2. I am a friend ofthe Plaintiffs and have used King Lane to get to Plaintiffs houses for more
than 5 years.
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3. On or Around August 21, 2014, someone installed a gate across King Lane. Prior to the
installation of this gate, there had never been any obstruction of the roadway or any

prohibition of access.
4. On or around August 22, 2014, I attempted to cross the gated roadway to get to John
Fuquay's house. Rose King confronted me and told me I was not allowed to use King
Lane to get to the Fuquay's house.

I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY OF PERJURY.
Dated: August 27, 2014
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Matthew R. Clevel'iey, ISB #5418
Fid_elity National Law Oroup
1200-61h Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Clevedey@ftif.com
Attorney fot· Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICTCOURT OF Tl-IE-STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSEFOQUAY,
Plaintiffs;

v.

Case.No. CV-14-0278
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY IN
SUPPORT OF EX PARTB MOTION FOR
TBMORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

SUSlE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMEIUCAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

Under penalty ofpetji1ry 1mde1'theJaws of the state of Oregon:, the undersigned declares:
Pronel'tics nud Parties

1. I atn OJ1e of the Plaintiffs in this action. I am Sl1bit1itting this de.claration in suppol't of
Plaintiffs' Motion for 't¢mporai·y Restrainh1g. Order (the 'iMotion't) preventing a11y o.f the
.

.

.

Defendants from blockiqgacces;:;to our prope1ty ove1··King-Lane.
2. A stt·eet ntap-shoWil'lg the geneta_l location of the area is anached as E~hibit "A'' to the
MQtion. A1t aedal tnap showing the Owyhee County Assess.or~s- lot boundaries is attached
as Exhibit "B" to the Motion. A Google Bai-th map showing an aedal view and gei1eral

COMPLAINT...., 1
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road batmdal'ies and identities of the affected parcel owners is attached as Exhibit "C" to
the Motion.
3. Clhtto11 Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuqµ~y own the pat·cel (the 11Clinto11 Fuquay
Parcel'') at the west end of King Lane. It was once palt of the Jolm Fhquay Pai'cel, The
legal description fc>1'· the Cli11ton F11q\1ay Patcel is shown ot1 the war1'ft1tty deed attached as
Exhibit 11D1• to the Motion.
4. l own the pai'cel (the ''John Fuquay Pat"cef,t) which is located south. of the Clinton: Fuquay
Pa1·cel. The legal descl'iption foi' the John Fuquay Patee! is shown on the Trustee's Deed
dated October 13, 1989 attached as Exhibit "En to the Motion (less the CJinton F11quay

Parcel).

5. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the CILow P~l'cel l '..) located.south of King Lane.
There are two parcels whlch we1·e conveyed by the same deed. The legal description fOl'
the Low Pal'cel 1 is shown on the Special Wan'anty Deed attached as Exhibit 11 F,, to tile

Motion.
6. Avco Financial Sel'vices ofldaho Falls, Ille. may claitn.sometight, title or interest in the

Low Patcel 1 by vh1t1e of El Real Estate Mortgage in Ure amount <>f $68,000 wllich was
i-ecorded on or around March 18, 1996 as Owyhee cotmty records no. 218373. The
Mo1'tgage was executed by Samuel V.C. Steine1· and Ma1;y J. Steiner, htisband and wife

and enc1uhbers Low Parcel l. It is possible that tl1is inortgl\ge wa$ p&id but was never
released. A copy of the Mortgage is attached as Exhibit 11 0'' to the Motfoil.

COMPLAINT- 2
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7. Susie Low ai1d Cal Low own the parcel (the ''LowParcel 2")located sQuth of King Lane.

01-eana Loop Road, ctos~es the no11hwest come1• of Low Parcel 2. The legal descl'iption
for the. Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed .attached as Exhibit "W' to
the Motion,

8. The HeartX Ranch Trust UTA December:28, 2012 owns the pat'Cel to the 1101·th of King
Lar1e (the "Heart K Ranch Pat-eel''). The legal description got the Heaet-KRanch Pa1·cel is

shown on the Gift Deed attached as Exhibit c'l" to the Motion.
9. .Got'don G. Kitig and Rose M. King may claim some right, title or interest in the Henrt K.

Ranch Pal'Cel by virtue of a Peed of Trn&thl the amou11t of$86,500 in favor of One West
Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as Owyhee County reool'ds no. 248616 and
encumbered the Heal't K Ranoh Patcel. A copy of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit
"J.

11

The deed oftmst was assig1,ed to Gotdon 0. King a.11d Rose M. Khtg on Septem~i'

12,. 2005. A copy of the Assignment of Deed of Trust is attached as Exhibit ''K., to the

Motion.
10. Fh·st American Title Insurance Company may olaitn s!'.>me dght, title or interest in the
Heart K. Ranch Parcel by virtue -of being named as the. trnstee under a Deed of Tmst in the

amount of $86,500 in favor .of 0•1e West Ba11k which was re_cotded on foly 28, 2Q04 as
Owyhee County recol'ds no. 2486l6 ·and encunibered the He.a1t K Ranch Parcel. A copy

of the deed of b:ust is attached as Exhibit ''Jif to the Motto:n.

FACTUAL.ALLEGATIONS
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11. The properties at issue in this Con1plait1t ~re looate.d ln Owyhee. Coumy, Idaho. They cu·e
located appl'oximately thl'ee miles east of Oreana a1ul are south of Highway 78. The
closest public roadway to ttie propedies is Oi'eana Loop Road.

12. Oreatm toop l.'oad t·m1s h1c a geue~ally,west dln~ction.f1'0J11 Highway 78 to a point ttear a
'location where Low Parcels 1 and 2 and the Heart K Ranch Parcels intersect. Near that

location, Oi'eana Loop Road tuttis and continues in a so,1thwestel'ly dlt'ection through Low
Parcel 1.
13. Kh1g Lane is a private roadway that conthtues westedy from whei·e: Oreana Loop Road
turns sO\!lbwest Orea1ia Loop Road and provides the access to the Clit1t F\1quay Parcel and

tbe,Jolm Fuquay Pal'ceJ.

14. The Plai11tiffs have used :King.Lane to access. the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the Johrt Fuquay
Putcelsince at least 1989.
15. King Lane has been an unobstn1cted t'Oadway µsed by Plah1tiffs and the general public

sh,ce at least 1989.
Blockage o·f King Laue by.Defend Ants
16. On

01·

Around August 21, 201-4, on~ or .alt of the Oefen~auts installed gates actoss King

La1ie to p1-eventus fro1n accessing King Lane to oti1· properties. One gate was fostalied at

the northeast co1·ner of the CUntoti Ft1qJ1ij)' Parcel and a ~·econd gate was installed ne.ar the
intersection of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.

17. Pictili'.es of the gated area al'e attached as Exhibit."K'; to the Motion.

COMPLAINT-4
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18. On or around August 22,.2014, n frl~nd of ours, Raymond Jnyco, attempted to

cross- lhe

gate<l roa<lwuy to get to. om· house:. Roso I<lng confronted the friend and told hlni he. wa$
110t allowed to ilSe Kitig Lane to ac'Cess om· properly.

19. We are in irnmediate need of access to their properties ove1· King l~ne,
20. The gate.If interfere with normal delivery services used by Plaintlfts s\1Qh as Fedoml
Express, UPS a11d ScbwaM.1s.

21. The gates interforo witlt PhdnUffs' .access to e111ergem~y services such.as pollce, fire and

tunb\llance services;
22. Defendants' instnllatlon. of the gale aoro.ss Kfog Laite was done ·a.Oer thi$. lawsuit was
filed, and we were not consulted p1•ior to the i,1stnllntion Qf the gate. No11e of the
Defend1mtswiil be harmed or damaged by allowing usto continue the same uninterrupted

access over K.Jng 1$e that we Juwe itsed fur 25 yea.,s. TherefQre; we should not

be

requii'edlo post a: bond fin the issua11ce of the temporary llesh·alningOrdet.
£.HEREBY DECLARE:THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE:BEST OF
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND TH.A.TI Ul'IQERSTAND IT IS MAPE FOR USE
AS EVIDENCE TN COURT AND IS SUBIBCT TO PENALTY OF PE
Y.

Dated-: August271 2014
Jolin FuqUaY, ·

COMPLAlNT- 5
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RONALD P. RAINEY ISB-#1022

Attorney at Law
P;O; Bo~ 26

110 Notth Ninth Stre_et
Cnldwell, IdahQ 83606~0026
Phone (208)459-:3659
Facl!imiJe Transmission No:459-9067
Attotney fol· Defendants

Gilbert. King as Trustee for the
Heart K Eanch Ti'u&t UTA December 28, 2012.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT Of THE THUID JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN ANb FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN B. FUQUAY; CLINTON WA~D, .)
FUQUAY ai1d HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)
Phihltiffs,
)

J
VS;

)

SUSIE LOW; .CAL LOW; HEART K

)
)

RANCH TRUST UTA ·DECEMBER 28,

)

Case No. CV;.;2014-0278
AFFlDAVIT OF ROSE KING

2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )

IDAHO FALLS, iNC.; GORDON G.. KING)
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)

ROSE NI. I{INO; flIRST AMERICAN
Defendants.

)
)

)

GILBERT KING, as Trnstee; and
ROSE M. l<ING, as Beneficiary of the
HEART K

RANCH TRUST UTA

DECEMBER 28, 2012,

)
~-

)
)
)

Counterclahnants.,

)
)

VS,

)

JOHN E. FUQUAY: CLlNTON WARD

)

)

AFFIDAVIT OF ROSEI{ING -1
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FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY )
)
Countel'defendnnts.
.)

______________

.)
,)

STATE OF IDAHO

)

Coumy of Owyhe¢

) ss:
)

Rose King, being first duly sworn 0~1 oath, depo.ses a11d slate$ as follows:

1..

I am one of theclefendants\counterclnimants iu the above...:ent.itled m1tttet'1 I. am ovet"

the age of majorityr and I make this Affidavit based upon facts wJthin my own personal

knowledge.
2.

My deceased husband, Gordon. King. and I put"ohased our ranch which included

King Lane on September 17, 197_3. At th~ tJn.1e of11ui'chase, Kil1g Ln1\e was

olily a path through

grass and weeds. My husband and I constructed what is now Ring Lane, an all welllher road.

We use this l'oad several times a day in our fai11ily and ranching operation,
'

I Ia.ter 1tained this road King Lnne.
3.

Attached to this ~ffidavit. are Ji'ue aM. cottectcd_pies of photographs that t tece11tly

took of the ilrea in question concerning King Lanei Castle Lanei the gates on King Lane. and the
current location of the school bus stop, whe1'e children who attend the local school are picked up
an,d dt·opped off. E.ach individual photo is captioned as to what it reveals

DATED '!'his: 9th day of September, 2014.

Rose King

AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KINO -2
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'

"
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE M_§._a-Net-a · Public in and fo1· said State,
../·'
.

this 9th day of September, 2014.

//

· otai'y Public for Idaho
Residing l\t: CaldweU, Idnho
My Com1nisslon Expii'es: 12118/2018 _,,,
C!ERTIFICATR OF SERVICE

q

I1 Ronnld P; Rainey, hereby ce1tify that on this
day of September, 2014, I
caused a ttue and col'l'ect .copy .of tlte foregoing .inslrnme~Iivered to the adverse parLy,
via the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
_x__u.s. Mall, Postage Pi·ep(l'id _Facsimile Transmission _Hand Delivery

Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 .6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone: 206~224-6003
Facsimile:· *77-655--5281
Binail: Matthew,Cleyerly@fnf.com
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Vi¢wt,fthe East Gate toKingLane.
Looking to .the West

Vi~w of the East Gate ·to King Lim:e
Looklng to tJ1e W~st

340

Cm·rent West Gate. to King ·Lane :Being -Constructed·
Lookingto 1he West

Arel\ ofthe Ciutelit West Oate to King Lane Before Construction
Which Indicate!Hhe Location of'the Fo1·me1"Wfre Gate

341

View ofCastleLarte

All Weather Sul'face-.Road
iookingto·the Nol'th fi'oin it$
lnterseotiori. with Oi'.eana
Loop Road

View t1f Castle Lane
· All We~ther Sui'face Road
Lookin,g to the Notth

342

Entry to Castle Lane All-Weathe1· Smface Road from the Oreana Loop Road
L6okh1g:to the North

Mail 'Boxes at the Intersection of the Oreana.Loop Road an:d Castle Lane School 13-us· Stop
Looking to the South

343

View of the Castle Lane An..weatherSurface Road
Looking to the North

View ofthe Castle La11.e All..;Weather Surface Road
Looking loJhe.North
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S. BRYCE FARRIS
[Idaho State Bar No. 56361

SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Golden Eagle Building
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110
P. 0. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 629-7447
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY;

Case No. CV-2014-0278

Plaintiffs,
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSIE LOW

vs.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G,
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY;
Defendants,
STATE OF IDAHO )
County

or!}/,._

~ ss.

Susie Low being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says that:
1.

I am over the age of 18 and I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge

and I am competent to testify to the matters contained herein.
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSIE LOW - 1
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2.

I have lived at 21101 Oreana Loop Road in Murphy, Idaho since September of2005

and I am familiar with the roadway located on or between the property currently owned by Heart
K Ranch Trust and the property currently owned by myself and my husband which as been
referenced in this matter as "Kings Lane."
3.

Since I have lived there, and during my observations of the roadway referenced as

"Kings Lane" there has always been a minimum of two gates across the roadway which have been
closed to prevent livestock from roamin_g onto and off of the property owned by Heart K Ranch
Trust. Any person attempting to utilize the madway has had to stop, open and close the gates.

Dn-A.TED.·t11·ts·

/t#"d·"ay;
•. 0··r·~~Ab>",
L,. I!.'-• ./ - 2014 .

Susie Low
Sworn to and subscribed befure me this
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Flotruy Public. for Idaho
Residing in~,.V~, Idaho
My Commission Expires:
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CERTIFICATE_OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the
following on this ./Jday of September, 2014 by the following method:

MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 - 61h Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone; (206) 224-6003
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

f.!J

RONALD P. RAINEY
RONALD P. RAINING PA
110 N. 91h Ave.
P0Box26
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026
Telephone: (208) 459-3659
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and Rose

[Kl U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid

LJ
LJ
LJ
LJ

W

LJ

LJ
LJ
LJ

LkJ

U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid
U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
Federa] Express
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
Federal Express
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

King

S. Bryce Farris
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RONALD P. RAINEY - !SB# 1022
Attorneys at Law
l lo North Ninth Avenue

Post Office _Box 26
Caldwell; Idaho 83606-0026
Telephonei (208) 459-3659
Facsimile:
(208) 459-9067 01· 459-6'147
Attoi'hey for Defendants
Gilbel't King 11s Tmstee for the
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA.December 28, 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE S'I'NfE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD

)
FUQUAY aiid HAILEY 'ROSE.FUQUAY, )
)
i>foin,tiff's,
)

CASE NO. CV2014-0278

}

vs.

)

AF.FIDA,VIT OF GJLllERT KING

)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28>
)
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;)
ROSE M, KING; FIRST AMEIUCAN
)
TITLEINSURANCRCOMPANY,
)
)
Defendants.
)

GILBERT KING, as Trustee,-and
ROSE M. KING, as He1reflci11i'j of the

)
)
)

HEART.le RANCH TRUST OTA

)

DECEMBER 28, 2012,

)
)

Counterclaimant!J,

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF G!LBERT KING-PAGE 1
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vs.

)
)
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSEFUQUA Y )
)

Cotmterdefendants.
STATE OF1DAHO

)
)ss.

County of Canyon

)

j

GILBERT KlNG, being first dtlly sworn. upon o~th depose$ and says:

I am a patty in t_he above-eapti(;med-a(.}tion, over the age of111ajo1·ity~ com11ete11uo

1.

testify, and l make this affidavit upon personal ktlow)edge.

AUached f!S Exlitl)it A to this a,fftdavit is a true apd co1·rect copy ofa umng Map1• as

2.

obtalned 1md downloaded from the Intemet, whi¢hprovides an accut'ftte-repl'esentation ofthe Orean~
Loop Road.
3.

State Highway 78 is highli'ghted in yellow on Exhibit A with the Oreana Loop Road

itself highlighted irt green. King Lane is highlighted it1 ~ - and another access.from the Oreana

~oop RQad to King La11e that is known:as Castle LaneJs highlighted in blue. Although.1he size of
this map does not reveal the actual location of the co1mection, the Oreana Loop road connects with

State Blghway 78 at both en.ds of tha.t.looJ) ro~d.
Attached as Exhibit D to this affidayitls a true and co1tect copy of the smt1e "Bing

4.

Map" In a_ closer view~ which reveals t.he actual ntnn:es· of the roadways ht question, but this closer
view 1)0. longel' l'evea)s the location ·of St~tt hlghway 78 to the 1101th.

Attached as Exhi'blt C to this ·afflcfavit-i.s a true conect copy of art Owyhee CoJUJty

5.

reference

llUlP

which shows the same atea .with a fill overlay of sections, quarter sections, atid
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indications of townships and ranges.
6.

I have indicated the approximate location of the Fuquay Plaintiffs' prnpertles on

Exhibit B.

7.

As indicated on Exhibit B, the npproxima:te length of Kihg Lane is !-4 mile, wlieref\s

C.a.stle Lane has i\"length of appi'oxhnately 1 3./4 miles.

8.

As should. be apparent fr~m the· rilaps that have hc::en attach~d to this. a~davit. and

by the photogtaphs attached to Rose King's affidavit, and by the other declatations that have been
inade aod submitted by affected parties iii this action, the Fuquay Plaintiffs proper~ is neither
lat1dlooked, nol'dependent upon the use of King Lane in order to access their property, but instead

.is readily acc~ssible ior all purposes by the all. w.eatber Castle Lane road.
9.

The l1uqu!:ly·Pl_ainUffs have no legal right to compel the continued-use ofthepl'ivate

King Lane, which use has at ~11 times has been entirely permissive.
10.

ln the absence of any demonstrated necessity, 'Ol' any manifest adverse claiin, the

Fuquay Plaintiffs have no right to a11y·coiitinued \1Se of Kii1gLane.
11.

Because KingLane is an entirely pl'ivate roadway, as the owners of that roadway, the

l!eart l<.Ranch is entirely within its rights tcrplac~,gates across that ~ntries to tluJt l'Qadwayin Otdei·
to lbnit nn.(l rcstl'ictits l1~e tht oWrttws, their invjtees, and other.given e:xpress per111tssio11.

r2.

I have received nelthet wdttennor or~l notice from tbe.Plaintiff'sattomeyexplaining

whut tne nahwe and extent of-any "immediate and irrepat·able iajury; lossi or damage"· that will resglt.
to·ihe F1.1q11ay Plafotiffs ifa Temporary Restrninh1g Order(TRO) is not issued, without fir~t allowing
om· attorney to be heard in oppositio11 to th,e issuance of tha:trequested.order.

AFFIDAVI.i OFGILBERT KING ~PAGE 3
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Further affiant sayeth not,

. SUBSCIUBED AND SWORN to before me this ~eptember~ 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY Thaton this -Z_ day :of Septembel', 20 l 4,a true and co1·1-ec.t copy of
the fol'egoing document: was sel'ved upon tlie following:
Malfhew R. Clevel'ley
Fldelity National Law GROUP
1200 Gth Avem,e,.Sulte 620
Seattle, Washington 98101
Teletihone: 206-224-6003
Facsimile:
877-6'55-5281

rr
[ ]

[J
[ ]

U;S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Ovem ight Mail
.Facshnilc Transmission
Other - - - - - - - - -

Email: Matthew~Cleverly@tnfa:om
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RONALD P. RAINEY TSB 111022
Atturnuy nt Luw
P.O. Box 26
110 North Nlnlh Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Phone (208)459-3659
Fncsimlle 'l'rnnsmiluilon No:459-9067

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King aa Trustee for the
Hen.rt K. Ru.11ch Trust UTA December 28 1 2012
IN THE OlSTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS
THE STA'rB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TflE COUNTY OF

WYHBE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, )
FUQUAY lmd HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

VL

)

)

SUSIE LOW: CAL LOWi HBART K.
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, )
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SBRVICBS OF )

DECLARATION OF ENlCE ·
COLLE'IT IN SUPPO OPDEPENDANT S
1

OBJECTION TO PLA TIFFS' EX·PARTE
MOTION FOR TEM RARY
RESTRAlNINO ORD R

IDAHO FA.LLS, INC.; GORDON 0. KING )

RpSE M. J<CNG: FIRSr AMERICAN
TITLE lNSURANCE COMPANY)
Defendants,

GILBERT KIN0 1 t\6 Truetee; and

ROSB M. KINO, ae DenefioJ111·y oe the,
HBART K RANCH TRUST UTA

DECEMBER 28, 2012 1

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

)

Counterchtim11nt11 1

)
)

VS,

)

JOHN B. FUQUAY; CUNTON WARD

)

)

DECLARATlON OF DENICE COLLETI ·1

·"··-····--··-----'-----------359
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FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY )
)

Count~rdefendants.

)
)

---------·---->
Under pennhy of perjury u1,der the laws of the state of Jduho, the 1ode,·sig11ed declme.,:

1.

J am over the age of 18. I 11m not related to nny of the pnrties in t is action and inn not
Involved in the lltlgRtion. 1 h1we personul knowledge of the events

U1is declaration and

could testify to them in n court proceeding.
2.

I reside on Colletr Lnne, Or()11nn 1 Idnho "nd hnvu be~n
School DIAtrlot for

3.

bu11 drlv r for tho Grttndviow

II

a.3...Yoo1·s.

I stMt my bu11 route. at

my residence by driving down Collett l

nc to Oreana Loop,

driving west on Oreana Loop to the Fuquay mail box where I pick up

-:,1id~,ct7

_ ..i -_ _
44.....

Puquny 1 son of J.C. Fuqmty. 1 proceed west on Orellna Loop through

the vii Inge of Orennn up to the west end of Orennl\ Loop and High ny 78 east to tho enin

of Oreana Loop where I make another stop. J do not mnke a son ol bus stop at Kings
'
Lane. When
I return the children home, I reverse the route 011 Orea a Loop and Highway

78 dropping orr ~
on C~llett L."tnts.
~

Fuquay at the Fuquay mailbox and thes I go ro my residence

'L - .

~

'1~~ ; .

~

~

.],µ-'#IA,-

.. ~_/

r; (!.

·~ ,_.-,!~,
1-

,J-

~

CAMA..t

~

.

I CSRTIFY UNDBR PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO HE LAW OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TR.OE A.N CORRECT.
011te.d thla 'i' day of September. 2014.

DECLARATION 0.F·DBNlCE COLLETT •2
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE

I, Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certil'y that on this_ day o-f Sept 11bor1 2014, l caused
a Lrue and conect copy of the foregoing Instrument to be deliverer.I tu tl10 dverfie pnl't)', vin the
method Indicated below, addressed as follows:
_U.S. Mo.ii, Postage Prepnid
_Facsimile Transmission
Delivery

Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity Nntionul Luw Oroup
1200 Glh Avenue, Suite 020

Seattle, W11shlngwn 98101
TeJephone: 206·224-6003
Fllcsimllc: •77-6SS ..S281
Email: Mttttb~Yt,Clqverly@fnf,oom

Ronald P. Rainey 1

DECLARATION OP DENlCE COLLETT .3
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GIL 11.Nl)JO KING

p.,

1

u.
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ISl
ISl
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en
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1.11
I

E-

l!Qo:'ALD P. RAINF.t' JSB #l.m.2

A1*amey at Lr,.,
l'.O. BCD 26
llO Notlh Nilllh Streor
Ca1illR1J. lilaho 836'.J6-0026
l'bcl:lc (D)4S9-36S9
Jl"aaj]m~ '!iammissloa N o ~
Anorlle.]I b Ddi:lldatu
Gilbellt Kmg: as. 1i.ml£e :1br 1ml
Rem K. Rind! TlOlt UTA D=cc:caber 23, 21H2

JN 'lUE DISTIUCt COUR'[ OF n1E nmm .JUDIC.AI. J:llSTIUCI' OF

'IBB STAIB OP JD.ABO. IN Mm FOR. llfE COUN'IY rJe OWY.HBE
JOHNE FIIQllA.Y; CUNTON WAJtD. )
FUQUA:! aad l3AlLEY ROSE RJQUAY, )
)
~

)
'V'S.

)

)

SUSIE IDW; CAL LOW; HEAJrr K.
J
RANCH TROST VIA OECEMBEll 28. )
2012; A\ICO flMANClAL S!itVtCES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, JNC.; GORDON 0. KING )
RCI.SE M. KING; FIRST AMBR:ICAN
)
TITLE !NSlJllANCE COMPANY,
)
De&.lldmD.

)
)

I

~

l,Z.,

1.11

,qt

OLBli1T lrnJG. a., nm,u:; amt
ROOS M. KING. 11S J!lc::udicl.llZ)' CJ! tbc:
EEABTK RANCH TRUSf U!A.
DECEMBER 28, 2012,

en

M

Co~

,qt

M
~I

t,M

I

en

vs.
JOHN f.. 'fllJQUAY~ ctJNTON WARD

ISl

DECLA'.l'UITJON OP SCOTT SNYDER -1

Casi:: N11. CV-2'01+o27.8

)

}
)
}

)
)
)
}
)
)
)
)

:te::LARATION OF SCOTT SNrnER

.------~~----------
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01·20J4.(ll430

CIVO.

INCIDENT REPOR'f
Mi11demu11or:
la,ltlal NOC:
Ver NOC;
(.(ic11tlan1

D

lfl!l11nyr

O

Non Cthnlt11I:

1t111pork.'CI Da11!11lme

0512812()14
11 :44
14 TO S/2M014
Octnrrtd '1'11111:
1:A4:li1AM TO 11:44:&tAM
'Rpl By:
KtNG, ILBERT GENE

liV&NT 0938&
~lll()HIOR 01$PUTE
19100 KING LN

Occur"'d Date:

Cr0n St:

,.080

1{4

P11trlttl
Jlps;d 111:
Dbputch:

~

MURP

ALLEN, LUCILE MAY

llhunu l:
Phone 2:

Al.~~N. LUDt1.e MAY

Intldent OFficeri

Offlc1:rs (0/1 RoporU)

SNVOl!R. SCOlT

31

SNYDER.SCOTT

31

([I

Duerlptlon
NlilCJHDOR DISPUTE ON~OING OVER B0UN0ARVFl!.NCl!8.

t:uended lh,ulpUun

Incident Ntmu
•• I

R:i:PORT.ID PARTU.S

~

••
ln'11danl Name ltl'lt

KING, GlLBER't' GENE
DOD:

...

R11:411

MURPHY 10 ll3'ltiO

JYg&: Fain

Hom~
Wurk1
-lmriloycr:
Cumtnont:
. . . lit

e1
Oi:.N:

89)11

PC B0X9fl

WI--IITE

Wgll

D11tt; 0512912014

aon1tor1
MA~E
•H•lrt

Cell:

...

Bthm

NOT till&PANIC

.Eyes: -

P•11or:

OTDJl:RS fl .. II
lm:ldent Natue Ent

FUQOA.Y,JORN ltDMOND
DOI:
SSN:
1&007 CASTI.E LANI.

OA~NA ID 83650

Rare!
Hat:
Vas:
Pagur:

Hum11:
Work:
Esn11le1yer:

OAIUS

C11mmi,nt1

UTLITHila

Age: . . .
OLN:

Ge11Jer1
Wat:

Dau1: 0&128/2014

-

fMLE

lhlr:
Cell:

Elfin:

NOT HISPANIC
fQl

-

Jnel•hnt CIUIIC'IIU

Inuhhnt Arruu

EXHIBIT A.
367
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N,4.TURE OF COMPLAINT, Civil Dispute of Fences and Oates
On S/29/2014 l w11.s di11patched to Kins Lone, and 18907 Caatle Lan 0"1im~ Owyhee
County, Idaho for a neighbor dispute conoernlns feRQee un private property.
l fir&t made contact with John Edmund Fuquay at his roaidence, l 8S'I07 Cas e Lane. On the

way to John', residence, from the Klns's property, I h.-d paned through two fenoes with the
gate, oloiod. I also observed cattle in the area. 1 lllked John if he had any t e of easement for
the privale road that 11 routed from the Kina property to John's n:&ldence. J hn advised he doea
have easemen~ that oune from many years past. I advised John, the Kings a vised there was no
legal easement, but permission was given to Joh.n use the road at any time, a long Q9 if the gates
were closed, the~ needed to remain alosed due to tattle In the area.

I advised John oftdaho Code 3S·l 12 BstabHshment of gates ... , in which if any damages
°"urred to fences or gates, any claims made by the property owner, would o doubled In a court
of law. Jolut advised if any damages were to occur to any fence or gates, or o any cattle related
to an open sate. he would take full responslb[Uty. Iohn advised he was not oing 10 cJQsc nny
gates on the road 1n question, as he felt he had a right of way or cHemant. J hn also adviacd he
would not close any sates, because he didn't want his older relatives to h11vo to 41:russto with the
sate1 or step In cattle manure. Jahn ndvisad ht waa involved with multiple a torneye ooncernins

the property and easements.
I then left John's l'Osidcinc~, artd returned to the King nuddence, I made co tact with Gilbert
Gilbert of possible
sntea left open whlle Gilberts• cattle were in the area. I aleo advised Gilbert of Johns intentions
ofpoHibty oot elosii,g the ptea. Gilbert did have cows in the area that wo d be affected if
gatell were lefl: open.

Gene K.lng1 and advised Gilbert olmy disc:ussion with John, mainly to infor

SWt St1ydgr 2031 peso
Officer's Signature

PII

o)
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T-553 P002/005 F-718

.l\..l.J)I~ .l\Al::J."J.,Js; .I.\.Vll,.KAJ.,

RONALD P, RAINEY ISB #1022
Attome)' t\t L11w

P.O. Box 26
110 North N1nth Street
Caldwell, tdaho 83606-0026
Phone (208)459~3659
Pncslmlle Trnnsmiludon No:459-9067
Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King us Trustee. tor tile
Heart IC. Uanch Tru!lt UTA December 28. 2012
IN THB DISTRICT COURT OF TRE THIRD JUDICIAL DlS'.rRlCT OF

THB STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'l'Y OF OWYHBB
JOHN E. FUQUAY: CLINTON WARD, )
FUQUAY 11ml HAILEY ROSR :PUQUAY, )
)

Pl!l,intlffs,

)

vs.

Ciuie No. CV-2014-0278

)

DECLARATION OF SB'fH rrHOMAS

)

)

STJSTE LOW: CAT.. LOWi HEART K.
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, )
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OP )
IDAHO PALLS, INC.; GORDON 0. KTNO )
ROSE M. KlNOi FIRST AMERICAN
)
TlTLB JNSURANCIS COMPANY,
)

_________

)

Defendants.

))
)

OlLBERT KING, ae Ttuotee; cmd
n.os:s M. KlNO, ll8. Be1\efi"il4T)' or the
Il6AR.T K ll.ANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,

Coumc:rclaimuntt1,

vs.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

JOHN E. FUQUAY: CLINTON WARD

)

DECLARATlON OF SETH THOMAS .. 1
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VJ:QO

MW A.~~ A~~L~£

Av............._,

T-553 P003/005 F-718

FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY )
)

Counterdeferulants.

)
)

Under penulty of perjury under the
1.

hlWS

of the state of ldnho, the undersigned deolm'eli:

1 am ov"r the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in t:llis a.clion and am not
involved in the liligatton. I have personal knowledge of the evenrs in this declaration und

could te&ttfy to them in
2.

tl

court proceeding.

Please, sec the attllched E.xhibif "A" for my statement.

l C.&RTIFY UND'lm PENALTY OF PE.R.TURY PURSUAN'f TO-TJIE LAW OF THE

STATE OF 1DAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECf.
Dated this 16th day of September, 2(H4.

DECLARATLON OF SETH THOMAS -2
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CBRTIP[CATE OF SERVICE
J.1 Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certify that on this J gi°...,day of September, 2014, 1 cnu11ed
a true and correct copy of the foregoing tnstrument co beTelive1·ed to tho udver&e party, via the
method Indicated below, addressed as followi;:
_u.s. Mall 1 Pofit&1ge P1·epaid AFnc.,imlle Tn1nR111hudon _Hond Delive,·y

Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Luw Group
1200 6th Avent1e. Suite 620
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone: 206·224~csoo3
PacRlmile: 877-65,·5281
Email: Mnttbcw,Cle,verl~@fgf,wm
S, Bryvo Pur1la
P.O. Box 798S
J3oi$e, Idaho 83707
Tel(,phant.:: 629-7447
FacaimUe: 629-7559

Email: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com

DECLARATION OP SB'rH THOMAS -3
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.l:'.U.1
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,l,""".L..L..&..1.i.:a
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. . . -------"T . . -

T-553 P005/005 F-718

September 131 2.014

it> Whom It May concern:

Our winter range la adjac-ent to the property of Heart K Ranch Trust. we graze our
cattle there during the winter months. It It beneficial to us If all landowners that border
u, keep their getee closed. This helps to Insure cattle are •~cured on our property and

not out.

Thank you,
- - - ~~11'1~/,j
Seth Thomas

Oreana. ID 83650
208-834·2261
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RONALD P. RAINEY ISB #1022

Attomey at Law
P.O. Box26

110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 .
Phone (208)4S9-36S9

Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
ll:eart K. Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE TI-IlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHNE. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD.
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

vs.

)

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.

)
)

RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC. i GORDON G. KING
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,

)
)
)
)
)

______________
Defendants.

Case No. CV-2014--0278
DECLARATION OF SCHWANN
DELIVERY PERSON

)

)
)
)

GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and

)

ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,

)
)
)
)

Counterclaimants,

vs.

)
)

)
)

JOHNE. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD

)

DECLARATION OF SCHWANN DELIVERY PERSON ~1
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09-15- 1 14 11:36 FROM-

T-529 P003/003 F-684

FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY
Counterdefendants.

)
)

_______________

)
))

Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the undersigned declares:
1.

I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of tho parties in this action and am not

involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and
could testify to them in a court proceeding.

2.

I have been delivering Schwann products to people in the Oreana area for approximately
five years.

3.

I have delivered Schwann products to Jolm Fuquay and Clinton and Hailey Fuquay by
traveling up Oreana Loop Road then Castle Lane to their residences. The road was
completely passable allowing me to travel it all year round. I was prevented from using
this road when the gate was locked across Castle Road. I would still use Castle Road
to make deliveries if the locked gate was not there.

I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO TIIB LAW OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOlNG rs TRUE AND CORRECT.
Pated this lt1"1...day of September, 2014.

DECLARATION OF SCHWANN DELIVERY PERSON -2
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Matthew R. Clevel'ley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law G1·oup
1200- 6111 Avenue, Suite 620

Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. CV-14-0278
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants.
Under penalty of pe1jury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the undersigned declares:

1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this action. I have personal knowledge of the facts in this
declaration, and I am competent to testify at trial as to the matters herein.
2. I am submitting this declal'ation in supp01t of Plaintiffs' Motion for Pa1tial Sununary
Judgment against Defendant Lows.
3. Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuq\iay

Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once part of the John Fuquay Parcel before l

DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- I

FIDELrn' NA'UONAL LAW GllOUP

1200- 6"' AVF.Kur., Smn: 620
Sl!A'l"fl.l::, WA !18101

(206) 223.4515

375

sold it to CJinton and Hailey Fuquay. The legal description for the Clinton Ft.1quay Parcel
is shown 011 the war1·anty deed attached as Exhibit "D', to the Motion.
4. I also own the parcel (the "John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the Clinton
Fuquay Parcel.

The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the

Trustee's Deed dated October 13. 1989 attached as Exhibit "B,. to the Motion (less the
Clinton Fuquay Parcel).

5. I began living on the Joh11 Fuquay Parcel in January 1977 when it was purchased by my
father. I was about 12 years old when we first moved onto the John Fuquay Parcel. My
parents bought a mobile home and put on the property and we lived in that for years.
6. From January 1977 forward, my family continuously used King Lane for access to Oreana
Loop Road. My parents drove personal vehicles of all types ove1· King Lane. From the
· time I was 12, we also walked over King Lane to get to the bus stop at Oreana Loop Road
and to pick up mail from the mail box which is at the comer of King Lane and Oreana
Loop Road.
7. Our family's guests regularly and continuously used King Lane to access our house.
8. My father, James Fuquay, owned large semi-trucks and cattle trucks that he used in his
farming and ranching operations. He would regularly drive those trucks over King Lane
to and from Oreana Loop Road.
9. At about age 14, I began driving large trucks for my father. Those included cattle trucks
and semi trucks, I would drive them over King Lane to and from Oreana Loop Road.
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10. At about age 21, I obtained my Idaho chauffeul''s license which is the predecessol' to the
CDL license. It permitted me to drive commercial tmcks. I started dl'iving large trucks

commercially at that time and have done so ever since. · I cunently drive commercial
trucks under the assumed business name of Joh11 Fuquay Trucking.
11. Since 1977, I have continuously used King Lane to access both the John Fuquay Parcel
and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel.
12. I have always believed that I have the right to access the John Fuquay Parcel and the
Clinton Fuquay Parcel over King Lane and I have always acted in accordance with that
belief.
13. At its west end, King Lane connects to Castle Lane. Castle Lane continues south until it
reached Oreana Loop Road again. There are no othe1· pl'Operties that use King Lane for
access.
LOWPARCELl

14. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the nLow Parcel P') which is located south of
King Lane and east of the Clinton F1.1quay Parcel. Thel'e are two parcels which were
conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for the Low Parcel 1 is shown on the
Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F" to the Motion,
15. Prior to the Lows ownership of Low Parcel 1, my family openly and continuously used
King Lane to access the John Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for more than
5 years.
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16. Based on the public records. on January 17, 1973, Elme1· 0. Johnston and May M.

JoJmston conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Charles W. Steiner and Florence W. Steiner.
17. Based on the public 1-ecords. on Mal'ch 21, 1980, Charles W. Steinel' and Florence W.

Steiner wel'e divorced and Low Parcel 1 was awarded to Florence W. Steine1·.
18. Based on the public records, on Septembel' 20, 1987, Samuel Steiner, as personal

representative of Florence W. Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel Steiner.
19. Based on the public 1·ecords, on January 23, 1995, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane

Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner.
20. Based on the public records, on July 15, 2005, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner
conveyed Low Parcel I to :Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC.
21. Based on the public records, on January 27, 2006, ~ioneer Exchange Accommodation

Titleholder#69, LLC conveyed Low Parcell to the Lows.
22. From January 1, 1977 through Mal'ch 21, 1980, I never asked Charles W. Steiner and

FlOl'ence W. Steiner for permission to use King Lane. Charles W. Steiner and Florence
W. Steiner never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane.
23. From Janua1·y 1, 1977 through March 21, 1980, my family used King Lane fol' access to
the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of pul'poses:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily basis

for regular 1-esidential purposes such as gofog to and from the store, picking up mail
from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and from
personal errands.
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b. Regulal' use of King Lane for driving large semiwtrucks to and from the John Fuquay
Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his tmcks and
continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Tmcking Company.
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment from
one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop previously
located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e.

Use of King Laue by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
prope11ies.

24. From March 21, 1980 thl'Ough September 20, 1987, I never asked Florence W. Steine1· for
permission to use King Lane. Florence W. Steiner never gave my family, my guests or
me permission to use King Lane.
25. From March 21, 1980 through September 20, 1987, we used King Lane for access· to the
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the followjng types of purposes:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a neat·-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal errands.
b. Regula1· use of King Lane for driving large semi-tJ:Ucks to and from the John

Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trncks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.
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c. Regular fa1·m vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment
from one location to another.

d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and fi'om the bus stop
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
prope1ties.
26. From September 20, 1987 through January 23, 1995, I never asked Samuel V.C. Steinerand Mary Jane Steiner for permission to use King Lane. Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mal'y
Jane Steiner never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane.
27. From September 20, 1987 thl'o\lgh January 23, 1995, we used King Lane for access to the
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:
a. Regulat· personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a nem·Mdaily
basis for regulal' residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for dl'iving large semi-trncks to and from the John
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment
from one location to another.
d. Pedestl'ian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
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e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
pl'Operdes.
28. Fl'Om January 23, 1995 through July 15, 2005, I never asked Samuel V.C. Steinel' and
Mary Jane Steiner for pet'mission to use King Lane. Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane
Steine1· never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane.
29. From January 23, 1995 through July 15, 2005, we used King Lane fol' access to the
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and fl'om Oreana Loop Road on a neai·-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from pe1·sonal enands.
b. Regular. use of King Lane for driving large semi-tmcks to and from the John
Fuquay Pal'cel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
tmcks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trnoking Company.
c. Regulat· farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment

from one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
properties.
30. From July 2, 2005 through January 27, 2006, I never asked Pioneei· Exchange
Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC for permission to use King Lane.
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Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC never gave my family, my guests 01· me
permission to use King Lane.
31. From July 2, 2005 throqgh January 27, 2006, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay

Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:
a. Regular pe1·sonal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily

basis for regulal' residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal errands.
b. Regula1· use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and ·from the Jolm
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his

trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.
c. Regula1· farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment

from one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the cornet· of King Lane and Ol'eana Loop Road.
e.

Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays•
pl'operties.

32. From January 27, 2006 through the pl'esent I never asked the Lows for permission to use
King Lane. The Lows never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King
Lane.
33. From January 27, 2006 to the present, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay Parcel
and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the foJlowing types of purposes:
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a. Regulat· personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a neat·-daily
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking

up mail from the mail box, taking childt-en to and from the bus stop, going to and
from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving lat·ge semi-trnoks to and from the John

Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.
c. Regulai· farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving form equipment
from one location to another.
d. Pedestdan use of King Lane fo1· children to walk to and from the bus stop

previously located at the come!' of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fnquays'

prope1ties.

LOWPARCEL2
34. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2'') located south of King Lane.

Oreana Loop Road c1·osses the northwest corneJ' of Low Parcel 2. The legal description
for the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Wall"anty Deed attached as Exhibit ..H,, to
the Motion.
35. Prior to the Lows ownership of Low Parcel 2, my family openly and continuously used
King Lane to access the John Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for more than
5 years.
36. From the pubfic 1·ecords, on May 6, 1942, D. Fred Henderson acquired Low Parcel 2.
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37. From the public records, between May 6, 1942 and March 18, 1997, the Low Parcel 2 was
owned by D. Fred Henderson, individually.
38. From the public records, on March 18, 1997 D. F1·ed Henderson conveyed the Low Parcel
2 to D. Fred Henderson and Mary F. Henderson as husband and wife.
39. From the public records, on February 11, 2000, Mary F. Henderson conveyed the Low
Parcel 2 to Mary F. Henderson, individually.
40. From the public records, on July 8, 2005, Mary Frances Henderson conveyed the Low
Parcel 2 to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC.
41. On Janua1·y 27, 2006, Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC conveyed
the Low Parcel 2 to the Lows.

42. Fl'Om January 1, 1977 through March 18, 1997, I never asked D. Fred Henderson for
permission to use King Lane. D. Fred Henderson never gave my family, my guests or me
permission to use King Lane.
43. From January l, 1977 through March 18, 1997, we used King Lane for access to the
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types ofpul'poses:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily
basis for 1·egular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking childt-en to and from the bus stop, going to and

from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John

Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his

trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.
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c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment
from one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop

previoi1sly located at the comer of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays•

properties.
44. Ft'Om March 18 1 1997 tlU'ough July 8, 2005, I never asked D. Fred Henderson or Mary F.
Henderson for permission to use King Lane. D. Fred Henderson or Mary F. Henderson
never gave my family, my guests or me pe1mission to use King Lane.
45. Fl'Om March 18, 1997 through July 8, 2005, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes:
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily
basis for regulai· residential pul'poses such as going to and from the store, plcking
1.1p mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and

from pe1·sonal errands.
b. Regula1· use of King Lane for driving large semi"trucks to and from the John
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company.
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane fo1· cattle trucks, moving farm equipment
from one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop

previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
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e. Use of King Ltme by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuq\.m.ys'
properties.
46. From July 2, 2005 through Januat·y 27, 2006, I never asked Pioneer Exchange
Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC for permission to use King Lane.

Pioneer

ExchangeAcco1nmodation Titleholder #69, LLC never gave my family, my guests or me
permission to use King Lane.
47. From July 2, 2005 tlll'ough January 27, 2006, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay

Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for 1he following types of purposes:

a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road

011

a near-daily

basis fot· regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and

from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi.trucks to and from the John
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his

trncks and continued when I began opel'ating the John Fuquay Tmcking Company.
c. Regulai· fal'm vehicle use of King Lnne for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment
from one location to another.
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to· walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop R~ad.

e. Use of ·King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays•
properties.
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48. From Januat·y 27, 2006 through the present I never asked the Lows for permission to use
King Lane. The Lows never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King
Lane.
49. From Januaty 27, 2006 to the present, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay Parcel

and the Clinton Fuquay Pat'Cel fat· the following types of purposes:
a. Regulal' personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily

·basis for regula1· residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and

from personal errands.
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trncks to and from the John
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucki11g Company.
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment
from one location to another.

d. Pedestl'ian use of King Lane fOl' children to walk to and from the bus stop
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road.
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays'
properties.

UTILITIES
50. The overhead electric lines that service the houses located

on the Clint Fuquay Parcel mn

from Oreana Loop Road along King Lane to the Clint Fuquay Pal'Cel.
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51. The undergro\md Centurylink telephone linos nm from Oreana Loop Road along King
Lane to the Clint Fuquay Parcel. It then runs south along Castle Lane to my house on the
John Fuquay Parcel.

52.

~:-~tric

lines for the house on tl1e John F~quay parcel run norlh through the

property to the soutll of the John Fuquay Parcel.

I HBREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELffiF, AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO ·PENALTY OF PERJURY.
Dated: O""ber~2014
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S. BRYCE FARRIS
(Idaho State Bar No. 5636)
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Golden Eagle Building
1101 W. River S,t., Ste. 110
P.O. Box 7985 .
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone (208)629 ..7447
Facsimile: (208)629-7559
E-mail: B1yce@sawtoothlaw.com
Attorney for Defendant,; Susie Low and Cal Low
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, )
FUQUAY and E.AILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)

Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV..2Q14-0278

)
)

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING

)
)

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, )
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING )
ROSE M. KING: FIRST AMERICAN
)
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)

Defendants.

)

STATE OF ID~O

)

County of Owy~ee

)

)ss.
Rose King being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and says that:
1.

I am a Defendant in the above-titled action, over the age of 18 and I make this

affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and I am competent to testify to the matters
contained herein. I have reviewed the Declaration of John Fuquay dated October 28, 2014. The
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statements set forth by Mr. Fuquay in his declaration are inaccurate for the reasons hereinafter
set fo11h:
2.

My deceased husband, Gordon King and I purchased our ranch on September 17,

1973 wllich included a field lane which has been referred to as "King Lane" in this litigation.

At the time of our purchase, King Lane was only a path through grass and weeds and was wet
and muddy most· of the year with a culvert constructed of 55 gallon barl'els at the west end. We
desired to access our fields through the use of this field lane, therefore, we started hauling rocks
to build a base for this road so that it would be passable for our farm equipment. We did this

aIUIUally until we decided to sell the ranch in 1982.
3.

My husband and I sold our ranch to Zane Block in 1982 but had to repossess it

in 1986. During this four year period I was still familiar with the use of King Lane as I

frequently observed the property and the operations of the ranch. After we repossessed the ranch,
the lane was in te1Tible condition and we had to construct and improve the road and the crossing
where the road crosses an il'rigation ditch which. provides water to our ranch.

There was a

culvert 1~ade from 55 gallon baU"els at the west end of the land and these were rusty and leaky.
We replaced the welded barrel culvert in 1988:.1989 with a concrete culve1t. Prior to that time
it was impossible for large trucks to cross over the welded banels. This lane still requires annual

maintenance to make it passable for our ranching operation.
4.

The path/road which has been referred to as "King Lane" was not named King

Lane until 2002 when emergency 911 came into existence and Gary Aman requested a name for
the lane to access of emergency vehicles. I informed him that the access would be named "King
1

Lane. '

At that time, addresses were provided for the four houses located on the King
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property/ranch with an address of King Lane. Mailing addresses for the four residences on the
King property/nmch then became King Lane. There was no detel'rnination that the path/road be
named King Lane would continue any further than the access to our residences. For purposes
of the rest of thi~ Affidavit I will refer to the roadway at issue as King Lane but this does not
alter my understanding that King Lane ends at the residences fo1· my rnnch.

5.

What has been referred to as King Lane for purposes of litigation has also been

used by Cal and Susie Low t who own the property generally to the south of the King

property/ranch and their predecessors in interest. When my husband and I purchased our ranch
in 1973, the property now owned by Lows was owned by the Steiner family, and the Steiners

used the road to access their property to get to and from their fields. This use has continued
since 1973 to present, including now that the property is owned by Cal and Susie Low.
6.

I am familiar with the property cuITently owned by John Fuquay and Clint and

Hailey Fuquay which is located generally to the south and west of the King :rancl1.
7.

My son, Greg King, rented the house which ls now occupied by J.C. Fuquay from

1979 to 1982. During said time my son worked for us and could not use King Lane on a regular
or frequent basis because the road was wet and impassible approximately ninety percent (90%)
of the time. Many times when he came to our house or for work he had to walk or drive a
tractor to do so because the road was not suitable for regular vehicle use. It was not until the

concrete culve11 mentioned above was installed in the irrigation ditch that allowed more frequent
use of the roadway.
8.

Our daughter, Karla Love, rented the main house on the Fuquay propel'ty for a

couple months in the 1980ts. She traveled up and down Castle Lane to Oreana Loop for access
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even when coming to visit us because King Lane was so impassible.
9.

From 1973 to present the primary access for the properties owned by John and

Clint Fuquay has bee11 Castle Lane. Any use by the Fuquays of King Lane has been occasional
use, but not on a daily or regular basis. This use has b~n casual use on occasion as a matter of
convenience. This is because, among other things, as mentioned above, King Lane is in fact
impassible during certain times of the year and cannot be used because it becomes too muddy.
Such occasionaJ/casual use by the Fuquays has been allowed because we wanted to be
neighborly, their- use did not interfere with our use of the road and it was done so with implied
permission. The Fuquays use has been so infrequent that is has not bothered us until recently,
or more specifically within the past five years, when the Fuquays have attempted to increase their
use by bdnging large trucks through our (King) prope1ty.
10.

There has always been a fence and a gate on the west end of our property along

what is referred to as King Lane to prevent our livestock from getting to the BLM property to
'
the west. We have
also used this fenced area where King Lane is located for our own livestock

to graze and to pen up for sorting. While the Fuquays have occasionally/casually used the road
on an infrequent basis they have previously respected the fence and gates across the roadway,
It was not until recently, within the past year, that John Fuquay asserted they did not have to ·
close the gate.
11.

Prior to this lawsuit, I am not aware of any use by UPS, post office or other

delivery services of King Lane to provide services to the Fuquay properties. To the contrary the
mailboxes for th.e Fuquays are located at the end of Castle Lane and I have not observed any
services using King Lane to provide deliveries to the Fuquay prope1ties. The only mailbox at
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the end of King Lane is for the Kings.

Since this lawsuit has been initiated by the Fuquays, I

have been asked if Schwaos delivery person can use King Lane to access the Fuquay propedy
because John Fuquay has locked the gate on Castle Lane directing them to use King Lane. I
verbally gave permission to the Schwans delivery person to use King Lane that one time which
was within the past six months.

12..

I am not aware of any guests of the Fuquays using King Lane to access the Fuquay

properties. Since my husband and I have owned the King ranch, there has been occasional use
of King Lane by hunters or othel's who have asked permission.
13.

Any use by Clint Fuquay of the road/King Lane to access the property now owned

by Clint Fuquay has been in the last 8 years. Again, any use been occasional and not on a
regular or primary access.
14.

With regard to children catching the school bus at the end of King Lane, my

children caught the bus there. I do 1·emember that on occasion Megan, John's sister, did come
down King Lane to catch the bus. I do not recall John Fuquay ever catching the bus at the end
of King Lane.

If he rode the school bus, he caught the bus at the bus stop at the end of Castle

Lane. Clint Fuquay's children and J.C. Fuquay's cllildren catch the bus at the end of Castle
Lane.
15.

Until the spring of 2014, I have never seen the Fuquays operate fa1m equipment

on King Lane.
16.

From 1973 to 1988M1989 there were never any large trucks used on King Lane

because, among other things, the trucks could not use the lane and pass over the welded ban-els
mentioned above and King lane was not suitable for said uHe. From 1988M89 to 2011 I have not
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observed any large trucks or fol' that matter much traffic at· all from the Fuquay properties using
King Lane. The heavy truck traffic seemed to commence about 2011.

In summary I have lived on the King Ranch from 1973 to cun-ent except for the four
years between 1982·1986. I can observe and hear all of the traffic that uses King Lane. I
dispute Mr. Fuquay's allegations that King Lane has been used since 1977 for regular personal
vehicles on a nearly daily basis, semi trucks consistently since 1977, regular farm vehicles such
as cattle tmcks and moving farm equipment, pedestrian traffic to and from the bus stop and
guests going to and comeing from the Fuquay properties.
The King family uses King Lane several times a day in our ranching/farming operations.
Any use if any of King Lane by other people including the Fuquays has never interfered with our
use of King Lane and in order to be neighborly we have allowed the use by others. Such use
has been with implied permission.

yZ_~r=
Rose King

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 4th da

otary Public for Idaho
Residing in Caldwell, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 12/18/2018
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a t111e and correct copy of the foregoing documeni was served on the
following on this ~day of J)u<Wi1'1h 2014 by the following method:
MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200- 61h Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 224-6003
E-Mail: Matthew.Clevedey@fnf.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
RONALD P. ~INEY
RONALD P. RAINING PA
UON. 9'hAve.
P0Box26
Caldwell, ID .83606·0026
Telephone: (208) 459-3659
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attomeys for Defendants Gordon and Rose
King
.

[ ~ U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid
LJ U.S. Cel'tified Mail, Postage Prepaid
LJ Federal Express
L] Hand Delivery
L] Facsimile
W Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

[2Q U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid

LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid

LJ
LJ

LJ
~

Fedel'al Expl'ess
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Electronic Mail or CM/BCF
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S. BRYCE FARRIS
[Idaho Slate Bar No. 5636)

SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Golden Eagle Building
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110
P. 0. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 629-7447
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR 1HE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY;

Case No. CV-2014-0278

Plaintiffs,
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL V.C.
vs.

STEINER

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC,; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY;

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO

)

COUNTYOFADA

)
)

SAMUEL V.C. STEINER being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:
1.
I and my wife Mary are the predecesson; .in title for Cal and Susie Low who purchased
our properties located adjacent to Oreana Loop Road .in Owyhee County in 2006.
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2.
I was born 1957. My parents purchased these properties in 1959. I was two (2) or
so when we moved onto the parcel in 1959 that is located across Oreana Loop Road from where
Lows built their residence. Our farm residence was within a half mile of the road everyone is
referring to as King Lane.
3.
I inherited the properties from my mother in 1984. I had lived on the parcel referred
to above.until 1975 when I lived in Boise and went to college. I returned to the property in 1980.
4.
There was an old oue-room school building located on what is referred to as Castle
Road close to the Foreman Reservoir, but classes were not held there. I believe the building was
moved off sometime in the 1980s. I understood that.it had been an active school site for a number
ofyears before being closed down when another school building was built that was more convenient.
5.
I do not know who, if anyone. constructed King Lane. This was an old farm access
roadway that was used occasionally by a variety of people. My dad always told me that he thought
the lane belonged to him. Neither my parents nor myselfttied to stop anyone from using the road.
As long es they did not interfere with our operations, we didn't object to them using 'the lane.
6.
Sometimes hunters used it to go back to the reservoir on the BLM ground. Kings
used it to go to the geothennal well they had leased on the BLM ground. Renters on the old Munger
property, now owned by Fuquays and previously owned by Bob Collett used it occasionally as a
shol't-cutto Grand View. I think that Jim Fuquay used it occasionally when he lived in the mobile
home located near the rental property now owned by Clint Fuquay. Jim and John Fuquay lived in
the old Foreman farm residence down by the Foreman Reservoh' for many years and while they
generally dt'Ove out Castle Road, they also used the lane as a short-cut to Grand View. When Jim
Fuquay moved on a mobile home at the corner of what would be King Lane and Castle Road, he
would occasionally use King Lane, probably as a short-cut when he went out to Grand View.
7.
However, the majority ofthe vehicle use was down Castle Road to Oreana Loop Road
to the west. This was especially true during wet weather because there is a slough at the common
west coiner of the Fouquay, Low's and King's properties that was pretty muddy in wet weather. It
was pretty difficult to get through then. When Zane Blockhad the King property under contract, he
and Jim Fuquay did some work on the lane one yea1·.
8.
While there was some use of King Lane by passenger vehicles and pickup tmcks, I
don't believe I ever saw anyone take a large truck out that way, logging trucks or cattle trucks.
Those kind of vehicles always went out Castle Road. However1 I think that John Fuquay may have
brought an empty cattle truck in that way a few times.

DATED this ~ y ofNovember1 2014.
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~
.. o ~
runuei;;:~.
Steiner

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to befo1·e me this

/61:;'of November, 2014.

~~

NOTARY PUB~ FO).l THE STATE OF IDAHO
Residing at
DJ, ti
· , Idaho
My Commission expires: t:,,/-:.j/"'17

i

I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served
on the following on this 8th day of Sept~, 2014 by the following method:

J)c~

MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW
GROUP
1200 - 61h Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 224-6003
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffe

~ U.S. First Class Mail, Postage
Prepaid
. LJ U.S. CerUfied Mail, Postage
Prepaid
LJ Federal Express
LJ Hand Delivery
LI Facsimile
~ Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

RONALD P. RAINEY
RONALD P. RAINING PA
110 N. 9th Ave.
P0Box26
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026
Telephone: (208) 459-3659
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and
Rose King

00 U.S. First Class Mail, Postage
Prepaid
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage
Prepaid
LJ Federal Exp1·ess
LJ Hand Delivel'y
LJ Facsimile
~ Electronic Mail or CM/ECF

S. Bryce Fanis
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RONALD P. RAINEY -ISB # 1022
Attorneys Law
110 No11h Ninth Avenue
Post Office Box 26
Caldwell, ldaho 83606-0026
Telephone: (208) 459-3659
Facsimile:
(208) 459-9067 or 459-6147

FIDEUTY NAT Till!

at

-

FILED

-A.M. )l~!C_P.M.

JAN 29 2015
FtB I 1 201~

AN~;ti!~Rhf<,;~ CLERK

0

SEATTLE LITJGATIOH

Deputy Clerk

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

~

)

vs.

(_.

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD P. RAINEY

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
) ·
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, )
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KINO;)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMEIUCAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
Defendants.
GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and

ROSE M. KJNG, as Beneficia1y of the
HEART KRANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
Counterclaimants,

vs.

)

)
)
)
)
)

~

)
)

)

)))
JOHNE. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY

Counterdefendants.

)
)

(
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Canyon

)

) ss.
)

RONALD P. RAINEY, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:
1.

I am counsel for the Defendant and Counterclaimant, Heart K. Ranch Tn1st, in the

above-captioned action, am over the age of majority, competent to testify, and I make this affidavit
upon personal knowledge.
2.

Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is a copy of the cited testimony of J.C.

Fuquay, John E. Fuquay and Clinton Ward Fuquay as given in open couit on Sep~mber 18, 2014
during the preliminary injunction hearing.

Fui1her affiant sayeth not.

(

SUBSCIUBED AND SWORN to before me this..tf!A.. day ofJanuaiy, 2015.

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this £.Oday ofJanuary, 2015,a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served upon the tbllbwing:
Matthew R. Cleverley
[ ]
Fidelity National Law GROUP
[ ]
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
[ ]
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone: 206-224-6003
Facsimile:
877-655-5281
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf.com

Ji

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overni,ht Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Other

---------

(
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Atlorney for Plalntiffe

S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC

!

1101 W. River Street, Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: 208-629-7447
Facsimile:
208-629-7559
Email: bryce@sawtoQthlaw.com

I

I

,I
!

[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Ovemight Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Other _ _ _ _ _ __

Attorneyfor Low Defendants

(

(
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Q

.2

>-\

j

Q
,,,I?

.J

.,
I

2

Q

Ol<ay. ,\nd

And :he:-e's no ilbstn:ctions ~Jing ::p Ci1st1e Lm•I! at

I

J

A

!t'-5 hilpi:~:-·w ilUfT'ercus times over ~t:e '/ears.

4

Q

CQ you know t:i;1c :his ,ane from the C'"ltom "' yoi..r

~rain

i

hai:p.,ned -mce since ..

I
I

It depar.ds on the '/P.M.

5

ll<7:..S•! arounc th11

ccrn•?r from ·,our !louse to Orl.lar..l is Kmgs·

Q

Well, what hapoens In an off year then;•

6

prlV'lt~ proper~/?

7

A

Well, t!'lere·~ the ditch that crln wash out.

8
9

Q

Who's locking you out?

7
8

A No, I wasn't aware 'lf tl:-lt. It's alWJ'/S ·le\?n
or.en lane since r·:e been ar:mncl.

A
Q

I said ther-e's a dltc:i that ciin wash out.

9

Q

Ycu dlC!n't l<no'N that i<ings owned that pr::pert'/:'

10

A

I kne,.., thar they ownad the prope,ty on the north

0

Oki1y. And --

A /111d llwt'!l -- lh;1\'1; l'ho onl\• one I can ll1ink 1:,( .ii
2 tho moment.
3
Q Wilen wa_s the last tlrne the ditch washed out?
A
Two years ago I v,ant to say ond we replaced tile.
1.i

11
12

13

i

14

5 culvert.

15

,6

Q

Okay. Vou got the culvert all replaced?

16

117

A

Uh-huh.

8

Q

And so It's a fine roild

17
10

I '9

A

19

120

Q
A
Q

Uh-huh.
ls that il yes?
Yes ..

21
22

. 1
122

'"3

: 4

125

~(
I

·1 ).

now?

20

Okay. So again, the emergency vehicles can go

right up Castle Lane without nny obstrucllons, correct?

A
Q

23
24
26

Yes.

And these delivery people can go up Castle l;ine

84

without any obstructions, correct?
A

1
2

Yes.

3

Q An<I the mall person that delivers your mall right
4 <lown at the llottom of Castle Lane ilnd Oreana Loop.
5
A Yes.
6

7
8

9

·,o
111
1

.

·wmiess: Okc,y. All right.

1J

1G

WlTNESS: All right,

LW MR. RAINEY:
Q

·7 t.mie; Is that correc~?
O
A Yes, yes.

Q Ancl one more time, there's not one obstruction
0 other than maybe a ditch washing out once in a white or a

'(

culvert?
A Uh-huh.

!

3
Q And thal only washes out when you don't dean out
: ii 'the debris, right?
A Or if the creek is rtoodtna and we cc111't control

I;!i

85
·--·-·-----------
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I
I

I
I

I
j

You didn't know that they owned the lane?
A No. l did not. I always assumed it was an
casernent or private road -- or an access point to our
property. It's never been disputed up until now.
Q Well, have you ever interfered with the Kings' use
of tlu1t land?
A No, I hnve not.
Q I-lave you ever told thl!m to get out? It's your
lane. You're ~olng to use it?
A No, sir, I have not.
Q Have. you ever done anything thilt Interrupted their
use? And they being Kings. Have you ever done anything to
lntel'rupt the Kings' use or that'lane?
A No, str; I have not.
06

II

I

Q

Do you know If anyone in your family has ever
Interrupted the Kings' use ot that lane?

A

Q

Not to my recollection, no.
llno Is nobody from your famlly, as
G for as you know, hr1v.e ever hindered or Interfered with thlf
6 l(lngs' use of lhat lm1e we'r~ •• in the pleadings, It's

7

And so bottom

called King's Lane. Do I need to rephrase that again?

Yeah, go ahead. Yeah.
9
Q Can you recnll onybody In your family, you, your
10 brother, f<1thor, t.hc1t's Interfered with l<ings' use of that
0

11

A

lane called Kings' Lane?

A

Between nw house c1nd their houses?

Q
A

Yes.
No.

Q So-· and you don't knpw who pays lhe tilxes on thc1t
lirn e I take~ It?

17

19

) ~~..

I

i

Q

3

·15
'16

All Lhese sP.rvices ,u-c ilVallable through Cnstla

,u1

sidL1 or th.:it lnm.:.

4

12
13
14

COURT: Your attorney can follow up.

~4

!i

-

Q so you have to go down the lane to get your mnil.
A Yes.
Q And you do that at least once a day?
A Can l say one thing?
Q No.
COUlff: Walt until he asks you a question.

! 2

1

,:th!

A

!I 11

i

·--~-----·---·---·--w:iter.

The:, c;,n '.:l~l uo :::a!.!:lff La;·~. ::or;·ec.t?
They can.

----~-----

A Jllo,ldonot.
18
Q You don't"/
19
A No, sir.
20
Q Now, the gattis you're talking about, have? you ever
21 looked at those gates?
22
A Which gates?
23

24
25

Q
A

The new gntes.

Not up close, no.
Q I-lave you e\1er opcnod the nC!W gales?

----··-------
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6

6
7

8
9

0

3

"0
1
2!
•

A

l don't know. I've never seen them locked.

1 some of these.

Q

So you haven't gone bacl< there since the'

2

conversation 7
A Since I went back. through there, the gates have
been •• I've been gooe for the last month so l mean he put
the cattle In there and I assume he opened the gates bacl<
up and there's not been an Issue.
Q Well, let's make the record clear, Mr. Fuquay. The
Kings use that lane to graze cattle and to actually corral
the cattle too, don't they?
A Yeah. I don't Know what they •• yeah, sure. They
graze It.
Q Okay. But they use It kind of as a holding pen

then?
A I don't know what -· I don't know about that but -·
Q Well, there's cattle In there.
A Yep.
Q There's cattle In there an awful lot of the year,
Isn't that correct?
A sometime$, yeah.
Q Okay. And they also -· Kings use that road to get
to their flelds, don't they?
A Correct.
Q They've used that road ever since you've lived In
that property.

CRO?S·e~MINAT[ON

QUESTIONS BY MR. FARRIS:
Q Mr. Fuquay, my name Is Bry<;e Farris and l represen
6 the Lows.
8
A Okay.

3
4

Q You've been talking about this roadway that they've
8 referred to or referred to as Castle Lane and from what J
9 understand is that lane comes off Oreana Loop up to your
10 property? If you'd look at 1>robably fxhllllt J If you have
11 It In front of you.
12
A Okay.
13
Q You see where there's an arrow that says Castle
14 Lane?
15
A Yeah.
16
Q That Castle Lane originates at Oreana Loop further
17 to the south of the area of your property?
18
A Correct.
19
Q That's the road you've been talking about and It 20 comes up, goes through your property?
21
A Correct.
22
Q And then goes up to the property that you've -23 th~t someone's Identified as Ofnt Fuquay?
24
A Correct .
25
Q Okay. With respect to that Castle-Lane, from what
7

. j 25
.{-_1~~--~~~---3_6~~~~~~--~~----~~~~~~~~3_8~~~~~~~~~~~·
....

A

2

Correct.

Q.. And never have you tried to kick the Kings off the

property, have you, off the road?
A Not that I recall.
5
Q Well, you never have, 1,ave you?
8
A Not that I recall, no.
•
. 7
Q So In other words, you've never Interfered with the
Kings using their own property, have you?
"
A Other than tile gates,
3

I

•

:4 .

!

O

Q

1

A

*
:2

'

13

Pardon me?

Other than the Issue with the gates.
Q Well, they put up gates. Particularly when they
had cattle In there, they had gates In there, Isn't that
right? ·
A Yeah.
Q Okay. N~w, you can't tell Judge Nye whether It's
easier to open the metal gate than to put the wire over the
posts with the loop, can you?
A I've not opened them metal gates. I haven't been
through there since.
MR. RAINEY: 'That's all the cross l have, Your
Honor.
COURT: Mr. Farris.

MR. FARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try n1>t
26 to be redundant. Let me see If I can put a fine point on

I

l/22/70!4 11

37

1 I'm understanding your testimony Is, that's where your
2 mailbox Is currently?
3
A Currently, yes.
4
Q Okay. That's your address?
6
A Yes.
6
Q That's where Schwann's or other delivery folks
7 deliver to?
8
A Currently.
9
Q. Okay. Currently. As we sit here today, And If
10 you'd look at Exhibit 1, do you have that In front of you?
11
A This one?
12
Q Yes, yeah.
13
COURT: Oh, I've got It. It's this one here.
14 Yeah.
16
WITNESS: Okay.
16 BY MR, FARRIS:
17
Q You see where at the top or that It says "map
18 address" and It says 18907 Castle Lane?
19
A Correct.
20
Q That's your address?
21
A Correct.
22
Q So that's -- If you want to put In your address to
23 find your property, that's the address you put In, Castle
24 · Lane?
26
A Correct.
39
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1·

I

2
J
4

(

A

Sure.

Q Coming up castle Lane, that's a straight shot
without stopping for anything, correct?
A Yes.

;

Q

6

A

Now, when did you get your driver's license?
When I was 15.

7

Q

And so you say you're 27 now.

8

9
10

11
12

13
14
16
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25

A Yes.
Q So that's twelve years ago?
A Yes.
Q And six of those twelve years you llved somewhere
else.
A Yes.
Q So you've only been on this property for six years.

Q Well, that's five years.
A Four. I don't remember when In 2001. Moved back
the summer of 2005,

Q When you got your driver's license, you were gone,
You didn't even live on that property.

A
Q

I stayed there on the weekends.
Other than weekends but you didn't live there on a
64

1 day·to·day basis.
3
4

5
6

7

A

Correct.

Q You were not watching the Kings' operation on· a
day-to-day basis.
A Correct.
Q

In fact, you've never watched Klr:igs on a day-to·

day-·

8

A

9
10
11

Q
A

correct.
Is thilt right?

Q Just occasionally seeing what's going on, right?
· A Correct.
13
Q So when you say that they've never had cattle In
14 there, you don't know, do you?

(

A

What are you talklng about?

16
17
18

Q Well, there's periods of times you s11ld they never
had cattle 11nd never locked gates. You don't knoY.( because
you're not there on a day-to-day basis, are you?

19
20
"'1

A I drive that road on a day-to·day basis but In that
time, I wasn't there on a day-to-day basis so at that time,
I can't say what they did on a day-to-day basis.

,k

23
24
25
19

A
A

•• to go through the Kings'?
Yes.

5

Q

Only convenience. That's.the only reason.

6
7
8

A It's quicker.
Q Could be?

9

Q
convenience.
A It's easier, yes.

10
11

Q

A

So It's Just a matter of convenience tor you -Yes.

It's quicker.
It's quicker. Well, that's what I'rn calling

12

Q

Okay, And Is there any reason you don't go down ••

when you're driving, you don't go down to Oreana through
Castle Lane?
A

or 3 5 sheets

19

could.

20

Q

21

lane?

A

It's quicker to get.where I'm going going thatway.

Have_you ever exclu(ted the Kings from using that

22
23
24

A

No.

25

Q

Have you ever told them that they couldn't use It

No.

Q Have you ever told them to get off?

5
Q Have you given them any hassle about when you use
6 thclane?.
7
A No.
8
Q Okay.

MR. FARRIS: Your Honor, l don't have anything to

10

add.

11

COURT: Okay, Thank you. Redirect.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY:

12
13

Q You Indicated that Castle Lan·e Is what Mr, Rainey
1S calls an all-weather road?
16
A Yes.
17
Q Is that -- who maintains that road?
18
A We do,

14

19
20
21
22
23

Q

Do you maintain King Lane?

A
Q

Yes.
How do you maintain It?

A We've bladed It with a road grader and a land
plane.

24

Q

What else?

25

A

We've ·- a backhoe. Filled In potholes with a

65
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1 If you're using lt7
2
A No.
3
Q So In a way, have you lnterrered with the Kings?
4
A No.

9

Correct.

12

15

Q

2
3
4

Q Okay. So you want to use King's Lane Just because
13 It's convenient.
14
A Because that's what I've always used.
A No. Eight, Since I was 19,
15
Q You don't claim any right to It, do you?
Q Can you give me the years when you were gone, from 16
A What's that?
when to when?
17
Q You don't claim any right to King's Lane, do you?
A I would say from 2001 to 2005,
18
A I've been using It so 1 Just always assumed that I

(
2

1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF
THE STATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYI:IEE

JOHNE. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

)

(

~laintiffs, ·

)
)
)
)

vs.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, )
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)

AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING IN
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)

Defendants.
GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,

)
)

)
))
)
)

Counterclaimants,

<.

)
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(

)

vs.

)
)

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FCQUA Y )
)
I

Counterdefcndants.

I
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Canyon

)

)
) ss.
)

ROSE KING, being fast duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:
1.

I am a party in the above-captioned action, over the age of majority, competent to

testify, and I make this affidavit upon personal knowledge.
2.

(

I have previously submitted affidavits in this action in opposition to the Fuquay

Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary iajunctio~ (9/9/14), and in response and objection to the Fuquay
. Pl~intiffs request for summary judgment against the Low Defendants (12/9/14), each of those
affidavits is incorporated by reference herein..
3.

I have reviewed the Declaration of John Fuquay, as filed with this Court on October

2912014, and submitted in support of the Fuquay Plaintiffs• motion for summary judgment against
the Low Defendants, and the claims for prescriptive easement made in that declaration concerni~g
the Fuquay Plaintiffs use of the roadway that has been identified in this action as "King Lane."
4,

As made and declared within the Declaration of John Fuquay, it appears that the

Fuquay Plaintiffs are asserting a prescriptive easement claim to the use of King Lane for the period ·
beginning January l, 1977 to the present.
5.

(

As declal'ed in my affidavit submitted in opposition to the Fuquay Plaintiffs' motion
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(

for summary judgment against the Low Defendants, the King Defenda~ts have owned the property
alleged to burdened by the alleged prescriptive easement claimed by the Fuquay Plaintiffs since
1973, except for a four year period between 1982 and 1986.
6.

At all ti.mes prjm· to 2014 tho Fuquay Plaintiffs' any use of King {,ane, whethe1· by

regular passenger vehicles of the Fuquays and their guests. the infrequent use of semi-trucks in the
course of the Fuquays' farm and ranch operations, other fm·m and ranch vehicle use, or simple
pedestrian use, has been in common with, and without interference to or disruption of, the Kings'
own use of that roadway, or without damage to that roadway or its bridges. As also stated in my
earlier affidavit, the heavy truck traffic conducted by the Fuquay Plaintiffs on King Lane did not
commence until about 2011, and until the spring of2014 I had never seen the Fuquays operate fm:m
equipment on King Lane.

(

7.

At no time prior to about 2011 did any of the Fuquay Plaintiffs ever overly assert or
-

.

claim any right or use in respect to King Lane in derogation to the rights of the Kings, or that was
in any way exclusive or proprietary, such that it wa$ adverse to the rights of the Kings in that"

roadway.
8.

At no time prior to 2011 did any of the Fuquay Plaintiffs ever perform any act or

· make any declarat_ion that would constitute a clear, open, and notorious assertion of a claim to a11
adverse and prescl'iptive right «;laim to the use of King 'Lane.
9.

It was only about in 2011 that the Fuquays did suddenly, and without explanation,

attempt to drive large semi-trucks for commercial pu1poses which increased use. began to damage

.

a bridge at the east side of King Lane. It was at this time that a cement block placed at that location

(
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(··

which prevented further use of those trucks, and it was also at this time that the fonner wire gates

were l'eplaced with metal swing gates.
10.

As stated in my earlier affidavit, at no time prior to about 1988-89 could any large

trucks use King Lane because the condition of the road rmcl the welded-barrel culvert simple was not
allow that use.

11.

Because any claim.by the Fuquay Plaintiffs to a prescriptive easement based upon

uses that commenced af\er 2006 would be subject to the 20 year statutory period for such easements,
those uses could not ripen into an actual prescriptive easement claim at any time before 2026.

('

Further affiant sayeth not.

Rose King

SUBSCRIB~D AND SWORN to before me this __ day of January, 2015.

Notary.Public for Idaho
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho

My C~mmission expires: _ _ _ _ __

(
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this __ day of January, 2015,a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served upon the following:
Mlltlhew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law GROUP
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone: 206-224-6003
Facsimile: · 877-655-5281
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf.com

[ ]
[ ]

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, 1iostage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile Tl'ansmission
Other

--------

Altorney for Plaintiffs

C

S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W. River Street, Suite 110
Boise, Idalto 83707
Telephone: . 208-629-7447
. Facsimile: · 208,629-7559
Email: b1yce@sawtoothlaw.com

[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[ ]

Hand Delivered

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Overnight Mail
.
Facsimile Transmission
Other _ _ _ _ _ __

Attorney for Low Defendants

Ronald P. Rainey

c...
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)

(

Plaintiffs,
. VS.

)
)
)

)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, )
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMEIUCAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)

AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT KING IN
SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT
HEART K RANCH'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

Defendants.

)
)

GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and .
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary ~fthe
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
CounterclaimantsJ

(

)
)
)
)
)
)
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(
i

i
l
1

) .
)
)
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY )
)
Counterc.lcfondants. )

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Canyon

)
) ss,
)

OILBERT'IGNG, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says:
1.

I am a party in the above-captioned action, over the age of majority, competent to

testify, and I make this affidavit upon personal knowledge.
2.

('

I have previously submitted affidavits in this action in oppositi~n to the Fuquay

Plaintiffs' request for a p~liminary injunction (9/9/14).
3.

It was not unti_l sometime in 2011 that t}:ie Fuquay Plaintiffs began ~ny use of King

Lane by large semi-trucks. ·
4.

This use appeared to be unrelated to uses occurring on the Fuquay properly itself, but

instead seemed to be for gene1·al commercial trucking purposes unrelated to the prope1ty itself.
5.

On 01· about 1 'Z· f.S "'r.3. (date) I had a large cement block placed at or neat' the

location of a bridge over°",1££ crt IC (state location) in any attempt eliminate this use of King Lane
by the Fuquays which was contributing to damage to this bridge.
6.

01\ or about 'Eh c).d:- l t.(

(date) I ha4 two former wfre gates on King Lane

replaced with metal swing gates, so as to be able to better .control entry onto and through King Lane.

(
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(

Further affiant sayeth not.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __ day of Janua1y, 2015.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho
My Commission expires: _ _ _ __

(
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)
Plaintiffs,

)
)

vs.

)
)

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K

)

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
DEFENDANT HEART K RANCH'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
)
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
'IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and

)
}
)

)
)

ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the

)

HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA

)

DECEMBER 28, 2012,

)

)
Counterclaimants,
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)

vs.

)

JOHNE. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAII.EY ROSE FUQUAY
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)

I.

REPLY ARGUMENT
In the opening brief submitted in .support of their motion for summary judgment the Heart
K Ranch Defendants argued that the Fuquay Plaintiff's alleged prescriptive easement claims, as
asserted in this action, must necessarily fail because,

any use [of King Lane] by the Fuquay plaimiffs ortheir predecessors, [prior to 2006]
was use in common with the Kings and Lows that in no way interfered with their use
of King Lane and therefore undea· Idaho law was deemed permissive and could
not be prescrintive. This rebuts elements three and four (adverse use that is known
to the servient landowner) making any prescriptive claim during this period
impossible.
Heart K Ranch Summary Judgment Memorandum at pg 8 (emphasis in original/bracketed references
added). Heart K Ranch's summary judgment motion was premised upon rhe standard that the
absence of evidence necessary to establish an element that the nonmoving party will be required to

prove at trial renders any other potential issues of fact irreleyant. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho
807, 810-11, 979 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (1999).
The Fuquay Plaintiffs have firmly planted their alleged prescriptive easement claims, as made
in tl1is action, within the five year prescriptive period that existed prior to the change in the
applicable statute, I.C. § 5-203, to a twenty year prescriptive use period in 2006. See e.g.• Capstar
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Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 420 n. 2, 283 P.Jd 728, 737 n. 2 (2012). Any

acrual adverse use that arose after that date would be governed by the cwenty year statute chat is now
in effect and therefore would not ripen into an actual prescriptive right claim, at the earliest, w1til
2026, and therefore such claims could not be at issue in this action. Under the controlling Idaho case

law standards set out in Chen v. Conway, 116 Idaho 90 l, 903, 781 P.2d 23 8, 240 (Ct.App.1989) and
A,felendezv.Hintz, lll Idaho401,405, 724P.2d 137,141 (Ct.App.1986)theuseofaroadwayin

common by neighbors is deemed "permissive."
Where one person merely uses a roadway in common with his neighbor, without
damage to the roadway, without interfering with the neighbor's use of the roadway,
and where the neighbor has established and maintained the roadway on his own
property for his own purposes, only the most minimal intrusion is made into the
owner's dominion over his property.
111 Idaho at 405, 724 P.2d at 141, as cited at 116 Idaho at 903, 781 P.2d at 240.
The various ·affidavits that have been submitted to the Court- and the Fuquays' own hearing

testimony, as submitted to this Court on September 18, 2014 - remains unrefuted on this critical
point that the parties to this action used King Lane in common without damage tQ the roadway and
without interference with each other's use at all times prior to 2011. In other words the use of

King Lane by the Fuguays was at all times permissive as a n1atter of law under the standards
of Chen v, Cor,way and Melendez v. Hi11tz.

The testimony of Rose King, as set forth in her Affidavit submitted in Support of the
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion for Summary Judgment filed January 29, 2015, on page 3
paragraph 6 sea.res, ''the Fuquay Plaintiffs' ... use of King Lane ... has been in common with, and
without interference to or disruption of, the Kings' own use of that roadway, .... " Furthermore
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Rose King states in paragraph 7, "At no time prior to about 20 l l did any of the Fuquay Plaintiffs

ever over[t]ly assert or claim any right or use in respect to King Lane in derogation to the rights of
the Kings, or that was in any way exclusive or proprietary, such that it was adverse to the rights of

the Kings in that roadway." The Fuquay Plaintiffs have further acknowledged that they never

interfered with Kings use of the lane as set forth in the excerpts of the trial transcript that were both
quoted in the Kings' summary judgment memorandum and attached to the Affidavit of Ronald P.
Rainey filed January 29, 2015.
Therefore the fact that King Lane was used in common, and without any interference to its
use by the Kings, remains unreftited, as to the Fuquays' alleged prescriptive use claim, as based upon
a five year period of adverse use, which allegedly arose at some period of time prior to 2006. The
only time that any damage to the road (the bridge crossing) 1 and any ensuing alleged hostile use
could have· arose, was after the statutory period had changed to twenty years in 2006. As already
noted above, no alleged prescriptive right arising out of such a claim could possibly mature and be
asserted at any time before 2026.
As to any change from permissive to hostile use as occurring within the earlier five year
period, prior to the change in the statute in 2006, the Idaho Supreme Court was emphatic in its recent
decision handed down inH.F.L.P. v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672,339 P.3d 557 (2014):
Moreover, if the presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the
presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested and
"brought home" to the servientproperty owner. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho
390,398,210 P.3d 75, 83 (2009); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789,792,537 P.2d

631,634 (1975).
157 Idaho at 681, 339 P.3d at 566.
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Not to draw too fine a point on this questioa, but note should be taken of the fact that any
actual change in the initial "permissive" use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs. to an ·'adverse"
use, within the context of their fiveuyear claim, had to be accomplished no later than June 30, 200 I.

The reason is that the statutory period of required adverse use changed from five years to twenty

years effective July 1, 2006. See, Ch. 158, § 1, of the 2006 Idaho Session Laws; LC.§ 67u5 l 0. Any
effective notice to the defendants in this action of that change in adverse use would have to have
occurred no later than June 30, 2001 ia order ·for the Fuquay Plaintiffs to claim a five year
prescriptive right under the former five-year adverse use statute.

Any change in use from

"permissive" to i,adverse" which occurred at any time after July I, 2001 would have necessarily
failed to mature under that five year statute before it changed to a twenty year prescriptive use period
on July 1, 2006, and thereafter would have required an additional fifteen years to become effective
under the new twenty year statute that went into effect July l, 2006.
A review of the chart of alleged disputed material facts, which the Fuquay :Plaintiffs have

submitted at pp. 5- 7 oftheir summary judgment response brief, only reveals a single allegation which
touches upon the specific issue that was raised in the motion for summary judgment submitted by
Heart K Ranch. The very last entry cites the January 2015 affidavit of Rose King for the proposition

that the Fuquay Plaintiffs' "use" has damaged King Lane. What Rose King actually declared in that
affidavit was the following:

9.

It was only about in 1.011 thattheFuquays dld suddenly, and without

explanation, attempt to drive large semi~trucks for commercial purposes which
inc:reased use began to damage a bridge at the east side of King I,ane. It was at
this time that a cement block placed at that location which prevented further use of
those trucks, and it was also at this time that the former wire gates were replaced with
mental swing gates.
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Affidavic of Rose King in Support ofthe DefendantHeartKRanch's Motion for Summary Judgment
at pp. 3-4 (emphasis added). The above highlighted language certainly implicates the Chen v.

Conway and Ji,Jelendez v. Hintz standard of permissive use- as cited above- concerning, "use of

a roadway in common with a neighbor, without damage to the roadway," since the use of those
trucks in 2011 began to damage the bridge. The problem with any application of that standard to the

facts ofrhis case is that rhe alleged damaging use in question did Qot arise untH 2011, almost five

years after the prescriptive period had become twenty years, rather than the five years upon which
the Fuquay Plaintiffs rely. Even under the applicable summary judgment standard that all facts and
inferences are viewed in favor of the Fuquays, as the non-moving party. a claim based upon that
allegation could not mature into a prescriptive right until 2031, at the earliest.

In addition, the Fuquay Plaintiffs refuse to acknowledge the established fact thatunderldaho
law even if they did have an established prescriptive easement over King Lane, the Kings, as the
servient landowners, are entitled to maintain gates over such an easement. See e.g., Beckstead v.
Price, 146 ldaho 57, 67,190 P.3d 876,886 (2008), by citation to Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho

633, 570 P.2d 870 (1977) and Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 78 P.3d 389 (2003). The
remaining alleged "disputed facts" as outlined in their chart do not raise any issues that go to the
"adverse use" element that has been actually raised and put at issue by Heart K Ranch's motion for
summary judgment (i.e., children walking to school, deliveries, use by friends and guests, daily or
infrequent use, express or implied permission, maintenance of the roadway).
On a motion for summary judgment once the absence of evidence in support of an essential

element of the non-moving party's claim has been demonstrated, the burden then shifts to opposing
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party to show, via further depositions, discovery responses, or affidavits that there is indeed a

genuine issue for trial. Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874, 876 P.2d l 54, 156
(Ct.App.1994). ((The non moving party cannot rely on mere speculation, and a sch1tilla of evidence
is insufficient to create a genuine issue of mate.rial fact." Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op.,

Inc., 152 Idaho 632,637,272 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2012). On the facts of this case that have been
submitted to this Court for decision on this motion for summary judgment the Fuquay Plaintiffs have
simply failed to submit even a scintilla of evidence in opposition to the "adverse use" element that
Heart K Ranch challenged and raised on its motion for summary judgment.

As declared by the Idaho Supreme Court in Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 406, 34 P .3d
1085, 1089 (2001) the purpose for imposing the requirement that a prescriptive use be open and
notorious is to give the owner of the servient estate an opportunity to assert his rights against the
development of an easement by prescription. In that same vein, this is also why "mere use" in
common with the servient owner is deemed to be permissive, and is also deemed insufficient to
establish hostile and adverse use. Instead, such an adverse use claim must be in some sense
exclusive, proprietary in nature, and exercised independently of the rights of all others. See, Hall

v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111,112,697 P.2d 451,452 (Ct.App.1985).
As based upon the burden-shifting standard that is implicated on a motion for summary
judgment when there is an absence of evidence in support of an essential element of the non-movmg

party's case, the Fuquay Plaintiffs' in their response have failed to come forward and meet that

burden rhrough the submission of further required evidence in order to avoid the entry of summary
judgment. Throughout this case the Fuquay Plaintiffs have based their alleged prescriptive easement
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claim on a five year prescriptive period, which necessarily must have commenced at some time prior
to June 30, 2001. The only evidence before this Court that in any way "brings home" an end of the
presumptive permissive use of King Lane by the FuquayPlainriffs is that use which arose in 2011,
at a time well within the twenty year prescriptive use period that under no circumstances has
matured, and that has not even been claimed by the Fuquays in this action. Beyond that single
incident, there is not even a scintilla ofevidence before this Court that otherwise supports the Fuquay
Plaintiffs' burden to establish an open, hostile, and adverse use claim in existence for the requisite
five year period of which the Kings ever had any notice sufficient to establish their alleged right to
a prescriptive easement in King Lane.

V.
CONCLUSION
Under the standard that the absence of a genuine issue of fact with regard to an essenrial
element of the plaintiff's claim renders all other potential issues of fact i.m.material, the Fuquay
Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their alleged prescriptive easement claim to King Lane due to an absence
of any evidence in support of an open and notorious adverse claim known to either the Kings or the

Lows that would have put the Kings or the Lows on notice of that alleged prescriptive use easement
claim. In the absence of this essential element of the Fuquay plaintiffs' claim, all other issues offact
are rendered immaterial, and entry of summary judgment for the defendants on the Fuquay Plaintiffs'
alleged prescriptive easement claim is therefore appropriate in this case.
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Respectfully submitted this ~ a y of February, 2015.

_Ronald P. Rainey
Attorney for the Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF 11IB STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
vs.
)
)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT
)
KING as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH )
TRUST UTA DECEMBER 12, 2012;
)
AVOCO FINANCIAL SERVICES
)
OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; THE ESTATE )
OF GORDON G. KING; ROSE M. KING; )
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE )
COMPANY,
)
)
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

MEMORANDUM DECISION
UPON KING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ROSE M. )
KING, as BeneficiaryofHEARTK
)
RANCH UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012,
)
)
Counterclaimants,
)
vs.
)
)
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)
Counterdefendants. )
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This matter came on for hearing on February 27, 2015 upon defendants Heart K Ranch
Trust UTA., acting by its Trustee, Gilbert King; the Estate of Gordon G. King and Rose M. King's
(hereinafter the "King defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment. Appearing on behalf of the
King defendants was attorney Ronald Rainey. Appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs was attorney
Matthew Cleverley, of the law firm Fidelity National Law Group.

Appearing on behalf of

defendants Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter the "Low defendants") was attorney Bryce Farris,
of the law firm Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC. The Court has considered the briefing, affidavits,
pleadings and argument submitted and sets forth its decision below.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is proper when ''the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,-show-that there is no genuine-issue as to any material fact.and.
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In a motion for summary
judgment, this Court should liberally construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draw
all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Summary judgment
must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting
inferences from the evidence presented. West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord 141 Idaho 75, 8687, 106 P.3d 401, 412 - 413 (2005), citing Iron Eagle Dev., L.L.C. v. Quality Design Sys., Inc.,
138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003) (citations omitted); see also Willie v. Bd of

Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133, 59 P.3d 302, 304 (2002).
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden is always upon the moving party to prove
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. If, however, the basis for a properly supported
motion is that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an element of the nonmoving party's case, it is incumbent upon the non-moving party to establish an issue of fact
regarding that element. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 (1996).
The burden on the moving party may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on
an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126
Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1994).
Summary judgment should be granted with caution. If the record contains conflicting
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inferences or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be
denied. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1991). Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119
Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991).
Where the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be
the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those
inferences. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,650 P.2d 657 (1982).
"While the court was permitted to draw probable inferences from the uncontradicted
evidence because it would serve as the trier of fact, it was not permitted to make conclusive
findings with regard to issues upon which the parties submitted conflicting evidence." Banner

Life Ins. Co. v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 127, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). Citing
Williams v. Computer Res., Inc., 123 Idaho 671, 673, 851 P.2d 967, 969 (1993); Ashley v.
Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 70, 593 P.2d 402,405 (1979); Argyle v. S/emaker, 107 Idaho 668, 67071, 691 P.2d 1283, 1285-86 (Ct.App. 1984).

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs seek a declaration of a prescriptive easement over King Lane in Owyhee County.
King Lane is a private, all-weather road about one-half mile in length. It runs in an east-west
direction from the public Oreana Loop Road until it connects with Castle Lane, which then runs
south until it connects with Oreana Loop Road. The King defendants own the parcel of land to the
north of King Lane, the Low defendants own the parcel of land to the south of King Lane and the
plaintiffs own parcels of land to the west of King Lane where it ends and connects with Castle
Lane.
According to the Affidavit of Rose King filed on December 9, 2014, the Kings purchased
their property on September 17, 1973. From 1973 to 1989, King Lane was just a path through their
property and at certain times of the season, it was impossible to use. 1 However, the Kings assert
that by 1989, they replaced the barrel welded culvert with a concrete culvert and improved the road
making it possible to access year-round.

1

Ms. King states that King Lane was unnamed until 2002 when The Owyhee County Sheriff's Office requested that
the Kings name the lane for identification by emergency vehicles.
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According to the Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014, the plaintiffs state
that since 1977, they have continuously used large semi-trucks, cattle trucks, farm vehicles and
personal vehicles to cross King Lane.
At various times throughout the year, the Kings graze their cattle over King Lane on both
the King property and the Low property. Prior to 2014, the Kings had barbed wire gates erected on
both the east and west ends of King Lane to keep the livestock contained. Anyone attempting to

use King Lane had to stop, open and close the gates. They also had to dodge the Kings' cattle. (See
Affidavit of Susie Low filed on 9/16/2014 and 9/18/2014 Preliminary Injunction Hearing transcript
pg. 17).
During the summer of 2014, a dispute arose between Gilbert King and John Fuquay
regarding the installation of large iron gates that the defendants recently placed at each end of King
Lane. (See Affidavit of Scott Snyder filed on 9/18/2014). According to the police report, the King
defendants told Deputy Snyder that they gave the plaintiffs permission to use King Lane so long as
the gates remained closed. At the time, the Kings had cattle grazing over King Lane that would be
affected if the gates were left open. However, John Fuquay stated that he did not have to close the
defendants' gates because he had an easement over King Lane. On August 11, 2014, the plaintiffs
filed this suit seeking a declaration of a prescriptive easement over King Lane.
According to the affidavits and declarations submitted by both the plaintiffs and the
defendants, King Lane was used by the general public. The plaintiffs assert that they have used
King Lane as a shortcut to access their property from Oreana Loop Road since 1977. (See
Declaration of John Fuquay in Support of Ex Parte Motion for TRO and Declaration of John
Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014). The King defendants assert that they use King Lane several
times a day to access their pastures and operate their cattle business. (See Affidavit of Rose King
9/9/2014).

ARGUMENTSOFTHEPARTIES
In their motion for summary judgment, the King defendants argue that the plaintiffs claim
of prescriptive easement is not supported by the necessary evidence to prevail on an essential
element of a prescriptive easement claim. Specifically, the King defendants argue that the record
before the Court shows that the plaintiffs' use of King Lane was entirely permissive and there is
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nothing in the record to show that their use was adverse and under a claim ofright.2
The plaintiffs contend that there remain genuine issues of fact regarding the required
elements of their prescriptive easement claim and therefore, summary judgment should be denied.
LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Requirements for establishing a prescriptive easement
The requirements for a prescriptive easement have been clearly established in Idaho:
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by
prescription "must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the
subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open and notorious;
(2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of
right; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the
servient tenement (5) for the statutory period." Hodgins v. Sales, 139
Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). A claimant may rely on his
own use, or he ''may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine
such predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the
requisite five continuous years of adverse use." Hodgins, 139 Idaho
at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. Once the claimant presents proof of open,
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the claimed right for the
prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began. he
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of
right. Woodv. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383, 38586 (1998); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980
(1997). The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tenement
to show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a
license, contract, or agreement. Wood, 131 Idaho at 703, 963 P.2d at
386; Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. The nature of the
use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the
property." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 975. The state of
mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling; the
focus is on the nature of their use. Id at 231-32, 76 P.3d at 975-76.

Becksteadv. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 62, 190 P.3d 876,881 (2008); citing Akers v. D.L. White Constr.,

Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005).
"A prescriptive right cannot be obtained if the use of the servient estate is by permission of
the landowner." Brown v. Miller, 140 Idaho 439, 443, 95 P.3d 57, 61 (2004); (quoting Wood, 131

2

The Low defendants support the Kings' Motion for Summary Judgment and reserve the opportunity to file their
own motion for swnmaryjudgment based on the same facts and argwnent.
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Idaho at 702, 963 P .2d at 385).
A determination that a claimant has established a prescriptive easement involves entwined
questions of law and fact. Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P .3d 876, 880 (2008). "Each
element is essential to the claim, and the trial court must make findings relevant to each element in
order to sustain a judgment on appeal." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973
(2003). It is the province of the trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs presented ''reasonably
clear and convincing evidence" of each of the five elements. Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 12-13,
784 P.2d 339, 342-43 (Ct.App.1989).

In addition, the creation of a private easement by

prescription is not favored under Idaho law. Elder v. Nw. Timber Co., 101 Idaho 356, 358, 613 P.2d
367,369 (1980).
The King defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claim of prescriptive easement fails as a
matter of law because there is no evidence in the record to show that prior to 2011, the plaintiffs'
use of King Lane was "adverse or under a claim of right" for the statutory period.3 Hodgins, 139
Idaho at 229. Rather, the record reflects that the plaintiffs' use of King Lane was permissive and in
common with the Kings, the Lows and the general public.

B. Adverse and under a claim of right
The Idaho Supreme Court has provided explanation for the prescriptive easement
requirement that use be adverse and under a claim of right:
A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient
tenement was by permission of its owner, because the use, by
definition, was not adverse to the rights of the owner. Indeed, the
rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or
ripen into a prescriptive right unless it constitutes an actual
invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner.

Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006) (citations omitted).
The nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the
property." Akers, 142 Idaho at 303 (quoting Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,231, 76 P.3d 969,
975 (2003)). "The state of mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling; instead,
3

In 2006, I.C. § 5-203 was amended to extend the statutory period from five years to twenty years. However, the twenty
year period does not apply to a prescriptive easement prior to 2006. The plaintiffs claim that they established the
required elements for prescriptive easement prior to 2006.
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the focus is on the nature of their use." Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 397-98, 210 P.3d
75, 82-83 (2009).

If a use has commenced as permissive, a user must make some new and independent act
that would put the owner of the servient property on notice that the use was no longer permissive.

Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326,327, 563 P.2d 50, 51 (1977). However, "mere inaction and
passive acquiescence is not a sufficient basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was
with the permission of the owner of the servient tenement." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557,
511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973).
There is nothing in the record to show how plaintiffs' use began but it is undisputed and the
record establishes that the plaintiffs' use of King Lane was (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous
and uninterrupted; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the defendants. Proof of these
elements, without evidence as to how the use began, raises the presumption that such use was
adverse and the burden is then on the defendants to show that such use was permissive.
The King defendants claim that beginning in 2011, the Fuquays use of King Lane became
adverse use and interfered with their ownership rights when an increased amount of commercial
and heavy truck traffic was causing excessive damage to the road surface. However, John Fuquay
claims that his use of King Lane has always been the same, which has always included moving
heavy trucks and equipment across King Lane.
According to the Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014, the plaintiffs have
used King Lane to access the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel since 1977. John
Fuquay asserts that his father, James Fuquay, owned large semi-trucks and cattle trucks that he
regularly drove across King Lane from the time they moved onto their property in January 1977.
John Fuquay also states that as a teenager, he drove large trucks across King Lane while working
for his father. (See Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014). Once he obtained his
commercial truck license, John Fuquay stated that he started driving large trucks commercially.
Currently, John Fuquay asserts that he operates under the business name John Fuquay Trucking
Company and continues to drive commercial trucks across King Lane.

In addition to the

commercial semi-truck use, John Fuquay asserts that since 1977, the plaintiffs have used King Lane
to access their parcels with the use of personal vehicles, regular farm vehicles, cattle trucks,
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pedestrian use, and use by the Fuquay's guests. (See Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October
29, 2014).
As stated above, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must make all
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. While the evidence in the record does not meet the
clear and convincing standard required to prove the creation of a prescriptive easement that is not
the standard for summary judgment. The material question of fact that remains to be decided is
when adverse use began, (whether it was in 2011 as alleged by the Kings or in 1977 as alleged by
John Fuquay).
Therefore, summary judgment must be denied.

Dated this

2-~fl,.

day ofMarch, 2015.

Thomas J. Ryan
District Judge
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I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the following via U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery:
RONALD P. RAINEY
Attorneys at Law
POBox26
Caldwell, ID 83606
S. BRYCE FARRIS
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P0Box7985
Boise, ID 83707
MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200-6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101

Dae

Deputy Clerk'

MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON KING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

c::

Page9

431

Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 - 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2014-0278

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

V.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING
as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST
UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO
FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO
FALLS, INC.; THE ESTATE OF GORDON
G. KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.
GILBERT KING, as Trustee , and ROSE M.
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Counterdefendants.
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NATURE OF THIS PROCEEDING
1. This is an action for a declaratory judgment to establish an easement to the real properties
owned by 1) John E. Fuquay and 2) Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay. The
Properties are accessed via a private roadway commonly known as King Lane. Plaintiffs
seek a declaratory judgment confirming their rights of access over all of the Defendants'
properties.
2. The Low and King defendants may own or have an interest in the parcels of property over
which King Lane runs.

I

3. The properties at issue are located east of the city of Oreana, Idaho in Owyhee County.

1

4. A street map showing the general location of the area is attached as Exhibit "A." An aerial
map showing the Owyhee County Assessor's lot boundaries is attached as Exhibit "B." A
Google Earth map showing an aerial view and general road boundaries and identities of
the affected parcel owners is attached as Exhibit "C."

Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay
5. Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuquay
Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once part of the John Fuquay Parcel. The
legal description for the Clinton Fuquay Parcel is shown on the warranty deed attached as
Exhibit "D."

John Fuquay
6. John Fuquay owns the parcel (the "John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the
Clinton Fuquay Parcel. The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT-2
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Trustee's Deed dated October 13, 1989 attached as Exhibit "E," (less the Clinton Fuquay
Parcel).
Susie Low and Cal Low Parcel 1

7. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 1") located south of King Lane.
There are two parcels which were conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for

'

1
1

the Low Parcel 1 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F."
1

Avco Financial Services of Idaho Falls, Inc.

\

8. Avco Financial Services ofldaho Falls, Inc. may claim some right, title or interest in the

\

Low Parcel I by virtue of a Real Estate Mortgage in the amount of $68,000 which was
recorded on or around March 18, 1996 as Owyhee County Records No. 218373. The
Mortgage was executed by Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner, husband and wife
and encumbers Low Parcel 1. It is possible that this mortgage was paid but was never
released. A copy of the Mortgage is attached as Exhibit "G."
Susie Low and Cal Low Parcel 2

9. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2") located south of King Lane.
Oreana Loop Road crosses the northwest comer of Low Parcel 2. The legal description
for the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "H."
Heart K Ranch Trust

10. The Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 owns the parcel to the north of King
Lane (the "Heart K Ranch Parcel"). The legal description got the Heart K Ranch Parcel is
shown on the Gift Deed attached as Exhibit "I."
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT- 3
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I

I

Estate of Gordon G. King and Rose M. King

11. The Estate of Gordon G. King and Rose M. King may claim some right, title or interest in
the Heart K. Ranch Parcel by virtue of a Deed of Trust in the amount of $86,500 in favor
of One West Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as Owyhee County Records No.
248616 and encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy of the deed of trust is attached
as Exhibit "J." The deed of trust was assigned to Gordon G. King and Rose M. King on
September 12, 2005. A copy of the Assignment of Deed of Trust is attached as Exhibit

"K."
First American Title Insurance Company

12. First American Title Insurance Company may claim some right, title or interest in the
Heart K. Ranch Parcel by virtue of being named as the trustee under a Deed of Trust in the
amount of $86,500 in favor of One West Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as
Owyhee County Records No. 248616 and encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy
of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit "J."
PROPERTIES AND ROADWAYS

13. The properties at issue in this Complaint are located in Owyhee County, Idaho. They are
located approximately three miles east of Oreana and are south of Highway 78. The
closest public roadway to the properties is Oreana Loop Road.
14. Oreana Loop road runs in a generally west direction from Highway 78 to a point near a
location where Low Parcels 1 and 2 and the Heart K Ranch Parcels intersect. Near that
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location, Oreana Loop Road turns and continues in a southwesterly direction through Low
Parcel 1.
15. King Lane is a private roadway that continues westerly from where Oreana Loop Road
turns southwest Oreana Loop Road and provides the access to the Clint Fuquay Parcel and
the John Fuquay Parcel.
16. The Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay
Parcel since at least 1989.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
{PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT)

17. The use of King Lane for access by owners of the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John
Fuquay Parcel has been open and continuous over the same route for more than 5 years, 1
and was without permission from adverse land owners.
18. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment declaring that they have established a prescriptive
easement for access and utilities over King Lane for access to the Clint Fuquay Parcel and
the John Fuquay Parcel.

1

LC. 5-203 was amended from 5 years to 20 years in 2006, but the 5 year time frame still
applies to prescriptive claims before 2006. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Id 212,222.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
{INJUNCTION}

19. The Low and King defendants have installed gates that block Plaintiffs' access to King
Lane and the Low and King defendants continue to block Plaintiffs' rightful access.
20. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment enjoining the Low and King defendants or any person
who takes by, through or under them, from blocking or impeding Plaintiffs' access over
King Lane.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS PRAYS AS FOLLOWS
1. For a Judgment declaring that Plaintiffs have an easement for ingress, egress and

utilities to over King Lane for access to Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay
Parcel.
2. For a Judgment Declaring that each of the Defendants rights in their parcels are
subject to and servient to the easement for access to Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John
Fuquay Parcel.
3. For a Judgment declaring that the easement runs with the land and is binding and
inures to the benefit of all subsequent owners, transferees, and assigns of the Clint
Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay Parcel.
4. For a Judgment declaring that the easement runs with the land and is binding and that
all subsequent owners, transferees, and assigns of Defendants shall be subject to the
easement.
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5. For a Judgment enjoining any defendant from impeding or interfering with Plaintiffs'
access rights over King Lane.

Dated: March 30, 2015
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Instrument # 284171

MURPHY OWYHEE IDAHO
2014-06-~6 04: 12:27 No. of Pages: 1
Recorded for: ALLIANCE TITLE - BOISE PROOUCTIC
ANGELA BARKELL
Fee: $10.00
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy: map
.,_Tc,.DEEOWARRANTY

Electronically Recorded by Simplifile

WARRANTY DEED
Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. Order No.:217172
FOR VALUE RECEIVED
John E Fuquay, a divorced man
the grantor(s), do(es) hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto
Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay, Husband and Wife

whose cu.rrent address is
18907 Castle Lane
Oreana, ID 83650
the grantee(s), the following described premises, in Owyhee County, Idaho, TO WIT:
In Township 4 South, Range l East, Bobe Meridian, Owyhee County, ldaho.
Section 34: The Southwest Quarter or the Northeast Quarter and the Northwest
Quarter or the Southeast Quarter
EXCEPT any mobile home or house trailer located thereon

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said
Grantee, heirs and assigns forever. And the said Orantor does hereby covenant to and with the
said Grantee(s), that (s)he is/are the owner(s) in fee simple of said premise.,; that they are free
from all encumbrances Except: Cunent Year Taxes, conditions, covenants, restrictions,
reservations, easements, rights and rights of way, apparent or of record.
And that (s)he will wamnt and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.
Dated:

June 241 2014

Jµ_~~
JohnEFuw
S1a1c of

/ ~

Tdtth'0
I
Mc,_"'~u::'------- l

ss

eoun1y or __

\

JANANNE KEATING
NOTAAY PUBLIC

SiATE OF IDAHO

PilcNo.211112

284171
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Recording Requested By and
When Recorded Return to:

Instrument# 254987
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO

2006--01,27

04:35:41 No. of Pages: 4

SUSIE LOW
CALLOW

Recorded for: PIONEER TITLE COMPANY
CHARLOTTE SHE.RBURN
~ JU..i'faa: 12.00

21220 Oreana Loop Road
Oreana, ID 33650

lndox1,.: DEEO, WARRAHN

Q.

Ex-Offlclo Recorder Daputy-"'-""""-'-'l-'~ilt='-'-----

SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED (this ..Deed"). made as of the 61h day of January, 2006, is between
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"),
whose legal address is: 21220 Oreana Loop Road, Oreana, ID 83650.
WlTNESSETH, That Grantor, for and in consideration of One Dollar and No/I 00 ($1.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and
confirm, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever, all the real property, together with
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State of Idaho, more particularly described as follows:
See legal description described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto

Futher Granted Water Rights as Defined in Attachment "Water Rights"
TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in
law or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of
way and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water,
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which arc
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the
property (collectively, the "Property").
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors and assigns,
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in law, in fee
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in
manner and form as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants,
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature
whatsoever, as of July IS, 2005 .
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above·bargained premises in the quiet
and peaceable possession of Grantee, its successors and assigns, against all and every person or persons
claiming the whole or any part thereor BY, THROUGH OR UNDER Grantor.
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IN WJTNESS WHEREOF, Granter has executed this Special Warranty Deed as of the date set
forth above.

PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC,
an ldaho limited liability company

By:

Pioneer 1031 Company, Member

By:

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)
) ss.
)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 61hday of January, 2006, by Alicia
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer I 031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.
My commission expires: 9.9.09.

Notary Public
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EXHIBIT-A
P07036

In Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho.
Section 34:
Section 35:

E112 SE1/41 SE1/4 NE 1/4

W1/2 SW1/4, SW1/4 NW14

EXCEPTING 1-1/2 acres In the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35,
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as
follows:
COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
of said Section, running thence In a Westerly direction 630 feet; thence In a Southerly
direction 104 feet; thence in an Easterly direction 630 feet; thence in a Northerly direction
104 feet to the PLACE OF BEGINNING.

In Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho.
Section 2:
Section 3:

Lot 4
Lot 1

F'll'St American TiUe tnsur11nco
Sehedule B
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EXHIBIT~
WATER RlGHTS

1.
2.
3.
4.

No. 57-89. 4-1-)874 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation and Stock Water.
No. 57-95. 4-1-1885 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation.
No. 57-I04. 4-1-1887 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
No. .57-116. 4-1-1895 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
5. No. 57-120. 4-1-1896 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
6. No. 57-127. 4-1-1899 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation.
7. No. 57-149. 4-1-1906 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
8. No. 57-2104. 10-5-1920 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation.
Total
Total Acres: 145.

c..:D

0.240 CFS.
0.360 CFS.
0.200 CFS
0.100 CFS
0.300 CFS
0.400 CFS
0.200 CFS
l.280 CFS
3.080 CFS
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SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED {this "Deed"), made as of the 61h day of January, 2006, is between
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"),
whose legal address is: 21220 Orenna Loop Road, Oreana, ID 83650.
WITNESSETH, That Grantor, for and in consideration of One Dollar and No/100 ($1.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged,
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and
confirm, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever, all the real property, together with
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State of Idaho, more particularly described as follows:
Township 4 South, Range I East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; Section 35: Northeast Quarter
Southwest Quaner; Southwest Quarter Northeast Quarter; Southeast Quarter Northwest Quarter; Northwest
Quarter Southeast Quarter; Including Water Right #57-10045 and #57-10046

TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in
law or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of
way and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water,
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which arc
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the
property (collectively, the "Property").
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors and assigns,
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in law, in fee
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in
manner and form as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants,
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature
whatsoever, as of July 15, 2005 .
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above-bargained premises in the quiet
and peaceable possession of Grantee, its successors and assigns, against all and every person or persons
claiming the whole or any part thereof BY, THROUGH OR UNDER Grantor.

458

,•

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Grantor has executed this Special Warranty Deed as of the date set
forth above.

PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER#69, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company

By:

Pioneer 1031 Company, Member

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)

) ss.
)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 6thday of January, 2006, by Alicia
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer I031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.

My commission expires: 9.9.09.

(NOTARIAL SEAL)
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GIFrDEED
Intending a gift, ROSE M. KING, a single person, Grantor; does hereby grant, bargain,
sell and convey to GILBERT GENE KING, AS TRUSTEE (or any successor Trustee
thereof) OF THE HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012, Grantee, whose
current address is Post Office Box 36, Murphy, Idaho 83650, the following real property located
in Owyhee County, Idaho, as described on Exhibit A, attached hereto and incorporated herein.
SUBJECT TO current taxes and assessments and all subsequent years, together with any
and all existing easements, rights-of-way, reservations, restrictions and encwnbrances of record,
to any existing tenancies, to all zoning laws and ordinances, and to any state of facts an accurate
survey or inspection of the premises would show.
This conveyance shall include any and all appurtenances, tenements, hereclitaments,

reversions, remainders, easements, rights-of-way and water rights in anywise appertaining to the
property herein described.
I

All income and gain derived from such property shall be the sole and separate property of
said Grantee.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has hereunto subscribed her name to this
instrument this 28th day of December, 2012.

Instrument # 279640
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO

12.31.2012

10:09:48 No. of Pages: 5

Recorded for: ROSE KING
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN •

GIFT DEED - 1 00433804.000

22.00

Ex-Officio Reeorder DeputY,
lnduto:OEED,PERSON4LREPAlill
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STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:

County of Ada

)

On this 28th day of December, 2012, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in and for
said State, personally appeared ROSE M. KING, known or aeknowledged to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed
the same.

IN WTINESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year first
above written.

GIFI' DEED· 2 00433804.000
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BXH1BITA

Tract]:
Jn Townsblp4 South. Range 1Emf, Bois~ Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho
Sccflon 26:
Soutbwoat Quarter,. South Half oftho Northwest Quarter, North Half of the Southeast
Quarter; Southwest Quarter Qfthe Southeast Quarter, South Half ofth'? Northeast Quarter, Nortlteut
Querier of the Northeast Qwutor
Section 27~
Southeast Quarter of the Southoast Quarter
Seotlon 94:
Northeast Quarter of the Northoast Quarter
Section 3S:
North Half of tho Northwest Quarter. and a parcel In the Southwest ~ of the
Northwest Quarter desoribed as follows: BegiMlng at tho Northeast comer of the Southwost Quarter of
the Northwest Quarter, Sec. 3S, T4S, RlB, B.M.; thence In a Woatorl)' dfreotion630 feet; thence Ina
Southerly dlraction 104 feet; thence In an Basterly dlm:tion 630 feet; thenoe In a Northerly dlreotfon 104
feet to the PLACB OP BBOINNINO.
BXCBPTINO THEREFROM:
A·portton of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35 In Township 4 South, Range l
Bast, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County. Idaho. described as follows!
COMMBNCJNO at tho Section comer common to Seotlons 26, 27, 34 and 3S ofTownahlp 4South,.
Range 1 East, Boise Merlcllen, Owyhee·County, Idaho; thence
·
· South 1320 feet along tho Section line common to Seotions 34 and 35 a distance of 1320 feet to
the Southwest comer ·otthe Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section. 3S;thenco
Bast along tho South line of said Northwest Quarter ofthe Northwest Quarter a dtstanoe of 558
feet to the. TRUB ~OINT OF BBOJNNINO; thence
North parallel with the We.1t line or said Section 35 a dtstance of 16S feet; thence
Bast and parallel with tho South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a dlstanoe
of 175 feet; thence
South and pamllel with tho West line of said Section 35 a distance of 16S feet to a point on tho
South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Qumter said Section 35 that la Bast a distance of
17S feet ftom the POINT OF BBOINNINO; thence
West along said South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 17S
feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEOJNNJNO.

of

Tractll:
.
A portion of the Nordlwest Quarter oftho Northwest Quarter of Section 35 In Township 4 South, Range l
Bast, Boise Meridian. Owyhee County, Idaho, dGSmlbed as follows:

COMMBNC~O at the Scotton comer common to Seotions 26. 27, 34 and 35 of Township 4 South.
Range 1 Bast, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; thence
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South 1320 feet along the Seotlon line common to Sections 34 and 35 a distance of 1320 feet to
the Southwest comer of the Northwest Quam,r of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 3Si thence
Bast along the South lino of said Northwest Quarter oftbe Northwest Quarter a diatance of S58 ·
feet to the TR.UB POINT OP BBOINNJNG; thence
Norlb parallel with the West line of said Section 3S a dJstance of 16S feet; 1hence
Bast and parallel wJth tho South line of1ho Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a d.latancc
of 17S feet; 1henee
South and parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet to a point on the
South Jim, of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of SBid Seetlon 3S that is Bast a distance of
175 feet ftom tho POINT OF BBOINNINO; thence
West along said South Una of1he Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a dls1ance of 175
feet to the TRUB POINT OF BEOlNNINO.

Tract Ill:
In ToW11Ship 7 South. Range 1 Bast, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho
Section 9:
BestHelfoftlm Northeast Quarter

Tract IV:
In Township 7 South. Range 2 East. Boise Moridi1111, Owyhee County, Idauo
Section 30:
WestHa1fof1he Northeast Quarter

TrlWt V:
In Township 8 Sou1h, Range 1 :&st, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho
Seetion 6:
Oovemment Lot 7, Southeast Quarter ofthe Southwest Quarter, Southwest Quarter of the

Southeast Quarter
Scotlon 7:
Government Lot I, Northeast Quarter ofthe Northwest Quarter" North Halfof the
Northeast Quarter
Section 18:
Government Lots 2, 3, S, 6 md 7, Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter
Section 19:
Government Lots 1, 2 and 3, East Half ofthe Northwest Quarter, Northeast Quarter of the
Southwest Quarter, North Half of1hc Southeast Quarmr
TraotVI:
In Township 8 South, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Owyhee CoUlllY, Idaho
Scotton 1:
East Half of the Southeast Quarter
Section 12:
Bast Half of the Northeast Quarter, Bast Half of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast .
Quam,r
Section 13:
South Half ofthe North H~ North Half of the South Hatt Oovomment Lots 1, 2, 3 and
4
Sectipn 18:
Southeast Quarter. East Half of the Southwest Quarter, Oovemment Lots 3 and 4
North Half of the Northeast Quarter, Southeast Quarter of the Northcast Quarter,
Section 19;
Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter, Government Lot 1, East Half of the Southeast Quarter
Section 20:
Southwest Quarter oftho Northwest Quarter, Northwest Quarter of 1he Southwest Quarter
Section 2.2:
Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter, South Half of tho Southeast Quarter
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Secuon24:
See1lon26:
Section 27:

Northwest Quarter, North Half oftho Southwest Quarter

Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
Northeast Quarter of1he Northeast Quarter

TOGBTHBR wrm a grant of Easement for a well, ditch and cooling pond loeat.ed in tho NWNE, Sec.
34. T4S, RlE. BM, as granted by the· United States, Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, on
August 4, 1961, under Serial No. Idaho 012682.
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After recording please return to:

Bank of the West, a
california C01:poration

lnstrwnent # 241816
IIUIIPHY, OWVHEE, IDAHo
20N-Ol-28
04·2&·21 N
llec«decf
.
' ·
· o. of P91: 16
u...
for·
PIONEER TITLE COMPANY
C

[Company Nam&]

..,....£.OTTE IHEUURN

llt.Qftlcfo Rec:anw Depwy

llldti,to: DIS)o, 1'IUIT

[Name of Natural Person!

8 ~:

48.DO

P.O. Bax 512086 {service)
[Street Add/eSSJ

Los Angeles, CA 90051-0086
Zip Code]

[City, State

- - - - - - - - - - - { S p a c e AboV& This Lina For Recording D a t a J - - - - - - - - - - ffiEPARED BY:

Kathy Rodriguez
(323} 727-4987 Ext.

DEED OF TRUST
DEFINITIONS
Words used in multiple sections of this document are defined below and other words are defined in Sections 3, ii,
13, 18, 20 and 21. Certain rules regaming the usage of words used in this document are also provided in Section 16.

July 19, 2004

(A)
"Security Instrument,, means this document, whlchis dated
together with all Riders to this document
(Jl)

"Borrower" is Karla Kay

KinJ rove, an umarried

\o.OtBil

. Borrower is the trustor under this Security Instrument
(C)

"Lender"is Bank of the West, a california Corporation
organized and existing mtder the laws of

Lender is

California

. Lender's address is

1977 Saturn street

(bene) , Monterey Park, Cl\ 91755
Lender is the beneficiary under this Security Instrument.
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(D)

"Trustee" is

First J.\nerican Title Insuranc:e

carpany, a coq,oration

"Note11 means the promissory note signed by Borrower and dated
July 19, 2004
The Note states that Borrower owes Lender
Eighty Six. Thousand Five Hurrlred and
(E)

00/lOOths
Dollars (U.S. $ 86,500.00
)
plus interest. Borrower has promised to pay this debt in regular Periodic Payments and to pay the debt in full not
laterthan
August 1, 2024
(F)

"Property" means the property

that is described below

under the heading "Transfer of Rights in the

Property."
(G)
"Loan" means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest. any prepayment charges and late charges due
under the Note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest

"Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instrument that are executed by Borrower. The following
(H)
Riders are to be executed by Borrower {check box as app6cable):

D
D
D
D

Adjustable Rate Rider
Balloon Rider
1-4 Family Rider

D
D
D

Condominium Rider
Planned Unit Development Rider

D
0

Second Home Rider

Biweekly Payment Rider

Revocable Trust Rider

Other(s) [specify]

"Applicable Law" means all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes. regulations, ordinances
and administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable final, non-appealable

(I)

judicial opinions.

,

"Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments~ means all dues, fees. assessments and other
charges that are imposed on Borrower or the Property by a condominium association, homeowners association or
similar organization.

{J)

(K)
"Electronic Funds Transfer" means any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check,
draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through. an electronic tenninal, telephonic instrument, computer,
or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an account. Such term
includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale transfers, automated teller machine transactions, transfers initiated by
telephone, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse transfers.
(L)

"Escrow Items" means 1hose items that are described in Section 3.

(M)
"Miscellaneous Proceeds" means any compensation, settlement, award of damages, or proceeds paid by
any third party (other than insurance proceeds paid under the coverages descn'bed in Section 5) for: (i) damage to,

any

or destruction ot: the Property; (ii) condemnation or other taldng of all or
part of the Property; (iii) conveyance
in lieu of condemnation~ or (iv) misrepresentations of, or omissions as to, the value and/or condition af1he Property.
(N)

"Mortgage Insurance" means insmance protecting Lender against the nonpayment

of. or default on, the

Loan.
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(0)
"Periodic Payment" means the regularly scheduled amount due for (i) principal and interest under the
Note, plus (ii) any amounts llllder Section 3 of this Security Instrument.
(P)
"RE.SPA" means the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Aa (12 U.S.C. §2601 el seq.) and its
implementing regulation, Regulation X (24 C.F.R. Part 3500), as they might be amended from time to time, or any
additional or successor legislation or regulation that governs the same subject matter. As used in this Security
Instmm~ "RESPA" refers to all requirements and restrictions that m imposed in regard to a "fedexa1ly related
mortgage loan" even if the Loan does not qualify as a "federally related mortgage loan'' under RESPA.
(Q)
"Successor in Interest of Borrower" means any party that has taken title to the Property, whether or not
that party bas assumed Borrower's obligations under the Note and/or this Security Instrument

TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY
This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and
modifications of the Note; and (ii) the performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security
Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust. with power
a:unty
of sale, the following descn"bed property located in the
{rype of Rr,c;ording Jurisdicfion]

of
{Nam& of Recording JurisdicUonJ

SE!!: ATmrnED HEREl'O AND MADE A PARl' HERIDF

which cm:rentl.y bas the address of

19100

K:i.n3

Lane

{Strset]

Mu:r;phy
[City}

, Idaho

83650

("Property Address"):

{Zip Code]
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Exhibit "A"

PARCEL I:
A portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35 In Township
4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as follows:
COMMENCING at the Section corner common to Sections 26, 27, 34 and 35 of Township
4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; thence
South 1320 feet along the Section line common to Sections 34 and 35 a distance
of 1320 feet to the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
of said Section 35; thence
East along the South line of said Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a
distance of 558 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
North parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet; thence
East and parallel with the South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter a distance of 175 feet; thence
South and parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet to
a point on the South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said
Section 35 that Is East a distance of 175 feet from the POINT OF BEGINNING; thence
· West along said South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a
distance of 175 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.

PARCEL 11:
An easement for Ingress and egress over a parcel of land located in the Northwest Quarter
of Sectlon 35, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho.
Being further described as follows:
"BEGINNING at a point on the Northerly right-of-way of Oreana Loop Road from which the
East Quarter corner of said Section 35 bears South 68° 05'05"' East a distance of 3,483.22

feet;
thence along said right•of-way on a curve to the left with a radius of 456.77 feet
and a central angle of 13° 02'31 ", an arc length of 103.97 feet (with a chord bearing of
South 74° 35'55" West, and a chord distance of 103.75 feet);
thence leaving said right-of-way North 89° 44'39 .. West a distance of 34.65 feet;
thence South 86° 52'41 11 West a distance of 101.22 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 956.00 feet and a central. angle
of 08° 09'05", an arc length of 136.01 feet (with a chord bearing of South 82° 48'09" West,
and a chord distance of 135.89 feet);
.
thence South 78° 43'37" West a distance of 16.97 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 190.00 feet and a central angle
of 34° 08'57", an arc length of 113.24 feet (with a chord bearing of North 84° 11'54" West, .
and a chord distance of 111.57 feet);
thence North 67° 07'26" West a distance of 132.56 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 162.00 feet and a central angle
of 57° 53'42", an arc length of 163.69 feet (with a chord bearing of South 83° 55'43" West
First American Title
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and a chord distance of 156.82 feet);
thence Into a tangent reverse curve to the right having, radius of 139.00 feet and
a central angle of 16° 00'01" attd a length of 38.82 feet. {with a chord bearing of South 62°
58'52 11 West, and a chord distance of 38.69 feet);
thence along a cure to the right having a radius of 474.00 feet and a central angle
of 18° 35'17";
thence westerly along the arc, a distance of 153.78 feet (with a chord bearing of
South 80° 16'32" West, and a chord distance of 153.10 feet);
thence South 89° 34'10" West a distance of 364.49 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 60.45 feet and a central angle of
80° 02'33", an arc length of 84.45 feet (with a chord bearing of North 51 ° 23'44" West, and
a chotd distance of 77.75 feet);
thence South 85° 29'29" East a distance of 30.23 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 32.45 feet and a central angle of
65° 16'28", an arc length of 36.97feet (with a chord bearing of South 58° 46'46" East, and
a chord distance of 35.00 feet);
thence North 89° 34'1 O" East a distance of 364.49 feet;
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 446.00 feet and a cental angle of
18° 35'17", an arc length of 144.69 feet (with a chord bearing of North 80° 16'31" East, and
a chord distance of 144.06 feet);
thence along a curve to the left having a radius of 111.00 feet and a central angle
of 16° 00'01"', an arc length of 31.00 feet (with a chord bearing of North 62° 58'52" East,
and a chord distance of 30.90 feet); .
thence along a curve to the right having a radius of 190.00 feet and a central angle
of 57° 53'42" and a.length of 191.99 feet, (with a chord bearing of North 83° 55'43" East,
and a chord distance of 183.92 feet};
thence South 67° 07'26" East a distance of 132.56 feet;
thence along a circular curve to the right with a radius of 162.00 feet and a central
angle of 34° 08'57", an arc length of 96.55 feet {with a chord bearing of South 84° 11'55"
East. and a chord distance of 95.13 feet);
thence North 781> 43'37" East a distance of 16.97 feet;
thence along a circular curve to the right with a radius of 984.00 feet and a central
angJe of 08° 09'05'1 , an arc length of 139.99 feet {with a chord bearing of North 82° 48"09"
East, and a chord distance of 139.87 feet);
thence North 86° 52'41" East a distance of 102.04 feet;
thence Sc,uth 89° 44'39" East a distance of135.37 feet to the .eotNT OF EGINNING.
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TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements,
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and additions shall also be
covered by this Security Instmment All of the foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as the "Property."
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of 1he estate hereby conveyed and has the
right

to grant and convey the Property and that the Property is unencumbered. except for encumbrances of record.

Bom>wec warnmts and will defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to any
encumbrances of record.
TillS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform
covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a uniform security instrument covering real property.
UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows:
1. Payment of Principal, Interest, Ellcrow Items, Prepayment Charges, and Late Charges.
BOIIower shall pay when due the principal of, and interest on. the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment
charges and late charges due under the Note. Borrower shall also pay funds
ES'Clow Items pursuant to Section 3.
Payments due under the Note and this Security Insttument shall be made in U.S. currency. However, if any check or
other instrument :received by Lender as payment under the Note or this Security Instrument is retmned to Lender
unpaid, Lender may require that any or all subsequent payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument be
made in one or more of the following fonns, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order, (c) certified check,
bank check, trcasmer's check or cashier's check, provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose
deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Tmnsfer.
Payments are deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at such
other location as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15. Lender may
retum any payment or partial payment if the, payment or partial payments are insufficient to bring 1he Loan current.
· Lender may accept any payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan current, without waiver of any
rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or partial payments in the future, but Lender is not
obligated to apply such payments at the time such payments are accepted. If each Periodic Payment is applied as of
its scheduled due date, then Lender need not pay interest on ·unapplied funds. Lender may hold such unappJied
funds until Borrower makes payment to bring the Loan cum:nt. If Borrower docs not do so within a reasonable
period of time, Lender shall either apply such funds or return them to Borrower. If not applied earlier, such funds
will be applied to the outstanding principal balance under the Note immediately prior to foreclosure. No offset or
claim which Borrower might have now or in the future against Lender shall relieve Borrower from making payments
due under the Note and this Security Instrument or performing the covenants and agreements secured by this
Security Instrument.
2. Application of Payments or Proceeds. Except as otherwise described in this Section 2, all payments
accepted and applied by Lender shall be applied in the following order of priority: (a) interest due under the Note;
(b) principal due under the Note; (c) amounts due under Section 3. Such payments shall be applied to each Periodic
Payment in the order in which it became due. Any remaining amo1111ts shall be applied fust to late charges. second
to any other amounts due under this Security Instrument. and then to reduce the principal balaru:e of the Note.
If Lender receives a payment from Borrower for a delinquent Periodic Payment which includes a sufficient
amount to pay any late charge due, the payment may be applied to the delinquent payment and the late charge. If
more than one Periodic Payment is outstanding, Lender may apply any payment received from Bonower to the
repayment of 1:he Periodic Payments if, and to the extent that, each payment can be paid in full To the extent that
any excess exists after the payment is applied to the full payment of one or more Periodic Payments, such excess
may be applied 10 any late charges due. Voluntary prepayments shall be applied first to any prepayment charges and
then as descnoed in the Note.

for
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Any application of payments, insurance proceeds, or Miscellaneous Proceeds to principal due under the
Note shall not extend or postpone the due date, or change the amount, of the Periodic Payments.
3. Funds for Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day Periodic Payments are due
under the Note, until the Note is paid in full, a sum (the "Funds'') to provide for payment of amounts dne for:
(a) taus and assessments and other items which can attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien or
encumbrance on the Property; (b) leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if anJ; (c) premiums
for any and an imnrance required by Lender and (d) Mortgage Jnsurance premiums, if any, or my sums
payable by Borrower to Lender in lieu of the payment of Mortgage Insurance premiums in accordance with
the prcmsions of Section 10. These items are called "Escrow Jtems." At origlnation or at any time during the
term of the Loan, Lender may reqoire that Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any, be
escrowed by Borrower, and such dues, fees and assessments shall be an Escrow Item. BorroweT shall
promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under this Section. Borrower shall pay Lender
the Fonds for Escrow Items unless Lender waives Borrowers obllgatum to pay the Funds for any or all
Escrow ltems. · Lender may waive Borrower's obligation to pay to Lender Funds for any or all Escrow Items
at any time. Any such waiver may only be in writing. 1n the event of mch waiver, Borrower shall pay
directly, when and where payable, the amounts due for any Escrow Items for which payment af Funds has
been waived by Lender and, if Lender requires, shall furnish to Lender receipts evidencing soch payment
within such time period as Lender may require. Borrowers obligation to make such payments and to
provide receipts shall for all purposes be deemed to be a covenant and agreement contained in the Security
Instrnment. If Borrower is obligated to pay Escrow Items directly, pursuant to a waiver, and Borrower fails
to pay the amount due for an Escrow Item, Lender may exercise its rights under Section 9 and pay such
amount and Borrower shall then be obligated to repay to Lender ury such amount. Lender may revoke the
waiver as to any or all Escrow Items at any time by notice and, upon such revocation, Borrower shall pay to
Lender all Funds. and in such amounts, that are then required.
Lender may, at any time, collect and hoW Funds in an amount (a) sufficient to permit Lender to
apply the Funds at the time specified under RESPA, and (b) not to exceed the maximum amount• a lender can
require under RESPA. Lender shall estimate the amount of Funds due on the basis of current data and
reasonable ~mates of expenditures of futurl: Escrow Items or othenvise in accordance with ApplicabJe Law.
The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency,
instrumentality, or entity {including Lender, if Lender is an institution whose deposits are so insured) or in
aDY Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the Escrow Items no later 1han the time
specified under RESPA. Lender shall not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funw, annually
analyzing the escrow account, or verifying the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the
Funds and Applicable Law permits I.ender to make such a charge. Unless an agreement is made in writing
. or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on the Funds, I.ender shall not be required to pay Borrower
any interest or earnings on the Funds. -Borrower and Lender can agree in writing, however, that interest
shall be paid on the Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the
Funds as required by RESP A.
1f there is a surplus of .Funds held in escrow, as defmed under RESPA, Lender shall account to
Borrower foT the excess funds in accordance with RESPA. If there is a shortage of Funds held in escrow, as
defined lUlder RESPA, Lender shall notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to
Lender the amount necessary to make up the shortage in accor!lanc.e with RESPA, but in no more than 12
monthly payments. If there is a deficiency of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA. Lender sball
notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to Lender the amount necessary to make up
the deficiency in accordance with RESP~ but in no more than 1l monthly payments.
·
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Len.der shall promptly refund
to Borrower any Funds held by Lender.

: 3984002
Idahe Deed e!Tnat.-Sinsle Family-F1111Die Mae/Freddie Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT

-THE

c.=~

INc.-

IIUll(IIIIIIIJIIIU

Page 50114

473

-'-,---,-------------

4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments. charges, fines, and impositions
attnbutable to the Property which can attain priority over this Security Instrument. leasehold payments or ground
rents on the Property, if any, and Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any. To the extent that
these items are Escrow Items, BorrO\ver shall pay them :in the manner provided in Section 3.
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instmment lDlless
Borrower; (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable to
Lender, but only so long as Bouower is pei:forming such agreement; (b) contests the lien in good faith by, or
defends against enforcement of the lien in. legal proceedings which in Lender's opinion operate to prevent the
enforcement of the lien while those proo:edings are pending, but only until such procccdings are concluded; or (c)
secures from the holder of the lien ao agn:emcnt satisfactory to Lender subordinating the lien to this Security
Instnunent. lfLe:oder determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien which can attain priority over this
Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying the lien. Wtthin 10 days of the date on which
that notice is given. Borrower shall satisfy the lien or take one or more of the actions set forth above in this
Section 4.
Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for a real estate tax verification and/or reporting
service med by Lender in connection with this Loan.
5. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing OT hereafter erected on the
Property .insured against loss by fire, hazards .included within the tcnn ••extended coverage," and any other hazards
including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance. This insmance shall. be
maintained in the amounts (including deductll>le levels) and for the periods that Lender requires. · What Lender
requires pursuant to the preceding sentcnccs can change during the term of the Loan. The insmance carrier
providing the .i.nsnrance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's right to disapprove Borrower's choice,
which right shall not be exercised unreasonably. Lender may require Borrower to pay, .in connection with this Loan,
either: (a) a one•time charge for ftood zone detemlinat:icm, certification and tracking services; or (b) a one-rime
charge for flood wne detennination and certification services and subsequent charges each time reJ\18PP.i.ngs or
similar changes occur which reasonably might affect such detemrination or certification. Borrower shall also be
respollSlllle for the payment of any fees imposed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in eotmection with
the review of any flood zone determination resulting from an objection by Borrower.
If Borrower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above, Lender may obtain .insurance coverage,
at Lender's option and Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any particular type or amount
of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might not protect Bom>wer, Bonower's
equity in the Property, or the contents of the Property, against any risk, hazard or liability and might provide greater
or lesser coverage than was previously .in effect Borrower acknowledges that the cost of the .i.nsmance coverage so
obtained might significantly exceed the cost of insmance that Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts
disbursed by Lender under this Section 5 shall become additional debt of Bonower secured by this Security
Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note xate from the date of disbursement and sball be payable,
with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment
All insurance policies required by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lender's right to
disapprove such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as mortgilgee and/or as an
additional loss payee. Lender shall have the right to bold the policies and renewal certificates. 1f Lender requires,
Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and renewal notices. If Borrower obtains any
form of insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, for damage to, or destruction ot: the Propeny, such
policy shall include a standard mortgage clause and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional loss
payee.
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may
make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in. writing. any
insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall be applied to restoration
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or repair of the Property, jf the restmation or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened.
During such repair and ~oration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such insurance proceeds until Lender
has had an opportnnity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction,
provided that such inspection shall be imdertaken promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and
restoration in a single pll)'lilent or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is
made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such insumnce proceeds, Lender shall not be
required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such proceeds. Fees for public adjusters, or other third parties,
retained by ;Borrower shall not be paid out of the insurance proceeds and shall be the sole obligation of Borrower. If
the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's secwity would be lessened, the insuiance proceeds
shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument; whether or not then due, with the excess, if any,
paid to Borrower. Such. insmance proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2.
JfBorrower abandons the Property, Lender may file, negotiate and settle any available insurance claim and
related matters. If Borrower does not respond within 30 days to a notice from Lender that the insurance carrier has
offered to settle a claim, then Lender may negotiate and settle 'the claim. The 30-day period will begin whm the
notice is given. In either event. or if Lender acquires the Property-under Section 22 or otherwise, Borrower hereby
assigns to Lender (a) Borrower's rights to any .insurance proceeds in an amount not to exceed the amounts wpaid
under the Note ortbis Security Instrument, and (b) any other ofBorrower's rights {other than the right to any refund
of unearned premiums paid by Borrower) under all insurance policies covering the Property, insofar as such rights
are applicable to the coverage of the Property. Lender may use the insurance proceeds either to repair or restore the
Property or to pay amOllltfs llllpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, whether or not then due.
6. Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal residence
within 60 days after the execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as
Borrower's principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender otherwise agrees in
writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, or umess extenuating circumstances exist which. are
beyond Borrower's control.
• Main1enance and Protection of the Property; Inspections. Bonower shall not
7. Preservation,
destroy, damage or impair1he Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the Property. Whether
or not Borrower is residing in the Property, Borrower shall maintain the Property in order to prevent the Property
from deteriorating or decreasing in value due to its condition. Unless it is determined pursuant to Section 5 that
repair or restoration is not economically feasible, Bonower shall promptly repair the Property if damaged to avoid
further deterioration or damage. 1f insurance or condemnation proceeds are paid in connection with damage to, or
the taking of, the Property, Borrower shall be respons1"ble for repairing or JeStoring the Property only if Lender has
released proceeds for such purposes. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single
or condemnation proceeds
payment or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. If the
are not sufficient to repair or restore the Property, Borrower is not relieved of Borrower's obligation for the
completion of such repair or restoration.
Lender or its agenl may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. If it has reasonable
cause, Lender may inspect the interior of the improvements on the Property. Lender shall give Borrower notice at
the time of or prior to such an interior inspection specifying such reasonable cause.
8. Borrower's Loan Application. Borrower shall be in default if, during the Loan application process.
Borrower or any persons or entities acting at the direction of Botrower or with Borrower's knowledge or consent
gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements to Lender (or failed to provide Lender
with material information) in connection with the Loan. Material. representations include, but are not limited to,
representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the Property as Borrower's principal residence.
9. Protection of Lender's Interest in the Property and Rights Under this Security Instrument. If
(a) Borrower fails to petform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instmment,-(b) there is a legal
proceeding that might significantly affect Lender's interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security

insurance
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Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate. for condemnation or forfeiture, for enfon:emcnt of a lien
which may attain priority over this Security Insnument or to enforce laws or regulations). or (c) Borrower has
abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is .reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's
interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument, including protecting and/or assessing 1he value of
the Property, and securing and/or repairing the Property. Lender's actions can include, .but are .not limited to:
(a) paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument~ (b) appearing in court~ and
(c). paying reasonable attorneys' fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or righls under this Sccmity
Instrument, including its secured position in a bankruptcy proceeding. Securing the Property includes, but is not
limited to> entering 1he Property to make repairs, change locks, ieplace or board up doors and windows, drain water
from pipes. eliminate building or other code violations or dangerous conditions, and have utilities 1urned on or off.
Although Lender may take action under tbi& Section 9, Lender does not have to do so and is not wider any duty or
obligation to do so. It is agreed that Lender incurs no liability for not taking any or all actions authorized 1Ulder this
Section 9.
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Bonower secured
by this Security Instrument.. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and
shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment
If this Security lllstrument is on a leasehold, Barrower shall comply with all the provisions of the lease. If
Borrower acquires fee title to 1he Property, the leasehold and the fee title shall n.ot merge unless Lender agrees to the
merger in writing.
IO. Mortgage IDsur.mce. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan,
Borrower shall pay the premiums required to main1ain the Mortgage Insurance in effect. If, for any ieason, 1he
Mortgage Insurance coverage required by Lender ceases to be avallable from the mortgage insurer lhat previously
provided such insurance and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments toward the premiums
for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage substantially equivalent to the
Mortgage Insurance previously .in effect, at a cost. substantially equivalent to the cost to Borrower of the Mortgage
Insmance previansly in effect. from an alternate mortgage insurer selected by Lenden If substantially eqllivalent
Mortgage Insurance coverage is not available, Bouower shall continue to pay to Lender the amount of the separately
designated payments that were due when the insurance coverage ceased to be in effect Lender will accept. use and
retain these payments as a non-refundable loss reserve in lieu of Mortgage Insurance. Such loss reserve shall be
non-refundable, notwithstanding the fact that the Loan. is ultimately paid in full. and Lender shall not be required to
pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such loss reserve. Lender can no longer require loss reserve payments if
Mortgage lnsutance coverage (in 1he amount and for the period that Lender requires) pro'1ided by an insurer selected
by Lender again becomes available, is obtained, and Lender requires separately designated paymems toward the
premiums for Mottgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan and
Borrower was ICqUired to make sepamtely designated payments toward the premimns for Mortgage Insurance,
Borrower shall pay the premiwns required to maintain Mortgage Insurance in effect, or to provide a non-refundable
loss reserve, until Lender's 1equiremcnt for Mortgage Insurance ends in accordance with any· written agycement
between Borrower and Lender providing for such termination or until termination is required by Applicable Law.
Nothing in this Section 10 affects Borrower's obligation to pay interest at the rate provided in the Nole.
Mortgage Insurance :reimburses Lender (or any entity that pun:hascs the Note) for certain losses it may
incur ifBorrower does not repay the Loan as agreed. Borrower is not a patty to the Mortgage Jnsurance.
Mortgage insurers evaluate their total risk on all such insurance in force from time to time, and may enter
:into agreements with other parties that share or modify their risk, or reduce losses. These agreements are on teans
and conditions that are satisfactory to the mortgage insurer and the other party (or parties) to these agreements.
These agreements may require the mortgage insurer to make payments using any source of funds that the mortgage
insurer may have available (which may include timds obtained from Mortgage Insurance premiums).
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~ a result of these agreements, Lender, any purchaser of the Note, another insurer, any minsurer, any other
entity, or any affiliate of any of the foregoing, may receive (directly or indirectly) amounts that derive from (or
might be cllaracterized as) a podion of Bonower's payments for Mortgage Insurance, in exchange for sharing or
modifying the mortgage insmer's risk, or reducing losses. If such agreement provides that an affiliate of Lender
takes a share of the .insurer's risk in exchange for a share of the premiums paid to the insurer, the ammgement is

often tenned "captive.reinsurance." Further:
(a) Any such agreements will not affect the amounts that Borrower has agreed to pay for :Mortgage
Insurance, or any other terms of the Loan. Such agreements will not increase the amount Borrower will owe
for Mortgage Insunnce, and they will not entitle Bol"i'ower to any refund,
(b) Any such agreements will not affect the rights Borrower has - if any - with respect to the
Mortgage Insurance under the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 or any other lalV. These rlghta may
include the right to receive certain diJclosurest to request and obtain cancellation of the Mortgage Insurance.
to have the Mortgage Insurance terminated automatically, and/or to receive a refund of any Mortgage
Imurance premiums that were unearned at the time of such cancellation or termination.
11. Assignment of MiJcellaneous Proceeds; Forleiture. All Miscellaneous Proceeds are hereby
assigned to and shall be paid to Lender.
If the Property is damaged, such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of the
Property, if the restoration or repair is ecOllOJJl.ically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. During such
repair and ICS1oration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such Miscellaneous Proceeds until Lender .has bad
an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work bas been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided
that such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may pay for the repairs and restoration in a single
disbursement or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing
or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such Miscellaneous Proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay
Borrower any interest or earnings on such Miscellaneous Proceeds. If the restoration or repair is not economically
,feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by
this Security Instrument, whetba or not then dne, with the excess. if any, paid to BOITOWer. Such Miscellaneous
Proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2.
In the event of a total taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall
be applied to the sums secutcd by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid to
Bonower.
In the event of a partial t.aJcing, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market value of
the Property immediately before the partial taking. destruction, or loss in value is equal to or greater than the amount
of the sums secured by this Security Instrument mnnediately before the partial taking. destruction, or loss in value,
unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the sums secured by this Security Instrument shall be
reduced by the amount of the Miscellaneous Proceeds multiplied by the following fraction: (a) the total amount of
the sums secirred immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value divided by (b) the fair market
value of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value. Any balance shall be paid
to Borrower.
In the event of a partial taking, destruction, ox loss in value of the Property in which the fair market value of
the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is less than the amount of the sums
secured immediately before the partial talcing. destruction, or loss in value, unless Borrower and Lender otherwise
agree in writing, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security I:nstrumcnt
whether or not ¢.e sums are then due.
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower. or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the Opposing Party
(as defined in the next sentence) offers to make an award to settle a claim for damages, Borrower fails to respond to
Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender is authorized to collect and apply the Miscellaneous
Proceeds either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or
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not then due. "Opposing Party" means the third party that owes Borrower Miscellaneous Proceeds or the party
against whom Borrower has a right of action in regard to Miscellaneous Proceeds.
Borrower shall be in default if any action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is begun !hat. in
Lender's judgment, could result in forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment ofLender's interest in the
Property or rights under this Security Instrument Borrower can cure such a default and, if acceleration bas
occuned. reinstate as provided in Section 19, by causing the action or proceeding to be dismissed with a ruling that,
in Lender's judgment, precludes forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment of Lender's interest. in the
Property or rights under this Security Instrument. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages that are
attnllutable to the impainnent of Lender's interest in the Property are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender.
All Miscellaneous Proceeds that are not applied to restoration or repair of the Property shall be applied in
the order provided for in Section 2.
11. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waivu. Extension of the time for payment
or modification of amortization of the swns secured by this Security Instrmnent granted by Lender to Borrower or
any Successor in Interest of Borrower shall not operate to release the liability of Borrower or any Successors in
Interest of Borrower. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against any Successor in Interest of
Borrower or to refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of the sums secured by this
Security instrument by reason of all)' demand made by the original Borrower or any Successors in Interest of
Borrower. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy including, without limitation, Lender's
acceptance of payments from third persons, entities or Successors in Interest of Borrower or in amounts less than the
amount then due, shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy.
13. Joint and Several Liability; Co-signers; Successon and Assigns Bound. Borrower covenants and
agiees that Borrower's obligations and liability shall be joint and several. However, any Borrower who co-signs this
Security hlstrument but does not execute the Note (a "co-signer''): (a) is co-signing this Security Instrument only to
mortgage, grant and convey the co-signer's interest in the Property under the tenns of this Security Instmment; (b) is
not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lender and any
other Borrower can agree to extend, modify, forbear or ~ e any accommodations with regard to the terms of this
Security Instrument or the Note without the co-signer's consent
Subject to the provisions of Section l&, any Successor in Interest of Borrower who assumes Bouower's
obligations under this Security Instrument in writing. and is approved by Lender, shall obtain all of Bonower's
rights and benefits under this Security Instnnnent. Borrower shall not be released from Borrower's obligations and
liability under this Secnrity Instrument unless Lender agrees to such release in writing. Toe covenants and
agreements of this Security Instrument shall bind (except as provided in Section 20) and benefit the successors and
assigns of Lender.
14. Loan Charges. Lender may charge Borrower fees for services perfonned in connection witll
Borrower's default, for the pmpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security
Instrument, including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees. In regard to any
other fees, the absence of express authority in this Security Instrument to charge a specific fee to Borrower shall not
be consuued as a prohibition on the charging of such fee. Lender may not charge fees that are expressly prohibited
by this Security Instrument or by Applicable Law.
H the Loan is subject to a Jaw which. sets maximum. loan charges, and that law .is finally intei:pretcd so that
the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the Loan exceed the permitted
limits, then: (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the ammmt necessary to reduce the charge to the
permitted limit, and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded
to Borrower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal owed under the Note or by making a
direct payment to Borrower. If a refund reduces principa). the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment
without any prepayment charge (whether or not a prepayment charge is provided for under the Note). Bonower's
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acceptance of any such refund made by direct payment to Borrower will consitnte a waiver of any right of action
Borrower might have arising out of such overcharge.
1S. Notices. All notices given by Borrower or Lender in connection with this Security Instrument must be
in writing. Any notice to Borrower in connection with this Security Instmment shall be deemed to have been given
to Bonowerwhen.mailed by first class mail or when.actually delivered to Borrower's notice address if sent by other
means. Notice to any one Borrower shall constitute notice to all Boaowers unless Applicable Law expressly
requin:s otherwise. The notice address shall be the Property Address unless Borrower has designated a substitute
notice address by notice to Lender. Boaower shall promptly notify Lender of Borrower's cliange of address. If
Lender specifies a procedure for ICpOrt:ing Borrower's change of address, ~ Bonower shall only report a change
of a<idres through that specified procedure. There may be only one designated notice address unde:r this Seem.icy
Instrument at any one time. Any notice to Lender shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail
to Lender's address stated herein unless Lender has designated another address by notice to Borrower. Any notice
in connection with this Secupty Instrument shall not be deemed to have been given to Lender until actually received
by Lender. If any notice required by this Security Instroment is also required under Applicable Law, the Applicable
Law requirement will satisfy the corresponding requirement. under this Security Instrument
16. Governing Law; Severability; Roles of Conltmction. This Security Instrument shall be governed
by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. All rights and obligations contained
in this Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and limitations of Applicable Law. Applicable Law
might explicitly or implicitly allow the parties to agree by contract or it might be silent, but such silence shall not be
construed as a prohibition against agreement by contract. In the event that any provision or clause of this Security
Instrument or the Note conflicts with Applicable Law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security
Instrument or the Note which can be given effect without the conflicting provision.
As used in this Security Instrmru:nt: (a) words of the masculine gender shall mean . and include
conesponding neuter words or words of the feminine gender; (b) words in the singular shall mean and inclnde the
plural and vice versa; and (c) the word "may" gives sole discretion without any obligation to take any action.
17. Borrower's Copy. •Borrower shall be given one copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument
18. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 18, "Interest
in the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not limited to, those beneficial
interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or escrow agreement, the intent
of which is the transfer of title by Bouo.wer at a future date to a purchaser.
If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or jf Bonower is not a
natural person and a beneficial interest in BOIIOwer is sold or tramferred) without Lender's prior written consent,
Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secnn:d by this Security Instrument. However, this
option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prolu"bited by Applicable Law.
If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide
a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15 within which
Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Bonower fails to pay these sums prior to the
expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies pennitted by this Secnrity Instrument without further
notice or demand on Borrower.
19. Borrower's Right 1o Reinstate After Acceleration. If Borrower meets certain conditions, Borrower
shall have the right to have enforcement of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time prior to the earliest of.
(a) five days before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in this Security lDstrument; (b) such
other period as AP,plicable Law might specify for the termination ofBonower's right to reinstate; or (c) entty of a
judgment enforcing this Security Instrument. Those conditions are that Borrower: (a) pays Lender all sums which
then would be due under this Security Instrument and the Note as if no aa:eleration had occurred; (b) cures any
default of any other covenants or agreements; {c) pays all expenses incurred .in enforcing this Security Instrument,
including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees. and other fees
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incurred for the purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights llllder this Security Instrument; and
(d) takes such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure that Lender's interest in 1he Property and rights
under this Security Instrument, and Borrower's obligation to pay 1he sums secured by this Security lnstnnnent, shall
continue unchanged. Lender may require that Borrower pay such reinstarement sums and expenses in one or more
of the following forms, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check, bank check, treasurer's
check or cashier's check. provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured by a
federal agency, instmmentality or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Tr.uisfer. Upon reinstatement by BOIIOwer, this
Security Instrument and obligations secured hereby shall remain fully effective as if no acceleratipn had occmred.
However~ this right to reinstate shall not apply in the case of acceleration un<ler Secti.on 18.
20. Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer; Notice of Grievance. The Note or a partial interest in the
Note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Bonower. A
sale might result in a change in the entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that collects Periodic Payments due llilder
the Note and this Security Instrument and performs other mortgage loan servicing obligations lJJldcr the Note, this
Security Instrument, and Applicable Law. There also might be one or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated
to a sale of the Note. If there is a change of the Loan Servicer, Borrower will be given written notice of the change
which will state the name and address of the new Loan Servicer, the address to which payments should be made· and·
any other information RESPA requires in connection with a notice of transfer of servicing. If the Note is sold and
thereafter the Loan is serviced by a Loan Servicer other than the purchaser of the Note. the mortgage loan servicing
obligations to Borrower will remain with the Loan Servicer or be transferred to a successor Loan Servicer and are
not assumed by the Note purchaser unless otherwise provided by the Note purchaser.
Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence, join. or be joined to any judicial action (as either an
individual litigant or the member of a class) that arises from the other party's actions pursuant to this Security
Instrument or that alleges that the other party has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by reason of, this
Security Instrument. until such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party (with such notice given in
compliance with the requiremans of Section 15) of such alleged breach and afforded the other party hereto a
reasonable' period after the giving of such notice to take corrective action. If Applicable Law provides a time period
which must elapse before ce~ action can be taken, that time period will be deemed to be reasonable for purposes
of this paragraph. The notice of acceleration and opportunity 1d cure given to Borrower pursuant to Section 22 and
the notice of acceleration given to Borrower pursuant to Section 18 shall be deemed to satisfy the notice and
opportuni1y to take cOIIective action provisions of this Section 20.
21. Hazardous Substances. As used in this Section 21: (a) "Hazardous Substances" are those substances
defined as toxic or haz.aidous substances, pollutants, or wastes by Environmental Law and the following substances:
gasoline, kerosene,- other fJammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides and herbicides, volatile solvents,
materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials; (b) "Environmental Law" means federal
laws and laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that relate to health, safety or enviromnental
protection; (c) "Environmental Cleanup" includes any response action, remedial action. or removal action, as
defined in Environmental Law; and (d) an "Environmental Condition" means a condition that can cause. contribute
to, or otherwise trigger anEnvironmental OeaIIUp.
Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any Hazardous
Substances, or1hreaten to release any Hazardous Substances, on or in the Property. Borrower shall not do, nor allow
anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property (a) that is in violation of any Environmental Law, (b) which
creates an Environmental Condition, or (c} which, due to the presence, use, or release of a Hazardous Substance,
creates a condition that adversely affects the value of the Property. The preceding two sentences shall not apply to
the presence, use, or storage on the Property of small quantities of Hazardous Substances that are generally
recognized to be appropriate to normal residential uses and to maintenance of the Property (including, but not
limited to, hazardous substances in conswner products).
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..
Bouowc:r shall promptly give Lender written notice of (a) any investigation. claim, demand. lawsuit or
other action by any govenunental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any Haz.ardous
Substance or Enviromncntal Law of which Borrower has actual knowledge, (b) any Environmental Condition,
including but not limited to, any spilling, leaking, discharge, release or threat of release of any Hazardous Substance,
and·(c) any condition caused by the presence, use or release of a Haz.ardous Substance which adveisely affects the
value of the P.roperty. If Bmrower learns, or is notified by any governmental or Tegulatory authoricy, or any private
party, that any removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Property is necessary,
Borrower shall promptly take all necessary remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law. Nothing
hetein shall create any obligation on Lender for an Environmental Cleanup.
NON-UNIFORM COVENANI'S. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows:
22. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following
Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument (but not prior to acceleration
under Section 18 unless Applicable Law provides othernise). The notice shall specify: (a) the default; (b) the
action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to
Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or before the date
specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument and sale of
the Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the
right to bring a court action to assert the non~xistence of a default or any other defense of Borrower to
acceleration and sale. If the default is not cured on or before the date specified in the notice, Lender at its
option may require immediate payment in fnll of all sums secured by this Security Instrument without
further demand and may invol,e the power of sale and
other remedies permitted by Applicable Law.
Lender shall be entitled to collect aD expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22,
including. but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence.
If Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall e:s:ecute or cause Trustee to execute written notice
of the occurrence of an event of default and of Lender's election to caJse the Property to be sold, and shall
cause such notice to be recorded in each county in which any part of the Property is located. Lender or
Trustee shall mail copies of the notice as prescn"bed by Applicable Law to Borrower and to other persons
prescribed by Applicable Law. Trustee shall give public notice of sale to the persons and in the manner
prescribed by Applicable Law. After the time required by Applicable Law, Trustee, without demand on
Borrower, shall sell the Property at public auction to the highest bidder at the time and place and under the
terms designated in the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in any order Trustee determines. Trustee
may postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public announcement at the time and place of any
previously scheduled sale. Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale.
Tmstee shall deliver to the purchuer Trustee's deed conveying tlie Property without any covenant
or warranty, expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the
truth of the statements made therein. Trustee shall apply 1he proceeds of the sale in the following order:
(a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable Trustee's and attorneys' fees; (b) to all
sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the person or persons legally entitled to it.
23. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall request
Trustee 10 reconvey the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured
by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property without wammty to the person or
persons legally entitled to it. Such person or persons shall pay any recordation costs. Lender may charge sucl:!
person or persons a fee for reconveying the Property, but only if the fee is paid to a third party (such as the Trustee)
for seivices rendered and the charging of the fee is pernritted under Applicable Law.
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24. Substitute Trustee. Lender may. for any .reason or cause, from time to time remove Trustee and
appoint a successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor
1rustee shall succeed to all the title, power and duties confem:d upon Trustee herein and by Applicable Law.
25. Area and 1.-0cation of Property. Either the Property is not more than forty aaes in area or the
Property is located wi1hin an :incorporated city or village.

BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and ag{CCS to the terms and covenants contained in this Security
Instrument and in any Rider exccnted by Borrower and recorded with it
Witnesses:

(Seal)
-BOITDWl!I'

Mailing Address: P.O. Box 36, Murphy, ID 83650
- - - - - - - - - - - - - (Seal)

-BOITower

Mailing Address:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - (Seal)
-Borrower

Mailing Address:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Seal)
-Borrower

Mailing Address:

- - - - - - - - - - - (Space Below Th/SLJne For Acknowledgment/------------

State o f ~
County of

§
§
§

L{l ~

Before me the undersigned authority, on tllis day personally appeared

tcLv~ ~

Uvy

Leue

known to me (or proved to me through an identity card or other document)
to be the person(s) whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he/she/they
executed the same forihe pmposes~flderation therein expressed.
-· f
Givenundermy~~I~,,.#,~3,9-aa
of
2)C)V'-1
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RECORDING REQUESTED BY:

Instrument # 263646
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:

MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO

Jones • Gledhill • Hess • Fuhrman
& Eiden, P.A.
225 N. 9lh Street, Suite 820
Boise, ID 83701

2005-09-28
_12:58:43 No. of Pagos: 2
Recorded for: JONES-GLEDHILL ET Al

CHARLOTTE SHERBUR~ ~ : 6 . 0 0

Ex-Offlcfo Recorder

DelNIIY

,

·

lndt1 ~; ASSlliNMENT. OEEO OF

1

ATIN: Kimbell D. Gourley, Esq.

(Space above this line for Recorder's use)

ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST
Bank of the West , a California corporation ("Bank of the West"), the
beneficiary under that certain deed of trust executed by Karla Kay King Love, a
single individual, as grantor/trustor, in favor of Bank of the West, as beneficiary,
securing a promissory note in the original principal sum of $86,500.00, recorded
July 28, 2004, as instrument no. 248616, in the records of Owyhee County, Idaho

(the "Deed of Trust"), does hereby assign and transfer unto Gordon G. King and
Rose M. King, husband and wife, whose address is 1912.f King Lane, Murphy,
Idaho 83650, all right, title, and interest in and to the Deed of Trust, without Bank
of the West's warranties, express or implied, as to the priority of the Deed of
Trust, but with Bank of the West's warranty that it is the legal and lawful owner
and holder of the Deed of Trust and the promissory note and other loan
documents associated therewith.
DATED this (2 lti day of September, 2005.
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,r--·
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r--·----------,·

STATE OF HAWAII

)

: ss.
City &County of Honolulu )
On the fttn day of September, 2005, before me, the undersigned notary
public in and for said state, personally appeared
GARY Y. KAWAHtOrO
,
known or identified to me to be the
14ffiTANI m Pffl!DENJ
of First
Hawaiian Bank. the company that executed the within instrument or the person who
executed the same on behalf of said company, and acknowledged to me that said
company executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day
and year first above written.

No ry

blic for Hawaii
1-\o nolu h..1 HI
Commission expires: NOV l 4 2005
Residing at
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RONALD P. RAINEY ISB #1022
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 26
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Phone (208)459-3659
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067

P.M.

APR - 7 2015

~~'~
~~-

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K. Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD,
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)'

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
)
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)

Case No. CV-2014-0278
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE
1 l(A)(2)(b) OF DECISION DENYING
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
______________)
)
)
GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and
)
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
)
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
)
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
)
Counterclaimants,
)
)
vs.
)
)

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 11 (2)(b)
ETC. -1
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JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY )
)

Counterdefendants.

)
)

________________)
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Owyhee

)
) ss:
)

Rose M. King, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am one of the defendants in the above-entitled matter, I am over the age of

majority, and I make this Affidavit based upon facts within my own personal knowledge.
2.

The area in which we live in Owyhee county is cattle country and my deceased

husband, Gordon, and I always owned and used trucks in our ranching operation. Many of our
neighbors also owned trucks and it would not have been out of character for the area for these
trucks to have used King Lane although I did not see them.
3.

It should be noted that the size of trucks used today are much larger than the

trucks used in the 1970's and 1980's.
4.

If other people drove large trucks on King Lane it would not have been out of

character for where we live, and such use did not interfere with our use of the lane and the use
did not damage the lane or bridges. Therefore we permitted other people to use the lane in an
attempt to be neighborly.

5.

It was not until J.C. Fuquay and Clint Fuquay got married and started their own

trucking business on or about 2011 that the damage to the lane and bridges started occurring.
There is still not intereference with others use of King Lane and our ranching operation.&2

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 11(2)(b)
ETC. -2
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DATED This 7th day of April, 2015.

Rose M. King

.
SUBSCRIB~D AND SWORN TO BEFORE M~.--~~blic in and for sai~ State,
"'
/
./
\~
this 7th day of Apnl, 2015.

. / I1I

. I

1

l )

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: Caldwell, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 12/18/2018
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certify that on this ,Z_ day of April, 2015, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be delivered to the adverse party, via the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
__U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_X_Facsimile Transmission _Hand Delivery
Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, Washington 98101
Telephone: 206-224-6003
Facsimile: 877-655-5281
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf.com
S. Bryce Farris
P.O. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: 629-7447
Facsimile: 629-7559
Email: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 11(2)(b)
ETC. -4

489

--~~~~-M.

APR - 7 2015
RONALD P. RAINEY - ISB # 1022
Attorneys at Law
110 North Ninth Avenue
Post Office Box 26

~-

Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
(208) 459-3659
Facsimile:
(208) 459-9067 or 459-6147

Telephone:

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K Ranch Trust UT A December 28, 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

VS.

)

)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
)
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;)
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendants.
)

GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the
HEARTKRANCHTRUSTUTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012,
Counterclaim.ants,

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

KING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE
ll(a)(l)(B) OF DECISION DENYING
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

KING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE
11 (a)(J)(B) OF DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 1
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vs.
JOHNE. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY

Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

COMES NOW the Defendant, HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA., acting by its Trustee,
GILBERT KING (Hereinafter, "King Defendants''), by and through its counsel ofrecord, RONALD

P. RAINEY, and submits this MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION pursuant to I.RC.P.

U(a)(2){B) of the Court's March 25, 2015 Memorandum Decision Upon King Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment. This motion is supported by the accompanying affidavits, and by a
supporting memorandum to be filed with the Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of thls
motion as provided by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(C).

Respectfully submitted tbis1' day of April, 2015.

· ~
~:,
~<
~
7,,~..-:---c :_-t,,:..----~C:
- ---~
----~ ~,' .:-;',
0-- L -~- ~
c -- ,-p
Ronald P. Rainey
===-------Attorney for the King Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

L

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this
day of April, 2015,a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served upon the folJowing:

Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity NationaJ Law GROUP
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ J Overnight Mail

Seattle, Washington 98101
jx1 Facsimile Transmission
Telephone:
206-224-6003
[ ] Other _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Facsimile:
877-655-5281
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf.com

Attorney for Plaintiffs ·

S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W. River Street, Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone:
208-629-7447
Facsimile:
208-629-7559
Email: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
,M Facsimile Transmission

[ ] Other---------

Attorney for Low Defendants
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RONALD P. RAINEY - ISB # I 022
Attorneys at Law
110 North Ninth Avenue
Post Office Box 26
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Telephone:
(208) 459-3659
Facsimile:
(208) 459-9067 or 459-6147

APR 2 0 2015

Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee for the
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING
as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH
TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012;
AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; THE EST ATE OF
GORDON G. KING; ROSE M. KING;
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2014-0278

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
KING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE
ll(a)(2)(B) OF DECISION DENYING
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF KING DEFENDANTS'
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I.
ISSUES RAISED ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

The King Defendants were extremely "surprised," not only by the Court's decision on their
motion for summary judgment, but by the Court's complete failure to either directly address the
single issue raised on that motion, or to address the specific arguments raised and presented by the
Kings in support of their summary judgment motion on the single issue presented to the Court. This
surprise was further fueled by what could only be the Court's inadvertent mischaracterization of the
Kings' motion as apparently being a "concession" as to the other elements of the Fuquays' case.
On summary judgment when a single element of a case is challenged, this only means that
the moving party is only challenging the failure of proof on that single element of the case, which
if successful, will necessarily render all other elements of the case "immaterial." This does not mean
that the moving party is conceding those remaining elements of the case.

Somehow that

characterization crept into this case, when at page 7 ofits Memorandum Decision the Court declared:
There is nothing in the record to show how plaintiffs' use began but it is
undisputed and the record establishes that the plaintiffs' use of King Lane was
(1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; and (4) with the
actual or imputed knowledge of the defendants. Proof of these elements, without
evidence as to how the use began, raises the presumption that such use was adverse
and the burden is then on the defendants to show that such use was permissive.
Memorandum Decision at pg. 7 (emphasis added).
As simply as can be stated, the King Defendants were only arguing that if, under the
controlling rule ofldaho law, the Fuquay Plaintiffs use of King Lane was at all times deemed to be
permissive, then there can be no prescriptive easement, which is dependent upon "adverseness" in

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF KING DEFENDANTS'
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order to be established. If that single element can be shown not to exist - as a matter of law - then
all other elements - and all other alleged genuine issues of material of fact - thereafter become
immaterial, and the entire claim fails, for lack of the required proof as to that single element adverseness.
Therefore, as just noted, the King Defendants' summary judgment motion was premised upon
that standard which provides that proof of the absence of evidence that is necessary to establish an
essential element of the claim that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial renders all

otherpotentialissues of fact irrelevant. Bromleyv. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 810-11, 979 P.2d 1165,
1168-69 ( 1999). In respect to the five elements that are required to prove a claim for a prescriptive
easement, the King Defendants had placed at issue on their motion for summary judgment the fact
that all use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs during the claimed five year prescriptive use period
had been deemed permissive - as a matter of law - under Idaho's long-recognized joint-use-incommon rule. Consequently, there never had been any adverse use of King Lane by the Fuquay
Plaintiffs, whatsoever, during any claimed five year adverse use period - as a matter of law therefore rendering all other potential issues of facts irrelevant. Instead, as the Court stated on page
7 of its opinion, the King Defendants were characterized to have conceded those elements.
In addition to this point, there were several other significant factual elements, which although
they were in fact noted by the Court in its decision, their full weight and significance to this summary
judgment motion apparently were not completely appreciated by the Court. These include the
following:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF KING DEFENDANTS'
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( 1)

The Fuquay Plaintiffs' claimed prescriptive use of King Lane is only being
asserted during the existence ofldaho's five year statutory prescriptive use
period prior that existed prior to 2006, and only upon their use made after
1989, as specifically pled by the Fuquays in paragraph 17 of their original
complaint and in paragraph 16 of their amended complaint.

(2)

The mere use of large commercial trucks in common on King Lane for
normal ranching purposes - both by the King Defendants and by the Fuquays
- does not create any notice of an adverse or prescriptive use by the Fuquays.

(3)

The Court failed to address in any fashion Idaho's long-standing "Joint-usein-common-rule," and its associated and derivative rules, as establishing only
a permissive use of a common roadway, such as King Lane.

Each of these specific points will be addressed in tum in the King Defendants' argument that is
presented in support of their motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial of their motion for
summary judgment.
II.

RESTATEMENT OF THE QUESTION
PRESENTED ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On their motion for summary judgment the King Defendants had presented a single narrow
issue for the District Court's consideration under the standard that if the Fuquay Plaintiffs failed in
the proof of a single element of their prescriptive easement claim, then that entire claim would
necessarily fail. The King Defendants had argued that the Fuquay Plaintiffs' alleged prescriptive
easement claim, as asserted in this action, must necessarily fail because,
any use [of King Lane] by the Fuquay plaintiffs or their predecessors, [prior to 2006]
was use in common with the Kings and Lows that in no way interfered with their use
of King Lane and therefore under Idaho law was deemed permissive and could
not be prescriptive. This rebuts elements three and four (adverse use that is known
to the servient landowner) making any prescriptive claim during this period
impossible.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF KING DEFENDANTS'
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Heart K Ranch Summary Judgment Memorandum at pg 8 (emphasis in original/bracketed references
added). Heart K Ranch's summary judgment motion was premised upon the standard that the
absence of evidence necessary to establish an element that the nonmoving party will be required to
prove at trial renders any other potential issues of fact irrelevant. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho
807, 810-11, 979 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (1999).
The King Defendants argued that under the primary controlling principles ofldaho law when
a neighbor (the Fuquays) is allowed to merely use a roadway (King Lane) in common with his
neighbor (the Kings), without either damaging the roadway itself, and without interfering with
the neighbor's use of the roadway, then that use of the roadway is deemed to be permissive, as a
matter of law. This is sometimes known as the "joint-use-in-common rule," and the King

Defendants had cited to, and provided an extensive quotations from, Chen v. Conway, 116 Idaho
901,903, 781 P.2d 238,240 (Ct.App.1989) and Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,404, 724 P.2d
137, 140 (Ct.App. 1986). This particular rule ofldaho law was first stated by the Idaho Supreme
Court almost 75 years ago in Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (1941), and was
reaffirmed by Idaho's high court as recently as, Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 503, 236 P .3
1257, 1263 (2010) ('"[W]here the owner of real property constructs a way over it for his use and
convenience, the mere use thereofby others which in no way interferes with his use will be presumed
to be by way of license or permission.' Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 1000, 1005, 829 P.2d 1349,
1354 (1992) (quoting Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941)).").
The Court denied the King Defendants' motion for summary judgment without directly
addressing, or even acknowledging, the single issue that the King Defendants had raised on their
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF KING DEFENDANTS'
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motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the King Defendants' request reconsideration, at least
to obtain clarification in moving towards trial, as to the Court's position on this essential question.

III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE ll(A)(2)(B)
In Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99,107,294 P.3d 1111,

1119 (2013) the Court declared that, "This Court has repeatedly held that I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B)
provides a district court with authority to reconsider and vacate interlocutory orders so long as final
judgment has not been entered." [citations omitted]. Denial of a motion for summary judgment is
such an interlocutory order that can be reconsidered under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B). See e.g., Wandering
Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586,589,329 P.3d 368,371 (2014).

When considering a motion for reconsideration under Rule l l(a)(2)(B) the Court may
consider any new evidence that may be presented that bears upon the correctness of the interlocutory
order that is being challenged. International Real Estate Solutions, Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816,
819, 340 P.3d 465,468 (2014).

IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Existence Of Commercial Trucking On King Lane, At Times Other Than When
The Five Year Prescriptive Use Period Applied, Is Irrelevant To The Fuquay Plaintiffs'
Claims
As the Fuquay Plaintiffs have unequivocally acknowledged in both of the complaints that

they have filed with this Court, their alleged prescriptive easement claims are only based during that
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time when Idaho had a five year prescriptive easement period prior to July 1, 2006. See, Ch. 158,

§ 1, pg. 474 of the 2006 Idaho Session Laws. In paragraph 18 of the original complaint and in
paragraph 17 of the First Amended Complaint, the Fuquays alleged:
18.

The use of King Lane for access by owners of the Clint Fuquay parcel and the
John Fuquay Parcel has been open and continuous over the same route for
more than 5 years, [footnote 1, noting changing in statutory period to 20 years
omitted] and was without permission from adverse land owners.

Original complaint at pg. 5; First Amended Complaint pg. 5. (bracketed referenced added).
This particular fact is significant because virtually all of the alleged "commercial" truck
traffic activity that the Fuquays have engaged in on King Lane has occurred after 2006 when the
prescriptive use period increased to 20 years. The Fuquays have made no claims in this action under
that 20 years prescriptive use period. Therefore, that particular "commercial" truck traffic, which
is all the trucking activity that has been engaged in by both Clint and J.C. Fuquay on King Lane, is
simply irrelevant to the five year prescriptive easement claims made in this action. Both Clint and
J.C. Fuquay testified at the September 18, 2014 preliminary injunction hearing that all of the
commercial trucking that they have personally engaged in on King Lane has occurred within the last
eight years - 2015 minus eight equals 2007. The following is the extracted testimony of Clint and
J.C. Fuquay from the preliminary injunction hearing:
Both Clint and J.C. Fuquay previously have testified that their alleged use oflarge trucks on
King Lane for commercial trucking purposes, in alleged adverse use to the King Defendants, arose
after the change in the statute to a twenty year prescriptive use period:'

The entire transcript of the September 18, 2014 preliminary injunction hearing has
previously been submitted to the court, as attached to the affidavit of Bryce Farris.
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Q.

So you've only been on this property for six years.

A.

No. Eight. Since I was 19.

Q.

Can you give me the years when you were gone, from when to when?

A.

I would say from 2001 to 2005.

Q.

Well, that's five years.

A.

Four. I don't remember when in 200 I. Moved back the summer of

2005.
Q.
When you got your driver's license, you were gone. You didn't even
live on that property.
A.

I stayed there on the weekends.

Testimony of Clint Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of J.C. Fuquay, September 18, 2014
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 65, LL. 5-24.
Q.

Where do you reside?

A.

18902 Castle Lane.

Q.

And where is that in proximity to Clint Fuquay's house?

A.

It is probably a quarter of a mile east of my brother's house.

Q.

Is that on property that Clint owns?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How long have you lived there?

A.
I've lived there since Clint owned it since June. Prior to that, I've
lived there almost eight years.
Q.

And prior to that, where did you live?
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A.

I was in college in Twin Falls.

Testimony of J.C. Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 73, LL. 6-18.
A.
I've lived there for eight years and I've had no dispute up until
recently about going that direction.
Q.

So eight years ago would have been about - -

A.
When I got married - - when I was married and moved - - officially
moved into the house that I live in.

Q.

You got married in 2007, didn't you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So from 2007 till now, you're saying you use King Lane?

A.

Yes.

Q.
And then before that, you were gone with your brother and mother
somewhere else?
A.
Yeah. Well, I moved- - when I was 15, as I said earlier, I moved from
my father's house to where my mother resides now. And then after that, after I
graduated high school I moved to Grand View and then I went to - I lived and
worked in Grand View and went to college in Twin Falls and then in 2007, I guess
you'd say, is when I moved back.
Q.

Okay. So this continuous use has only been since 2007.

A.

My continuous use, yeah.

Testimony of J.C. Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 89, LL. 4-24.
A.

We've always drove trucks up and down that lane.
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Q.

I mean these cattle trucks.

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And that's just been in the last five years, hasn't it?

A.

Yeah.

Q.
So in the last five years, you and your brother have started driving
cattle trucks up and down King Lane.
A.

Yes.

Testimony of J.C. Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 91, L. 20 to pg. 92, L. 3.
Q.

You've only been doing it for the last five years.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Your brother's only been doing it for less than five years.

A.

Yes.

Q.
So since '06 is when you - - at least '06 and past is when you started
using the big trucks.

A.

Yeah. Of my own, yeah.

Q.
And you would agree that those big trucks are hard on the road and
hard on the bridge?
A.
They are extra weight than a typical vehicle, yes, but we also help to
maintain the road.
Q.

My question is are those big trucks hard on the bridge and hard on the

A.

They're hard on everything, yes.

road?
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Q.
Okay. And that's an increase in use that you've been doing just in the
last six years, five years?
A.
the lane.

I wasn't aware that the bridge was under question. I thought it was

Q.

But you've just increased your use by driving the big trucks there?

A.

Yeah, I did.

Q.

Your brother did too?

A.

That is how I make my living.

Q.

And your brother also?

A.

And that's how he makes his living.

And you and your brother could go up and down Castle Creek - Q.
Castle Lane with your big trucks?
A.

We could.

Testimony of J.C. Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 92, L. 21, to pg. 93, L. 24.
Now you and your brother are both driving trucks up and down this
Q.
King's Lane.
A.

Yes.

Q.

Before, it was just your dad?

A.

It was.

Q.
Okay. So you've increased the use by at least two different drivers by
two different trucks?
A.

Yes. yes.
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Q.

That's been in the last five years?

A.

Yes.

Testimony of J.C. Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 101, L. 22 to pg. 102, L. 6. 2
In sum, the only significant point that the Court seemed to make in its March 25, 2015
Memorandum Decision concerning the existence of genuine issues of material fact that would
preclude entry of summary judgment, was the use of King Lane by large commercial cattle trucks.
See, Memorandum Decision at pp. 7-8. Based upon the evidence presented, the use of such large
trucks for "commercial" purposes falls outside of "any" claim made by the Fuquay Plaintiffs in this
action, since that use has arisen after the prescriptive use period changed from five to twenty years,
and the Fuquays' claim in this action is only being made within the five year prescriptive period that
existed before 2006.
Another point that arises as to the time of use by the Fuquay Plaintiffs also goes to the claims
made on the face of their complaint. As recently stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in, Mickelsen
Construction, Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396,299 P.3d 203(2013):

"' (T)he only issues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the
pleadings.' A cause of action not raised in the pleadings may not be raised on
appeal, even if the trial court considered the issue." Nelson v. Big Lost River
Irrigation Dist., 148 Idaho 157, 160, 219 P .3d 804, 807 (2009) (quoting Vanvooren
v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440,444, 111 P.3d 125, 129 (2005)) (citation omitted); Nava v.
Rivas-Del Toro, 151 Idaho 853, 860-61, 264 P.3d 960, 967-68 (2011); accord

2

If you go further back in time than 2007, then you will find that neither Clint (age 27,
- Tr., pg. 64, L. 7), nor J.C. ( age 29, - Tr., pg. 55, LL. 20-21; Tr., pg. 89, L. 16) would have been
then old enough to have held a commercial license to drive such commercial trucks at that earlier
date, as within the five year period of their prescriptive easement claim (1989-2006).
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O'Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 139 Idaho 9, 15, 72 P.3d 849,855 (2003).
154 Idaho at 405,299 P.3d at 212 (emphasis added). In both the Fuquay's original complaint, and
also in the now pending, First Amended Complaint, they have only pied and placed at issue their use
of King Lane since 1989:
17.

The Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the
John Fuquay Parcel since at least 1989.

Original Complaint at pg. 5; See also, First Amended Complaint, ,i 16 at pg. 5. (emphasis added).
As already noted above, as pied, the Fuquay Plaintiffs' claim to a prescriptive easement over
King Lane requires proof of five years of continuous adverse use. As based upon the face of their
own pleading this adverse use would have had to have commenced at some time between 1989 and
mid-200 I. Arguably, any adverse use that commenced after July I, 200 I could not have ripened into
a full prescriptive easement before the required five year adverse use period changed to twenty years
on July I, 2006. See, Ch. 158, § I, pg. 474 of the 2006 Idaho Session Laws.
Again, the Court in going the other direction has simply stated that, "There is nothing in the
record to show how plaintiffs' use began ... " Memorandum Decision at pg. 7, but the Fuquay
Plaintiffs themselves allege that the use began in 1989, and at least for summary judgment purposes
under the Mickelsen Construction case that is the basis upon which the case is to be submitted to the
Court for decision.

B.

The Normal Course Of Development Allows For The Use Of Large Commercial Trucks
As A Regular Part Of Common Ranching Operations
It seems that a key element of the Court's March 25, 2015 summary judgment decision was

that the use of large commercial trucks on King Lane was one of the primary grounds upon which
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the Court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed that precluded a grant of summary
judgment to the King Defendants. The Court's conclusion is encapsulated in the following two
paragraphs of its summary judgment Memorandum Decision.
The King defendants claim that beginning in 2011, the Fuquays use of King
Lane became adverse use and interfered with their ownership rights when an
increased amount of commercial and heavy truck traffic was causing excessive
damage to the road surface. However, John Fuquay claims that his use of King
Lane has always been the same, which has always included moving heavy trucks
and equipment across King Lane.
According to the Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014, the
plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay
parcel since 1977. John Fuquay asserts that his father, James Fuquay, owned large
semi-trucks and cattle trucks that the regularly drive across King Lane from the time
they moved onto their property in January 1977. John Fuquay also states that as a
teenager, he drove large trucks across King Lane while working for his father. (See
Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014). Once he obtained his
commercial truck license, John Fuquay stated that he started driving large
trucks commercially. Currently, John Fuquay asserts that he operates under the
business name John Fuquay Trucking Company and continues to drive commercial
trucks across King Lane. In addition to the commercial semi-truck use, John Fuquay
asserts that since 1977, the plaintiffs have used King Lane to access their parcels
with the use of personal vehicles, regular farm vehicles, cattle trucks, pedestrian
use, and use by the Fuguay's guests. (See Declaration of John Fuquay filed on
October 29, 2014).
Memorandum Decision at pp. 7-8 (emphasis added).
The King Defendants continue to adhere to their original argument that it was not until 201 1
that any use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs became adverse to them, such to trigger any
adverse or prescriptive claim. Nonetheless, there are certain intervening issues that have emerged
from the Court's analysis on this summary judgment motion, as set out above, which deserve further
consideration on this motion for reconsideration. First, is the alleged continuing and on-going use
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of King Lane by the Fuquays' large cattle trucks- prior to their increased damaging and interfering
use that began in 20 l l. This use of large cattle trucks by the Fuquays does not in any fashion rebut
the King Defendants' primary argument on summary judgment of the existence of an "in-common"
and permissive use of King Lane between the Kings and Fuquays. The use of such large trucks is
not at all uncommon in the general ranching community and in the cattle business, and therefore
should be considered an "in common" use of King Lane in the same fashion as any other noninterfering use. See. April 7, 2015 Affidavit of Rose King.
While the applicable rule itself is stated in the context of an existing easement, which
easement the King Defendants do not in this case concede, for purposes of addressing this issue, this
discussion of Idaho easement law provides a useful benchmark. When an easement has been
recognized, some change in use of that easement is permissible over time to accommodate normal
development. McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 924, 88 P.3d 704, 743 (2004); and Elder v.
Northwest Timber Co., IOI Idaho 356,613 P.2d 367 (1980). Uses made by servient and dominant

owners may be adjusted consistent with normal development over their respective lands. Boydstun
Beach Ass 'n v. Allen, l l 1 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.1986). The degree of change that will

be allowed in use of an easement differs with the manner in which the easement was conveyed,
language of conveyance, and use of servient estate before and after conveyance. Abbott v. Nampa
School Dist. No. I 3 I, l l 9 Idaho 544, 808 P .2d 1289 ( l 99 l ). The question of whether a dominant

tenants' increased use of an easement over a roadway amounts to an expansion of original easement
or merely an, increase in the degree ofuse is a question oflaw. Gibbons v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633,
570 P.2d 870 {l 977) (Where prescriptive easement was established for access to single family
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residence and movement necessitated by cattle and farming operations, additional use of easement
for commercial business and additional four residents amounted to an expansion of the original
easement).
Therefore, under the Idaho's "joint-use-in-common" rule, the mere use oflarge cattle trucks
has in fact become a normal part of normal ranching operations, such that their use on King Lane
should be treated no differently for purposes of "in common use" than the other uses the Court
observed concerning, "the use of personal vehicles, regular farm vehicles, cattle trucks, pedestrian
use, and use by the Fuquay's guests." Consequently, the use of large cattle trucks by the Fuquays
was just as much a non-interfering use "in common" with the Kings as was any other use of personal
vehicles, farm vehicles, or other vehicle that was typical to a farming or ranching operation. The key
element, was that there was no evidence of either "interference," or "dama~" to the Kings.
C.

The Court Failed To Address The Primary Legal Question Raised By The King
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, The Application Of The "Joint-Use-InCommon Rule"

Finally, as based upon two Idaho Court of Appeal's decisions- Chen v. Conway, 116 Idaho
901, 903, 781 P.2d 238, 240 (Ct.App.1989) and Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,405, 724 P.2d
137, 141 (Ct.App.1986)- the King Defendants had presented to the District Court the "joint use-incommon rule" upon which they had based their argument that there was simply no evidence of
adverse use upon which the Fuquay Plaintiffs' could proceed on their prescriptive easement claim

to King Lane. The foundation of the "joint use-in-common rule" is an almost 75 year old decision
of the Idaho Supreme Court in Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (1941), in which the
Court set out authority from a number of sister states in support of that rule, which decision since
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that time has been consistently followed in this jurisdiction, having been most recently cited and
followed by the Idaho Supreme Court in, Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497,503, 236P.3 1257,
1263 (20 I 0). As originally stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in 1941, the "joint use-in-common
rule" as stated in Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P .2d 740 (1941) was declared as follows:
The rule would seem to be that where the owner of real property constructs
a way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by others which

in no way interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of license or
permission. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291; Howard v. Wright,
38 Nev. 25, 143 P. 1184; Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W. 925; Burk v.
Diers, 102Neb. 721, l69N.W.263;Longv.Mayberry, 96Tenn.378,36S.W.1040;
Parish v. Kaspare, 109 Ind. 586, 10 N.E. 109; Null v. Williamson, 166 Ind. 537, 78
N.E. 76; Gascho v. Lennert, 176 Ind. 677, 97 N.E. 6;Kilburn v. Adams, 48 Mass. 33,
7 Met. 33, 39 Am. Dec. 754; 18 C. J., sec. 120, p. 105.
The use of a driveway in common with the owner and the general public,
in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part indicating a separate and

exclusive use on his part negatives any presumption ofindividual right therein
in his favor. Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 631, 66 P. 10; Heenan v. Bevans, 51
Cal.App. 277, 196 P. 802; Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W. 925; Pirman
v. Confer, 273 N.Y. 357, 7 N.E.2d 262,264.
An individual using land as a road in common with the public cannot
acquire a prescriptive right of way against the owner. Thornley Land & Livestock
Co. v. Morgan Bros., 81 Utah 317, 17 P.2d 826; Pirman v. Confer, 273 N.Y. 357, 7
N.E.2d 262; 111 A. L. R., Extended Annotation, p. 221.
The rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or ripen
into a right by prescription unless it constitutes some actual invasion or
infringement of the rights of the owner. Thomas v. England, 71 Cal. 456, 12 P.
491 ;Monarch Real Estate Co. v. Frye, 77 Ind.App. 119,133 N.E. 156; 19 C. J. 887,
sec. 52, Citations, Note 74.
63 Idaho at 144, 118 P.2d at 744 (emphasis added). See also, Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho
497,503,236 P.3 1257, 1263 (2010); Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851,861,230 P.3d 743, 753 (201 O);

Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 64, 190 P.3d 876, 883 (2008); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 684,
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691,946 P.2d 984,991 (Ct.App.1996); Burns v. Alderman, 122 Idaho 749, 754-55, 838 P.2d 878,
883-84 (Ct.App.1992); Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 13, 784 P.2d 339,343 (Ct.App.1989); and
Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,404, 724 P.2d 137, 140 (Ct.App.1986).
In its March 25, 2015 Memorandum Decision the Court had several times noted that King

Lane had also been used by, "the public," which also under the Simmons decision creates a strong
presumption against the establishment of a prescriptive easement. The rule that use by the "public"
can never ripen into a prescriptive right is derived from the broader rule to the same effect
concerning use of a "public road." French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950, 958, 751 P.2d 98, 106
(1988).
The requirement of such "independent decisive acts, serves to reemphasizes that "mere use,"
in common with the owner, can never establish a prescriptive easement. State v. Camp, 134 Idaho
662,666 n.4, 8 P.3d 657,661 n.4 (Ct.App.2000); Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, 114, Idaho 79, 83, 753
P.2d 290,294 (Ct.App.1988). As pointed out on the summary judgment motion, the Idaho Supreme
Court in one its most recent decisions, H.F.L.P. v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672,339 P.3d 557
(2014) had declared:
Moreover, if the presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the
presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested and
"brought home" to the servient property owner. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho
390,398,210 P.3d 75, 83 (2009); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789,792,537 P.2d
631,634 (1975).
157 Idaho at 681,339 P.3d at 566.
With all due respect to this Court, no acknowledgment of these arguments, much less any
consideration of them, was provided in the Court's March 25, 2015 Memorandum Decision. It was
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the primary question that had been advanced by the King Defendants' in support of their argument
that if the Fuquays were unable to prove that they had established an adverse claim, then all other
elements of their alleged prescriptive easement claim were simply rendered immaterial - not as the

Court somehow had characterized those elements, as having been conceded by the King
Defendants.
While the King Defendants had presented the preliminary injunction testimony of J.C.
Fuquay as being fairly representative of all the Fuquay Plaintiffs to the effect that they had in fact
never interfered with the Kings' use of King Lane, all of the Fuquays did so-testified at that
September 18, 2014 hearing, as set forth in the following excerpts from that testimony:

Q.
And never have you tried to kick the Kings off the property, have you,
off the road?
A.

Not that I recall.

Q.

Well, you never have, have you?

A.

Not that I recall, no.

Q.
So in other words, you've never interfered with the Kings using their
own property, have you?
A.

Other than the gates.

Q.

Pardon me?

A.

Other than the issue with the gates.

Q.
Well, they put up gates. Particularly when they had cattle in there,
they had gates in there. Isn't that right.
A.

Yeah.
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Q.
Okay. Now, you can't tell Judge Nye whether it's easier to open the
metal gate than to put the wire over the posts with the loop, can you?
A.

I've not opened them metal gates. I haven't been through there since.

Testimony of John Fuquay, the father of Clint and J.C. Fuquay, September 18, 2014 Preliminary
Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 37, LL. 2-20.

Q.

Have you ever excluded the Kings from using that lane?

A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever told them to get off?

A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever told them that they couldn't use it if you're using it?

A.

No.

Q.

So in a[ny] way, have you interfered with the Kings?

A.

No.

Q.

Have you given them any hassle about when you use the lane?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

Testimony of Clint Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of J.C. Fuquay, September 18, 2014
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 66, L. 20 to pg. 67, L. 8 (bracketed reference added).

Q.
Do you know that this lane from the bottom of your house around the
corner from your house to Oreana is Kings' private property?
A.
No, I wasn't aware of that. It's always been an open lane since I've
been around.
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Q.

You didn't know that Kings owned that property?

A.

I knew that they owned the property on the north side of that lane.

Q.

You didn't know that they owned the lane?

A.
No. I did not. I always assumed it was an easement or private road - or an access point to our property. It's never been disputed up until now.
Q.

Well, have you ever interfered with the Kings' use of that land?

A.

No, I have not.

Q.

Have you ever told them to get out? It's your lane. You're going to

A.

No, sir, I have not.

use it?

Q.
Have you ever done anything that interrupted their use? And they
being Kings. Have you ever done anything to interrupt the Kings' use of that lane?
A.

No, sir, I have not.

Q.
Do you know if anyone in your family has ever interrupted the Kings
use of that lane?
A.

Not to my recollection, no.

And so bottom line is nobody from your family, as far as you know,
Q.
have ever hindered or interfered with the Kings' use of that lane we're - - in the
pleadings, it's called King's Lane. Do I need to rephrase that again?
A.

Yeah, go ahead. Yeah.

Q.
Can you recall anybody in your family, you, your brother, father, that's
interfered with Kings' use of that lane called Kings Lane?
A.

Between my house and their houses?

Q.

Yes.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF KING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE ll(a)(2)(B)
OF DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 21

513

.

(

A.

No.

Testimony J.C. Fuquay, Son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014
Preliminary Injunction Tr., pg. 86, L., 4 to pg. 87, L. 14.
In sum, the Fuquays all testified that they had not interfered with the Kings' use of King
Lane. Clint and J.C. Fuquays' use of large cattle trucks for "commercial" uses did not arise until
after 2006, which is beyond the time at which the claims are being made in this lawsuit. The
remaining uses of large cattle trucks on King Lane, within the five-year prescriptive-use period has
been non-interfering and non-injurious, and therefore in common with the Kings - as a matter of

law.
Under the Simmons v. Perkins standard, and the decisions in Chen w. Conway and Melendez

v. Hintz, within that Simmons standard, which were cited and relied upon in the Kings' summary
judgment memorandum, the Fuguays' use of King Lane has been at all times permissive as a

matter of law.
Prescriptive easements are disfavored under Idaho law. Lorangv. Hunt, 107 Idaho 802,803,
693 P.2d 448, 449 (1984). Trials are expensive. This case is set for trial beginning June 15, 2015.
Both the facts and the law upon which this case will be tried appear to be fairly well settled at this
time. The King Defendants respectively request that the Court reconsider its summary judgment
decision and directly and specifically address the factual issues and legal questions raised concerning
the application of the rule in Simmons v. Perkins to this case.
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V.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set out above, the King Defendants respectfully request that their motion
for reconsideration be granted.

Respectfully submitted this ~~day of April, 2015.

onal P. Rainey
Attorney for the King Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
Case No. CV-14-0278

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
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FALLS, INC.; THE ESTATE OF GORDON
G. KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.

SUMMARY
The Kings request for the Comt to reconsider its denial of the King's Motion for
Summary Judgment should be denied. The cou1t's ruling shouldn't have come as a "smprise"
to anyone, The Court cannot grant summary judgment to any party in this case because there

are disputed issues of material fact.

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO KING'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1

FIOELIT\' NI\TIONAL LAW GftOUP
1200 - 6'" AVENllE, SUITE 620
SEATJ'LE, WA

98101
(206) 22J-o1S2S

517

Aor. 28. 2015

2:53PM

No. 1629

P. 3

In its March 25, 20 l S ruling, the trial court pointed out that ''the material question of fact
that remains to be decided is when adverse use began, (whether it was in 2011 as alleged by
the Kings or in 1977 as alleged by John Fuquay.)" Very simply, Plaintiffs' arguments for
reconsideration are irrelevant because the Court has already determined that there are disputed
issues of fact. Whether the Court considered all of the Kings nuanced legal arguments really
doesn't matter because the disputed issues of fact preclude summary judgment.

LEGAL STANDARD
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l l(a)(2)(B) permits parties to move the court to 1·econside1·

an interlocutory order until fourteen days after a final judgment has been entered. The court
must consider new evidence bearing on the correctness of a summary judgment order if the
motion to reconsider is filed within fouiteen days after a final judgment issues. KeplerFleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho 207,210,268 P.3d l 159, 1162 (2012).

The district couit has no discretion on whethel' to entertain a motion for reconsideration
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1l(a)(2)(B). On a motion for reconsideration, the
comt must consider any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an
interlocutory order. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 473, 147 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct.
App. 2006).

When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
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reconsidered. In other words, if the original order was a matter within the trial comt's
discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the
original order was governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to the motion

for reconsideration. On the other hand, when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for
reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, the Court must determine whether
the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).

ARGUMENT
A. There are Disputed Issues of Fact that Preclude Summitry Judgment
The Kings ask the court to reverse itself but offer no basis for the court to suddenly find
that the material facts are undisputed. On that point alone, the court cannot grant Kings'
motion.
The Kings complain that the Court ignored their "sole argument" in their motion -- that
Fuquay's use falls under the ''use in common" rule, and was therefore permissive. The Kings
actually make two arguments which can be succinctly distilled as: l) The Fuquay's use of
King Lane was permissive and was not adverse until 201 t and 2) the use was not adverse
because it was uin common."
Kings attempt to prove this by using the testimony of JC Fuquay and Clint Fuquay
because they didn't have trucks until 2011. However, Kings totally ignore John Fuquay's
testimony that he and his father used trucks over the roadway starting in 1977.
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The Kings continue to ignore the disputed issues of fact. As the court noted, "the King
defendants claim that beginning in 2011 1 the Fuquays use of King Lane became adverse ....
According to the Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014, the plaintiffs have
used King Lane to access the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel since 1977.0 The
Kings are asking the Court to simply ignore the disputed issues of fact and accept their
conclusory "use in common'' argument. As the court has recognized, adverse use, and when
it began, is at the heart of the dispute. There is no reason to reconsider Kings' arguments
because the facts are disputed. The court must decide based on the evidence at trial, not at
summary judgment.
B. "Adverse and Under a Claim of Right" docs not mc1m confrontational

The Kings also argue that because the Fuquays never interfered or tried to kick the Kings
off the roadway that their use wasn't adverse enough. The Kings seem to argue that some sort
of physical confrontation is required to show adversity. That isn't the case. "Under a claim
of right" means that the claimant has used the property without recognition of the rights of the
setvient landowner. Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 541, 989 P.2d 276, 283 (1999). It
would be ludicrous to think that the Fuquays - or any other easement claimant -· would have
to engage in a physical confrontation or prevent the servient landowner from using the

roadway. The Kings' argument that confrontation is required would not make good public
policy.
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C. The Kings Misrepresent Fuguay's Pleadings and the Testimony
The Kings also argue that the Fuquays cannot prove any use of the roadway prior to 1989
because "they have only pled and placed at issue their use of King Lane since 1989." (King's
Memorandum at 13). The Kings misrepresent the Complaint. The Complaint alleges that
John Fuquay acquired the property in 1989 from his father and that the use was adverse ''since
at least 1989. " John Fuquay' s declaration states that adverse use commenced in 1977. Kings
representations and arguments that the Plaintiffs allegations are limited to 1989 forward are
simply untenable and without merit.
CONCLUSION

The court correctly recognized that there are disputed issues of fact. King's Motion for

Reconsideration should be denied.

Dated: April 28, 2015
Matthew R. Cleverley, I B #5418
Fidelity National L
r up
1200 -6 1'1 Avenu , Suite 20
Seattle, WA 981
(206) 223-4525, ex . 3
Matthew. Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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I.
REPLY ARGUMENT
This Court concluded its Memorandum decision on the King Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment with the following sentence:
The material question of fact that remains to be decided is when adverse use began,

(whether it was in 2011 as alleged by the Kings or in 1977 as alleged by John
Fuquay).[?]
Memorandum Decision at pg. 8. The essential question that the King Defendants have raised on this
Motion for Reconsideration is:
Whether there is any evidence before this Court of"any" adverse use of King Lane
by the Fuquay Plaintiffs that arose before 2011 under the applicable legal standards
for determining such "adverse use," as established by Simmons v. Perkins, and its
progeny?
In response to the King Defendants' arguments made in support of its Motion for
Reconsideration the Fuquay Plaintiffs have argued: ( 1) That the Kings have ignored other essential
genuine issues of material fact in the case upon which summary judgment should be denied; (2) That
the Kings have raised and asserted an incorrect standard of "adverseness" in respect to the Fuquay
Plaintiffs' prescriptive easement claim, and (3) That the Kings have mis-read the extent of claims
presented by the Fuquays on the face of their complaint. The King Defendants will respond to each
of these argwnents in this Reply Brief on its Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's denial of its
Motion for Summary Judgment.
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The Standard Of "Interference" Or "Injury" Necessary To Establish The Existence

Of The Reguired "Adverseness" Of An Alle2ed Prescriptive Easement On Summary
Jud2ment Is Well Established Under Idaho Law
The King Defendants have argued on their Motion for Reconsideration that this Court erred
in failing to fully and completely consider the single issue that was raised by the Kings on their
Motion for Summary Judgment, which is that the Fuquay Plaintiffs have failed to establish the
required "adverseness" of their alleged prescriptive easement claim within any five year period
necessary to claim a prescriptive easement in King Lane. The essence ofthe Kings' argwnent, is that
in the absence of the required "adverseness," all other elements of the Fuquays' alleged prescriptive
easement claim are therefore rendered irrelevant, and as a consequence, cease to be genuine material
facts in the case. See e.g., O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 13, 72 P.3d 849, 853 (2003)
("A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the case may be different. Rife v. Long, 127
Idaho 841,849,908 P.2d 143. 151 (1995)").

In support of their motion for swnmary judgment, the King Defendants primarily relied upon
the testimonial evidence of the Fuquay Plaintiffs themselves, which testimony established that the

Fuquays had neither: (a) interfered with the Kings' own use of King Lane, nor, (b) that by their use
of King Lane had the Fuquays injured that roadway, at any time within any claimed five year
prescriptive use period, thus eliminating any basis upon which the Fuquays could allege their
prescriptive easement claim to King Lane.

In response to this argument, the Fuquay Plaintiffs have essentially ignored the Kings'
argument that all of their alleged use of King Lane prior to 2011 was permissive - as a matter oflaw
- under Idaho's long-recognized joint-use-in-common rule. The Fuquays have instead responded
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that, "The Kings seem to argue that some sort of physical confrontation is required to show
adversity." See, Fuquays' Reconsideration Response, at pg. 4. The Kings have never made any such
argument that any "physical confrontation" is required to establish the required adverseness to
establish a prescriptive easement. The Kings have consistently, and repeatedly, relied upon the longestablished rules, as laid down by the Idaho Supreme Court. In this instance, the applicable standard
was most recently summarized by the Court in, Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 76 P .3d 969 (2003):
Proof of independent, decisive acts, such as maintenance of the way, tearing down
barriers, and other indications of separate and exclusive use is sufficient to rebut a
presumption of pennissive use. Marshall v, Blair, 130 Idaho at 680-681, 946 P.2d
at 980-981; Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 140, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941).
139 Idaho at 232, 76 P.3d at 976. This requirement of the existence of evidence consisting of
independent decisive acts, such as the maintenance of the road, or tearing down of barriers, or other
indications of separate and exclusive use, of such an extent sufficient to rebut the presumption of
permissive use is required to emphasize the corollary rule that "mere use" can never establish a
prescriptive easement to the use of a roadway in common with a neighbor. State v. Camp, 134 Idaho
662,666 n.4, 8 P.3d 657,661 n.4 (Ct.App.2000); Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, 114, Idaho 79, 83, 753
P.2d 290,294 (Ct.App.1988).
In the King Defendants original memorandum that was submitted in support of their motion
for summary judgment the Kings had cited a recent decision from the Idaho Supreme Court,

HF.LP., LLC v. The City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672, 339 P.3d 557 (2014), in which the Court
had declared that a change from permissive use to adverse use must be of such an extent that the
change in use is, "'brought home," to the servient landowner (the Kings) before that permissive use
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can be held to have changed to an adverse use:
--------~--~--

Moreover, if the presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the
presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested and
"brought home" to the servient property owner. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho
390,398, 210 P.3d 75, 83 (2009); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789,792,537 P.2d
631,634 (1975).
157 Idaho at 681,339 P.3d at 566.
Throughout the course of this action the Fuquay Plaintiffs have alleged nothing more than
their mere use of King Lane. They have utterly failed to allege any "adverse" use of King Lane,
which was at the heart of the claim raised on the King Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

It has been the very absence any ''interfering use," or any ''damaging use," at any time during a
claimed five year claimed period of adverse use which would serve the purpose of the required
adverse use. That required, "adverse use," is simply absent from the Fuquay Plaintiffs' prescriptive
easement claim in this action. The only evidence of any maintenance by the Fuquay's in this action
was conduct that occurred after the prescriptive period changed to twenty years in 2012 and 2013
and therefore would not be relevant to five year claim that has made by the Fuquays in this action.

See, Preliminary Testimony of Clint Fuquay at pg. 67, L. 21 to pg. 68, L. 1; pg. 69, LL. 4-21; and
pg. 70, LL. 11-15.
In conjunction with the fact that the Fuquays have offered no evidence whatsoever of any
"independent or decisive acts that demonstrate their "adverse" claims to King Lane at any time
during their use of that roadway within their alleged five year prescriptive use claims, they also
allege that, "Kings totally ignore John Fuquay' s testimony that he and his father used trucks over the
roadway starting in 1977 ." See, Fuquay Response to Motion to Reconsideration at pg. 3. The King
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Defendants have not ignored this evidence. Instead, it is merely the fact that all of this evidence,
when considered by the Court, does not meet the required threshold standard of either: (1) having
interfered with the Kings' own use of King Lane, or (2) in any way having injured King Lane, at any
time prior to 2011, as that rule of adverse use was first announced in Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho
136, 118 P .2d 740 (1941 ), and was most recentfy applied in Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497,
503, 236 P .3 1257, 1263 (2010). There is simply is no evidence of required adverse use by the
Fuguay Plaintiffs in this action.

As apparently emphasized by this Court at pp. 7-8 of its summary judgment decision, it was
the use of "commercial trucks, both for the Fuquay Plaintiffs' own use, and for other use in

commercial true kin&, that apparently swayed this Court to deny the King Defendants' motion for
summary judgment.

But as demonstrated by the affidavit submitted in support of the King

Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, the mere use of commercial trucks, standing alone, does
not create an adverse use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs, since the Kings themselves use such
commercial size trucks in their own use of that roadway, and the commercial trucking use for others
by the Fuquays did not begin until the prescriptive use period changed to twenty years in 2006, and
is therefore outside the scope of the prescriptive easement claims that have been made by the Fuquay
Plaintiffs in this action.
Consequently, none of the "permissive use" of King Lane by the Fuquays, under thejointuse-in-common rule established by Simmons v. Perkins, has ever been rebutted by any evidence
presented by the Fuquay Plaintiffs, much less for any continuous five-year period of claimed
prescriptive use. There simply has been no adverse use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs as is
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required to establish such a prescriptive easement.

In sum, in the absence of any alleged "adverse use," of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs,
they simply have no colorable claim to a prescriptive easement at any time prior to 2006 when the
statute changed to 20 years. As such, summary judgment for the King Defendants is appropriate on
that basis.

B.

The Kina Defendants Have Not Misrepresented The Fuquay Plaintiffs Pleadin& Under
The Standards Applicable To Summary .ludament Motions
The United States Supreme Court's precedent in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477U.S. 317, 106

S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), as that standard has been adopted and followed in Idaho, is often
cited by Idaho Courts in support of summary judgment procedure. (The United State Supreme Court
noting that summary judgment upon a proper showing of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of
material fact, is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the civil rules

as a whole, which rules are designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action."). 477 U.S. at 327 106 S.Ct. at 2555.
In Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 882 P.2d 475 (Ct.App. 1994), the Idaho Court of
Appeals cited the summary judgment rule that has been cited, invoked, and relied upon by the King
Defendants in this case::
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c), which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R.C.P. S6(c), stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showin& sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be
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"no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof
concernine an essential element of the nonmovin& party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is
"entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw,, because the norunoving party has
failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with
respect to which she has the burden of proof. "[The) standard [for granting
sununary judgment) mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) ...."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d
265 (1986) (citations omitted).
The language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted by the appellate
courts ofldaho. See, e.g., G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808
P.2d 851 (1991); Barab v. Plumleigh, 123 Idaho 890, 892, 853 P.2d 635, 637
(Ct.App.1993); Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 93 7, 941, 854
P.2d 280,284 (Ct.App.1993); Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 44-45;844 P.2d 24,
26-27 (Ct.App.1992).
126 Idaho at 311-12, 882 P.2d 478-79 (emphasis added). This conclusion of the Idaho Court of
Appeals, as to the adoption of Celotex by the Idaho Courts, was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 770 n. 2,215 P.3d 485,490 n. 2 (2009) ("Our court
of appeals has correctly recognized that ''(t)he language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted
by the appellate courts of Idaho." Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 312, 882 P.2d 475, 479
(Ct.App.1994) (citing, interalia, G& M Farms v. Funklrl"igarion Co., 119 Idaho 514,808 P.2d 851
(1991 )).")
Celotex was included within the cited authority that was relied upon in the King Defendants'
opening brief on this motion for summary judgment. The King Defendants' have also raised and
cited to this Court the principle that the only issues that are before the Court on a motion for

summary judgment are those that are presented on the face of the pleadings that are before the court
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in the case. Mickelsen Construction, Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 405, 299 P.3d 203, 2012
(2013 ). This point is raised again here because the Fuquay Plaintiffs have made the argwnent in
opposition to the King Defendants Motion for Reconsideration that the Kings have misinterpreted
the Fuquays complaint, as unfairly limiting their claims on summary judgment concerning both the
Fuquays' use of King Lane after 1989 and prior to 2006 under the former five year prescriptive use
statute. These are simply the facts that have been pled on the face of the Fuquay Plaintiffs' own
complaint in this action for an alleged prescriptive easement in King Lane.
Although Idaho is clearly a "notice pleading" state, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently
stated that within this notice pleading standard that, "The key issue in determining the validity of a
complaint is whether the adverse party is put on notice of the claims brou1ht a1ainst it.''

Brown

v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 164, 335 P.3d 1, 9 (2014) (emphasis added). Critical to the five
elements necessary to prove a prescriptive easement is the actual prescriptive period that applies to
that claimed easement. The Fuquay Plaintiffs have made it quite clear in footnote 1 to their
complaint in this action that they intend to proceed under the former statute that provided for a five

year prescriptive period. 1 The Machado case, as cited in that footnote to their complaint, indicates
this is permissible. ("We held that 'the twenty year time period does not apply to an easement by
prescription acquired prior to the amendment."').

In contrast to the Machado rule, as applied only to the facts of this case, a civil action is
generally controlled by the law that is in force at the time the complaint is filed. See e.g., Woodland

The text of that footnote to the Fuquays' complaint declares that: "I.e. 5-203 was
amended from 5 years to 20 years in 2006, but the 5 year time frame still applies to prescriptive
claims before 2006. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Id 212, 222.,,
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Furniture, LLC v. Larsen, 142 Idaho 140, 146, 124 P.3d 1016, 1022 (2005) ("We agree with
Woodland that the version of LC.§ 48-104 in effect when Woodland filed its complaint in March
2000 governs this suit."), citing to, Unity Light & Power Co. v. City ofBurley, 92 Idaho 499, 503-04,
445 P.2d 720, 724-25 (1968) (A lawsuit is governed by the statutes in effect at the time the
complaint is filed). Under I. C. § 73-101 statutes are not to be applied retroactively, "unless expressly
so declared." But see, Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 938, 318 P.3d 918, 928 (2014) (The
Legislature's intent to apply a statute retroactively is sufficient if that intention to make that law
retroactive is clear and if the language clearly refers to the past as well as to the future, then the intent
to make the law retroactive is expressly declared.).
When I.C. § 5-203 was amended from five to twenty years effective July 1, 2006, see, Ch.
158, § 1, pg. 474 of the 2006 Idaho Session Laws, that new twenty year prescriptive period was to
operate prospectively only, such that no new claim to adverse rights under that amended statute
could ripen into an actual prescriptive right- at the soonest - until July 1, 2026.
The Fuquays' have pointed out in response to the King Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration that on the face of their complaint that they state their alleged use has been adverse
"since at least 1989," which allows them to also provide proof of use prior to 1989. As noted above,
the questions that are placed at issue on a motion for summary judgment are those that are stated on
the face of the complaint, as supported by the Mickelsen Construction decision. In addition, the
Idaho Supreme Court has also declared that the standards of Rule 1S(b) do not apply to motions for
summary judgment in Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 967 P.2d 284 (1998):

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF KING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE l l(a)(2)(B)
OF DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 10

532

05-11-'15 09:26 FROM-

T-047 P012/023 F-578

Rule l S(b) applies only to unpled theories that are litigated through the submission
of evidence at a trial of the cause on the merits, and not to factual issues raised in a
motion for summary judgment.
132 Idaho at 86,967 P.2d at 288. See also, 0 'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 15, 72 P.3d
849,855 (2003). Consequently, on summary judgment the rules seems faidy well established that
it is only what is stated on the face of the complaint that is placed at issue, and not what might be
established at a subsequent trial by consent of the parties. This is a risk that a party must bear, that
chooses to plead its claims differently than what it might subsequently attempt to prove at trial, if
it is successful in reaching trial.
A number of the specific evidentiary questions raised by the Fuquays' response are more
appropriately addressed in response to the Kings' motion in limine and therefore have been reserved
for the Reply to the King Defendants' motion in Ii mine. Nonetheless, at some point, the Fuquay
Plaintiffs must confine their alleged prescriptive easement claim to a specific declared discrete five
year period, even if that five year period is tacked with a predecessor's alleged adverse use. But, as
consistent with the purposes of swnmary judgment, as stated above, the Fuquay Plaintiff's should
not be allowed to avoid summary judgment by merely speculating as to the existence oftheir alleged
prescriptive easement claim, hoping that the required evidence will eventually appear at trial.
Although that evidence at this point would be highly contradictory to the evidence that has already
been presented in court under oath by the Fuquays themselves. As the Idaho Court of Appeals in

Heather v. Honkers' Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 8 P.3d 1254 (Ct.App.2000) summarized:
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) governs the defense of a motion for
summary judgment, and states, in relevant part:
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of that party's pleadings. but the party's response. by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.
(Emphasis added.).
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is identical to its federal counterpart and,
thus, we find federal law instructive to this Court's analysis of the issue at hand. It
is not the intent ofF .R.C.P. 56 "to preserve purely speculative issues of fact for trial."

Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm 'n, 663 F.2d 120, 128 (D.C.Cir.1980). [8 P.3d
1257] A party opposin2 summan judiment cannot demand a trial simply
because of the "speculative possibility that a material issue of fact may appear
at that time." 1OB CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY
KANE, WRIGHT MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDUREE § 2739 at 388-89 (3d ed.1998). See Childers v. High Society
Magazine, Inc., 557 F.Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (an unsupported statement
that "it might not be so" was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact to
defeat a motion for summary judgment).
134 Idaho at 713-14, 8 P.3d at 1256-57 (emphasis added).
In sum, there simply appears to be no evidence within any specific five year period - as
claimed by the Fuquay Plaintiffs - that supports their claim of an adverse prescriptive easement to
King Lane. It was the Fuquay Plaintiffs' burden in response to the King Defendants• motion for
summary judgment, not just to allege the existence of genuine issues of material fact, of disputed
genuine issues of material fact on the motion for summary judgment - whether the Fuquays use of
King Lane had ever interfered with of Kings's use of King Lane or injured King Lane during the
period of alleged adverse five period of alleged prescriptive use claimed under the Fuquays'
complaint? This alleged use necessarily had to occur at some time prior to 2006, and as pied on the
face of that complaint - sometime after 1989. That evidence - other than mere pennissive use in
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common with the Kings- in fact has not been presented to this Court. The Fuquays do nothing more
than merely speculate that a genuine issue of fact may appear at the time of trial. Something more
is required to avoid the entry of swrunary judgment.

II.

CONCLUSION
Under the Simmons v. Perkins standard, raised on the King Defendants original motion for
summary judgment, the Fuquay Plaintiffs have not established an adverse claim to King Lang. The
King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration should be granted, and summary judgment should be
entered for the King Defendants on the Fuquays alleged claim to a prescriptive easement in King
Lane.
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This matter came on for hearing on May 14, 2015 upon the King defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration of this Court's ruling on their Motion for Summary Judgment.
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behalf of the plaintiffs was attorney Matthew Cleverley, of the law firm Fidelity National Law
Group. Appearing on behalf of the King defendants was attorney Ronald Rainey. Appearing on
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behalf of the Low defendants was attorney Bryce Farris, of the law firm Sawtooth Law Offices,
PLLC. The Court has considered the briefing, affidavits, pleadings and argument submitted and
sets forth its decision below.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STANDARD
IRCP ll(a) (2) (B) allows a party to seek reconsideration of any interlocutory order
before the entry of judgment.

Final judgment has not been entered in this case therefore,

Defendants' motion is timely. On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new
admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. See PHH

Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P .3d 1180, 1184 (2009) (citing Coeur
d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037
(1990)).
"When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012), reh'g
denied (Aug. 1, 2012). In this case, the King defendants seek reconsideration of the Court's
Memorandum Decision upon King defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on March
25, 2015. Thus, this Court must apply the summary judgment standard that it applied to its
earlier decision.
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In a motion for summary
judgment, this Court should liberally construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draw
all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Summary judgment
must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting
inferences from the evidence presented. West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord 141 Idaho 75, 8687, 106 P.3d 401, 412 - 413 (2005), citing Iron Eagle Dev., L.L.C. v. Quality Design Sys., Inc.,
138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003) (citations omitted); see also Willie v. Bd. of

Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133, 59 P.3d 302,304 (2002).
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On a motion for summary judgment, the burden is always upon the moving party to prove
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

u: however, the basis for a properly supported

motion is that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an element of the nonmoving party's case, it is incumbent upon the non-moving party to establish an issue of fact
regarding that element. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,923 P.2d 416 (1996).

The burden on the moving party may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on
an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126
Idaho 308,311,882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1994).
A trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or
resolve controverted factual issues. American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 671 P.2d
1063 (1983).
Summary judgment should be granted with caution. If the record contains conflicting
inferences or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be
denied. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,808 P.2d 876 (1991). Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119
Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991).

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs seek a declaration of a prescriptive easement over King Lane in Owyhee County.

King Lane is a private, all-weather road about one-half mile in length. It runs in an east-west
direction from the public Oreana Loop Road until it connects with Castle Lane, which then runs
south until it connects with Oreana Loop Road. The King defendants own the parcel of land to the
north of King Lane, the Low defendants own the parcel of land to the south of King Lane and the
plaintiffs own parcels of land to the west of King Lane where it ends and connects with Castle
Lane.

The Court went into greater background detail in its Memorandum Decision Upon King
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on March 25, 2015.

That background

information is incorporated herein.
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Argument Supporting Motion to Reconsider
Quoting from King Defendants' Memorandum in Support, beginning on page 2:

As simply as can be stated, the King Defendants were only arguing
that if, under the controlling rule of Idaho law, the Fuquay Plaintiffs
use of King Lane was at all times deemed to be permissive, then
there can be no prescriptive easement, which is dependent upon
"adverseness" in order to be established. If that single element can
be shown not to exist - as a matter of law - then all other elements and all other alleged issues of material fact - thereafter become
immaterial, and the entire claim fails, for lack of the required proof
as to that single element - adverseness.
The Court denied the King Defendants' motion for summary
judgment without directly addressing, or even acknowledging, the
single issue that the King Defendants had raised on their motion for
summary judgment. Therefore, the King Defendants' request
reconsideration, at least to obtain clarification in moving towards
trial; as to the Court's position on this essential question.
The King Defendants' argue that: (I) the five year prescriptive period had to begin
sometime between 1989 and 200 I since it had have been completed before the law changed in
2006; therefore, use of commercial truck traffic is not relevant since it only occurred after 2007
when Clint and J.C. Fuquay started to run their commercial trucks over that road (2) John Fuquay's
claimed use beginning as far back as 1977 of large cattle trucks was not adverse as it simply was the
same sort of general cattle ranching operation that the King Defendants' were involved in and thus
not adverse - but rather consistent with the ''joint use in common rule" established in Idaho; (3) and

it is this "joint use in common rule" that the King Defendants' are asking the Court to apply to grant
summary judgment.

In their response to the King Defendants' motion to reconsider, the Fuquays state:
The Kings continue to ignore the disputed issues of fact. As the
court noted, "the King defendants claim that beginning in 2011, the
Fuquays use of King Lane became adverse . . . According to the
Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014, the plaintiffs
have used King Lane to access the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton
Fuquay Parcel since 1977." The Kings are asking the Court to
simply ignore the disputed issues of fact and accept their conclusory
"use in common" argument. As the court has recognized, adverse
use, and when it began. is at the heart of the dispute. There is no
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reason to reconsider Kings' arguments because the facts are
disputed. The court must decide based on the evidence at trial, not at
summary judgment.
The argument that the King Defendants want the Court to revisit is that pursuant to the law
set forth in HE.L.P.. LLC v. The City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672,339 P.3d 557 (2014) a change
from permissive use to adverse use must be of such an extent that the change in use is "brought
home" to the servient landowner before that permissive use can be held to have changed to an
adverse use. Citing Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,398,210 P.3d 75, 83 (2009):
Moreover, if the preswnption of permissiveness applied when the
use began, the presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use
is clearly manifested and "brought home" to the servient property
owner.
The King Defendants argue that although John Fuquay, in his affidavit, claimed that he and
his father used to run their commercial or cattle trucks through and over King Lane as far back as
possibly 1977, there is nothing in Fuquay's claim that describes the use as interfering with or
damaging the use of the lane for the Kings. It is upon that basis that the King Defendants seek
summary judgment. That is, there is no evidence in the record before the Court that can establish

adverse use for any five year period leading up to 2006. Thus, summary judgment should be
granted as there is no issue of fact on the element of adverse use.

Adverse and under a claim of ript
The Idaho Supreme Court has provided explanation for the prescriptive easement
requirement that use be adverse and under a claim of right:

A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient
tenement was by permission of its owner, because the use, by
definition, was not adverse to the rights of the owner. Indeed, the
rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or
ripen into a prescriptive right unless it constitutes an actual
invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner.
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006) (citations omitted).
The nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the
property." Akers, 142 Idaho at 303 (quoting Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,231, 76 P.3d 969,
975 (2003)). "The state of mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling;
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instead, the focus is on the nature of their use." Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 397-98,
210 P.3d 75, 82-83 (2009). Emphasis added.

If a use has commenced as permissive, a user must make some new and independent act
that would put the owner of the servient property on notice that the use was no longer permissive.

Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326, 327, 563 P.2d 50, 51 (1977). However, "mere inaction and
passive acquiescence is not a sufficient basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was
with the permission of the owner of the servient tenement." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557,
511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973).

It is undisputed and the record establishes that the plaintiffs' have used King Lane as far
back as 1977, and the use was with the actual knowledge of the defendants. It can be argued that
plaintiffs use has been open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted. Proof of these elements,
without evidence as to how the use began, raises the presumption that such use was adverse and the
burden is then on the defendants to show that such use was permissive. Marshall v. Blair, 130
Idaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975 (1997).

However, the Idaho Supreme Court has articulated

exceptions to the preswnption of adverse use in the case of roadways and driveways like King
Lane.

'use of a driveway in common with the owner and the general
public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part
indicating a separate and exclusive use on his part negatives any
presumption of individual right therein in his favor.' Simmons v.
Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (1941) (emphasis added).
This Court further explained in Simmons that use of a roadway
must invade or infringe on the owner's rights in order for the use to
be considered adverse and, thus, to ripen into a prescriptive right of
way.
Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680.
On summary judgment, the King defendants argue that there is nothing in the record to
show a decisive act on the part of the plaintiffs that would have interfered with their use. The

burden is on the plaintiffs to present some evidence to show a decisive act or incident to create a
genuine issue of material fact that defendant's use of King Lane was adverse and under a claim
of right. Since plaintiffs have not done so, the King defendants believe that summary judgment
is appropriate.
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According to the Affidavit of Rose King filed on September 9, 2014, the King defendants
began making improvements to King Lane in 1973 when they purchased their property. By I 988-

89, the defendants had turned King Lane into an all-weather road. The record before the Court
shows that the Kings were the only parties to maintain or make improvements to King Lane m1til
2013 when the plaintiffs assert that they graded or added gravel to the lane. (See Transcript of
Preliminary Injunction Hearing, pgs. 67 - 69 attached to Affidavit of Bryce Farris filed December

9, 2014). The evidence also shows that the Kings use King Lane on a day-to-day basis to conduct
their cattle operation, and at various times throughout the year, graze their cattle over King Lane
between two gates at either end of the lane.
There is also evidence in the record to show that King Lane was used by the general public.
According to Samuel Steiner, a predecessor in title to the Low property, King Lane ''was an old
farm access roadway that was used occasionally by a variety of people." (See Affidavit of Samuel
Steiner filed on December 9, 2014) Steiner stated that his family did not try to stop anyone from
using the road so long as they did not interfere with his family's operations. He stated that hunters
used King Lane to access the reservoir on BLM land, that the Kings used it to access a geothermal
well, and that the predecessors to the Fuquay property used it as a shortcut to Grandview. Steiner
also stated that the majority of vehicle use was down Castle Road, especially during the wet
weather because King Lane was difficult to cross when muddy. Furthermore, there is evidence in
the record of other specific public use by the mail carrier, the Schwann Truck driver and the school
bus driver. See Declarations of Krivanec, Drew and Collett filed September 9, 2014.

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe all facts in favor of the
nonmoving party. However, it is incumbent upon the nonmoving party to "make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
In this case, the plaintiffs have simply stated that there was adverse use prior to 2006 and
that a genuine issue of fact exists. However, there is nothing in the record to show a decisive act
of interference that could

be construed as a separate and exclusive use.

According to the

Declaration of John Fuquay in Support of the Ex Parte Motion for TRO, the plaintiffs began using
King Lane in 1989. The Fuquays also state that the general public has also used King Lane since
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1989. This only supports the defendants' argument that there was no decisive act or incident of
exclusive use because the use was in common. At the preliminary injunction hearing, there was
disputed testimony that the plaintiffs actually began using King Lane in 1977. However, even when
this Court views those facts in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no evidence to show that the
plaintiff's use was ever adverse to or ran contrary to the Kings' claims to the property.
Rather, the evidence shows that prior to 2011, the plaintiffs never interfered with the
defendants' use of King Lane and their use was in common with the Kings, the Lows and the
general public. The only evidence of an adverse use and decisive act occurred in 2011 when the
plaintiffs increased large commercial truck traffic over King Lane. However, that adverse use
places the prescriptive easement claim within the twenty year statutory period.
Not only do the plaintiffs state that the general public used King Lane, they admit that their
own use of King Lane never interfered with the defendants. According to the transcript from the
September 18, 2014 hearing on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiff Clint Fuquay,
the son of John Fuquay, testified to the following:

Mr. Rainey:

You don't claim any right to King's Lane, do you?

Clint Fuquay: I've been using it so I just always assumed that I
could.

Mr. Rainey:

Have you ever excJuded the Kings from using that
lane?

Clint Fuquay: No.

Mr. Rainey:

Have you never told them to get off?

Clint Fuquay: No.
Mr. Rainey:

Have you ever told them that they couldn't use it if
you 're using it?

Clint Fuquay: No.

Mr. Rainey:

So in a way, have you interfered with the Kings?

Clint Fuquay: No.

MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON KING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Page8

543

Mr. Rainey:

Have you given them any hassle about when you use
the lane?

Clint Fuquay: No.

(Transcript of Preliminaty Injunction hearing on September 18, 2014, pgs. 66-67).
Plaintiff John Fuquay also testified at the September 18, 2014 hearing. According to the
transcript, John Fuquay stated that whenever the Kings' cattle were grazing over King Lane, there
was barbed wire gates placed on both the east and west ends of the road. John Fuquay also testified
as to the physical description of the gates as well as how he would unlatch, open and close the gates
each time he passed through. He also testified that before the "last four or five years/' King Lane
has always been open. (See Transcript, pgs. 16-17).

J.C. Fuquay (not a party to this case), the son of plaintiff John Fuquay, also testified at the
hearing and stated the following:

Mr. Rainey:

Do you know that this lane from the bottom of your
house around the corner from your house to Oreana is
Kings' private property?

J.C.:

No, I wasn't aware ofthat. It's always been an open
lane since I've been around.

Mr. Rainey:

You didn't know that Kings owned that property

J.C.:

I knew that they owned the property on the north side
of that lane.

Mr. Rainey:

You didn't know that they owned the lane?

J.C.:

No. I did not. I always assumed it was an easement or
private road-or an access point to our property. It's
never been disputed up witil now.

Mr. Rainey:

Well, have you ever interfered with the Kings' use of
that land?

J.C.:

No, I have not.

Mr. Rainey:

Have you ever told them to get out? It's your lane.
You're going to use it?
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J.C.:

No, sir, I have not.

Mr. Rainey:

Have you ever done anything that interrupted their
use? And they being Kings. Have you ever done
anything to interrupt the Kings' use of that lane?

J.C.:

No, sir, I have not.

Mr. Rainey:

Do you know if anyone in your family has ever
interrupted the Kings' use of that lane?

J.C.:

Not to my recollection, no.

(Transcript, pgs. 86-87).
Based on the record before this Court the plaintiff has failed to make any showing on the
essential element that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was adverse and under claim of right. Even
when this Court makes all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, there is nothing in the record to
indicate a decisive act or incident of separate and exclusive use from 1977 until 2011. While the
use of King Lane may not have started with express or even implied permission, the record and
testimony of the plaintiffs shows that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was in "common with the owner
and the general public." Marsha/1130 Idaho at 680; (quoting Simmons, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d
740 (1941 ). A prescriptive easement cannot be granted unless there is evidence of a decisive act

or incident showing adverse use that could be considered an "actual invasion of or infringement
on the rights of the owner." Hughes, 142 ldaho at 480.
Because there is no proof or evidence concerning this essential element of the plaintiffs'
case, that the Fuquays' use was adverse and contrary to the ownership rights of the Kings, the
King defendants have met their burden of sho-wing there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding the element of adverse use.
Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden
shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further
depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a
genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure
to do so under I.R.C.P. 56 (f). Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389,
392, 179 P.3d 352,355 (Ct.App. 2008).
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This court has reviewed the record thoroughly and cannot find that plaintiffs have met
this burden. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate.

This is especially so given the plaintiffs

burden of proof at trial (clear and convincing evidence).
Therefore, counsel for the King defendants is directed to prepare a judgment consistent
with this Memorandum Decision and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54.

Dated this

/t:t-"'

day of June, 2015.

Th,£. q &District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
V.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No. CV-14-0278

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE
COURT'S JUNE 19, 2015
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
KING'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND REQUEST FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

I.

MOTION AND BACKGROUND

Pursuant to IRCP 11 (a)(2)(B), Plaintiffs move the court for reconsideration of its June
19, 2015 Memorandum Decision Upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. The
Kings sought reconsideration of the Court's original March 25, 2015 Memorandum Decision

Upon King Defendants' Motion/or Summary Judgment which had denied the Kings' Motion
for Summary Judgment.
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The Court's original March 25, 2015 decision denied the Kings' Motion for Summary
Judgment because the court found that there were disputed issues of material facts as to when
adverse use began. In its decision, the Court concluded:
As stated above, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must make
all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. While the evidence in the record does
not meet the clear and convincing standard required to prove the creation for a
prescriptive easement that is not the standard for summary judgment. The material
question of fact that remains to be decided is when adverse use began, (whether it was
in 2011 as alleged by the Kings or in 1977 as alleged by John Fuquay).

Despite finding that there were material issues of fact regarding when adverse use
began, the Court reversed itself and granted the Kings' motion for summary judgment. In its
June 19, 2015 decision, the Court stated:
Based on the record before this Court the plaintiff has failed to make any showing on
the essential element that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was adverse and under a claim
of right. Even when this Court makes all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, there is
nothing in the record to indicate a decisive act or incident of separate and exclusive
use from 1977 until 2011. While the use of King Lane may not have started with
express or even implied permission, the record and testimony of the plaintiffs show
that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was in "common with the owner and the general
public." Marshall 130 Idaho at 680; (quoting Simmons, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740
( 1941 ). A prescriptive easement cannot be granted unless there is evidence of a
decisive act or incident showing adverse use that could be considered an "actual
invasion or infringement on the rights of the owner." Hughes, 142 Idaho at 480.
Because there is no proof or evidence concerning this essential element of the
plaintiffs' case, that the Fuquays' use was adverse and contrary to the ownership rights
of the Kings, the King defendants have met their burden of showing there is no
genuine issue of material fact regarding the element of adverse use.
June 19 Memorandum Decision at p. 10.
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Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reconsider its reversal because its original
decision was correct. There are disputed issues of material facts that make summary judgment
inappropriate.
In addition, the Court used the incorrect legal standard in reconsidering its decision
and based its decision on an incorrect application of the law. When the correct legal standard
is applied, the court should have denied the Kings' request for reconsideration and concluded
that the Kings are not entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiffs are also submitting pages from the deposition of Rose King and Gilbert King
which were taken on May 11, 2015 and which were not available to be submitted in response
to the prior motions.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B) permits parties to move the court to reconsider
an interlocutory order until fourteen days after a final judgment has been entered. The court
must consider new evidence bearing on the correctness of a summary judgment order if the
motion to reconsider is filed within fourteen days after a final judgment issues. KeplerFleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho 207,210,268 P.3d 1159, 1162 (2012).
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for reconsideration
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B). On a motion for reconsideration, the
court must consider any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an
interlocutory order. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound
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discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 473, 147 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct.
App. 2006).
When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered. In other words, if the original order was a matter within the trial court's
discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the
original order was governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to the motion
for reconsideration. On the other hand, when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for
reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, the Court must determine whether
the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).

III.

ARGUMENTS

Respectfully, there are several problems with the court's rulings:
1. The Court applied the wrong presumption of adverse use. There is no evidence of how
the road was created, and there is a presumption of adverse use which should have
been construed in favor of the Fuquays.
2. "Use in common" is a factual determination and there is conflicting evidence as to the
use of the roadway. The court construed inferences from the conflicting evidence in
favor of the Kings instead of in favor of the Fuquays.
3. Even if there was "use in common" the evidence showed that Jim Fuquay had
committed a distinct act of placing a new mobile home on his property in 1977 and
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using the roadway for access to that mobile home. The placement of the mobile home
was a separate distinctive act that created an adverse use. The court ignored the
evidence of the adverse use commencing in 1977 and focused only on the use in 2011.
A. The Prescriptive Easement Requires a Three-Step Analysis

Presumptions for prescriptive easements use a three-step analysis: 1) Does the general
rule presuming adverse use apply? 2) Is there evidence of permission by the landowner that
negates the presumption of adverse use? and 3) If there is evidence of permission, is there
evidence of an infringement of right by the easement claimant that reinstates the presumption
of adverse use?
1. General Presumption

The first prong is a presumption that use of a roadway, without evidence of how that
use began, is presumed to be adverse to the servient owner.
Although clear and convincing proof of each of the elements necessary to establish a
prescriptive easement is generally essential to a claim, there is a shortcut in terms of
proving adverse use. Without evidence of how the use of the property began, proof of
open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted use for the prescriptive period raises a
presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right."
Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 232, 76 P.3d 969, 976 (2003).
Once the presumption of adverse use is established, the servient landowner has the
burden of proving that the use was permissive:
The general rule is that proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the
claimed right for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use began,
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. The burden
is then on the owner of the servient tenement to show that the use was permissive, or
by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement.
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W. v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973). See also Marshall v.
Blair, 130 Id. 675,680; Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 62, 190 P.3d 876, 881 (2008).
2. "In Common" Exception to General Presumption

The second prong, the exception to the adverse presumption rule is: if the servient
landowner presents evidence of a use "in common," then the use may be deemed permissive.
However, for the "use in common" exception to apply, there must be an "absence of evidence
as to whether the use began adversely or with permission of the servient owner." Melendez v.
Hintz, 111 Idaho 401, 404, 724 P.2d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 1986). Mere acquiescence by the
servient owner, however, is not evidence of permission: "As we have noted, mere proof that
the owner "acquiesced" in the use is not proof that the use was with the owner's consent or
permission." Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,405, 724 P.2d 137, 141 (Ct. App. 1986). This
puts the burden on the servient owner to produce affirmative evidence that the use was
permissive. Simply "doing nothing" is not evidence of permission or of a "use in common."
3. The General Presumption Overrules the Exception

The third step is: even if there is some evidence of permission or use in common from
the servient owner, if there is some evidence that the easement claimants' use infringed on or
invaded of the owners' rights, the general rule presuming adverse use, rather than the
exception, still applies:
Understanding the basis for the Simmons rule helps to determine the limits of its
application. There should be no presumption that the use originated adversely to the
owner unless the use itself constitutes some invasion or infringement upon the rights
of an owner. Where one person merely uses a roadway in common with his neighbor,
without damage to the roadway, without interfering with the neighbor's use of the
roadway, and where the neighbor has established and maintained the roadway on his
own property for his own purposes, only the most minimal intrusion is made into the
owner's dominion over his property. Logically, a use which is not in fact adverse to
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the owner provides no basis for the presumption that the use is adverse. However,
where the use made of the property for the prescriptive period is shown to constitute
some infringement or invasion of the owner's rights, it is more appropriate to apply
the general rule, presuming the use to be adverse, that is, without permission of the
owner.
Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,405, 724 P.2d 137, 141 (Ct. App. 1986)(emphasis added).

B. The Facts in this Case Support the General Presumption of Adverse Use

In this case, the general rule applies. First, the roadway was in existence long before
any of the parties in this case owned their properties. Second, the Kings did not show
evidence of permission (as opposed to mere acquiescence). And third, even if the Kings
showed some evidence of permission or use in common, the Plaintiffs presented evidence of
an infringement of right that re-instated the presumption of adverse use.
The court applied the presumptions incorrectly. There is no evidence as to how the
original use began. Therefore, the court must apply the general rule in favor of the Plaintiffs.
The Kings then have the burden of presenting evidence that the use was permissive. The
Kings may not merely rest on acquiescence. However, even if there is some evidence as to
use in common, if there is any evidence to show an infringement or invasion of the owners'
rights, then the general presumption of adverse use must apply. Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho
401, 405, 724 P.2d 137, 141 (Ct. App. 1986). Here, the court simply looked at the evidence
of increased truck use in 2011 but ignored the evidence as to the adverse use that began in
1977.
The court was initially correct in its analysis when it applied the general rule that when
there is no evidence as to how use of a road began, the use is presumed adverse to the
landowners. However, as to the second step, the Kings did not present evidence that the use
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of the roadway commenced as permissive or that there was use in common in 1977. The
Kings merely argued that they had a similar use of the roadway for farm trucks in 2011, and
since Plaintiffs did not cause any damage to the roadway until then, the similar use was "in
common." The Court accepted Kings' arguments that because Plaintiffs did not cause any
damage to the roadway until 2011, the use was "in common" with the Kings.
First, it is illogical that the law would require an easement claimant to damage a
roadway in order to show adverse use. Common sense dictates that one who regularly uses a
roadway would take care to prevent, not cause, damage to the roadway. After all, why would
someone intentionally cause damage to a roadway that they would then need to repair? The
reliance on arguments that there was no damage to the roadway is illogical and contrary to
public policy.
Second, the Court did not address the fact that the Kings sold their property to Zane
Block in 1982 and repossessed it some 4 years later, in 1986. Affidavit of Rose King Dated
December 4, 201413. There was no evidence of use in common during the year before or the
year after Block's ownership of the property. The Kings also presented no evidence that the
use of the roadway between March 1982 and September 1986 - when the Kings did not own
the property-- was permissive. Therefore, the Fuquays' continued use of the roadway during
that time is presumed to be adverse.
In her deposition, Rose King acknowledged that she did not know if the use of the
roadway from 1982-1986 was permissive or adverse.
13 Q. All right. We're talking about
14 King Lane when Zane Block was buying it.
15 A. If I drive down and you drive down
16 tomorrow, am I supposed to see your tracks?
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17 Q. Well, my question was could you tell
18 whether or not anybody had been using the road?
19 Did it look like it was in use?
20 A. Well, somebody had been using it.
21 Q. Okay. But if there's a -- you don't
22 know who was using the road during that time?
23 A. No, I do not know.
24 Q. Okay. It could have been the Fuquays,
25 right?
1 A. I don't know who was using the road,
2 sir.
3 Q. When Mr. Block was buying the property,
4 did you believe that you still had the right to
5 control who could or could not use King Lane?
6 A. We didn't try to do that.
7 Q. Okay. Was it your belief that you
8 still had that right to?
9 A. No. But I had the right to observe
10 what was going on.
11 Q. Okay. So when Mr. Block was there, you
12 couldn't have come in and put gates up and said,
13 "Well, you're just buying the property. We're
14 going to put gates up and control who comes
15 through"?
16 A. No, I could not have done that.
Rose King Deposition at 39-40
At the time the Kings re-acquired the property in 1986, the use by Plaintiffs was
presumptively adverse to the Kings because there is no evidence that the Plaintiffs' use during
the time of Blocks' ownership was permissive. The Kings did not present any evidence of a
change from adverse use to permissive use in 1986 when they re-acquired the property. In
fact, the Kings did not live on the property immediately after re-acquiring it in 1986 and took
no steps to determine whether the Fuquays' use of the roadway was adverse at that time.
12 Q. Now, between 1986 and 1988 when you
13 moved back up, did any of your -- did you have any
14 indication during that two-year period that the
15 Fuquays or anyone on their property were using
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16 King Lane?
17 A. I would assume they were, but I can't
18 tell you.
19 Q. At any point, did you ask any of your
20 children to prevent anybody from using King Lane?
21 A. No, we did not.
Rose King Deposition at 42.
There is at least an issue of fact as to whether the Plaintiffs' use of the roadway during
Blocks' ownership, and the year before or after Blocks ownership - a period totaling more
than 5 years--was adverse.
C. There is No Evidence of Use in Common in 1977
The court's analysis of "use in common" relied exclusively on the evidence of
increased truck use in 2011. Again, that issue is largely irrelevant. While the increased use is
relevant to the scope of the easement, the prescriptive easement had vested long before 2011.
The evidence in the record showed that Jim Fuquay purchased the property in 1977
and began using the roadway at that time. (Declaration of John Fuquay dated October_
2014). In his deposition, Gilbert King acknowledged that Fuquays began using the roadway
for access after Jim Fuquay put in the mobile home:
23 A. Okay. We're probably not clear. When
24 they lived in this house here where John lives,
25 they went in and out Castle Lane. When they put
Page 86
1 the double-wide in over here -- so I suppose it
2 would be closer to like '79 -- then, you know,
3 their use was once in a while.
4 Q. Okay. Once in a while is what?
5 A. A time or two a week, I would say.
6 Q. Okay. A time or two a week with cars
7 or a pickup?
8 A. Cars or pickups.
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Gilbert King Deposition at 85-86.
There is no evidence that Jim Fuquay's use of the roadway began as permissive in
1977. Since there was no evidence that the use began as permissive in 1977, the presumption
is that the use was adverse. The Kings had an obligation to show evidence of a change in use
from hostile to permissive by 1982 (5 years after Jim Fuquays purchase in 1977). The Kings
presented no evidence of "use in common" between 1982 and 1986. Based on the
presumption of adverse use commencing in 1977, Plaintiffs' prescriptive rights vested in
1982. No amount of permissive or in-common use after that time nullifies the fact that the
easement rights had already vested.
The evidence is that the Kings never enforced any right to exclude Jim Fuquay from
using King Lane. They merely acquiesced:
Q. Did you ever tell Jim and Wanda that
22 they were not allowed to use King Lane?
23 A. No, I did not.
24 Q. Did you believe at the time that you
25 had -- would have had the right to tell them that
Page 23
I they couldn't use King Lane?
2 A. Yes, I do.
Deposition of Rose King at 22-23.
D. The Public Use Exception Does Not Apply

The "public use" exception requires indiscriminate public use equal to the use of the
easement claimant. Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111, 112-13, 697 P.2d 451, 452-53 (Idaho App.,
1985) ("Where, as here, the same degree of use upon which the adverse claim is based has
been exercised indiscriminately by the general public, individual acquisition of a prescriptive
easement has generally been held impossible.") The Court relied on Huges v. Fischer for
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support that use in common with the public requires a separate distinct act of adversity.
However, the facts in Huges show the road at issue in that case was actually open to the
general public. "All of the plaintiffs themselves corroborated the public use of the Path by
testifying that use of the Path was "common knowledge," that "everybody did it." Hughes v.
Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 481, 129 P.3d 1223, 1230 (Idaho,2006). So, in Hughes, the public use
was to the same degree as the adverse use.
That is not the same in this case. In this case, the Court stated that "there is evidence
in the record of other specific public use by the mail carrier, the Schwann Truck driver and
the school bus driver." Memorandum Decision at 7. The first issue is there is no evidence that
that use would be "to the same degree" as the adverse use.

The second issue is those

declarations, which were submitted by the Kings, say that those drivers did NOT use King
Lane.
In addition, Rose King testified that there was never any public use of the roadway:
Prior to this lawsuit, I am not aware of any use by UPS, post office or other delivery
services of King Lane to provide services to Fuquay properties. To the contrary, the
mailboxes for the Fuquays are located at the end of Castle Lane and I have not
observed any services using King Lane to provide deliveries to the Fuquay
properties ... .I am not aware of any guests of the Fuquays using King Lane to access
the Fuquay properties.
Affidavit of Rose King dated December 4, 2014.
In her deposition, Rose King reaffirmed her testimony that the roadway was never
used for deliveries:
1 Q. You've never seen any delivery drivers
2 using King Lane, FedEx, UPS, Post Office dropping
3 off any mail packages to anybody that lived in
4 Clint or JC's houses?
5 A. No. The only time that I ever saw, the
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6 Schwan's asked me one day, he said, "The gate is
7 locked. I can't go up." I said, "You can go this
8 time, but don't go anymore. They'll have to
9 unlock their gate if they want it."
10 So, no, they didn't come our way. The
11 FedEx man did stop several times and ask how we
12 got there, and we directed them to go around the
13 way they were supposed to. And I believe you
14 have some affidavits showing that from those
15 people.
Deposition of Rose King at 58.
In her deposition, Rose King indicated that if the general public tried to go down the
roadway, she would stop them in her driveway:
A. Let me tell you one thing before you go
20 too far. If you're looking at the picture, if
21 you're going to drive across our bridge and you
22 don't know that there's a lane that goes to the
23 left, you're going to come directly into my yard.
24 We had that. We told people where they wanted to
25 go. They turned around and went back. So most of
1 the people that I would have came or if there was
2 a hunter, as you have asked before, then they
3 would ask.
4 Q. Okay. So if somebody didn't know that
5 the road took the left tum after the bridge to go
6 out there, they would have usually ended up in
7 your driveway?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. And then they would have either said,
10 "Oops, sorry," turned around and left, or if they
11 were looking for somebody they might have stopped
12 and asked? Is that a fair statement?
13 A. Yes. And we would have told them how
14 they went to get there
Rose King Deposition at 25-26.
There is no evidence of any public use that was equal to or greater than the use by the
Plaintiffs. In addition, Rose King specifically denied any public use of the roadway. At the
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very least, that testimony creates an issue of material fact. Was King Lane used by UPS,
Schwanns, and other delivery services as the Court decided? Or did they never use King
Lane, as Rose King testified? To what extent was there use by the general public versus
invitees of the Fuquays? While the court can certainly make those factual findings at trial, the
question of whether there was public use is clearly a disputed issue of material fact. In
addition, the Court made the reasonable inferences of public use against the Plaintiffs instead
of against the Kings as the moving party. The court should not have construed any facts or
inferences against the Plaintiffs.

E. There is Evidence of Distinct Adverse Use
As noted, the Plaintiffs are entitled to rely on the presumption of adverse use because
there is no evidence that the use of the roadway began as permissive. According to Rose
King, the roadway has existed in the same location since at least 1894:
A. It goes right where it is today. It is
the same spot. It hasn't moved. That lane goes
to where the fence -- the gate is because those
fences are all the borderlines. When we bought
the property, nobody resurveyed any land. Where
we live, it was surveyed in 1894. So when they
took us around to show us the borderline, and if
you will look, the fence goes all the way across
what's between Cal and Susie's and then it comes
right here in front of Clint and JC's house. That
same fence. And then it turns and goes south.
Deposition of Rose King at 15-16.
Samuel Steiner also testified that King Lane was in existence since at least 1959 when
he was born and lived on it: "I do not know who, if anyone, constructed King Lane. This was
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an old farm access roadway that was used occasionally by a variety of people." Declaration
of Samuel V.C. Steiner at, 5.
The Kings first acquired the property in 1973.

Affidavit of Rose King dated

December 4, 2014 at 12. According to Rose King, the roadway was in existence for nearly a
hundred years before they bought he property. There is no evidence as to how the road was
created or when the use began.

Therefore, under the first prong of the analysis, the

presumption is that the use of the roadway was adverse to the owners. Marshall v. Blair, 130
Id. 675, 680.
There is also ample evidence in the record to show the Fuquays' use of the roadway
was adverse to the owners. The record first shows a distinctly adverse act when Jim Fuquay
purchased his property in 1977 and began using the roadway for access. After purchasing the
property, Jim Fuquay put a new mobile home on his property and began using King Lane to
access that new home. As John Fuquay testified:
I was about 12 years old when we first moved onto the John Fuquay Parcel. My
parents bought a mobile home and put on the property and we lived in that for years.
From January 1977 forward, my family continuously used King Lane for access to
Oreana Loop Road. My parents drove personal vehicles of all types over King Lane ....
Since 1977, I have continuously used King Lane to access both the John Fuquay
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel.
Declaration of John Fuquay dated October_, 2014.
John Fuquay is not the only one to testify as to the Fuquays' use of the roadway after
the placement of the mobile home in 1977. Samuel Steiner testified in his declaration that:
"When Jim Fuquay moved on a mobile home at the comer of what would be King Lane and
Castle Road, he would occasionally use King Lane, probably as a short cut when he went out
to Grand View." Steiner also testified that "Renters on the old Munger property, now owned
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...
by Fuquays and previously owned by Bob Collette used [King Lane] occasionally as a shortcut to Grandview. I think that Jim Fuquay used it occasionally when he lived in the mobile
home located near the rental property now owned by Clint Fuquay." Declaration of Samuel
V.C. Steiner dated November 10, 2014 at if6.
The testimony is significant because it provides evidence of a distinct and decisive act
that put the Kings on notice as to Jim Fuquay's adverse use of the roadway. At the time the
Kings purchased their property in 1973, the mobile home on the Fuquay property did not
exist. Once Jim Fuquay placed the mobile home on his property in 1977, he began using
King Lane for access to that home. From that testimony, the court must make the reasonable
inference that the Fuquays' use of the roadway after placement of the new mobile home was a
distinct and decisive act that showed adverse use of the roadway by the Fuquays. At the very
least, it is a material issue of fact as to when the adverse use began that precludes summary
judgment.
In addition to the Fuquays' use for access to the mobile home, the Fuquays had
numerous renters on their property who would use the roadway for access to the rental
property. Dennis Jayo, Nate Moore and Tanna Gilbert are some of the renters. The Kings
were aware that all of these people were using the roadway.
12 Q. How about when Tanna Gilbert was there?
13 Do you recall her living there?
14 A. I recall her living there.
15 Q. Do you recall how she would get to and
16 from that house?
17 A. She came down the lane part of the
18 time. She worked for other people. She wasn't
19 always around.
20 Q. So she would use King Lane to get to
21 and from her house?
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22 A. I don't know if that was her primary,
23 sir.
24 Q. I'm not saying whether or not it is her
25 primary. I'm asking if she used it.
A. I saw her very seldom on the road
2 because she was seldom ever around.
3 Q. Did you ever tell her not to use
4 King Lane?
5 A. No, I did not.
6 Q. Is it your understanding and belief
7 that you could have told her not to use that lane
8 and that would have been within your rights?
9 A. Yes, I feel that.
Deposition of Rose King at 18-25.
Rose King acknowledged that during the time that Nate Moore was a renter and lived
on Fuquays' property, he used the roadway for access:
6 Q. And when Nate lived in that house, how
7 did he get to and from that house?
8 A. He would have probably went down our
9 lane.
10 Q. And you were aware that he was going up
11 and down?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And how often would he go up and down?
14 A. He went to work in the morning, and he
15 came home in the evening. That was the extent.
16 He didn't run up and down back and forth.
17 Q. Do you remember how many years that
18 would have been?
19 A. Oh, maybe a couple of months.
20 Q. And again, same thing, is that you
21 never told Nate that he wasn't able to use that,
22 the road to get up and back from the house?
23 A. No, I did not.
24 Q. But, again, you understood that you
25 could have if you had wanted to?
Page 31
I A. Yes, I do. Yes, I do.
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Gilbert King acknowledged that starting in at least 1980, renters on the Fuquay
property would use the roadway for access:
21 Q. Okay. What was -- I don't know if
22 you're old enough to remember what it was like
23 then. Was it -24 A. It was -- well, I remember in the
25 wintertime, it would get pretty sloppy. My
Page 19
1 brother lived in the house where JC lives, and he
2 had a two-wheel-drive pickup. And it was bad
3 enough that he couldn't get back and forth at
4 times in the winter because of the ruts where it
5 is alkali, you know. That was the reason for
6 gravelling it there in '80 in the summertime.
7 Q. Which brother was that?
8 A. Greg.
9 Q. How long did he live in that house?
10 A. It was from the time he got married
11 until -- like three years, I think. '79 to '82 or
12 so. Something like that.
13 Q. Okay. And when he lived there, how
14 would he get back and forth to his house or to
15 where he was living?
16 A. Oh, just, you know, on the dirt road
17 there in the lane.
18 Q. He would go up and down King Lane to
19 get to the house?
20 A. Um-hum.
21 Q. Do you know who else lived in that
22 house over the years?
23 A. Some people by the name of Laws lived
24 there. Tanna Gilbert lived there. Nate Moore.
25 Somebody else.
Page 20
1 Q. Dennis Trayo?
2 A. I don't remember. He was before my
3 time. But I know John lived there for a period of
4 time when they got divorced.
5 Q. John Fuquay?
6A. Um-hum.
7 Q. Okay. And when those people lived in
8 that house, how would they get back and forth to
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9 the house?
10 A. Down the lane there part of the time.
11 Q. So they would go -- this Exhibit 5
12 doesn't show it, but let me see it. All right.
13 So Exhibit 3, you had marked where the gate is.
14 JC's house is just west of where the gate is
15 now?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. There? So the -- whoever lived in
18 the house would come out King Lane past the -19 down the lane past the houses out to Oreana Loop
20Road?
21 A. Yes.
Gilbert King Deposition at 18-20.
The use of the roadway by renters for access to the rental property is not in common
with the Kings. Use by renters is a distinct act that put the Kings on notice of Plaintiffs
adverse use.
Since there is evidence of a distinct and decisive act that put the Kings on notice of
Plaintiffs adverse use in 1977, the presumption of adverse use has continued uninterrupted.
The Kings offered no evidence to interrupt the adverse use of the roadway or to change the
adverse use to permissive. Since the Kings were aware of the adverse use, they lost any right
to object in 1982.
The law will presume that the land belongs to the owner of the paper title, and that the
use was by permission or silent acquiescence. If this presumption is overcome by
evidence showing the use to have been hostile, and that the owner knew of such
hostile claim and took no steps to protect his property for a period of five years, then
the presumption changes. No injustice is done to the owner, if he knows the claim to
be hostile, and that title is being asserted against him, but neglects for five years to
avail himself of the right which the law gives him. He is in the position of any other
owner of property who negligently allows the statute of limitations to run against him.
Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 667, 670-71, 66 P. 10, 11-12 (1901).
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Since there is no evidence to contradict the presumed adverse use of the roadway
beginning in 1977, Fuquays' prescriptive rights would have ripened and vested in 1982either 5 years from Jim Fuquays' purchase of the property in January 1977 or 5 years from the
placement of the mobile home.
The Kings argued that Plaintiffs' adverse use did not occur until 2011, and therefore did
not occur within the 20-year statute of limitations period. The court accepted this premise but
ignored the evidence of adverse use that began in 1977 when Jim Fuquay placed the mobile
home on his property and began using the roadway for access. The Kings showed no evidence
of use "in common" between 1977 and 1982.

Again, this is significant because the

presumption is that Jim Fuquay's use beginning in January 1977 was presumptively adverse.
And, at the very least, the Fuquay' s placement of the mobile home in 1977 was a separate and
distinct act that brought home to the Kings that Fuquays intended to use King Lane for access.
Because it is apparent that there are disputed issues as to when the adverse use began,
summary judgment was inappropriate:
This case is highly complex and presents multiple issues of material fact which the
lower court should address at trial. The testimony of several material witnesses
presented conflicting information and the parties should be cross-examined to
determine their credibility. Thus, the district court erred in granting Capstar summary
judgment because the case presents multiple issues of material fact that preclude the
court from deciding on a motion for summary judgment whether an easement exists.
Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 421, 283 P.3d 728, 738
(2012).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court's original determination that there are disputed issues of material fact that
preclude summary judgment was correct.

As has been noted, summary judgment is

inappropriate when the evidence and inferences are in dispute:
Summary judgment was not a proper method to dispose of a case with so much
conflicting evidence ... Although the court, as the trier of fact, may draw the
most probable inferences from the undisputed evidence, there are enough
genuine issues of material fact to warrant deciding the merits of the case at
trial. There is a fine line between drawing the most probable inferences and
weighing the evidence, and this Court holds the belief that the district court
should have allowed the case to go to trial in order to weigh the conflicting
evidence and test the credibility of the witnesses.
Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 416, 283 P.3d 728, 733
(2012).

The Court's determination on reconsideration that there was no evidence of adverse use or
distinctive acts is incorrect. The record has heavy evidence that the adverse use began in
1977, and of distinct acts that put the Kings on notice of Plaintiffs' adverse use of the
roadway after that time.
Plaintiffs are not required to put forth their entire case or to present clear and convincing
evidence to defend against a summary judgment motion. They need only show material issues
of fact. It was erroneous for the court to suggest that it was considering the weight of the
evidence at this point in the case. The only way for the court to hear and weigh all of the
evidence is for it to be presented at trial.
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Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reconsider its reconsidered order,
acknowledge that there are disputed issued of material fact, deny the Kings' motion for
summary judgment, and continue the matter for trial.

Dated: July 2, 2015
Matthew R. Cleverley, IS
Fidelity National Law roup
1200 - 6th Avenue, Sui e 62
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 223-4525, ext. 10
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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I
DEPOSITION OF ROSE KING, taken at the
2 instance of the Plaintiffs, at the Holiday Inn
3 Express,4104E.FlamingoAvenue,ConferenceRoom,
4 in the City of Nampa, State of Idaho, commencing
5 at 11:57 a.m., on May 11, 2015, before Brooke R.
, 6 Bohr, CSR, RPR, a Notary Public in and for the
7 State of!daho, pursuant to notice, and in
8 accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil
9
IO
II

1 NAMPA, IDAHO

,,
1

I 2 May 11,2015, 11:57 a.m.
3
4
ROSE KING,
1

1
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Procedure.
APPEARANCES
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FOR PLAINTIFFS
Matthew R. Cleverley, Esq.
14
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200- 6th Avenue, Suite 620
. 15
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
16
matthew.cleverley@fuf.com
17 FOR SUSIE LOW and CAL LOW
1
S. Bryce Farris, Esq.
18
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1101 W.RiverStreet,Suite 110
19
Boise, ID 83707
(208) 629-7447
'20
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com
21 FOR HEART K RANCH TRUST and ROSE M. KING:
Ronald P. Rainey, Esq.
22
RAINEY LAW OFFICES
110 N. 9th Avenue
. 23
Caldwell, ID 83606
(208) 459-3659
erainey@questoflice.net
• 24
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produced as a witness at the instance of the
Plaintiffs, having been first duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR. CLEVERLEY:
Q. Ms. King, as you know, I'm
Matt Cleverley. I represent the Fuquays.
You've observed several of the
depositions. So you kind of know how this is
going to work. So if you have any -- if you're
not understanding any questions, let me know.
A. Okay.
Q. Can you state your name, please.
A. Rosemary King.
Q. And where do you live?
A. I live at 19124 King Lane.
Q. How long have you lived there?
A. Total years, probably 40.
Q. Total years?
A. Um-hum.
,
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Q. When did you first move into the
property?
A. We bought it in September of 1973.
Q. You and your husband bought it?
A Yes, we did.
Q. And did you buy the entire property
that is now also known as the Heart K Ranch
property, as well?
A. It is all one piece of property.
Q. It is all one piece? And you have your
house now that has a separate property?
A. I just have my home, yes. Due to the
trust, I have my home.
Q. Okay. So I just want to make sure I'm
clarifying. You're the one that's been around the
longest on this one?
A. Yes.
Q. All of the property at one time
belonged to you and your Mr. King?
A Yes .
Q. Okay. And then at some point you sold
all of the property to Zane Block?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall when that was?
A We sold it in March of'82 is when we

1
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that?
signed the papers to sell it.
2
A. He had a payment January 3rd, 1984, and
Q. And then he owned all of the property,
3 that was the last payment that he made.
including your house, all of the houses?
Q. All right. So what happened -- he made
A. No. There was no houses there. There
4
5 his second payment. 1985 comes around, and you
was only one house.
6 don't get a payment? Or had there been any
MR. RAINEY: He asked you ifhe owned the
7 conversations before then that he wasn't going to
house. Explain to Mr. Cleverly the mechanism of
8 be able to make the payment?
the sale.
A. There was no conversation from him.
THE WITNESS: Okay. We sold it to him,
9
9
Q. So what happened after he didn't make
JO
IO but we retained -- we had a Quitclaim Deed we
. 11 retained because we weren't sure of the man's
II the third payment or he made a second payment
12 and didn't make anything else? Tell me what
12 abilities. So everything, the State leases, the
13 BLM, the water rights, everything retained in our
13 happened.
A. We went to the bank to give us our
14 name. He was more or less a tenant.
14
15 papers, and then he filed a lawsuit against the
15
Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: So explain -16 bank if they gave us our papers and then he filed
i 16
explain that to me. He was -- did he put money
17 down as a down payment?
17 bankruptcy.
18
A. He did.
Q. And what happened as part of everything
18
19 that was going on?
Q. How much?
• 19
• 20
A. I don't remember.
A. What do you mean what happened?
20
! 21
21
Q. Does $650,000 sound right?
Q. Well, was he -- was he filing
!
l 22 bankruptcy to try and make payments?
22
A. Truthfully, I do not remember.
i
23
Q. What was he supposed to pay monthly?
A. No, not to us. He was just filing
) 23
bankruptcy
because he wanted the property.
[ 24
24
A. He didn't pay monthly. It was supposed
25 to be yearly.
Q. So he wanted to keep the property? Was
2s
f--- ---··----- --·--·-·--·
-----~~--------~
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Q. How much was he supposed to pay each

2 year?
A. The figure, if! can recall correctly,
4 should have been about $96,000.
5
Q. And for how many years was he supposed
6 to pay that?
7
A. I don't know.
8
Q. Was he -9
A. Until it was paid for.
IO
Q. Okay. Do you know what the total
11 overall purchase price was?
12
A. $1,860,000, I believe.
· 13
Q. All right. And so he put a down
14 payment down, and you were carrying the balance of
15 the contract?
16
A. Wedid.
17
Q. Okay. So he would then pay you
18 payments, and he was supposed to make one payment
19 a year?
20
A. Yes.
21
Q. And was that -- when was this first
22 payment due?
23
A. The first payment was due January 3rd,
24 1983. He made that payment.
25
Q. And then did he make payments after

! 2
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he going to try and make payments through the
bankruptcy to be able to pay you from the
bankruptcy?
A. I truly don't know how that all
operated, sir.
Q. So you said you went down to the bank
to get your papers. What do you mean you went to
the bank to get your papers?
A. Because they held it in escrow for us.
We owned -- we still owned the property.
Q. So you had a purchase contract for the
property he was buying. He would get the title to
the property -A. When it was paid for.
Q. -- when it was paid for?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you end up getting the
property back?
A. We had to evict him because he would
not leave the premises after the judge gave it
back to us, and it was in September of '86.
Q. So you had to evict him? Did the
sheriff come out and move him out?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Did you have a separate lawsuit that
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A. Where JC lives was there.
Q. Okay. Did somebody live in that one?
A. The Foreman -- the Foreman we purchased
from, his hired hand lived there.
Q. Was the?
A. The house where Clint lives, no. There
was no house there. The Fuquays bought that and
moved it in.
Q. That was in about 1979?
A. I think so.
Q. It would have been at least -- so we're
getting time references -- after you bought the
property, but before you had sold to Steiner -I'm sorry. Not Steiner -- Zane Block, sometime
between then and when you sold is when the Fuquays
put that additional house in -- Clint's house
where Clint currently lives on the comer; is that
right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So tell me how -- what about
what we're calling King Lane? What was it called
when you bought your property?
A. When we bought the property, it was -it is a road so we could get to and from our
fields. The only King Lane is from Oreana Loop
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took us around to show us the borderline, and if
you will look, the fence goes all the way across
what's between Cal and Susie's and then it comes
right here in front of Clint and JC's house. That
same fence. And then it turns and goes south.
Q. Okay. So the fence was there when you
bought the property?
A. The fence was there when we bought the
property, and we were told that was the property
line.
Q. Were there two fences, one on either
side of the road?
A. There was a fence. So they had -- the
fence was there so the movement of the cattle, if
you wanted to bring your cattle out of the field,
you moved them in. And ifby chance that's what
the reason for all of those fences are.
Q. So maybe I -- I probably didn't ask
this clearly. When you moved in, was there a
fence on both sides of King Lane?
A. Both sides. But the south fence, which
is against the Lows', is what they called the
section fence, the border fence.
Q. Okay. So was it your understanding
that the roadway was entirely on your property?

i

i
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into our premises. This is just a field road to
get to and from our properties. It is not a lane.
It doesn't have a name. But everybody is calling
it King Lane. For the premiss of this lawsuit, we
call it King Lane. But the 9-1-1 only comes into
our property.
Q. Okay. So tell me about -- so that
we're referencing the same thing for what we're
talking about, tell me what King Lane looked like
when you bought your property.
A. What it looked like?
Q. Um-hum.
A. It was a little narrow two-wheel track
to go to and from because we have to go that way
to get into our fields, and that's all it was used
for.
Q. Okay. So how far down did those tracks
go? I mean, did they go all the way down to where
Clint's house is now?
A. It goes right where it is today. It is
the same spot. It hasn't moved. That lane goes
to where the fence -- the gate is because those
fences are all the borderlines. When we bought
the property, nobody resurveyed any land. Where
we live, it was surveyed in 1894. So when they
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A. Yes, we were under that understanding.
'
But we were also told that they had -- because of
the bridge to get to and from, that they were
allowed to come around and come in. They have
three gates in their fence so they can get into
their property. So they used it in common.
Nobody else.
Q. And who is "they"?
A. Well, at that time, it was the
Steiners.
Q. Okay.
A. They came in and used it. But they
had three gates. And if they wanted to move
their cows out, then they could move them up and
go out, and they didn't get into our fields and
intermingle with our cows. Ifwe needed to move
our cows, they didn't intermingle with theirs.
Q. Did the Steiners own their property
before you bought the property?
A. Yes, they did.
Q. Did you ever talk with the Steiners
about who owned the road?
A. I had no reason to.
Q. As far as where that road went, you
were calling it a path, a two-Jane path that went
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between the fences. How far west did that path
go? Did it stop at the gate or did it -- at the
comer of where your property was or did it
continue on past the Fuquays?
A. Well, I'm sure at one time when they
had a school there, I'm sure that they probably
used the wagons to go that way for the school.
But that didn't make it a road, sir. And I know
on one of these pictures that you have, you can
even see the grass in between the tire -- where
the wheel tracks go.
Q. So if you were to go down King Lane
through your property and out, would you
eventually be able to connect back up with
Castle Lane and end up at the schoolhouse?
A. You could or you could go straight
across the desert, and you can come out at Oreana.
Q. So what was the -- did you ever see
where the Fuquays lived, Clint and JC have their
houses at the end, if you follow the road out, you
get to their houses. Did they use that road -sorry. Did anybody that lived there at the time
use that road to -- King Lane to get to Oreana
Loop?
A. Run that by me again.

r-------.. --- ------··-- ··--------~---~
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Q. Sure. Well, let's narrow that down.

l

2
The Foreman owned the property that now
3 belongs to the Fuquays?
4
A. Yes.
5
Q. And they lived in the house where
6 John Fuquay lived?
A. Correct.
7
8
Q. The house where JC lives, which is up
: 9 there along King Lane -!I IO
A. Yes.
Q. -- you said somebody -- the Foreman
'. II
i 12 hired hand lived in that house when you bought the
13 property?
I 14
A. Yes. That was Mr. Foreman that lived
I
where we do.
!, 15
Q. What do you mean he lives where you
: 16
. 17 do?
18
A. We bought from DI Foreman. Fuquays
19 bought from Kirby Foreman. Two different segments
20 of properties.
21
Q. Okay. All right.
22
A. They separated out their properties,
23 and Mr. Foreman says, "This is your lane. You own
24 it. Nobody else has it."
25
Q. Is that -- so is that what you

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

I

J

understood when you bought the property from
DI Foreman -A. Correct.
Q. -- that you owned that lane and that
nobody else had the right to use it?
A. I didn't say they had a right to use
it. I said the neighbors, they had an agreement
at the time we moved there. And at the time we
moved there it was the Steiners.
Q. Did you ever have an agreement with the
Steiners?
A. No, we did not. You know, there was a
thing that was called an honor. Mr. Foreman told
us that those people that owned that ranch had
that right. So when they sold it to the Lows, it
went to the Lows.
Q. When was the first time that you were
aware that the Fuquays were using -- going up and
down King Lane? When is the first time you became
aware of that?
A. Which Fuquays?
Q. Well, it would have either been Jim,
because he was the one that ended up buying the
property, or any -- John eventually bought the
property. Let's start with Jim Fuquay. When he

9
: 10
i
'1

11
12

: 13
I

'

14
15

: 16
. 17
\ 18
: 19
i 20
1 21
; 22
I
, 23
I 24
. 25

bought the property, did he ever go up and down
King Lane?
A Very, very seldom.
Q. When you say "very seldom," what does
that mean?
A. Maybe once a week. Maybe not that
often. It was closer for them. They lived where
John lives. It would be closer for them to go
south. That's only three-quarters of a mile. And
their children caught the bus there, John, when he
went to school, John and Megan.
Q. Okay. So let's -- hang on with me so
we can track. When Jim Fuquay bought the
property, they bought it from Kirby Foreman in
19 -- it was 1977 when Jim bought the property?
A. Okay.
Q. And they moved into -- which house did
they move into?
A. Where John lives.
Q. Where John lives? And then they
brought in a couple of years later, the doublewide
mobile and put that at the property where Clint
now lives, right?
A. Correct.
Q. When they put that mobile home in
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there, who lived in that mobile home?
A. Well, eventually, Jim and Wanda moved
into it.
Q. Okay. And when Jim and Wanda moved
into that home, did they use King Lane to get to
and from that house?
A. From which house?
Q. From the house that they put in the
doublewide that Jim and Wanda put in that they
moved into, did they use King Lane to get to and
from that house, the one that they put in and
moved into?
A. How did they use it?
Q. No. Did they use King Lane to get to
and from their house?
A. Very seldom. They went south.
Q. So you're saying maybe once a week that
they would use it, and otherwise they would go
south?
A. They went south.
Q. Did you ever tell Jim and Wanda that
they were not allowed to use King Lane?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you believe at the time that you
had -- would have had the right to tell them that

2
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5
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1 25
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A. I saw her very seldom on the road
because she was seldom ever around.
Q. Did you ever tell her not to use
KingLane?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Is it your understanding and belief
that you could have told her not to use that lane
and that would have been within your rights?
A. Yes, I feel that.
Q. Do you recall who lived in the house
after Tanna Gilbert?
A. No. Truthfully, I can't tell you who
all lived because I had things I had to do. So
that wasn't my primary concern to watch who lived
where.
Q. Well, you knew that there were some
people living there, regardless of who it was?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And were you aware of how they
were getting to and from that house?
A. Well, they had both ways to go.
Q. Okay.
A. I don't know.
Q. I understand that they could have gone
both ways. My question is were you aware that
-----------------"---·--
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they couldn't use King Lane?
' I
A. Yes, 1 do.
2
3
Q. Now, at some point, there were other
people that lived in the house that we call JC's
4
house, which is the one that fronts on King Lane?
5
A. Yes.
6
Q. And there have been a number of people
7
that had lived in that house. And tell me who I
8
9
might be missing. Dennis Jayo, Tanna Gilbert.
A. Dennis Jayo would have been long before
10
my time. I don't know about him.
11
Q. How about when Tanna Gilbert was there? 12
Do you recall her living there?
13
14
A. I recall her living there.
Q. Do you recall how she would get to and
15
from that house?
16
A. She came down the lane part of the
17
time. She worked for other people. She wasn't
18
I
always around.
19
Q. So she would use King Lane to get to
i 20
and from her house?
21
A. I don't know if that was her primary,
22
sir.
23
Q. I'm not saying whether or not it is her
, 24
primary. I'm asking if she used it.
25
1

1

1

1

- - ---- -

they were using King Lane?
A. I was aware. Periodically I saw
people, yes.
Q. Did you always know who they were or
did you not know who they were that were living
there?
A. I knew who the Lows were or the -shoot. Who the Laws were. I knew Tanna; the
young boy that worked at the garage. Those, I
remember.
Q. Was there ever anybody that lived there
that you didn't know or you don't -A. Sir, I don't know.
Q. Did you ever stop anybody along those
going up and down saying, "Hey, who are you?
Where are you going"?
A. I have.
Q. What-A. Let me tell you one thing before you go
too far. If you're looking at the picture, if
you're going to drive across our bridge and you
don't know that there's a lane that goes to the
left, you're going to come directly into my yard.
We had that. We told people where they wanted to
go. They turned around and went back. So most of,
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the people that I would have came or if there was
a hunter, as you have asked before, then they
would ask.
Q. Okay. So if somebody didn't know that
the road took the left tum after the bridge to go
out there, they would have usually ended up in
your driveway?

Page 28 :
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4
5
6
7

I

A. That's correct.
8
Q. And then they would have either said,
9
"Oops, sorry," turned around and left, or if they
10
were looking for somebody they might have stoppe~ 11
and asked? Is that a fair statement?
i 12
A. Yes. And we would have told them how
I 13
they went to get there.
i 14
Q. Did you ever have anybody stopped that
!I 15
were looking for the Fuquays?
i I6
A. Yes.
i 11
Q. How would you tell them to go to the
! 18
Fuquays?
! 19
A. We told them to go back to the highway,
i 20
Oreana Road South, and that was their road.
I 21
Q. I was using the term Fuquays broadly.
I 22
Were they looking for John Fuquay at that time?
'i 23
A. I would say so.
i24
Q. Did you ever have anybody stop that was 125
I

r----·--------------------·-------- ---
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I

looking for Tanna Gilbert?
A. No.
2
i 3
Q. Or anyone else?
4
A. No.
5
Q. Do you recall -- just to make it clear,
6 do you recall anybody stopping and asking for
7 directions to anyone other than John Fuquay's
8 house that would come in and stop?
9
A. No, I do not.
10
Q. Was there a gate at the west end of
11 your property where the Fuquay's property is and
12 the Lows and then yours is on the other side where
13 the new gates have been put up. Was there a gate
14 down at that end of the property?
15
A. When we bought it, yes, there was.
16
Q. Was that left open or was that closed?
A. It was closed most of the time.
17
18
Q. So if people were going through along
19 that road, would they open and close the gate?
A. They had to open and close the gate.
20
21 That's common courtesy.
22
Q. When Tanna Gilbert lived there, did you
23 ever see her stop and open the gate?
24
A. If it was closed, I'm sure she did, and
I 25 she would have closed it if they went through.
L___ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

--···---------·,-·--

Q. How about the Laws?
A. They would have did the same.
Q. So when we're talking King Lane, you
said that it was mostly a path, a two-wheel
path -A. Yes.
Q. -- that went out that way. Who
improved it and made it into the type of gravel
road it is now?
A. My husband and I did, our boys.
Q. Tell me about when that was.
A. Well, when we first moved there, we had
to do different things to it. It is alkali
ground. When alkali gets wet, you sink. And it
had to be very firm. So we hauled big rocks and
put on it. I can't tell you all of the years that
we did what we did, but we made the road to what
it is today. And that was so we could take our
feed in to feed the cattle, so we could irrigate,
so we could take our equipment back and forth.
All of our individual fields are individually
fenced, and they've all got gates.
Q. Did anyone else assist in the road
improvements that you were doing? You and your
husband and your children. Did anybody else

'

I

i
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i
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,24
25

help?
A. No.
Q. When do you recall the -- let me back
up. Do you recall when Jim Fuquay moved into the
house that Clint now lives in, the doublewide?
A. Um-hum.
Q. Do you recall when he moved in there?
A. I do not.
Q. Do you know when -- and, again, going
back. Do you recall if when he moved into that
house, John lived in the other house where John
currently lives? I'm just trying to get a gauge
on how people moved around.
A. You know, sir, John didn't always live
on that property. And when -- I don't know when
he moved into that house to live there for his
own.
Q. Okay. Do you remember when Nate Moore.
lived out there?
A. I know he lived there, but I can't tell
you when he lived there.
Q. Do you remember which house he lived
in?
A. The little tiny one where JC lives.
Q. Where JC lives now?

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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A. That was the only house that anybody
Jived in that was not Fuquay.
Q. That would have been used more like a
rental house?
A. It sat vacant a great deal of the time.
Q. And when Nate lived in that house, how
did he get to and from that house?
A. He would have probably went down our
lane.
Q. And you were aware that he was going up
and down?
A. Yes.
Q. And how often would he go up and down?
A. He went to work in the morning, and he
came home in the evening. That was the extent.
He didn't run up and down back and forth.
Q. Do you remember how many years that
would have been?
A. Oh, maybe a couple of months.
Q. And again, same thing, is that you
never told Nate that he wasn't able to use that,
the road to get up and back from the house?
A. No, I did not.
Q. But, again, you understood that you
could have if you had wanted to?

~ll
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trucks or cattle trucks or things like that -- up
and down King Lane?
A. Maybe once or twice. I don't recall
him very seldom on our Jane. And I know that
until Block moved there, we got it back, I know
that they didn't.
Q. Okay.
A. Or if they did, I don't know how they
maneuvered it.
Q. When Zane Block owned the property and
lived there, did he make any improvements to the
road, to King Lane?
A. Not that was visible.
Q. So would you say that King Lane then
has been in its current state since you -- since
before Zane Block, as far as the condition that it
is in now?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall when Clint Fuquay moved
into his house?
A. About the time he and Haley got
married, I would say.
Q. Do you know how Jong ago that was?
A. Maybe 2008, '9. I don't know.
Somewhere in through there.
'
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A. Yes, I do. Yes, I do.
Q. When was the first time that you
remember seeing John -- let me back up.
Do you ever remember seeing John Fuquay
using King Lane to get to and from any of the
properties?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall when you first would have
seen him doing that?
A. No, sir, I do not.
Q. Was he -- did you ever stop him and
say, "You've got to go use your other road"?
A. No, I did not.
Q. But it is your understanding and belief
that you could have if you had wanted to at that
time?
A. Ifwe hadn't have been neighbors -- if
we hadn't have been nice neighbors to them, we
could have, yes.
Q. Did you ever give him any permission,
say, "Hey, you're supposed to use the other road,
but it is okay if you use this one"?
A. Never said anything to him.
Q. Did John Fuquay ever drive big trucks
that you recall -- and I'm talking either semi

i

--~-~~__J
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1
Q. Did Clint and Haley use King Lane to
2 access and get to and from their property?
A. Some.
3
4
Q. Okay. When you say "some," tell me
5 what that means.
6
A. Well, I'm sure they went the other way,
7 too, or they should have. I don't know. They
8 went sometimes.
9
Q. Okay. So, again, I'm not really -: 10 whether they could have gone the other way is -I1
A. Is irrelevant to you.
12
Q.
Right. My question is did they go
I
13 through and use King Lane from the time that
, 14 they moved in -- Clint and Haley moved into that
:
' 15 house?
: I6
A. I can't answer that.
· I7
Q. Do you recall ever stopping them or
. 18 saying, "Hey, stop coming up and down the road"?
19
A. No.
Q. Is it fair to say that you never did
: 20
21 that to any of the Fuquays or anybody that was
22 living on those properties?
23
A. I think that would be a fair
! 24 assessment.
Q. I don't want to have to keep asking
· 25
1

1

1
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, I
specifically like that. If that's a fair -2
A. That's a fair statement.
3
Q. Okay. And it is also a fair statement
4
that you believed that you could have told anybody
5
at any time to stop using that road if you had
6
wanted to do that?
7
A. Probably. I don't know. I don't
8
know. I think so. We were trying to be neighbors
9
to the Fuquays.
IO
Q. How long did it take for you to put the
I
i 11 gravel and rock down on the road on King Lane as 11
12
i 12 it is now?
I 13
13
A. It took years.
114
14
Q. So was it -- if you -- was it a gradual
15
I 15 improvement?
16
A. It is alkali soil. When alkali gets
16
I
17
I 17 wet, it eats. So those rocks and things
! 18 disappear. Now then, we have put big rocks in the
18
I
I 19 road, so we have built a base now that we are
19
20
20 pretty firm. But we still have to keep
21
121 maintaining it every year when there's a wet spot.
22
122 If the neighbor's ditch runs over on us or if the
sub gets out, it gets wet and it goes down. You
23
i 24 have to keep doing it. It is a never-ending job.
24
I
25
/ 25 But we have to use it daily, so we have to
I
2
3
i 4
5
6
7
8
I 9
IO

I

I

I
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A. No.
Q. If you had discovered that the road was
on the Steiners property instead of your property,
would you have still done all of the improvements
that you did to the road for your own maintenance
and access?
MR. RAINEY: Counsel, your question still
calls for pure speculation. I don't know that the
witness can answer that.
Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: Well, if she can
answer it. You either would have or wouldn't
have, I'm guessing?
A. I cannot answer that for you.
Q. Okay. You indicated that you believed
that the section fence was the fence on the south
side of the road, and that you owned up to that
section fence. Was there a map or something that
you saw that made you believe that that was the
section fence?
A. No. That was just what the Foremans
had bought when they bought it in 1894. That's
where the fence was, and that's what their old
survey or however they bought it.
Q. Did you ever see that?
A. No, I did not see that, sir.
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15
16
17
, 18
19
20
21
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maintain it so we can get to and from our fields.
Q. If you had known that the road was
2
actually on the Steiners' property, would you have
3
actually done anything differently?
4
MR. RAINEY: Objection to the form of the
5
question because it calls for pure speculation,
6
first of all. And, secondly, we don't know who
7
owns the road at this point. We don't agree with
8
your survey.
9
Q. Okay. Well, let's take it this way
'I, IO
then. You believed that you owned the property
ill
over which the road run?
12
i 13
A. Correct.
Q. Was it your belief you owned all of the
14
road and all of the property from Oreana Loop all
15
the way to the west of your property?
16
A. Yes.
17
Q. And was it your belief that that was
18
entirely -- that the road was entirely on your
19
property?
i 20
' 21
A. Yes.
Q. Did -- were there ever any
: 22
23
conversations between you and the Steiners about
the Steiners believing the road was on their
24
25
property?
1

f
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Q. Okay. Then how -- I'm wondering how
!
you came to the belief that that was where the
section fence was?
A. The Foremans told us, sir. That's how
I came to that belief. When they sold it us to,
that's where they sold it to.
Q. So it was your belief that you were
buying -- when you bought that, you were buying
the road, as well as both fences on -- the fences
on both sides of the road?
A. Correct, sir.
Q. When you moved to California after
Mr. Block bought the property, how often did you ,
come back to Idaho and go over to see the
property?
A. We were probably back to Idaho,
probably, monthly. At least, every two months.
Q. Okay. And did you go over to see
Block?
A. No, we did not go see Mr. Block, but we
went to observe.
Q. When you say you went to "observe,"
what does that mean?
A. We drove around so we could see what
was happening on the premises.

---------~·-··-----···---~----···-··---------

- - - - - --

10 (Pages 34 - 37)
Veritext Legal Solutions
800-567-8658

579
973-410-4040

Page 40

Page 38

2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

IO
' 11
• 12
i 13
14
15
16
17
, 18
19
'20
21
1

122
: 23
i 24
i 25

Q. You drove around-- tell me where you
would drive. Just drive in through the barn or
you'd go down the lane?
A. We would go down the lane and look.
Q. So would you go all the way back out
Castle Lane, as well?
A. No, we didn't go back out Castle Lane.
We came out through the ranch.
Q. What did you observe when you were
observing to see how things were being handled or
what he was doing to the property?
A. It wasn't good.
Q. Okay. Tell me what you saw or why you
think it wasn't good.
A. Well, when you have weeds that are
3 feet tall and you don't see things that are
going like they should, they are tearing up
things, taking out -- it just wasn't -- he was not
trying to maintain it good.
Q. You were, I guess, concerned because
you were concerned that you might end up getting
it back in worse condition or he was not going to
maintain it?
A. Yes, we were concerned he was not
maintaining it.
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sir.

Q. When Mr. Block was buying the property,
did you believe that you still had the right to
control who could or could not use King Lane?
A. We didn't try to do that.
Q. Okay. Was it your belief that you
still had that right to?
A. No. But I had the right to observe
what was going on.
Q. Okay. So when Mr. Block was there, you
couldn't have come in and put gates up and said,
"Well, you're just buying the property. We're
going to put gates up and control who comes
through"?
A. No, I could not have done that.
Q. When you moved back onto the property
after evicting Mr. Block and after getting the
ownership back, that was in 1986?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Did you make any
improvements to King Lane after that point, other
than -- let me -- from 1986 forward, did you make
any improvements to the King Lane road?
A. Yes, we did.

391

Q. Did you ever talk with him about
that?
A. No, we did not.
Q. Could -- when you were driving down the
road, could you tell that anybody else had been up
and down the road, on King Lane?
A. Well, that's hard to say, sir.
Q. Was it -- was there any track marks or
anything like that that would show people had been
up and down the road?
A. I don't -- I don't understand your
phrasing of that.
Q. All right. We're talking about
King Lane when Zane Block was buying it.
A. If I drive down and you drive down
tomorrow, am I supposed to see your tracks?
Q. Well, my question was could you tell
whether or not anybody had been using the road?
Did it look like it was in use?
A. Well, somebody had been using it.
Q. Okay. But if there's a -- you don't
know who was using the road during that time?
A. No, I do not know.
Q. Okay. It could have been the Fuquays,
right?

j

A. I don't know who was using the road,
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Q. Okay. What were those improvements
that you made?
A. That's when we put in the new culvert
across the ditch, across the lane, as you're
calling it. And that's when we hauled in more
rocks, made it a harder surface.
Q. Okay. And after you had done those
improvements, did you ever see the Fuquays using
the road after you had done those other
improvements? Did you see anybody to and from the
Fuquay property over King Lane after you had -between '86 and 1987, in that first year you were
back?
A. I don't know how to put that first year
we were back. We got the property back. Mr. King
and I sent Gil and our daughter and husband to
stay up on that ranch. We continued on the other
ranch coming back monthly. Mr. King and I did not
move back until '88, our personal self, but we had
our home that we came up and stayed there and we
did things while we were there.
Q. So you moved back permanently in 1988?
A. Yes. But our children came before us .
We sent them on up.
Q. Okay. So they would have lived there
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Q. You've never seen any delivery drivers
using King Lane, FedEx, UPS, Post Office dropping! 2
off any mail packages to anybody that lived in
I 3
I 4
Clint or JC's houses?
A. No. The only time that I ever saw, the
5
6
Schwan's asked me one day, he said, "The gate is
locked. I can't go up." I said, "You can go this
7
8
time, but don't go anymore. They'll have to
unlock their gate if they want it."
9
10
So, no, they didn't come our way. The
FedEx man did stop several times and ask how we 111
got there, and we directed them to go around the
112
way they were supposed to. And I believe you
. 13
have some affidavits showing that from those
I 14
people.
[ 15
Q. Do you have any agreements with the
116
Lows about the use of the King Lane?
I 11
A. No, we do not. We just honored what
! 18
Mr. Foreman told us.
! 19
Q. Is King Lane impassable certain times
I 20
of the year?
i 21
A. The lane was impassable until we fixed
I 22
,
it.
Q. In 19 -- in the 1970s or I 980s?
A. Yes. 1989.
___
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Q. So the statement -- I'm looking in your
affidavit that says, "This use has been casual use
on occasion as a matter of convenience. This is
because, among other things as mentioned above,
King Lane is, in fact, impassable during certain
times of the year and cannot be used because it
becomes too muddy." Is that true?
A. That is very true. The ditches -- we
now have a cement ditch. Our well runs 24 hours a
day, 365 days a year. And when you have a dirt
ditch, water is always subbing. I don't know if
you're familiar with things like that. But the
Steiners, the Lows also had irrigation ditches
that are dirt. There's times in our yard the
water would get so high, and we would ask them if
they would turn off their water if they weren't
irrigating so it would go down.
So that road is that way. It is so
wet. It mires down. So we keep building up that
base, and we have to do that. That's the only way
we can get back and forth.
Q. When was the last time that the road
was impassable?
A. Well, I think the neighbors water got
out of control and came running down the ditch,

- - - --------
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i
i I and it took a number of days -- or coming down the :

'
road. It took a number of days before it dried
out enough it was good again.
Q. Other than that time, when was it
impassable?
A. Periodically during the year. Like I
was telling you, when the water is in -- the Lows
now have put in pivots. So they don't have that
ditch. So that ditch is no longer there. So that
water isn't there 24 hours a day.
(Cell phone ringing.)
MR. CLEVERLEY: We'll take a pause while
your attorney steps out.
(Recess taken.)
Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: Before our break,
you were telling me -- we were talking about when
the road is impassable. And you told me there was
a time when the neighbor's ditch had overflowed
and had come down and made the road impassable,
and then you were going to tell me when else the
King Lane has been impassable.
A. Well, if -- it doesn't happen very
often. But if we get a downpour of rain, then it
goes back. Like I said, it is a marshmallow, and

1
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Q. How long does it take to dry out?
A. Well, it depends on how wet it gets.
Q. A day?
A. Oh, no. It will take several days.
And we have -- like I say, we have alkali. So if
you look, at times, you'll look at it and you
think it's snowed and it looks like there's salt
out there because that's what alkali is.
Q. If there was a bad downpour, maybe a
few days for it to dry out that it would become
impassable?
A. Yes. It would take a few days to a
week. But as long as we stay right on the road,
we can keep the base. But it is a work in
progress.
Q. How often does that happen where it
becomes impassable like that that you wouldn't be
able to use it for a few days or a week?
A. Well, there again, it is going to be
determined by the weather and if the ditch
overflows or something. I can't tell you. I
can't be specific like you want.
Q. Okay. Well, can you tell me when in
the last year it was impassable?
A. I don't think we've had a problem this

----------------------------- ---- --- --------- - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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DEPOSITION OF GILBERT KING, taken at the
instance of the Plaintiffs, at the Holiday Inn
Express, 4104 E. Flamingo Avenue, Conference Room,
in the City of Nampa, State of Idaho, commencing
at 9:07 a.m., on May 11, 2015, before Brooke R.
Bohr, CSR, RPR, a Notary Public in and for the
State ofldaho, pursuant to notice, and in
accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.

NAMPA, IDAHO
2 May 11, 2015, 9:07 a.m.
3
4
GILBERT KING,
5 produced as a witness at the instance of the
6 Plaintiffs, having been first duly sworn, was
7 examined and testified as follows:
8
9
(Exhibit Nos. 3 through 8 marked.)
IO
11
EXAMINATION
12 BY MR. CLEVERLEY:
Q. Could you please state and spell your
'13
14 full name.
15
A. Gilbert Gene King.
16
Q. And what's your address, please.
17
A. 19100KingLane.
: 18
Q. In Oreana?
19
A. Oreana.
!20
Q. And you are here as the trustee of the ,
21 Heart K Ranch Trust; is that correct?
22
A. Yes.
23
Q. Okay. How long have you been the
:24 trustee for that trust?
25
A. Two years.
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Q. Do you have any ownership in any of the
properties that we're talking about and have been
involved in litigation as an individual or are you
just through the trust?
A. Just through the trust.
(Exhibit No. 20 marked.)
Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: I'll hand you
what's we've marked as Exhibit 20. From that, can
you tell me or show which property is owned by
Heart K Ranch?
A. Okay. I can show you right here.
Q. You can go ahead and draw on that, if
that helps. I just want to make sure we know
exactly which ones are which.
A. Just outline it for you?
Q. Sure. That's fine.
A. (Indicating.)
Can you see that? It is this in here,
and it continues on.
Q. It continues to the north?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So the -- there are a couple of
small squares of property inside there. Does the
trust own those or is that Rose's property and

25 someone else's property?
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Q. Do you know when this road became
called King Lane?
A. Ever since I was a little boy. I don't
know. That's just what we referred to it as
there, King Lane.
Q. Did it ever have a -- was it always
called King Lane or was it part of Castle Lane or
what was it?
A. It was never part of Castle Lane that I
knew of.
Q. So let's talk about King Lane. And
we'll just talk about the road there that you're
considering King Lane. How long has that been
there?
A. It was there when we moved there in
'74, as far as I know. It was a lane, you know,
which -- it was a lane, not necessarily that there
was a road in the lane, but there was a fence on
each side and a way up the middle. And then my
folks gravelled it in, probably, '80.
Q. Okay. What was -- I don't know if
you're old enough to remember what it was like
then. Was it -A. It was -- well, I remember in the
wintertime, it would get pretty sloppy. My

·---- -- --
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Q. Dennis Trayo?
A. I don't remember. He was before my
time. But I know John lived there for a period of
time when they got divorced.
Q. John Fuquay?
A. Um-hum.
Q. Okay. And when those people lived in
that house, how would they get back and forth to
the house?
A. Down the lane there part of the time.
Q. So they would go -- this Exhibit 5
doesn't show it, but let me see it. All right.
So Exhibit 3, you had marked where the gate is.
JC's house is just west of where the gate is
now?
A. Yes.
Q. There? So the -- whoever lived in
the house would come out King Lane past the -down the lane past the houses out to Oreana Loop
Road?
A. Yes.
Q. Are there utility lines that run along
King Lane?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know where they go?

Page 19
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brother lived in the house where JC lives, and he
had a two-wheel-drive pickup. And it was bad
enough that he couldn't get back and forth at
times in the winter because of the ruts where it
is alkali, you know. That was the reason for
gravelling it there in '80 in the summertime.
Q. Which brother was that?
A. Greg.
Q. How long did he live in that house?
A. It was from the time he got married
until -- like three years, I think. '79 to '82 or
so. Something like that.
Q. Okay. And when he lived there, how
would he get back and forth to his house or to
where he was living?
A. Oh, just, you know, on the dirt road
there in the lane.
Q. He would go up and down King Lane to
get to the house?
A. Um-hum.
Q. Do you know who else lived in that
house over the years?
A. Some people by the name of Laws lived
there. Tanna Gilbert lived there. Nate Moore.
Somebody else.
---

------
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A. Well, somewhere in here, right about
where this white dirt is, one takes off through
the field.
Q. North?
A. North, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. And the rest ofit continues up here.
{Indicating.) I don't know ifit stops at Clint's
house or if it -- I don't know where it goes from
Clint's.
Q. Okay. What's the condition of
King Lane now? What's its road surface? Can
you describe how wide it is and what it is like
now?
A. Oh, it is probably JO-, 12-foot wide of
gravel.
Q. Has it had more than just gravel? Has
it had a road base put down under it and gravel on
it?
A. No. It is just pit run.
Q. Who's been maintaining that road?
A. Kings.
Q. Has anybody else ever helped maintain
that road?
A. JC brought a road grader down once that

- - - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I ___________________________ - -
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I know of.
Q. Do you know why he would do that?
A. No. To make it hard for us to mow the
weeds along there. I don't know why he brought
it.
Q. Did it help improve the road or did it
make the road -A. No.
Q. It didn't help improve the road at
all?
A. Not from my point of view.
Q. Okay. What about any other gravel or
things like that? Anybody else contribute to
gravel or anything else along the road?
A. JC got from hay from me once. And
instead of reimbursing me for the hay, I had him
bring me a load of gravel. It would have been on
the east end of the lane between the bridge and
the highway.
Q. Did anybody else ever add gravel or do
anything else besides that?
A. No.
Q. Now, down at the east end of King
Lane -- I'm going to show you Exhibit 4. And
these numbers are the same ones that we had. On
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Q. How long does that take to have the
cattle eat the grass off?
A. It depends on what kind of season it
is, how wet the season it is, and how many cattle
are put on it for the given time, you know.
Q. Okay.
A. So it could be from two weeks to two
months. And then part of the year the lane is
used for a water gap to water cattle out of
Lows' property because the last several years
the creek hasn't had any water in it for the cows
to drink, and the artesian well runs down the
ditch that parallels the lane. So the cattle had
to come off their property into the lane to get a
drink. So, you know, it's been -- shoot, the last
few years, it's been, you know, up to six months
at a time it's been closed up.
Q. If someone were to go down the road,
were those gates able to be open and passed
through?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. Okay. Now, is it your understanding
that the King Lane is on Heart K Ranch property or •
is on the Lows' property?
A. It could be on both up through there.
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Exhibit 4, were there any other gates or any other
fences that would have crossed the road anywhere
between -- that is shown on that portion of the
map?
A. Yeah. There's a gate right here.
(Indicating.) Do you want me to draw on this?
Q. Sure. Go ahead.
A. (Indicating.)
Q. Okay. So you put an X on the roadway
just to the west of the buildings there. What
type of a gate is that?
A. That's a wire gate.
Q. What's the purpose of that wire gate?
A. To keep the cows from coming down by
the creek when I didn't -- because there's another
fence right here. You can't quite -- your picture
doesn't go far enough. There's another gate here,
and we fenced this off. And if we'd ate this off
already, and we don't want the cows coming down
here. So this just closed it off. So they are
just locked in this portion of the lane.
(Indicating.)
Q. Okay. How often does that happen?
A. Every year we do it. We eat it off.
We keep the grass and the weeds ate down.
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-•-s-•

Page 25 •

· I
2
3
4
1

5
6
7

8
i 9

: IO
I

' 11
12
13
14
15
16
17
! 18
: 19
i 20
I
i 21
: 22
[ 23
24
25
I

I don't know. It is on one or the other.
Q. Is it anything that's ever been -was ever discussed with the Steiners or anybody
else about whose property the road actually is
on?
A. No.
Q. Everybody has just used it?
A. Yeah. Well, rephrase that. How
everybody has just used it?
Q. Well, I guess -- Jet me be a little
bit, just kind of an offhand comment. Has
anybody, to your knowledge, ever had a survey or
investigation to determine whose property the road
actually goes on?
A. To my knowledge, no.
Q. So I guess when it was -- when it's
been built and maintained, you haven't been
concerned about whose property that it's been on,
as long as it has just been maintained and you've
had it available for access; is that fair?
A. It is either on -- it was either
Steiners' or Kings' property or Lows' or Kings'
property, one or the other, and we both use it in
common. So ...
Q. Were there ever any -- to your

--- ------•--·---·------·

7 (Pages 22 - 25)
Veritext Legal Solutions
800-567-8658

585
973-410-4040

Page 28 ·

Page 26'

1
2
3
4
5
6

I

7

8
9
10
1 11
12
, 13
: 14
: 15

! 16
. 17
, 18
: 19
!20
21
22
23
24
I
25
I

I

knowledge, ever any discussions between the Kings I
and the Steiners or anybody that owned the
2
property prior to the Steiners? 1 guess the
3
4
Steiners have owned the property for a Jong time.
Ever any discussion about whose property the road
5
6
was on or anything like that? Ever any
7
discussions that you're aware of?
8
A. No.
Q. So what's at the west end of -- if
9
i
! IO
you're going to be -- let me back up.
: 11
What types of things do you use,
say, you in general, the Kings, use that roadway
12
I 13
for? Where do you go if you're going down that
road?
: 14
A. To the irrigation well. What do we
15
16
use? ls that your question? Tractors, hay
: 17
trailers, trucks, any field equipment.
Q. Do you have any reason to go past the
! 18
gate that is on the west end of King Lane now?
: 19
A. Yeah. Our well water comes from right
20
here, from this pond.
21
Q. Okay.
22
A. So we go up there, and we check it.
: 23
Q. ls that well on your property or is it
24
:
25
on BLM property?

hardly in this country. So a rabbit trail shows
up forever, you know.
Q. Do you drive cattle trucks with cattle
in over there? Do you take the cattle trucks out
over to that well?
A. No loaded trucks. We go up there and
wash out periodically.
Q. So who else -- we were talking about
people that have lived in the house that JC lives
in now that have used that road. You mentioned
the Laws and Tanna Gilbert and Nate Moore and
John Fuquay. Would anybody else go up there
besides those people? Would you have, I don't
/
know, hunters? Would you have BLM people goin~
through over there? Was it pretty much just who
lives there that would be going out there?
A. Pretty much just the people that live
there, as far as I can remember.
Q. And there's nowhere else that this -that the roads go to, other than the houses and
the BLM property? There's no businesses or
destinations out there that anybody would go to?
A. No.
Q. Again, that's not a trick question?
A. No.
I
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JC's house and Clint's house.
A. Okay.
Q. And then the fence would be -- the gate
would be over here, somewhere right around in
here?
A. Um-hum.
Q. Where would you go once you came down
around this way?
A. Right -- that well is right here.
Right here is where I go to. There's a number of
ways you can go. You can go up the road here.
You can go up the ditch, in the upper ditch here.
(Indicating.)
Q. What's the primary route that you would
take?
A. On my motorcycle, probably right up the
ditch. In a vehicle, right up this lane, this
road here. (Indicating.)
Q. I'm looking at the overhead. It looks
like there's some well-used roads coming north off
of Castle Lane at the comer of the Fuquay
property.
A. Yeah. There's no vegetation at all

I

Q. If there was something out --

A. It is on BLM.
Q. Take a look at Exhibit 6, which shows
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A. No, there's nothing out there.
Q. I saw you kind of getting worried about
it. It is not a trick question. I just want to
I
know if there's any other reason why anybody woulq
come down the roads, other than, assumably, they
would be the people that live there. There's no
grocery store, you know, anything else that anyone i
would have a reason to go out there?
A. (Witness shakes head.)
Q. You're shaking your head no?
A. No.
Q. What about UPS or FedEx? Have you ever
seen them go down the road?
A. No.
Q. Down King Lane?
A. (Witness shakes head.)
Q. No? Do you recall the Fuquays ever
having a mailbox at the end of King Lane near
Oreana Loop Road?
A. Yeah.
(Exhibit No. 21 marked.)
Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: I'll show you
Exhibit 21 which is an aerial view of where Oreana i
Loop curves off into King Lane. Can you indicate !
1
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Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: So you previously

submitted an affidavit in this case, a couple of
them. You said that it was not until sometime in
2011 that the Fuquay plaintiffs began any use of
King Lane by large semi trucks. Is that true?
A. Yeah. Any use that was, you know,
noticeable. Like I told you earlier, when John
lived where JC does, you know, he took his truck
up there periodically. And then he moved back to
the other house, and there was no use to speak of.
Q. So I don't want to put too fine of a
point on it. But there was use, it was just not
as noticeable as what you're saying in 201 I?
A. Well, it was just -- the only time I
remember is when he lived in that little house
where JC does. And then when Karen moved off and
he moved back to the other house, I don't remember
anymore truck use until those kids started doing a
little trucking around here and there.
Q. How much use are you seeing Clint and
JC use? Do they have a lot of trucks?
A. They each had a truck for a period
there. It is just seasonal use, you know. It
was.
Q. Would they be going up and down all the
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edge of the bridge. They were getting careless
coming around there, and it was keeping -- so they
got straight before they tried to cross the
bridge, to prevent from breaking the comers off
the bridge.
Q. Did that block impede anybody's use of
the bridge or did it make your corner wider so you
hit straight before you hit the bridge?
A. Make sure you're correct before you go
across.
Q. So in your declaration you said, "I
had a large cement block placed at or near the
location of the bridge over Castle Creek in any
attempt eliminate this use of King Lane by the
Fuquays which was contributing to the damage to
the bridge." Were they contributing damage to the
bridge?
A. They -- it hadn't, but it would. If
the use continued, it would.
Q. Okay. So up until then, there hadn't
been any damage to the bridge?
A. I guess it is preventative.
Q. Okay. So you put the block there to -A. There's no broken boards on the bridge
yet.
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time or was it just out and then you might see
them come back in a week or two later? What was
2
the type of -3
A. Yeah. It would be out, do their work
4
and then back. They didn't truck up and down the
5
Jane, you know. It was seasonal work, it seemed
6
like.
7
8
Q. When you say "semi truck," what type of
trucks were they? What type of trucks do you see
9
them using?
IO
A. They have a ten-wheeler truck, and then
11
the trailer is -- they borrow different trailers
12
around from people. I seen them go by with a
13
belly dump. That was pretty much it. Dirt
14
trailers that I remember.
15
Q. Do you recall whether or not you would
16
see them trucking their cattle in and out?
17
A. No.
18
Q. You don't recall or, no, you didn't see
19
them?
20
A. No.
21
' 22
Q. What about the cement block that you
placed by the bridge?
23
A. It is right here in this picture.
24
It was just to keep people from running off the
' 25
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Q. Okay. All right. And at the time that
you put that there, there wasn't any damage? You
were doing it as preventative?
A. There was tire tracks, you know.
could see what was going to happen.
Q. Did you ever have to make any repairs
to the bridge because of truck use or anything
else?
A. No. I put out some -- a cement wall on
this other side to keep the bank from eroding
away.
Q. Did you ever see anybody bring any
loaded trucks in that way over the bridge?
A. I did not. But to my understanding,
there were -- somebody brought a loaded log truck
over there, but I wasn't home at the time.
Q. Was that one of the Fuquays that did
that?
A. I think one of them -- one of the
Fuquays was a passenger in the truck, I believe.
I don't know. I wasn't home.
Q. Any other -- was there any damage that
the Fuquays ever caused to the bridge that you
recall, aside from your preventative wanting to be
sure? Did they ever cause any damage to the
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it during the week and drive home in a car on the
2
2 weekends or time off, you know. So it varied.
3
, 3 From time to time, it would be daily, you know.
4
4 And then if they went somewhere else and worked,
5 it wouldn't be.
5
6
6
Q. All right. That helps me understand.
7
7
Oh, let me have just a minute here.
8
8 Let me ask you about this one. Take a look at
9
I 9 that exhibit. Do you recognize what that is?
; 10
A. Yes.
IO
Q. What is that?
i! 11
11
; 12
A. It is the west end of King Lane.
12
13
Q. Okay. Is that the gate that you put at
13
14 the west end?
14
A. Yeah, the gate and the new fence.
15
15
16
Q. Okay. And there's a chain that goes
I 16
17 around the top rail of that fence, it looks like.
17
18 Is that -18
A. Yes.
! 19
19
: 20
Q. Is that a fence to lock the gate?
20
MR. FARRIS: Chain.
21
21
Q.
BY
MR.
CLEVERLEY:
I'm
sorry.
The
22
i 22
'23 chain.
23
24
A. Yeah. I believe it is not locked on
: 24
'25 the gate right there. It is just a chain laying
( 25
i,

1

A. Okay.
Q. So you were talking earlier about when
Jim Fuquay owned the property in 1977.
A. Yes.
Q. And what piece of property, if you look
at Exhibit 3, did you understand he owned at that
time?
A. Okay. It would be this and this here.
(Indicating.)
Q. Okay.
A. So it would be west of the Lows'
property and next to the Lewis' property would be
the boundary on the south side.
Q. And on Exhibit 3 you marked what has
been labeled by someone as Clint Fuquay and
John Fuquay?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did you understand Jim Fuquay to
have lived in 1977?
A. Where Clint lives currently at the
comer of -- the northwest comer of the property.
Q. Did anyone occupy the house where
John Fuquay currently resides?

'
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around the pipe.
Q. Okay. Is that chain currently used to
lock that gate and prevent it from being opened?
A. There's a chain around it. I assume it
is probably that one.
That looks nice, that white fence metal
gate. I wish they would have got a picture more
to the south.
MR. CLEVERLEY: Let's go off the record.
(Off the record.)
MR. CLEVERLEY: All right. I don't have any
other questions, unless Mr. Farris or Mr. Rainey
have any for you.
MR. FARRIS: I do. I have a few questions.
EXAMINATION
BY MR. FARRIS:
Q. Mr. King, you know me. My name is
Bryce Farris, and I represent Cal and Susie Low,
for the record.
A. Yes.
Q. I have a few follow-up questions I want
to make sure I'm understanding.
Do you have Exhibit 3 in front of you?
It is this one right here.
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[ 22
i 23
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I

A. Ask me that again.
Q. At that time, in 1977, did anybody
occupy the house where John Fuquay currently
resides?
A. Okay. 1 could have told you wrong to
begin with. Maybe when they first moved there,
they might have lived in the house where John
lives.
Q. Where he currently lives?
A. Yes. And then maybe it was a couple of
years later they moved in the double-wide.
Q. Okay. And you mentioned in 1977 there
was use by Jim Fuquay with a car or pickup
occasionally?
A. That's what I recall.
Q. Can you explain what you mean by
"occasionally"? Is that once per week, once per
day?
A. Probably, about a couple times a week.
Q. Okay. And so we're clear, we're
talking about the house that John currently
resides in.
A. Okay. We're probably not clear. When
they lived in this house here where John lives,
they went in and out Castle Lane. When they put

___ ._l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ • - - - - - - ~ - - - - ·-
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the double-wide in over here -- so I suppose it
would be closer to like '79 -- then, you know,
their use was once in a while.
Q. Okay. Once in a while is what?
A. A time or two a week, I would say.
Q. Okay. A time or two a week with cars
or a pickup?
A. Cars or pickups.
Q. It wouldn't have been with larger
trucks?
A. No.
Q. The house where John currently resides,
you said they went -A. Out Castle Lane to the south.
Q. Have you ever seen anybody residing at
that house use what we've been calling King Lane
for purposes of your deposition today?
A. No. Their use was primarily Castle
Lane.
Q. Okay. Now, you were talking about that
it was physically impossible to use what we've
been calling King Lane because of some corrals
that were built?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know when those corrals were

I east -- no, the west end, where there's been a
2 gate that's been installed?
3
A. Yes.
4
Q. Is there a culvert that you would have
5 to drive over?
6
A. At the west end?
7
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
8
Q.
How wide is that culvert? Do you know?
' 9
! 10
A. It is 10 -- 8-, 10-foot wide.
Q. Do you know what that culvert is made
i 11
! 12

of?

. 13

21
22
' 23
' 24
' 25

A. Concrete .
Q. A concrete culvert? Do you know how
deep it is?
A. It has got maybe a foot of dirt on it.
Prior to that concrete culvert being put in there,
there was just a couple old tin barrels that were
welded together.
Q. Do you know when the concrete culvert
was installed?
A. It was when we poured the cement
ditches so the trucks could come in that way.
would say '89-ish or so.
Q. Okay. Because I thought -- yeah,

Page 87
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removed?
A. Sometime during the period when Zane
Block was on the King property.
Q. Was that, I think you said, between '83
and '86?
A. Yes.
Q. So prior to '83, at least, it was
physically impossible for any truck use down what
has been called King Lane?
A. Yes.
Q. And then sometime during that period of
'83-'86, the corrals were removed by Zane Block
when he occupied the property?
A. Yes.
Q. Did -- are there any other impediments
that would prevent the use of King Lane by large
trucks since 1986? Let me ask it a different
way. Prior to '83 or '86, there was the corrals
that prevented it from physically happening.
After that time and current, today, are there
any physical impediments that would prevent use
of large trucks on what is now referred to as
King Lane?
A. Not that I'm thinking of.
Q. Okay. Is there a -- I guess it is the
__

2
3
4
5
6
7
' 8
9
10
II
12
, 13
: 14
15
16
17
' 18
19
20
! 21
, 22
: 23
. 24

I'm trying to track the timeframe. So you had
mentioned that Zane Block when he was occupying
the property removed all of the ditches?
A. The ditches -- excuse me. The dirt
ditches in the field, he had tore out the ditches,
plowed them out and taken the fences out. We have'
it fenced up to where you can control the cows in
smaller bunches. On the section of property,
there's ten or a dozen fields.
Q. So you weren't referring to the
concrete ditches along the roadway?
A. No.
Q. But, nevertheless, the barrels that you
were talking about got replaced sometime after -A. After.
Q. --you took possession of the property
back in, roughly, '89?
A. That's when we poured some ditch and
the barrels had a hole in it, I remember, and it
had to be replaced because we had to bring the
cement trucks in that way to get in the field
because you couldn't cross the bridge with a
loaded truck.
Q. Okay. You had discussed this concept
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Facsimile: (208) 629-7559
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY;

Case No. CV-2014-0278

Plaintiffs,

SUSIE AND CAL LOW'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY;
Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Low"), by and through their attorneys ofrecord, Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC, and hereby MOVES
the Court as follows:
( 1)

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE for entry of an Order granting
partial summary judgment to Low and dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Low in their
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entirety.
The basis and grounds for this Motion is set forth in the Memorandum in Support submitted
herewith and is supported by the Affidavits already on file with the Court, the Court's prior decisions
in this matter, along with the record and pleadings already on file with the Court.
Low reserve the right to submit additional affidavits in support of this Motion.
Oral argument on this Motion is respectfully requested.

DATED thisj!/."t;y of July, 2015.
:J'H LAW OFFICES, PLLC
by""'·,;.L---------~_-_ _-i..-_ _ _ _ __
S. Bryce Farris
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Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and Rose
King
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SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Golden Eagle Building
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110
P. 0. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83 707
Telephone: (208) 629-7447
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY;

Case No. CV-2014-0278

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY;

SUSIE AND CAL LOW'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
COMES NOW Defendants, Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Low"), by and through their attorneys of record, Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC, and hereby submits
this Memorandum in Support of the Low' s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed concurrently
herewith. Low's Motion and Memorandum are supported by the Affidavits already on file with the
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Court, including, but not limited to the Affidavits of Rose King, Samuel Steiner, and S. Bryce Farris
, as well as the record already before this Court, including, but not limited to, the Declarations of
Rose King, Gilbert King, the Mailperson and Denice Collett previously filed with the Court on or
about September 9, 2014. The Low's Motion and Memorandum are also supported by this Court's
prior Decision regarding the Kings' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Judgment entered in
favor of Kings in this matter.

I. INTRODUCTION
As this Court is well aware, Plaintiffs claim an easement by prescription for use of King Lane
across the property of Low and Defendants Heart K Ranch, Gordon King and Rose King (hereinafter
collectively "King"). It is not known at this time to what extent the road crosses the Low and King
properties but there is no dispute that the road crosses a portion of each. King filed a motion for
summary judgment contending that Plaintiffs had not met the necessary elements to establish a
prescriptive easement for King Lane and thus summary judgment was appropriate.

This Court

issued a Memorandum Decision Upon King Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on March
25, 2015 denying King's motion. Low participated in the oral argument for said motion and advised
the Court that should summary judgment be granted to King it would apply equally to Low and that
Low anticipated they would file their own motion for summary judgment. King subsequently filed
a Motion for Reconsideration and on June 19, 2015 this Court issued a Memorandum Decision Upon
King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration which again analyzed whether Plaintiffs had met the

necessary elements to establish a prescriptive easement. Again, Low participated in support of
King's motion. The Court granted King's Motion for Reconsideration and concluded that "[t]his
SUSIE AND CAL LOW'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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court has reviewed the record thoroughly and cannot find that plaintiffs have met this burden.
Summary judgment is appropriate. This is especially so given plaintiffs burden of proof at trial
(clear and convincing evidence)." Memorandum Decision Re: Reconsideration, pg. 11. The Court
then issued a Judgment in favor of Kings on July 8, 2015 .1
Now that the Court has granted judgment in favor of King, the same basis, reasoning, facts
and law support granting summary judgment in favor of Low. In fact, the facts relied upon by this
Court includes the Affidavit of Samuel Steiner, a predecessor in title to the Low property.
Memorandum Decision Re: Reconsideration, pg. 7, Thus, Low now seek summary judgment

dismissing Plaintiffs' claims to a prescriptive easement across any portion of King Lane which is
owned by Low and thus dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Low.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment must be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Friel v. Boise
City Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). The court liberally construes

the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Friel, 126 Idaho at 485,887 P.2d at 30 (citing Farm
Credit Bank ofSpokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994); Harris v.
Dept. ofHealth and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992)). Ifreasonable people

Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's June 19, 2015 Decision but no
hearing has been scheduled.
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could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, a summary
judgment motion is typically denied. Farm Credit Bank ofSpokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho at 272,
869 P.2d at 1367.
However, these standards differ where cases, such as this one, are tried to courts in the
absence of a jury. See, e.g., State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008)
( citations omitted) (""[W]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a
jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those
inferences. When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained
to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial
judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary
facts.").
III. ARGUMENT
The facts, law and arguments supporting the Low' s motion for partial summary judgment are
already part of the record before this Court. In fact, this Court has decided the very issue that Low
now seek to address with respect to the claims against Low. Thus, in order to avoid redundancy and
for judicial economy Low will not repeat said facts and law and instead incorporate by reference the
existing record which specifically includes the Court's Memorandum Decision Upon King

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 25, 2015 and the Court's Memorandum
Decision Upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration dated June 19, 2015.
After thoroughly reviewing the affidavits in the record, including those of the Kings, Samuel
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Steiner, the predecessor to the Low property and the testimony of Plaintiffs themselves, the Court
concluded the following:
Based on the record before this Court the plaintiff has failed to make any
showing on the essential element that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was adverse under
claim of right. Even when this Court makes all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs,
there is nothing in the record to indicate a decisive act or incident of separate or
exclusive use from 1977 to 2011. While the use of King Lane may not have started
with express or even implied permission, the recorded and the testimony of the
plaintiffs shows that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was in "'common with the owner
and general public." Marshall 130 Idaho at 680; (quoting Simmons, 63 Idaho 136,
118 P .2d 740 (1941 ). A prescriptive easement cannot be granted unless there is
evidence of a decisive act or incident showing adverse use that could be considered
an '"actual invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner." Hughes, 142
Idaho at 480.
Because there is no proof or evidence concerning this essential element of
plaintiffs' case, that the Fuquays' use was adverse and contrary to the ownership
rights of the Kings, the King defendants have met their burden of showing there is
no genuine issue of material fact regarding the element of adverse use.
Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden shifts to
the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses
or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid
justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56 (f). Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho
389, 392, 179 P.3d 352, 355 (Ct.App. 2008).
Memorandum Decision Re: Motion/or Reconsideration, pg. 10.
The law, facts and reasoning of the Court applies equally to the Lows. This is not a situation
where Low is asking the Court to apply Idaho Supreme Court precedent or decision from some other
judge, court or jurisdiction, but rather Low is seeking to have the Court apply the same law and facts
it has already applied to another defendant, i.e. Low. Evidence concerning the use of the roadway
in common with Low is provided in the Affidavit ofSamuel Steiner, was examined, considered and
relied upon by this Court, and the lack of evidence or showing by Plaintiffs as to the elements of
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their claim equally applies to those claims against Low. For these reasons, and the reasons already
specified in the Court's decision, summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiffs cannot meet
their burden of showing that any use of King Lane as it applies to Low was "adverse and contrary
to the ownership rights to the" Lows.
Given the Court has granted summary judgment to King based upon the same facts, law and
analysis applicable to the claims against Low, the Court could possible enter conflicting decisions
if it did not grant summary judgment to Low. Under the rule of stare decisis, when the Court states
a rule of law necessary to resolve and issue, the rule of law becomes the law of the case and must
be adhered to through the case's subsequent history. Suitts v. First Bank ofIdaho, N.A., 110 Idaho
15, 21-22, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380-81 (1985). The rule oflaw or decision becomes precedent and
controls future decisions under the rule of stare decisis.
Finally, Plaintiffs claims against Low are rendered moot by the Court's decision granting
summary judgment to King. If Plaintiffs cannot establish an easement over the property of King,
which there is no dispute that the roadway crosses a portion of the King property, then Plaintiffs
cannot have a presecriptive easement across any portion of the roadway which crosses the property
of Low. In other words, now that the Court has granted judgment in favor of King, there can be no
easement across the property of Low because there is no continuous easement for Plaintiffs' access
from their property to Oreana Loop Road. Thus, whether mootness, stare decisis, issue preclusion
or some other basis, summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Low just as the Court has granted
judgment in favor of King as to the prescriptive easement claims by Plaintiffs.
II
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IV. CONCLUSION

For the same reasons this Court has granted summary judgment to the Kings, this Court
should also grant the Low's motion for partial summary judgment and dismiss all causes of action
of the Plaintiffs against Low.

/a; of July, 2015.
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I.
QUESTION PRESENTED ON THE FUQUAY
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The Fuquay Plaintiffs' July 6. 2015 Motion for Reconsideration essentially presents only a
single question for this Court's determination:
Whether the undisputed facts in the record before this Court support the
application of the "Use in Common" rule, upon which summary judgment has been
granted to the King Defendants, or whether, in the alternative, a presumption of
adverse use should be applied to the facts of this case?

IL
THE APPLICABLE IDAHO LEGAL STANDARD
Beginning with the first memorandum that was submitted to the Court by the King
Defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment they have consistently- and correctly
- cited the controlling Idaho legal standard on the question presented on this motion for
reconsideration, as initialing supported by their citation to the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in

Chen w. Conway, 116 Idaho 901. 781 P.2d 238 (Ct.App.1989):
The general rule in Idaho is:
[P]roof of open, notorious, continuous. uninterrupted use of the
claimed right for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use
began. raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of
right. The burden is then on the owner of the servient tenement to show that
the use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement.
[Quoting Westv. Smith, 95 Idaho at 557,511 P.2dat 1333; emphasis added.)

In Melendez, we noted that two exceptions have been recognized to the
2:eneral rule stated in West. One of these exceptions is found in Simmons v.
Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941). There, the Supreme Court
said:
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The rule would seem to be that where the owner of real property
constructs a way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use
thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be
presul!!_ed tQ be by way of license or permission.

116 Idaho at 903, 781 P .2d at 240 (italicized emphasis in original; bold/underlined emphasis added),
as originally cited at pg. 9 of the King Defendants, Opening Briefin Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment.

In this case, the King Defendants have submitted facts to this Court which have established
the existence ofthe "joint use-in-co1J1II1on" exception, as described above, that created a presumption
of pennissive use by the Fuquays concerning King Lane from the time that use began. There has
been no question presented in this case as to any uncertainty as when the Fuquay Plaintiffs' ''use"
of King Lane began, and as further argued below, if anything, their arguments submitted in support
of their motion for reconsideration only further solidify the fact that their "use·' of King Lane is well
established as to how and when it began. such that the presumption of adverseness does not apply,

to the facts of this case, and instead, the "joint-use-in-common" rule does apply to the
circumstances concerning the Fuquay Plaintiffs' use of King Lane.

The above-stated rule, as to ~e application of the ''presumption of adverse use" that is based
upon the absence of any evidence of how the claimed "use" be~an, has remained unchanged as
applied in Idaho. See e.g., HFL.P., LLC v. The City of 'fwin Falls, 157 Idaho 672,681,339 P.3d

557, 566 (2014); and Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 232, 76 P.3d 969,976 (2003) ("Without

evidence of how the use of the property began. proof of open. notorious, continuous and
uninterrupted use for the prescriptive period raises a presumption that the use was adverse and under
a claim of right.") (emphasis added). Here we have evidence of how the Fuquays "use" began.
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III.
THE FUQUAY PLAINTIFFS HAVE MISSTATED THE APPLICABLE
IDAHO LEGAL RULES IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE ARGUMENT
PRESENTED IS SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATiON
The Fuquay Plaintiffs have summarized the three points that they have raised in support of
their argument in support of their motion for reconsideration on pages 4-5 of their supporting
memorandum. All three points are founded upon material misstatements of Idaho law, or the
application of the facts to Idaho law. The first point contains the following misstatement ofldaho
law:

l.

The Court applied the wrong presumption of adverse use. There is no
evidence of how the road was created, and there is a presumption of
adverse use which should have been construed in favor of the Fuquays.

(Emphasis added). As already stated and emphasized above. the presumption of adverse use under
Idaho law, only arises when there is no evidence as to how the ''use,, that is at issue began - not how
the road itself was created. Here, the evidence before the Court - as presented by the Fuquays
themselves - establishes that their use of King Lane began in 1977.
The Fuquays simply misstate the law when they predicate their entire argument on their
motion for reconsideration on the premise that a presumption of adverse use under Idaho law can
arise upon an absence of evidence as to how the road was created, instead of an absence of evidence
of how their own "use" of the road began, which is the proper question. HF.LP .. LLC v. The

City ofTwin Falls, 151 Idaho 672,681,339 P.3d557, 566 (2014); Hodginsv. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,
232, 76P.3d969,976(2003);andChenw. Conway, 116Idaho901, 903,781 P.2d238,240(Ct.App.
1989).
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The second point that the Fuquays have attempted to argue on their motion for
reconsideration is that application of the "use in common.. rule is to be determined as a ''factual

detem1ination," rather than as a "presumption," which they are required to rebut. Under Rule
of Evidence 301, Idaho follows the "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions, Sraie v. Hagerman
Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 736,745.947 P.2d 409,418 (1997), which in simple parlance

means that by its operation a presumption relieves the party in whose favor it operates form
presenting further evidence of the existence of the presumed fact until the opposing party has
introduced substantial evidence of the nonexistence ofthat presUmed fact. 130 Idaho at 745-46, 94 7

P.2d at 418-19.
Here, under the applicable Simmons standard - as declared almost 7 5 years ago in 1941 and
that is still followed - and which was clearly stated in the Kings' Motion for Reconsideration, the
applicable controlling presumption is:
where the owner of real property constructs a way over it for his own use and
convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use
will be presumed to be by way of license or permission.

63 Idaho at 144, 118 P.2d at 744 (emphasis added). See also, Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho
497,503,236 P.3 1257, 1263 (2010); Weitzv. Green, 148 Idaho 851,861,230 P.3d 743,753 (2010);

Beckstead v. Price. 146 Idaho 57. 64, 190 P .3d 876, 883 (2008); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 684,
691,946 P.2d 984,991 (Ct.App.1996); Burnsv. Alderman, 122 Idaho 749, 754-55, 838 P.2d 878,
883-84 (Ct.App.1992); Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 13, 784 P.2d 339,343 (Ct.App.1989); and

Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,404, 724 P.2d 137, 140 (Ct.App.1986).
The Fuquay Plaintiffs in their argument on their Motion for Reconsideration now attempt to
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ignore this long-standing presumption, and instead argue as follows:
2.

'·Use in common" is a factual determination and there is conflicting
evidence as to the use of the roadway. The court construed inferences from
the conflicting evidence in favor of the Kings instead of in favor of the
Fuquays.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration at pg. 4 (emphasis added). In one of the Idaho Supreme

Court· s most recent decisions on this specific question concerning rebuttal of a presumed permissive
use, HFL.P., LLC v. The City of Twin Falls, 151 Idaho 672, 339 P.3d 557 (2014), the Court
emphasized that the burden is on the party claiming a prescriptive right to present evidence to rebut
the existence of such a presumed "permissive use:"
Moreover. if the presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the
presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested and
"brought home" to the servient property owner. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho
390,398,210 P.3d 75, 83 (2009); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789,792,537 P.2d
631, 634 (1975).
157 Idaho at 681,339 P.3d at 566.

The question of what constitutes sufficient rebuttal of this permissive use presumption leads
directly into the Fuquays' third argument presented in support of their motion for reconsideration
alleging that they had provided evidence in rebuttal of the King Defendants' presumption of the
Fuquays' permissive "use-in-common" of King Lane:
3.

Even if there was "use in common" the evidence showed the Jim Fuquay had
committed a distinct act of placing a new mobile home on his property in
1977 and using the roadway for access to that mobile home. The placement
of the mobile home was a ~l!~l"ateJLnd distinctive act that created an
adverse use. The court ignored the evidence of the adverse use commencing
in 1977 and focused only on the use in 2011.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration at pp. 4-5 (emphasis added).
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Nothing that Jim Fuquay did, or for that matter, that any of the other Fuquays did or
undertook on their own land would have any effect whatsoever as to their alleged rights to the "'use"
of King Lane as that roadway crossed over property owned by the Kings. Only the Fuquays' actions
as taken in respect to King Lane as that roadway passed over King property would affect any
potential easement claim that they could ever potentially assert in this action. The general principles

that apply on this particular question were recently summarized in, Capstar Radio Operating Co.
v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411,283 P.3d 728 (2012):

"An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner." Hughes, 142 Idaho
at 480. 129 P.3d at 1229 (citing Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3dat 973). In other
words," 'an easement is defined as a ri2ht in the lands of another, and therefore
one cannot have an easement in his own lands.,,, Zingiber Inv., L.L. C., v.
Hagerman Highway Dist.• 150 Idaho 675,681,249 P.3d 868, 874 (2011) (quoting
Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767,771,450 P.2d 990, 994 (1969)).
153 Idaho at 420,283 P.3d at 737 (emphasis added).
What the Fuquays have argued on their Motion for Reconsideration is nothing more than
actions constituting an alleged "distinct act" for purposes ofrebutting the "use-in-common" rule that

only affected their own land, rather than land owned that was by the King Defendants. These socalled "distinct acts," as allegedly only undertaken by the Fuquays on their own property, cannot
create an adverse use, much less an easement, in respect to King Lane as that roadway crosses the
King Defendants' property. In direct contrast, the adverse conduct that did arise in 2011 consisted
of distinct acts undertaken by the Fuquays that occurred on the King Defendants' property, which
as argued in the Kings' Motion for Reconsideration, placed the Kings on notice for the first time of
the Fuquays' adverse right claim to the "use" of King Lane.

KING DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO THE
FUQUAY PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION-PAGE 7

608

T-252 P009/024 F-917

This alleged damage to King Lane, as allegedly caused by the Fuquay Plaintiffs in 2011,
occurred on the King Defendants' property. Such damage, as arising on King property, as opposed
to actions only taken on the Fuquays' own property would be sufficient to constitute, '~independent
decisive acts," under the standard of Hodgins v. Sales. 139 Idaho 225, 76 P.3d 969 (2003), as cited

in the King Defendants' Reconsideration Reply Memorandum:
Proof of independent, decisive acts, such as maintenance of the way, tearing down
barriers, and other indications of separate and exclusive use is sufficient to rebut a
presumption of permissive use. Marshall v, Blair, 130 Idaho at 680-681, 946 P.2d
at 980-981; Simmons v. Perkins. 63 Idaho 136, 140, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941).
139 Idaho at 232, 76 P.3d at 976. See, King Defendants• Reconsideration Reply Memorandum at
pg. 4. But actions taken by the Fuquays that only affect their own property do not satisfy this
standard, inasmuch as those actions cannot in any manner establish any right to an easement over
the King Defendants' property.
Finally, although not put at issue by the Fuquays' motion for reconsideration, the Court

shonld be reminded that throughout this matter it has been undisputed by any of the parties that King
Lane has been used by the general public. Use by the general public also rebuts any claim to a
presumption of adverse use as summarized in Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223
(2006), as also incorporating the 1941 Simmons decision in its overall analysis, as summarized in
the following excerpts from the Hughes v. Fisher decision:
However, there are special considerations relating to notice to the owner when the
claimant's use of the subject property is shared with the 2eneral public:
Where, as here, the same degree ofuse upon which the adverse claim is based
has been exercised indiscriminately by the general public, individual
acquisition of a prescriptive easement has generally been held
impossible. In such a case, the claimant must perform some act whereby the
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adverse nature of the claim is clearly indicated to the owner of the servient
estate.

Hall, 108 Idaho at 112-13, 697 P.2d at 452-53.
In such situations, mere use of property alone is insufficient to establish a
private prescriptive easement; rather, the claimant must perform some independent
act signifying to the owner the adverse user's claim. Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, 114
Idaho 79, 753 P.2d 290 (Ct.App.1988), vacated by 116 Idaho 739, 779 P.2d 414
(1989); Hall, 108 Idaho at 112, 697 P.2d at 452. This independent act requirement
is merely a common sense
of ensuring the prescriptive easement elements have
been satisfied. By definition. a use must be open and notorious, continuous and
Wlinterrupted, and adverse and under a claim of right with the actual or imputed
knowledge of the landowner for five years before it can ripen into a prescriptive
easement. When the claimant is usin~ the land along with members of the
genera) public, it would simply be unfair to impute knowledge to the landowner
that the claimant is makini: an adverse claim. The law in Idaho is clear that the
general public may not obtain a private prescriptive easement. See Stare ex rel.
Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 145, 594 P .2d 1093, 1098 (1979) ("[T)his court is of
the opinion that the 'general public' or 'the people of the state of Idaho' as
distinguished from specific individuals cannot, absent specific statutory
authorization, acquire prescriptive rights to private property."). Fairness demands
the landowner receive some type of ··special notice" so the landowner can
differentiate between an adverse claimant-who can seek a private prescriptive
easement-and a member of the general public-who cannot-and take action to protect
the landowner's property rights.

way

Once such use by the public is established, the claimant is obligated to
identify some independent act si2nifying the adver-se claim to the landowner.
There is simply nothing in the record indicating acts were committed that would have
put Fisher on notice that Hughes' use was adverse. In fact, the district court found,
"Plaintiffs each admitted that there was nothing about their respective uses of the
Path that would have imparted to Fisher or his predecessors that they were claiming
a right to use the Path.,, Hughes has not shown this factual finding was clearly
erroneous. In the absence of some independent act, Fisher cannot be deemed to have
been on notice that the plaintiffs were each claiming an adverse right. Accordingly,
Hughes has failed to establish all elements of a prescriptive easement and the district
court's decision on this matter is affirmed.
142 Idaho at 481-82, 129 P.3d at 1230-31 (emphasis added).
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In sum, no act undertaken by the Fuquays in respect to King Lane, as that roadway crossed
the King property, prior to 2011, ever put the Kings on notice of any adverse or prescriptive claim
made by the Fuquays to a prescriptive right claim to an easement in King Lane. On this motion for

reconsideration, the only independent act that the Fuquays have alleged is an action in respect to their
own property, which is insufficient - as a matter of law- to create any adverse claim to King Lane

as it crosses the Kings' property.
IV.
THE FUQUAYS, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

THEREFORE FAILS ON ALL ARGUMENTS RAISED
Ultimately, the Fuquays' adverse use argument is simply self-rebutting, since they have
provided the Court with ample evidence as to how their alleged ''use" of King Lane began in 1977

at the time of the placement of Jim Fuquay's mobile home> followed by his commencement of the
use of King Lane for ordinary access to and from that mobile home at that time. Under the Simmons
decision, and its progeny, the Fuquays' use of King Lane could only be presumed to be adverse if
there was no evidence as how the Fuquays' use of King Lane had begun_ On this Motion for
Reconsideration the Fuquays themselves have offered precise and exact evidence of just how and

when their alleged use of King Lane first began, thus rebutting any possibility of a presumption of
adverse use under that specific adverse use rule. Therefore, the use-in-conunon rule, upon which
this Court granted summary judgment to the King Defendants, does in fact apply here, where all the
evidence before this Court points to the fa.ct that no use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs as that
roadway crosses over the King property had been anything other than permissive until 2011.
Because the "use-in-common" rule is in the nature of a presumption, the Fuquays can only
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rebut that presumption by proof ofindependent decisive acts taken to establish an adverse claim to
King Lane for purposes of establishing a prescriptive easement across the King Defendants'
property. Such acts undertaken upon the Fuquays' ov.n property have no rebuttal effect for this
purpose because: (1) the Fuquays cannot establish any claim to an easement in their own lands, and
(2) such actions are wholly ineffective as to any claim to an easement as made against the King
Defendants' land.
Finally, the Fuquays' use of King Lane was at all times also in common with members of the
general public.
In sum, none of the grounds alleged in the Fuquay Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration

state a valid basis upon which to overturn the Court's grant of summary judgment to the King
Defendants. Therefore, the Fuquay Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration should be denied.

Respectfully submitted this _ _ day of August, 2015.
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involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and
could testify to them in a court proceeding.
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Defendants.

Plaintiffs respectfully submit this Reply in support of their motion for reconsideration.
There are three key issues raised in Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration:

1, Did the Court apply the correct presumptions?
2. ls there conflicting evidence as to ''use in common?"
3. Is there evidence of a "distinct act of adverse use?"
While the answers to the questions not dispose of the case at this time, they show enough
disputed issues of fact that the Court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of
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the Kings. Because there are disputed issues of material fact, the court must, as a matter of
law, reverse itself and vacate the Kings' summary judgment order and the Judgment.
It is important to note that the original Motion for Summary Judgment was brought by the
Kings. Therefore, the Coi1rt was required to construe all facts and all reasonable inferences
from the facts in favor of the Plaintiffs. Originally, the Couit ruled (correctly) that there are

disputed issues of matel'ial fact and denied the Kings' motion, The Court then el'red on
reconsideration when it construed the facts and inferences in favor of the Kings as the moving

pal'ty instead of in favor of the Plaintiffs as the non-moving party.
It was not the Plaintiffs' bw·den to prove their entire case in opposing the Kings' motion.

The Plaintiffs needed only show that there are factual disputes that cannot be resolved on
summary judgment. The arguments and evidence before the court show that there are disputed
issues of fact as to when the roadway was constructed, when the adverse use began, and
whether the nature of the use was adverse to the Kings. Those facts are clearly disputed in the
evidence before the court1 and summary judgment should not have been granted.
1. The Court Applied the Presumptions Incorrectly

The presumption is that when there is no evidence of how the use of a roadway began, the
use is presumed adverse to the owner. The Kings are arguing that the evidence of initial use
of the roadway is limited to the Plaintiffs, and therefore the presumption does not apply. That
is not conect. Idaho law allows dominant easement holders to "tack" their adverse use onto
prior owners, and any vesting of prescriptive rights of prior owners is conveyed with the land
to subsequent owners. Thus> the presumption of adverse use relates back to the initial use of
the roadway. It is not is not limited to just Plaintiffs' use of the roadway.
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In this case, the evidence shows that the roadway has been in existence for nearly 100

years and was used by the propetty owners prior to the Plaintiffs. There is no evidence that
the initial use of the roadway was ever permissive. Therefore the use of the roadway from its
inception, including the time through Plaintiffs predecessors, is presumed to be adverse to the
Kings. The Kings have the burden of showing permissive use at the time the roadway was
built and use began, not just from the Fuquays' first use in 1977. The Kings have not shown
any evidence that the initial use nearly 100 years ago was permissive; therefore, the
presumption is that the use has been adverse.
Since the initial use is presumed to be adverse, then the Kings cannot prevail on summary
judgment.
2. There ls Conflicting Evidence as to "Use in Common"

The Kings rely on Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941) to
support their claim of"use in common.'' However, Simmons was later discussed in Melendez
v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,405, 724 P.2d 137, 141 (Ct. App. 1986) where the cotui said if there
is "some infringement or invasion of rights" that the general rule (presuming adverse use)
instead of the exception (pl'esuming permission) applies.
The Plaintiffs presented evidence that their use was adverse to the Kings. The Kings argue
that evidence is insufficient and that the use was "in common.,, The court should not weigh
the conflicting evidence in a stunmary judgment motion. Since there is conflicting evidence as

to what the "use in common" is, and whether that use "infringed» or "invaded the Kings
0

rights, the inference must be construed in favor of Plaintiffs, and summary judgment was
inappropriate. Once the court hears testimony of all of the evidence and considers the

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S
JUNE 19, 2015 MEMORANDUM DECISION-3

1''1DELl'f~ NATIONt.L L"W GROUP
l200-6'J' AVENUt::,SUIT£620
SEATI'LE, WA

9810t
(206) 223-4S2S

618

' Aug. 12. 2015

No. 1710

9:09AM

P. 4

credibility of the witnesses, the court can weigh it and decide whether the Plaintiffs have met

the clear and convincing standard. However, the court should not have made any inferences
against the Plaintiffs on summary judgment because they were the non•moving parties. The
court was required to make all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs and against the
Kings, meaning that the court was required to infer that all of the Plaintiffs' use was adverse.
3. There is Evidence of a Distinctive Event Creating Adverse Use

As the evidence shows, Jim Fuquay purchased his property and then placed a mobile
home on his prope1ty in 1977. It is not the act of placing a new home on one's own prope1ty
that creates adverse use, it is placing a new home on one's own property and rhen using

someone else's roadway ro access

it that creates the distinct adverse use. Once the mobile

home was placed in 1977 and Jim Fuquay started using the roadway to access it, the Kings
were on notice that Fuquay's use was adverse to theirs and under a claim of right. That notice
continued as the homes on the Fuquay property were rented to others and the renters used the
roadway for access.
Finally, the Kings continue to argue that any public use of the roadway requires separate

and distinct adverse use. That is not the standard. The standard is: indiscriminate use by the
general public equal to that of the claimants. Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111. Here, there is no
evidence ·of ''indiscriminate public use." In fact, Rose King repeatedly testified that the
roadway was never used by the general public. The Kings argument that the roadway was
open to the general public is directly contradicted by Rose King's own testimony. The Kings
can't have it both ways - either Rose King's testimony must be discounted entirely, or their

argument must be ignored.
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CONCLUSION
Respectfully, the court erred when it granted the Kings' Motion after originally denying it
The presumption of adverse use applies because there is no evidence as to how the original

use of the roadway began, and thus the originating use is deemed adverse. The Kings never
presented any evidence that the use began as permissive. Without permissive use, the Kings
cannot prevail.
Even if the court were to agree with Kings that Jim Fuquay's use began as permissive, Jim
Fuquay1s separate and distinct act of placing a new home on his property and then using ~e
roadway to access the new home is sufficient to show adverse use, The continued use by

renters to access the home is also a distinct event evidencing adverse use,
The Plaintiffs simply want to have their day in court where they can present all of the
evidence in this case. At that time, the court can weigh the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses and make a decision based on all of the facts.

Dated: August 12, 2015

Matthew R. Cleverley, I B 5418
Fidelity National Law ·ou
1200-6tl' Avenue, Suit 62
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 223A525, ext. 103
Matthew.Clever1ey@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S
JUNE 19, 2015 MEMORANDUM DECIS10N-5

FII>EUT'\' NATIONAL LAW Gn0\11'
1100- 6'" AVEl'IUE, SUITE 620

SEAITLE, WA 98101

(206) :m.4s2.s

620

•

' . . ' Aug. 12. 2015 9:09AM

No.1710

P.6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the date given below I .caused to be served the foregoing Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration and the pages from Depositions of Gilbert King and Rose King on the
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Ronald P. Rainey
Attorney at Law
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, ID 83606
208-459-3659
erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorney for Kings

S. Bryce Farris
Sawtoolh Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W, River Street, Suite 110
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Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY;

Case No. CV-2014-0278

Plaintiffs,
SUSIE AND CAL LOW'S REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY;
Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendants, Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"'Low"), by and through their attorneys of record, Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC, and hereby submits
this Reply in Support of the Low's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
II
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I. INTRODUCTION
As indicated in the Low' s initial Memorandum in Support ofPartial Summary Judgment, this
Court has granted summary judgment to Defendants Heart K Ranch, Gordon King and Rose King
(hereinafter collectively "King") because Plaintiffs have been unable to establish the necessary
elements for a prescriptive easement. See Memorandum Decision Upon King Defendants' Motion
for Reconsideration, dated June 19, 2015. Since the roadway at issue, referred to in this litigation
as "King Lane", is partially on the property of Low, Low have filed their own motion for summary
judgment on the same grounds as those already decided by this Court. In response, Plaintiffs do not
dispute the common use and public use of King Lane, or that Plaintiffs have not met their burden
of establishing a decisive act of adverse use, but instead argue the following: ( 1) the "common use"
by Low is somehow distinguishable because the use common use was for agricultural purposes even
though Plaintiffs provide no citations or authority for the basis of their argument; and (2) that Low
purchased the property in 2006 and that the prescriptive easement claimed by Plaintiffs ripened
before Low purchased the property even though the record is clear that the use in common occurred
while the Low' s predecessor, Samuel Steiner, owned the property and according to Rose King as
early as 1973. Plaintiffs' arguments lack merit in fact and law and this Court should grant summary
judgment to Low based upon the same reasoning, facts, law and basis already determined when it
granted summary judgment to King. 1

Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Memorandum Decision Upon King
Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 19, 2015, which is to be argued on the same date
as the Low's Motion, and Low reserve the right to respond and support the Court's decision and the position
of King regarding Plaintiffs' Motion.
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II.ARGUMENT
The first argument raised by Plaintiffs is that the "common use" by Low was for agricultural
purposes and not to access their homes. Plaintiffs' Response, pg. 2. In other words, Plaintiffs do
not dispute that there is common use by Low or their predecessors, which then modifies the
presumption standards for adverse use, but simply argue the common use is not exactly the same
because it was not to access homes. Plaintiffs suggest this is a "critical distinction" but then provide
no argument, citations or basis for this alleged distinction. The reason Plaintiffs do not do so is
because there is no basis for their unsupported argument. The use in common is for a roadway with
other vehicles of Low, Low's predecessors, King, and the general public and there is no case law
suggesting the use must be exactly the same. The fact that both are using the roadway in common
is sufficient to shift the presumption regarding adverse use and Plaintiffs again fail establish the
necessary element of adverse use by some decisive act.
Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to dispute the undisputed evidence that King Lane was used
by the general public, which is something also relied upon by the Court in its Memorandum Decision

Upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 19, 2015, and which also rebuts any
claim to a presumption of adverse use by the Plaintiffs. The Court specifically referred to the
affidavit of the Low's predecessor, Samuel Steiner, to conclude that the use of King Lane was in
common with the general public. Again, it is not disputed that King Lane was used in common with
the general public and again there is no support for the argument that the use by the general public
must be exactly the same as the claimed use by Plaintiffs. That said, there is no dispute that the use
is the same which is for vehicular access. Whether the particular vehicle was going to the grocery
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store to get eggs, access a field for agricultural purposes, or to access a pond for hunting does not
change the fact that the use was in common and the burden is on the Plaintiffs to show adverse use
by some "decisive act." Plaintiffs have failed to do so.
While somewhat redundant, it is worth repeating this Court's decision, which is stare decisis,
as to this issue:
Based on the record before this Court the plaintiff has failed to make any
showing on the essential element that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was adverse under
claim of right. Even when this Court makes all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs,
there is nothing in the record to indicate a decisive act or incident of separate or
exclusive use from 1977 to 2011. While the use of King Lane may not have started
with express or even implied permission, the recorded and the testimony of the
plaintiffs shows that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was in "common with the owner
and general public." Marshall 130 Idaho at 680; (quoting Simmons, 63 Idaho 136,
118 P .2d 740 (1941 ). A prescriptive easement cannot be granted unless there is
evidence of a decisive act or incident showing adverse use that could be considered
an "actual invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner." Hughes, 142
Idaho at 480.
Because there is no proof or evidence concerning this essential element of
plaintiffs' case, that the Fuquays' use was adverse and contrary to the ownership
rights of the Kings, the King defendants have met their burden of showing there is
no genuine issue of material fact regarding the element of adverse use.
Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden shifts to
the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses
or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid
justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56 (f). Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho
389, 392, 179 P.3d 352, 355 (Ct.App. 2008).
Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for Reconsideration, pg. 10.
For the reasons already determined by this Court in the Memorandum Decision Upon King
Defendants' Motion/or Reconsideration, dated June 19, 2015, this Court should grant summary
judgment to Low because Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing adverse use.
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The second argument raised by Plaintiffs is that the prescriptive easement ripened before the
Lows purchased the property in 2006. This argument lacks merit and fails because Plaintiffs have
again not disputed that the use of King Lane was in common with the Low' s predecessors, namely
Samuel Steiner, or the general public. While Lows may not owned the property during this time
frame, they have submitted the affidavit of Samuel Steiner, and again relied upon by this Court, who
moved to the parcel in 1959 with his parents and was the owner of the property since 1984. See

Affidavit of Samuel Steiner, filed December 9, 2014. In addition, Plaintiffs simply disregard the
Affidavit ofRose King, also filed on December 9, 2014, which provided the following:
What has been referred to as King Lane for purposes oflitigation has also been used
by Cal and Susie Low, which own the property generally to the south of the King
property/ranch and their predecessors in interest.
When my husband and I
purchased our ranch in 1973, the property now owned by Lows was owned by Steiner
family, and the Steiners used the road to access their property to get to and from their
fields. This use has continued since 1973 to present, including now that the
property is owned by Cal and Susie Low.

See Affidavit ofRose King,, 5.
For Plaintiffs to now suggest that the easement ripened before Low purchased the property
is flat out incorrect. Again, the evidence is clear that the use was in common and by the general
public before and during Plaintiffs' alleged use and Plaintiffs have not and cannot meet their burden
of showing by clear and convincing evidence that their alleged use was adverse. Simply because
Low purchased their property in 2006 does not alleviate Plaintiffs from establishing adverse use by
a decisive act given the undisputed evidence of common use and public use.
Finally, Low contends that Plaintiffs claims against Low are rendered moot by the Court's
decision granting summary judgment to King because if Plaintiffs cannot establish an easement over
SUSIE AND CAL LOW'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
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the property of King, which there is no dispute that the roadway crosses a portion of the King
property, then Plaintiffs cannot have a prescriptive easement across any portion of the roadway
which crosses the property of Low. Plaintiffs have responded by citing to a Montana decision which
suggests "better rule" is that the existence of intervening land does not itself defeat an easement.
Plaintiffs fail to point out that the "better rule" cited in the Montana decision, recognizes a
disagreement among jurisdictions on the issue, but then holds that the "better rule" which the
Montana court followed applies to an express easement and not implied easements or easements
by prescription like the one at issue in this case. See Davis v. Hall, 280 P.3d 261 (Mont. 2012). In
other words, the Court did not hold that there can be intervening land when dealing with implied
easements. Indeed, the Court stated "this Court adheres to the rule that in order to establish an
implied easement, the dominant and servient parcels must be held as a single track of land or
contiguous tracts of land at the time of severance." Id. at 270. Plaintiffs cannot have an easement
by prescription which goes nowhere and it is illogical to suggest that Plaintiffs can establish an
easement by prescription as to one defendant property owner and not the other. Again, for the
reasons this Court granted summary judgment to Kings, this Court should grant summary judgment
to Low.

III. CONCLUSION
For the same reasons this Court has granted summary judgment to the Kings, this Court
should also grant the Low' s motion for partial summary judgment and dismiss all causes of action
of the Plaintiffs against Low.

-/>-

DATED this/l day of August, 2015.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the
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MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
RONALD P. RAINEY
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PO Box 26
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
JOHN E. FUQUAY, CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,

)
)

vs.

)
)
)

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.

)
)

Plaintiffs.

RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES
OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN mLE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants.
GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and ROSE
M. KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART
K. RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER
28, 2012,
Counterclaimants,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2014-0278.,;M
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FILED
JULY6,2015

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,

)
)
)

Counterdefendants.

)
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SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW,

)
)
)
)

Counterclaimants,
vs.

)

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)

This matter came on for hearing August 20, 2015 upon the Fuquays' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's June 19, 2015 Memorandum Decision on Kings' Motion for

Summary Judgment and Request for Reconsideration. Appearing on behalf of the Fuquays was
attorney Matthew Cleverly, of the law finn Fidelity National Law Group. Appearing on behalf of
the Kings was attorney Ronald Rainey. Appearing on behalf of the Lows was attorney Bryce Farris,

of the law firm Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC. The Court has considered the briefing, affidavits and
pleadings of record and hereby renders its decision below.

BACKGROUND
The Fuquays seek a declaration of a prescriptive easement over King Lane in Owyhee
County. King Lane is a private, all-weather road about one-half mile in length. It runs in an eastwest direction from the public Oreana Loop Road until it connects with Castle Lane, which then
runs south until it connects with Oreana Loop Road. The King defendants own the parcel of land to

the north of King Lane, the Low defendants own the parcel of land to the south of King Lane, and
the Fuquays own parcels of land to the west of King Lane, where it ends and connects with Castle
Lane. The Court went into greater background detail in its Memorandum Decision upon King
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on March 25, 2015.

That background

information is incorporated herein.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STANDARD
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l l(a)(2)(B) allows a party to seek reconsideration of any
interlocutory order before the entry of judgment. Final judgment as to the King defendants was
not entered in this case until July 8, 2015, two days after the filing of this motion. Therefore,
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plaintiffs' motion is timely. On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new
admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. See PHH

Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631,635,200 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2009) (citing Coeur
d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037
(1990)).
"When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012), reh'g

denied (Aug. l, 2012). In this case, the Court denied King defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment in a memorandum decision filed March 25, 2012. It then reversed itself and granted
the Kings' Motion for Summary Judgment in its June 19, 2015 Decision on Kings' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Request for Reconsideration. Now, the Fuquays seek reconsideration of
the Court's June 19th decision granting defendants' motion. Thus, this Court must apply the
swnmary judgment standard that it applied to its original decision filed March 25, 2012, in which
it denied Kings' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In a motion for summary
judgment, this Court should liberally construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draw
all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Summary judgment
must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting
inferences from the evidence presented. West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75,
86-87, 106 P.3d 401, 412-413 (2005) (citing Iron Eagle Dev., L.L.C. v. Quality Designs Sys.,

Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003); see also Willie v. Bd of Trustees, 138 Idaho
I 3 I, 133, 59 P.3d 302, 304 (2002).
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden is always upon the moving party to prove
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. If, however, the basis for a properly supported
motion is that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an element of the nonmoving party's case, it is incumbent upon the non-moving party to establish an issue of fact
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regarding that element. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,923 P.2d 416 (1996).
The burden on the moving party may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on
an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126
Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (CtApp.1994). A trial court, in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or resolve controverted factual issues. American
Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600,671 P.2d 1063 (1983). However, "[w]hen an action will
be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of
the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at
the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontrovened evidentiary facts." Loomis v. City

of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added); see also Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661
(1982) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

On review, the court will look to

whether the record reasonably supports the inferences drawn by the trial court. lntermountain
Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233,235, 31 P.3d 921,923 (2001).

THE PARTIES, ARGUMENTS RE: MOTION TO RECONSIDER
The Fuquays argue the Court incorrectly interred controverted facts in favor of the Kings
and present four arguments for the Court to reconsider: ( 1) the Kings failed to bear their burden
of showing that any use of King Lane, since its inception, has been permissive, therefore the
Court should have presumed any and all use was adverse; (2) the Court improperly weighed
evidence in favor of the Kings by concluding the Fuquays use of the road was permissive and "in
common" with the Kings' use, rather than adverse and an infringement on the Kings' rights; (3)
the infringement was established in 1977, when the Fuquays began using the road to come and
go from their home, not in 2011, as the Court concluded; and (4) conflicting evidence exists as to
whether King Lane was used by the public.
In their memorandum in opposition, the Kings make the following arguments: (I) the
presumption of adverse use is inapplicable because the Fuquays use of the road was "in
common" with the Kings; (2) where a claimant's use is in common with the landowner's. the use
is presumed permissive; (3) the Fuquays have failed to show their use infringed on the Kings'
rights prior to 2011; and (4) it is undisputed that the public used King Lane.
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ANALYSIS
To acquire a prescriptive easement in Idaho. the Fuquays must show reasonably clear and
convincing evidence of open. notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of King Lane, under a
claim of right, with the knowledge of the owner of the servient estate for the prescriptive period
of five years. I.C. § 5-203; West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,557,511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973). Thus,
a prescriptive right cannot be obtained if use of the alleged easement is by permission of the
landowner. Woodv. Hoglund, 131 ldaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1998). Therefore,
the Fuquays must show through reasonably clear and convincing evidence that their use of King
Lane was not permissive, but adverse, and for a period of five years.
The general rule is that a presumption of adverse use arises where it is undisputed that an
alleged easement has been used, without interruption, for the established period of prescription.

Eagle Rock Corp. v. ldamont Hotel Co., 59 Idaho 413, 85 P.2d 242 (1938). Where an adverse
presumption is applied, a landowner bears the burden of showing the use was by virtue of a
license or permission.

Id.

This showing must be more than mere inaction and passive

acquiescence. Smith, 95 Idaho at 557,511 P.2d at 1333.
An exception to the general rule exists, which, when applicable, presumes use is
permissive: "Where the owner of real property constructs a way over it for his own use and
convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be
presumed to be by way of license or permission." Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118
P.2d, 740, 744 (1941).

Where a permissive presumption is applied, the claimant bears the

burden of showing he or she engaged in some unequivocal conduct giving the landowner notice
of his or her hostile and adverse use. Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326, 327, 563 P.2d 50, 51
(1977).
Here, the Fuquays argue the adverse presumption applies because it is unknown whether
the general use of the alleged easement began as adverse or permissive. In support of this
contention, the Fuquays rely on the deposition testimony of Rose King, where she asserts the
roadway that is now King Lane has been in existence since at least l 894. Plaintiffs' Motion for

Reconsideration, pg. 14. The Fuquays also rely on the testimony of Samuel Steiner, who stated,
"I do not know who, if anyone, constructed King Lane. 1bis was an old fann access roadway
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that was used occasionally by a variety of people." Id. (quoting Declaration of Samuel V.C.

Seiner, at ,i 5). The Fuquays' argue that since it is unknown whether the historical use of the
roadway began permissively or adverse to the owner(s), the general rule is that the use is
presumed adverse.
Conversely, the Kings argue the adverse presumption only applies where it is unknown
whether a claimant's use of an alleged easement began as adverse or pennissive. In this case, it
is known when the Fuquays' use of King Lane began, 1977. When the Kings acquired their
property in 1973, they took steps to improve the roadway. Thereafter, Jim Fuquay acquired his
property in 1977, placed a mobile home on his property and began using King Lane at that time.
It is true that the general rule in Idaho is that proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted
use of the claimed right of way for the prescriptive period raises the presumption that the use is
adverse. West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,511 P.2d 1326 (1973). However, there exists an exception
to that presumption under Idaho law. Specifically, "where the owner of real property constructs a
way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way
interferes vvith his use will be presumed to be by way of license or pennission." Simmons v.

Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941). That exception was reaffirmed as Idaho
law in Marshall v. Blair, wherein the Idaho Supreme Court articulated:
... [U]se of a driveway in common with the owner and the general
public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part
indicating a separate and exclusive use on his part negatives any
presumption of individual right therein in his favor.' Simmons v.
Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (1941) (emphasis added).
This Court further explained in Simmons that use of a roadway
must invade or infringe on the owner's rights in order for the use to
be considered adverse and, thus, to ripen into a prescriptive right of
way.

130 Idaho 675,680,946 P.2d 975,980 (1997).
In this case, it is undisputed that the Kings began improving the roadway, which is now
King Lane, in 1973 to benefit their farming operation. In her affidavit, Rose King stated that at
the time of their purchase of this property in 1973, "King Lane was only a path through grass and
weeds and was wet and muddy most of the year .... We desired to access our fields through the
use of this filed lane, therefore, we started hauling rocks to build a base for this road so that it
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would be passable for our farm equipment. We did this annually ...." Affidavit of Rose King, pg.
2, filed Dec. 9, 2014.

Thus, the Kings constructed the roadway for their own use and

convenience. The law applicable here is that "the mere use thereof by others which in no way
interferes with his use will be preswned to be by way of license or permission." Simmons v.
Perkins, supra. Therefore, the permissive preswnption is applicable here.
As previously addressed, where a permissive presumption is applied, the claimant bears
the burden of showing he or she engaged in some unequivocal conduct giving the landowner
notice of his or her hostile and adverse use. Magleby, supra, 98 Idaho at 327, 563 P.2d at 51.
Here, the Fuquays only argwnent is that when Jim Fuquay purchased his property in 1977 and
put a mobile home on it and began using the roadway as access to his property that this was the
decisive act that placed the Kings on notice that his use was hostile. The Court disagrees,
because Jim Fuquay's use did nothing to interfere with the King's use. Interference is required to
show adverse use.
The Fuquays further assert that because they used the road for residential purpose and the
Kings used the road for business purposes the road was not being used in a similar manner,
therefore the preswnption of permissive use is not applicable. However, the Fuquays fail to take
their argwnent to the next and necessary step by way of showing that such use interfered with the
Kings' use. Simply put, the Fuquays have produced no evidence that their use of King Lane
interfered with the Kings' rights.
The Court, in its memorandwn decision filed June 19, 2015 also accepted the premise
that use of King Lane by the general public also rebutted the Fuquays' claim to a presumption of
adverse use. In their motion to reconsider, the Fuquays point out that the declarations of the
school bus driver and the Schwann Truck driver disclosed that those declarants did not use King
Lane, but rather used the Oreana Loop Road and Castle Lane. Plaintiffs' Motion, pg. 12-13. The
Fuquays also quote from Rose Kings' testimony that essentially states that she instructed the
public that they could not use King Lane. Id., at pg. 13. It does appear that there is a question of
fact as to whether there has been use by the general public. However, it does not change this
Court's conclusion that because the Fuquays' use did not interfere with the Kings' use of King
Lane, the presumption applicable in this case is that the Fuquays use was permissive.
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·.

Therefore,

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing analysis, Fuquays' Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

Dated this

I~

day of September, 2015.

District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the following via U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery:

MATTHEW R. CLEVERLY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 6m Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, Washington 98101
S. BRYCE FARRIS
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83707
RONALD P. RAINEY
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
P.O.Box26
Caldwell, ID 83606
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY, CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES
OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants.

GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and ROSE
M. KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART
K. RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER
28, 2012,
Coooterclaimants,
VS.

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Coooterdefendants.
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SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW,

)
)
)
)
)

Counterclaimants,
vs.

)
JOHNE.FUQUAY;CLINTONWARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)

On July 15, 2015, Defendants Susie and Ca1 Low (hereinafter referred to as the "Low
Defendants") filed a motion for partial summacy judgment The matter came on for hearing on

August 20, 2015. Appearing on behalf of the Lows was attorney Bryce Farris, of the law firm
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC.

Appearing on behalf of the Fuquays was attorney Matthew

Cleverly, of the law firm Fidelity National Law Group. Appearing on behalf of the Kings was
attorney Ronald Rainey. The Court has considered the briefing, affidavits and pleadings of record
and hereby finds as follows.
The Fuquays argue in this lawsuit that they possess a prescriptive easement by adverse use
over King Lane located near Oreana, Owyhee County, Idaho. King Lane travels over and through

property owned by both the Kings and the Lows. It is not !,-pecifically known to what extent the
road crosses the Low and King properties but there is no dispute that the road crosses a portion of
each.
On January 29, 2015, the King Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The
matter was fully briefed and argued by both the Kings and the Fuquays. The Lows did not file their
own summary judgment at that time but their legal position has always been clearly in line with the
King Defendants.

The Court initially denied the Kings' motion for summary judgment in its

Memorandum Decision filed on March 25, 2015.

Thereafter, the Kings filed a motion to

reconsider. After another round of briefing and oral argument, the Court, upon reconsideration
granted the Kings' motion for summary judgment The Fuquays then filed their own motion for
reconsideration and another round of briefing, affidavits and oral argument ensued.

In its

Memorandum Decision filed September 11, 2015, the Court affirmed its' Order granting summary

judgment for the King Defendants.
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At the hearing on August 20, 2015, the Court verbally expressed the opinion that because
the Low Defendants' legal position is identical to the King Defendants' position relating to whether
the Fuquays possess a prescriptive easement over King Lane. Since the Court has now affirmed its
Order granting summary judgment to the Kings, the Low Defendants would likewise be entitled to
summmy judgment.

Therefore, based upon the analysis of this Court in its Memorandum Decisions of June 19,
2015 and September 11, 2015 granting the King Defendants summary judgment, the Court hereby
intends to enter an Order granting swnmary judgment to the Low Defendants. Counsel for the

Lows is directed to prepare the appropriate Order.
Dated this

Zl~

day of September, 2015.

District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the following via U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery:

MATIHEW R. CLEVERLY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, Washington 98101
S. BRYCE FARRIS
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83707

RONALD P. RAINEY
A TIORNEYS AT LAW
P.O. Box26
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Deputy Clerk
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200- 6th Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAYt

Case No. CV-14-0278

Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT

v.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; E-IEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Defendant Lows' counterclaims against Plaintiffs are dismissed with prejudice and
without the award of fees or costs either party; and

2. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and the causes of action for Declaratory Judgment
(Prescriptive Easement) and Injunction against Defendant Lows are dismissed with
prejudice.

Dated:

--'-H+-n. . /,....•~'-.

JUDGMENT-I

Hon. Thomas J. Ryan
FlDUlTY NA·t10NAL LAW GROUP
1100- 6"' AVENUE, SUJl'UilO
S£A1'TLE. WA !18101

(206) ll3-4525
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NOTICE OF ENTRY
On the date given below, I served the attached document on the following individuals
in the manner indicated:
Ronald P. Rainey
Attorney at Law
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, ID 83606
208-459-3659
erainey@gwestoffice.net
Attorney for Kings

X

S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
110 l W. River Street, Suite 110

Boise. ID 83 707
208-629-7447
bcyce@sawtoothlaw.com
Attorney for Lows
Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 - 61h A venue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101

CK)!

I LEGAL MESSENGER
I EMAIL

(206} 224-6003
Matthew.C1everley@fnf.com

I
I

Attorney for Plaintiffs

Dated:

------

JUDGMENT-2

U.S. MAIL

HAND DELIVERED
EXPRESS DELIVERY
FACSIMILE

Clerk

FlllELITY NATIONAL LAW CROUP

llOO- 6"' AV£Nl.JE, SUtTE 620
SEATTLE, WA 98111

(206) l23-4Sl5
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_Fl_~mP.M.
Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
1200 - 61h Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
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AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

V.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING
as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST
UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO
FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO
FALLS, INC.; THE ESTATE OF GORDON
G. KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.
GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ROSE M.
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012,
Counterclaimants,
VS.

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Counterdefendants.
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TO:

SUSIE LOW and CAL LOW
And their Attorney: S. BRYCE FARRIS

And to:

GILBERT KING as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012; THE ESTATE OF GORDON G. KING; and ROSE
M.KING;
And their Attorney: RONALD P. RAINEY

And to:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1. The above named appellants, JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD FUQUAY and
HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho
Supreme Court from following:
03/25/2015 Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
06/19/2015 Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
07/08/2015 Judgment (Dismissing Plaintiffs Easement Claims against the Kings)
Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration Filed July 6,
0911112015
2015
09/21/2015 Memorandum Decision Upon Low Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment
10/06/2015 Order on Low Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
Judgment dated December 18, 2015 Dismissing Plaintiff's easement claims
1212112015
against the Lows (Item #2 of the Judgment. Item #1 is not appealed.)

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
I.A.R l l(a)(l).
2. Preliminary Statement of Issues:
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondents
and dismissed Plaintiff/Appellant's Complaint seeking a prescriptive easement. The
Trial court erred because:
a. It failed to use the proper legal standards in making its decisions.
b. It granted summary judgment to Defendants/Respondents even though
there are disputed issues of material fact.
c. It construed facts in the light most favorable to the Defendant/Respondents
instead of the non-moving Plaintiff/Appellant.
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d. The Low Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the same
basis as the King Defendants because the facts and issues are different.
3. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.
If so, what portion? NIA
4. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested?
No transcripts are requested from the court reporter. The transcripts of
the preliminary injunction hearing held on September 18, 2014 were
already transcribed and are included in the 12/8/2014 Affidavit of Bryce
Farris, which is listed in #6.
Additional or separate copies of the transcripts from the 12/8/2014
hearing are not necessary. No other hearings had testimony, and were all
argument. Since review is de novo, prior oral arguments are irrelevant
and transcripts of the parties' arguments is not requested.
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript: None.
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.
08/11/2014
09/04/2014
09/04/2014
09/04/2014
09/09/2014
09/09/2014
09/09/2014
09/09/2014
09/10/2014
09/15/2014
09/16/2014
09/17/2014
09/18/2014

Complaint Filed ( Prescriptive Easement)
Declaration of Raymond Jayo in Support of Ex parte Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order
Declaration of John Fuquay in Support of Ex parte Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order
Declaration of Matthew Cleverley in Support of Ex parte Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order
Answer and Counterclaims by Defendants Trustees for the Heart King Ranch
Trust UTA December 28, 2012
Affidavit of Gilbert King
Affidavit of Rose King
Declaration of Denice Collett in Support of Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs
Ex Parte Restraining Order
Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey
Declaration of Schwann Delivery Person
Affidavit of Susie Low
Answer of Defendants Susie and Cal Low and Counterclaim
Declaration of Scott Snyder
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09/18/2014
09/18/2014

12/9/2014
(out of date
order)
10/29/2014
10/29/2014
10/29/2014
12/09/2014
12/09/2014
12/09/2014
12/09/2014
12/17/2014
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
02/10/2015
02/13/2015
02/13/2015
02/19/2015
03/25/2015
03/30/2015
04/07/2015
04/07/2015
04/20/2015
04/28/2015

Declaration of Scott Snyder
Declaration of Seth Thomas
Affidavit of Bryce Farris (which includes a full transcript of the
preliminary injunction hearing which was held on September 18, 2014)
which is related to the above filings

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Susie Low and Cal
Low
Declarations of Matthew Cleverley
Declarations of John Fuquay
Response and Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Rose King
Affidavit of Samuel V.C. Steiner
Affidavit of S. Bryce Farris (which includes a full transcript of the preliminary
injunction hearing which was held on September 18, 2014)
Withdrawal of Motion for Summary Judgment Against Lows
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion For Summary Judgment
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Memorandum in Support of Notion for Summary
Judgment
Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey
Affidavit of Rose King in Support of the Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion
for Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Gilbert King in Support of the Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion
for Summary Judgment
Defendant Lows' Response to Kings' Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs Response to Heart K. Ranch's MSJ
Compilation of Testimony
Reply Memorandum in Support Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion for
Summary Judgment
Memorandum Decision upon King defendants' motion for summary judgment
Amended Complaint Filed/First amended
Motion/King Defendant's motion for reconsideration under rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) of
decision denying motion for summary judgment
Affidavit in support of motion for reconsideration
Memorandum in Support of King Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration
Under Rule 1 l(a) (2)(B) of Decision Denying Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs' response to Kings motion for reconsideration
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05/11/2015
06/19/2015
07/06/2015
07/06/2015
07/06/2015
07/08/2015

07/15/2015
07/15/2015
08/04/2015
08/12/2015
08/12/2015
08/17/2015
09/11/2015
09/21/2015
10/06/2015
12/21/2015

Memorandum/Reply memorandum in support of King defendants' motion for
reconsideration under Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) of decision denying motion for
summary judgment
Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' motion for reconsideration
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's June 19, 2015
Memorandum Decision on King's Motion for Summary Judgment and Request
for Reconsideration
Deposition of Rose King
Deposition of Gilbert King
Judgment
Susie and Cal Lowe's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment
Motion For Summary Judgment
Memorandum/King Defendants' memorandum in opposition to the Fuquay
Plaintiffs Motion for reconsideration
Declaration of Matthew Cleverley
Reply/Plaintiffs' reply in support of motion for reconsideration of the court's
June 19, 2015 memorandum decision of King's motion for summary judgment
and request for reconsideration
Susie and Cal Low's reply in support of motion for partial summary judgment
Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration Filed
July 6,2015
Memorandum Decision Upon Low Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment
Order on Low Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
Judgment dated December 18, 2015 Dismissing Plaintifrs easement claims
against the Lows (Item #2 of the Judgment. Item #1 is not appealed.)

7. I certify:
(a)

that a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
NOTE: No Additional Transcripts are Requested.

Name and
address:

----------------------------
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Name and
address:

----------------------------

Name and
address:

----------------------------

(b)

(1) [ ] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.

(2) [ ] That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because

(c)

(1) [X] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record will be
paid upon request.

(2) [ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the
record because

(d)

(1) [X] That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(2) [ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.

Dated: January 5, 2016

STATE OF IOAHO }
County of Owyhee
ss
. I hereby certify that the foregoing
instrument is a true a
orr ct copy of the
onginal as it appears
·
'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Amended Notice of
Appeal on the following individuals in the manner indicated:
Ronald P. Rainey
Attorney at Law
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, ID 83606
208-459-3659
erainey@gwestoffice.net
Attorney for Kings
S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W River Street, Suite 110
Boise, ID 83707
208-629-7447
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com
Attorney for Lows

00\ U.S. MAIL
DI LEGAL MESSENGER
00\ EMAIL
DI HAND DELIVERED
DI EXPRESS DELIVERY
DI FACSIMILE

I
I
I
I
I
I
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I
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LEGAL MESSENGER
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I
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In the Supreme Court of the State of
.

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY; and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,

A,ft\ZIIWLO"I.D

)
)
)

Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsAppellants,

)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS APPEAL

)

v.

)
)

SUSIE LOW and CAL LOW,

)
)

Defendants-Respondents,

Supreme Court Docket No. 43705-2015
Owyhee County No. CV-2014-278
Ref. No. 16-34

)
)

and

)
)

GILBERT KING, as Trustee of the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER28, 2012; THE ESTATE OF
GORDON G. KING; and ROSE M. KING,
as Beneficiary of the HEART K RANCH
TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants-CounterclaimantsRespondents,

)
)

)

)

and

)

AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO
FALLS; and FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

)
)
)

)

)

. Defendants.

)

RESPONDENT HEART K RANCH'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL and an
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD P. RAINEY IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT HEART K RANCH'S
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL with attachments were filed by counsel for Respondent Heart K.
Ranch Trust on January 19, 2016, requesting this Court for an Order dismissing this appeal on the
basis that no final appealable judgment has yet been entered in the action below upon which this
appeal may proceed. Thereafter, PLAINTIFF/APELLANTS' RESPONSE TO HEART K RANCH
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL was filed by counsel for Appellants on January 22, 2016. The
Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL-Docket No. 43705-2015
651

,-

.
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT HEART K RANCH'S MOTION TO
DISMISS APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and this appeal is DISMISSED.
DATED this

_!l__ day of February, 2016.
By Order of the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge Thomas J. Ryan
District Court Reporter

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL- Docket No. 43705-2015
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e;;ERK

RONALD P. RAINEY ISB #1022

Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 26
110 North Ninth Street

Deputy~

Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026
Phone (208)459-3659
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067
Attorney for Defendants
Gilbert King as Trustee .for the
.
Heart K. Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE ~TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, )
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, )
'

Plaintiffs,

vs.

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-0278

KINGS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PROPOSED JUDGMENT

)

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K.
)
RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28, )
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF )
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING )
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
)
)
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)

_____________
Defendants.

' as Tmstee; and
GILBERT KING,
ROSE M. KING·, as Beneficiary of the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28~ 2012,
Counterclaimants,

vs.
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

KINGS'' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED JUDGMENT l

653

1 1 >> 208 495 1226

2016-03-10 13:42

P 7/9

FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY )
)

Counterdefendants.

)

______________

)
)

The King defendants, Counterclaimants, have redrat\ed Mr. Cleverley's initial proposed
judgment on King's counterclaims deleting what were paragraphs 5 and 6 quoted as follows:
5

The kings have no legal or equitable right to use any part of the Fuquay
properties or the portion of King Lane that extends west beyond the King
or Low property boundary. The Kings are c11joined from entry onto or use
of the Fuquay properties.

6.

To the extent that the Kings have the right to maintain ditches on
the fuquay properties under I.C. 42-1102» access to the ditches shall
h~ from along the ditch banks only. The ditches shall not be
accessed from over any of the Fuquay roads or through the
Fuquays, fields.

The b~is for deleting these paragraphs is that the issues addressed jn paragraphs 5 and 6 were
not raised as iss~es in the case in chief.
The Kings feel that it is necessary to pursue the three counterclaims in order to clearly
establish that the Fuquays do not have any right whatsoever to enter King's property in any
manner. Kings first counterclaim is for a declaratory judgment and merely dismissing Fuquay's
complaint to establish a prescriptive easement over King Lane does not exlinguish all legal and

equitable rights that Fuquays may claim in the future.
King's second counterclaim seeks a permanent injunction to keep Fuquays from using
King Lane and goes to the future claims that Fuquays may generate which may not be addressed
by merely dismissing Fuquays claim for prescriptive easement. The contentious nature of the
relationship between the Fuquays and Kings causes the Kings to be proac.1ive in preventing future
problems.
KINGS" MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP PROPOSED JUDOMENT 2
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prob Ir.ms.

Kinr, ·s tbir<l cou11L1..:n,;laim make.~ it clear that the Puquay 's have no int.~rcst i11Ki11~ Lane
of any kind whether an e.asemenl. or ownership.

While I.he Conrt granted the on.lt:r dismissing Fuquay's complaint. for 1,rcscri1>ti ve

t~ascmc11t over the King's prope:rty, the Kings were inle::nding to eliminate any possible future

da.iJns Fuquays may havein clrnfl.ing their counterclaims were int.ending tl) eliminale uny possible
future claims fiuquuys may have t.o complete tcrmirmlion of any legal c,r auy type of claim they

may misc 1n Lhe future.
Just dismissing F11q11ay's complaint do~s nol. provide the parlit:s wiJh a complclc

sctt!cmcut of the fulure issues which may arise.

DATED This

/tJ

day of Man:h, 2016.

RONALD P. RATN.l{Y
.
.... .P.A.

-~.

--~:: - . .,-·· -.,>·::.r...)

.-~'-:ir.;;:",..-·
. . .~_.,,,.,:~~··
_<>-~-;~,.,.._ ...... -::.:.'
__..,.., ~
•·?/~ ...~ (:;. ..
a,;~

•

..~.,··~--

Rima Id P. l{aincy- - ···· . ,...,·····
Attorney for n~fondants, (JilhcrL King as
Trust<.~~. and l{osc M. King, m, Benefi<:iary
of Lht: Hemt K Ranch Trust UTA l>t'.ccmbcr 28,
2CH2
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CERTIFICATE OF :-:i.ERV1CE

l, H.onalcl P. Raiu~y. herehy certify that on this .Ji...L.. <lay of Much, 2016, I caused a I.rue
and correct copy of lhe roregoi.ng instrnmc11t lo ht: delivert-.cl t.o the advcrs(; party, via the method
i11<lil:al.t!d below, addressed as follows:
.U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
~-Facsimile Transmission ..Jland Delivery
Mal.I.hew R. Cl.cvcrlcy
Fi,lel it.y Nationai Law Group
1200 (iU1 Avenue, Suite 620
Seattle, Washington 98l01

Telephone: 206-22tl--(jQ(l'3
Fac:simile: 8'/'/-655-57.81
Email: Jy1j1t.th~w.ClcvcrlvaM11fsmn.
S. Rryc.:e Farris
P.O. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83707
Tclcpl1one: 629-'/44'/
F,1csim.il.e: 629-7559
Emuil: bryce.@s~wtoot.hlaw_.,~om

. ········7

.·

~~~~::-___
-Ronald P. l{iiin~yl

/,.

.

/
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2710
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

_Fl.~P.M.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
V.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No. CV-14-0278

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM
REGARDING ENTRY OF FINAL
JUDGMENT ON KINGS'
COUNTERCLAIMS

Defendants.
This Memorandum is submitted in support of Plaintiffs' proposed form of Judgment as to
the Kings' counterclaims.

1. First Counterclaim - Scope of Easement
Kings' first counterclaim seeks declaratory relief that the Plaintiffs have exceeded the
scope of their prescriptive easement and that the Fuquays do not have the right to drive trucks
over King Lane:
45.
The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants seek declaratory relief establishing that
the Fuquay Counterdefendants have exceeded the nature and scope of their permissive
right to use King Lane for ordinary and infrequent residential use.
FUQUAYS' MEMORANDUM RE: ENTRY OF
FINAL JUDGMENT - 1

FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
COLUMBIA CENTER
701 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 2710
SEATTLE,'\VA 98104

(206) 223-4525

657

46.
The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants seek declaratory relief establishing that
the Fuquay Counterdefendants have no legal or equitable right to use King Lane for
the current uses being made of that access by means of large commercial trucks on an
almost daily basis.
Since the Court has determined that the Plaintiffs do not have prescriptive rights over
King Lane, a declaration regarding specific scope of the easement or use is irrelevant. The
claim must be denied as moot.
2. Second Counterclaim - Permanent Iniunction

The Kings second counterclaim seeks a permanent injunction as follows:
55.
The Fuquay Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, including their employees, invitees,
agents, and other representatives should be ordered and restrained by entry of
permanent injunction as follows:
a. From any entry onto, or use of, King Lane by means of any motor vehicle,
whatsoever, as the private roadway is owned by and held out only for the use of,
the Heart K Ranch and its invitees; and
b. From any in any way, or by any means, interfering with or obstructing the gates,
chains, or any locks, or other hardware related to the structure and operation of
those gates, which may have been placed across the entries to King Lane; and
c. By undertaking to obstruct, by any means, or to molest or harass the users, in the
rightful use of King Lane by the owners and invitees of Heart K Ranch.
a. Injunctive Relief is Not a Proper Remedy

Injunctive relief is only available when there is no adequate remedy at law. "Injunction to
restrain trespass is ordinarily confined to cases where the nature of the property or frequent
repetition of the trespass precludes recovery of remedial damages at law. In the case of injury
to land, injunctive relief will not be granted where the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law." Milbert v. Carl Carbon, Inc., 89 Idaho 471,479,406 P.2d 113, 118 (1965). In this case,
there has been no evidence that the Plaintiffs have used King Lane since the Court denied
FUQUAYS' MEMORANDUM RE: ENTRY OF
FINAL JUDGMENT - 2
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their Motion for Preliminary Injunction in September 2014. In addition, Plaintiffs have an
adequate remedy at law: a suit for trespass, the same as any other landowner.
Further, an injunction should not be granted unless there is irreparable injury to the
landowner. Johnson v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 66 Idaho 660, 675, 167 P.2d 834, 841 (1946).
Here there is no showing that the Kings will suffer any irreparable injury if they are not
granted an injunction. There is no evidence that the Plaintiffs have threatened to continue to
use the roadway in violation of any orders, to remove or obstruct gates, or remove locks.
There is no evidence that the Kings would be unable to seek any other remedy afforded to any
other landowner. Thus, an injunction is not a proper remedy.
b. The Kings Seek an Injunction Against Unnamed Third Parties.

The Kings seek an injunction against third parties other than the Plaintiffs who might
happen to use King Lane. The Court does not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction against
unnamed third parties. Further, there is no basis for an injunction against a third-party who
might be looking for the Fuquays' property and who happens to drive down King Lane
looking for them. That is entirely outside the Fuquays' control.
c. There is No Evidence to Support an Injunction

Finally, the only evidence in the case related to the Plaintiffs' use of King Lane under
their assertion of a legal right. There is no evidence that the Plaintiffs ever "obstructed,
molested or harassed" any users of King Lane, so there is no evidentiary basis for an
injunction.
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3. Third Counterclaim - Quiet Title
The Kings' third counterclaim is for quiet title:
57.
The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants request a determination that no
prescriptive or adverse rights exist in King Lane as it crosses their property, and that a
decree quieting title in them, and extinguishing any such claims, or easements, be entered
by this Court, such as can be recorded in the land title records of Owyhee County.
Since the Court has determined that the Plaintiffs do not have prescriptive rights over
King Lane, the most appropriate Judgment is simply that the Plaintiffs do not have a
prescriptive easement over King Lane.
There are other issues between the parties that are not involved in the easement dispute.
That has to do with water rights and scope of access to ditches. Any Judgment in this case
should address only the Plaintiffs' prescriptive rights over King Lane. The Judgment should
not be any broader as the parties may have various other access and use rights that are not
being addressed in this case.

Dated: March 7, 2016
Matthew R. Cleverley,
Fidelity National Law
701 Fifth Avenue, Sui
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 223-4525, ext. 103
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the date given below, I caused to be served the foregoing document entitled
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM RE: ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT ON KINGS'
COUNTERCLAIMS on the following counsel of record, in the manner of service indicated as
follows:
Ronald P. Rainey
Attorney at Law
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, ID 83606
208-459-3659
erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorney for Kings
S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W. River Street, Suite 110
Boise, ID 83707
208-629-7447
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com
Attorney for Lows
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Dated: March 9, 2016
Estela Acosta, Paralgal
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In the Supreme Court of the State of ld.:fl.h02G1s
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY; and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants,

v.
SUSIE LOW and CAL LOW,
Defendants-Respondents,

and
GILBERT KING, as Trustee of the
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER
28. 2012; THE ESTATE OF
GORDON 0. KING; and ROSE M. KING,
as Beneficiary of the HEART K RANCH
TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012
Defendants-CounterclaimantsRespondents,
and
AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO
FALLS; and FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
TN SU RANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

REMITITTUR
Supreme Court Docket No. 43705-2015
Owyhee County No. CV-2014-278

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF OWYHEE.

The Court having granted Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal on Febtllary 8, 2016, and
having entered an Order dismissing this appeal February 8, 2016; therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal herein from thejudgment of the district court be,
and hereby is. DISMISSED. M
DATED this ;t,,;/ day of March, 2016.

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TillRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY, CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES
OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants.
GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and ROSE
M. KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART
K. RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER
28, 2012,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Counterdefendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2014--0278-M

AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT

Page I
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to
the defendants, Gilbert King, as trustee of the Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012; the
estate of Gordon G. King and Rose M. King.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the King defendants' counterclaims are dismissed
without prejudice.
Dated this

Zf"k day of March, 2016.
Thomas J. Ryan
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the following via U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery:

J
J
)

MATTHEW R. CLEVERLY
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620
.Seattle, Washington 98101
S. BRYCE FARRIS
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 7985
Boise, Idaho 83707
RONALD P. RAINEY

Attorney at Law
P0Box26
Caldwell, ID 83606

'7/iq 1, LQ
Date
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY, CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES
OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G.
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants.
GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and ROSE
M. KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART
K. RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER
28, 2012,
Counterclaim.ants,
vs.
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Counterdefendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON
REQUEST FOR FINAL JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2014-0278-M
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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The above-entitled matter came on for hearing February 26, 2016 upon a motion for
status conference filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. Matthew R. Cleverly, of the law firm Fidelity
National Law Group, appeared on behalf of the moving plaintiffs (hereinafter "Fuquays").
Ronald P. Rainey, Attorney at Law, represented the defendants (hereinafter "Kings"). The issue
before the Court is the parties dispute exactly what language should be placed in a final judgment
allowing this matter to proceed to appeal. The Court asked each party to submit their proposed
Final Judgment. The Kings submitted theirs on March 10, 2016 and the Fuquays submitted
theirs on March 14, 2016. The Court has considered the parties' briefing and oral argument and
hereby finds as follows.

BACKGROUND
In their Complaint, the Fuquays sought a declaration of a prescriptive easement over
King Lane in Owyhee County. King Lane is a private, all-weather road about one-half mile in
length. It runs in an east-west direction from the public Oreana Loop Road until it connects with
Castle Lane, which then runs south until it connects with Oreana Loop Road.

The King

defendants own the parcel of land to the north of King Lane, the Low defendants own the parcel
of land to the south of King Lane and the plaintiffs own parcels of land to the west of King Lane
where it ends and connects with Castle Lane.
The Court determined that, under the controlling rule of Idaho law, the Fuquays use of
King Lane was at all times deemed to be permissive, therefore there could not be a prescriptive
easement, which is dependent upon "adverseness" in order to be established. Based upon the
Court's decision granting Defendant Kings' motion for summary judgmenC the Court entered a
Final Judgment dismissing the Fuquays' Complaint. However, that Final Judgment did not
address the Kings' counterclaims.
The Kings filed counterclaims alleging the following: (1) that the Court should grant
declaratory relief finding the Fuquays exceeded the nature and scope of their permissive right to
use King Lane for ordinary and infrequent residential use; (2) seeking a permanent injunction
that the Fuquays cannot enter onto King Lane and may not interfere with or obstruct the gates;
and (3) that the Court quiet title to King Lane to the Kings and determine that no prescriptive or
adverse rights exist.
As to (l) and (3) set forth above, the court is of the opinion that the ruling upon Kings'

summary judgment effectively made those counterclaims moot. The Court will order those
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON
REQUEST FOR FINAL JUDGMENT
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counterclaims dismissed without prejudice so that in the event the Kings disagree, they may
refile for said relief.
As to counterclaim (2) set forth above, the Court agrees with the position of the Fuquays

that i:ajunctive relief is not a proper remedy. In its Memorandum Decision upon Fuquays motion
for summary judgment regarding the Lows counterclaims, this Court found:
The Lows also seek an injunction to prevent the dogs from
entering their property in the future. "Injunction to restrain trespass
is ordinarily confined to cases where the nature of the property or
frequent repetition of the trespass precludes recovery of remedial
damages at law." Milbert v. Carl Carbon, Inc., 89 Idaho 471, 479,
406 P.2d 113, 118 (1965). Moreover, "[i]n the case of injury to
land, injunctive relief will not be granted where the plaintiff has an
adequate remedy at law." Id. (citing 43 C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 57
and 60). This court has discretion to grant or refuse irtjunctive
relief. I.C. § 8-402; Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley,
83 Idaho 285, 361 P.2d 788 (1961); White v. Coeur d'Alene Big
Creek Mining Co., 56 Idaho 282, 55 P.2d 720 (1936); Rowland v.
Kellogg Power & Water Co., 40 Idaho 216, 233 P. 869 (1925).
The exercise of such discretion by the trial court in granting or
refusing an injunction will not be reversed on appeal unless a clear
abuse of discretion is shown. Milbert v. Carl Carbon, Inc., 89
Idaho 471,479,406 P.2d 113, 118 (1965).
Thus, the Court finds that the Kings' second counterclaim should also be dismissed but
without prejudice.

Dated this

21-"" day of March, 2016.

District Judge
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
70 l Fifth A venue, Suite 271 O
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.C1everley@fpf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

A't 02. 2016
CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2014-0278

NOTICE OF APPEAL

V,

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING
as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST
UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO
FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO
FALLS, INC.; THE ESTATE OF GORDON
G. KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.
GILBERT KING, as Trustee , and ROSE M.
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012,
Counterclaimants,

vs.
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Counterdefendants.
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TO:

SUSIE LOW and CAL LOW
And their Attorney: S. BRYCE FARRIS

And to:

GILBERT KING as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012; THE ESTATE OF GORDON G. KING; and ROSE
M. KING;
And their Attorney: RONALD P. RAINEY

And to:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1. The above named appellants, JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD FUQUAY and
HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho
Supreme Court from following:

03/25/2015 Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
· 06/19/2015 Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
, 07/08/2015 Judgment (Dismissing Plaintiffs Easement Claims against the Kings)
Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration Filed July 6,
0911112015
2015
09/21/2015 Memorandum Decision Upon Low Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment
, l 0/06/2015 Order on Low Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
Judgment dated December 18, 2015 Dismissing Plaintiff's easement claims
1212112015
against the Lows (Item #2 of the Judgment. Item #1 is not appealed.)

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
I.A.R 11 (a)(l ).
2. Preliminary Statement of Issues:
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondents
and dismissed Plaintiff/Appellant's Complaint seeking a prescriptive easement. The
Trial court erred because:
a. It failed to use the proper legal standards in making its decisions.
b. It granted summary judgment to Defendants/Respondents even though
there are disputed issues of material fact.
c. It construed facts in the light most favorable to the Defendant/Respondents
instead of the non-moving Plaintiff/Appellant.
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d. The Low Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the same
basis as the King Defendants because the facts and issues are different.
3. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.
If so, what portion? NIA
4. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested?
No transcripts are requested from the court reporter. The transcripts of
the preliminary injunction hearing held on September 18, 2014 were
already transcribed and are included in the 12/8/2014 Affidavit of Bryce
Farris, which is listed in #6 below.
Additional or separate copies of the transcripts from the 12/8/2014
hearing are not necessary. No other hearings had oral testimony, and were
all argument. Since review is de novo, prior oral arguments are irrelevant
and transcripts of the parties' arguments is not requested.

(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter1s
transcript: None.
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk1s record
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.
08/11/2014
09/04/2014

09/04/2014

09/04/2014
09/09/2014
09/09/2014
09/09/2014

09/09/2014
09/10/2014
09/15/2014
09/16/2014

09/17/2014
09/18/2014

Complaint Filed ( Prescriptive Easement)
Declaration of Raymond Jayo in Support of Ex parte Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order
Declaration of John Fuquay in Support of Ex parte Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order
Declaration of Matthew Cleverley in Support of Ex parte Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order
Answer and Counterclaims by Defendants Trustees for the Heart King Ranch
Trust UTA December 28, 2012
Affidavit of Gilbert King
Affidavit of Rose King
Declaration of Denice Collett in Support of Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs
Ex Parte Restraining Order
Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey
Declaration of Schwann Delivery Person
Affidavit of Susie Low
Answer of Defendants Susie and Cal Low and Counterclaim
Declaration of Scott Snyder
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09/18/2014
09/18/2014
12/9/2014
(out of date
order)
10/29/2014
10/29/2014
10/29/2014
12/09/2014
12/09/2014
12/09/2014
12/09/2014
12/17/2014
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
01/29/2015
02/10/2015
02/13/2015
02/13/2015
02/19/2015
03/25/2015
03/30/2015
04/07/2015
04/07/2015
04/20/2015
04/28/2015

Declaration of Scott Snyder
Declaration of Seth Thomas
Affidavit of Bryce Farris (which includes a full transcript of the preliminary
injunction hearing which was held on September 18, 2014) which is related to
the above filings

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Susie Low and Cal
Low
Declarations of Matthew Cleverley
Declarations of John Fuquay
Response and Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Rose King
Affidavit of Samuel V.C. Steiner
Affidavit of S. Bryce Farris (which includes a full transcript of the preliminary
injunction hearing which was held on September J8, 2014)
Withdrawal of Motion for Summary Judgment Against Lows
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion For Summary Judgment
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Memorandum in Support of Notion for Summary
Judgment
Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey
Affidavit of Rose King in Support of the Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion
for Swnn1ary Judgment
Affidavit of Gilbert King in Support of the Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion
for Summary Judgment
Defendant Lows' Response to Kings• Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs Response to Heart K. Ranch's MSJ
Compilation of Testimony
Reply Memorandum in Support Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion for
Summary Judgment
Memorandum Decision upon King defendants' motion for summary judgment
Amended Complaint Filed/First amended
Motion/King Defendant's motion for reconsideration under rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of
decision denying motion for summary judgment
Affidavit in support of motion for reconsideration
Memorandum in Support of King Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration
Under Rule l l(a) (2)(8) of Decision Denying Motion for Swnn1ary Judgment
Plaintiffs' response to Kings motion for reconsideration
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05/11/2015
06/19/2015
07/06/2015
07/06/2015
07/06/2015
07/08/2015
07/15/2015
07/15/2015
08/04/2015
08/12/2015
08/12/2015
08/17/2015
09/11/2015
09/21/2015
10/06/2015
12/21/2015

Memorandum/Reply memorandum in support of King defendants' motion for
reconsideration under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of decision denying motion for
summary judgment
Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' motion for reconsideration
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's June 19, 2015
Memorandum Decision on King's Motion for Summary Judgment and Request
for Reconsideration
Deposition of Rose King
Deposition of Gilbert King
Judgment
Susie and Cal Lowe's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment
Motion For Summary Judgment
Memorandum/King Defendants' memorandum in opposition to the Fuquay
Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration
DecJaration of Matthew Cleverley
Reply/Plaintiffs' reply in support of motion for reconsideration of the court's
June 19, 2015 memorandum decision of King's motion for summary judgment
and request for reconsideration
Susie and Cal Low's reply in support of motion for partial summary judgment
Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration Filed July
6,2015
Memorandum Decision Upon Low Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment
Order on Low Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
Judgment dated December 18, 2015 Dismissing Plaintiff's easement claims
against the Lows (Item #2 of the Judgment. Item #1 is not appealed.)

7. I certify:
(a)

that a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
NOTE: Hearing transcripts are already included as part of other motion papers.
No Additional Transcripts are Requested.

Name and
address:

--------------------------
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Name and
address:

-----------------------Name and
address:
-----------------------(b)

(1) [] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(2) [ JThat the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because

(c)

(1) [X ] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record will be
paid upon request
(2) [] That appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the
record because

(d)

( 1) [X JThat the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(2) [ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.

April 27. 2016
Matthew R. Cleverle
Fidelity National

w roup

701 Fifth Avenue Suit 2710
Seattle, WA 981
(206) 223-4525, ext 03
Matthew.C1everley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

i:x,~~ }·

f !'Utl'eby certify tha '
l11iltn.iment is a true
r.ir11;11rial
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Notice of Appeal on the
following individuals in the manner indicated:

Ronald P. Rainey
Attorney at Law
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, ID 83606
208-459-3659
erainey@gwestofficy.net
Attorney for Kings
S. Bryce Farris

Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
110 I W River Street, Suite 110
Boise, ID 83707
208-629-744 7
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com
Attorney for Lows

Dated: April 27. 2016
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CJn!l.~ED P.M.
AUG 2 2 2016
Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418
Fidelity National Law Group
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2710
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 224-6003
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants

A-tELL, CLERK
Deputy~

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Supreme Court No. 44155
Owyhee District Court No. CV-2014-0278

v.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING
as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST
UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO
FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO
FALLS, INC.; THE EST ATE OF GORDON
G. KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY,

APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO
CLERK'S RECORD AND REQUEST
FOR SUPPLEMENTATION

Defendants/Respondents.
GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ROSE M.
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Counterdefendants.

OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD- 1
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r-----------------------

The Clerk for the Owyhee County District Court submitted the Clerk's record to the
Supreme Court on or about July 29, 2016. However, the Clerk's record is missing the following
documents, even though they were designated in the Notice of Appeal:
9/10/2014

Affidavit of Ron Rainey

2/13/2015

Compilation of Testimony

6/19/2015

Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration

Appellants request that the Court enter an Order requiring the Clerk of the District Court
of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Owyhee to
supplement the Clerk's record so it includes the designated documents.

August 17, 2016
B #5418

OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD - 2

FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
701 FIFTH A VENUE, SUITE 2710
SEATILE, WA 98104
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Objection to Clerk's
Record on the following individuals in the manner indicated:
Ronald P. Rainey
Attorney at Law
110 North Ninth Street
Caldwell, ID 83606
208-459-3659
erainey@qwestoffice.net
Attorney for Kings
S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC
1101 W River Street, Suite 110
Boise, ID 83 707
208-629-7447
bryce(a)sawtoothlaw.com
Attorney for Lows

[]] U.S. MAIL

DI LEGAL MESSENGER I
DI EMAIL
I
DI HAND DELIVERED
I
DI EXPRESS DELIVERY
DI FACSIMILE

I
I

[K]j

U.S. MAIL

DI LEGAL MESSENGER
DI EMAIL
DI HAND DELIVERED

DI EXPRESS DELIVERy
DI FACSIMILE

Clerk of the District Court of the Third
Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and
for the County of Owyhee
PO Box 128
20381 State Highway 78
Murphy ID 83650

I

I

I
I
I

I
I

[KJI U.S. MAIL

I
DQ,EGAL MESSENGER I
DI EMAIL
I
DI HAND DELIVERED
I

DI EXPRESS DELIVERY
DI FACSIMILE

I
I

Dated: August 17, 2016
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JOfJN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Suprome Court No. 44155
Owyhee District Court No. cv;.2<>14-0278

v.

SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING

as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST
UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO
FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO
FALLS, INC,; nm ESTATJ! OF GORDON
0. J<ING; ROSE M. IONO; FIR.ST
~RICAN TITLB INS~CE
COMPANY,

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTINQ
A:PPELLANrs REQUEST FOR THE
CLERK TO SUPPLEMENT THE
RECORD

Defendants/Respondents.
GILBERT KING, as Trustee , and ROSE M.
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28,
2012,

Counterclaimams,
vs.

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLOOON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY.

Counterd.efendants.
Plaintiff/Appellants. objection to the Cl~'.s feCQl'.d·dated August 17, 2016 .is s~ined.
The Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial l)imct of the State of Idaho in and for the

County of Owyhee is ordered to supplement tho Clerk's Recor<l '!Njth the ft>llowing documeius:
9/10/2014

Affidavit of Ron Rainey

2/13/201S

Compilation of Testimony

ORDER-l
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Orde.r on the following

individuals in the ~er indicated:
llonald P. Rainey

Att9rrtey at X...w

no North.Ninth Street

Caldwell, ID 83606
208-459-3659
eqinev@awestoffi&c~net
Attorney for Kings

S. Bryce Farris
Sawtooth Law Ofnce$, PLLC
1101 W Rivet Street, Suite 110
Boise. ID B3707
.
208-629-7447
bme@SlWlQothlaw.qpm
Attorney for Lows

Clerk of the District COUt1 of the Third
Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and

for the County of Owyhee
PO Box 128

20381 State Highway 78
Murphy ID 83650
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'IY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD.
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,

)
)
)
Plaintiff-Appellants,
)
)
)
Vs.
)
)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING, As
)
Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA )
)
DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO FINANCIAL
)
SERVICES OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; THE
ESTATE OF GORDON G. KING; ROSE M.
)
KING; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
)
INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendant-Respondents,
)
)
)
GILBERT KING, As Trustee, and ROSE M.
)
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012,
)
)
Counterclaimants,
)
)
Vs.
)
)
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY.
)
)
Counterdefendants,
)

Case No. CV-2014-0278*M
Docket No. 44155

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Owyhee, do hereby certify that the following
are being sent as exhibits: NONE
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Murphy, Idaho this/~y o&p1er1tt-t'.,(2016.

ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
· in and for the County of Owyhee.

By:

l2ktJava-

Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNIY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD.
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,
Plaintiff-Appellants,
Vs.
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING, As
Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA
DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO FINANCIAL
SERVICES OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; THE
ESTATE OF GORDON G. KING; ROSE M.
KING; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondents,
GILBERT KING, As Trustee, and ROSE M.
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012,
Counterclaimants,
Vs.
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY.
Counterdefendants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-0278*M
Docket No. 44155
AMENDED
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Owyhee, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled case was compiled and bound under my direction
as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of
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the Idaho AJ:>pellate Rules, except no documents were included from the previous appeal
in Docket No. 44155.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this {'7-1--day of9tf~'0016.

ANGELA BARK.ELL, Clerk of the District
Court ofthe Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Owyhee.
By:
Deputy

•
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD .
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY,

)
)
)
Plaintiff-Appellants,
)
)
)
Vs.
)
)
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING, As
)
Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA )
)
DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO FINANCIAL
)
SERVICES OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; THE
)
ESTATE OF GORDON G. KING; ROSE M.
KING; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
)
INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendant-Respondents,
)
)
)
GILBERT KING, As Trustee, and ROSE M.
)
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K
)
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012,
)
)
Counterclaimants,
)
)
Vs.
)
)
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD
)
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY.
)
)
Counterdefendants,
)

Case No. CV-2014-0278*M
Docket No. 44155

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Owyhee, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record record, and one copy of the transcripts to each party as follows:
Matthew R. Cleverly Fidelity National Law Group 1200-6th Ave, Ste 620 Seattle, WA
98101.
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Ronald Rainey 110 N. Ninth St. Caldwell, ID 83707
S. Bryce Farris 1101 W. River St. Ste. 110 Boise, ID 83707

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Murphy, Idaho this

f7:}--

day of

S.ep±-crv~b{/l.-, 2016.

ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Owyhee.
B y : ~ ~ Deputy
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